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Abstract
This dissertation argues that an interactive and dialectical model best 
explains the political economy of central-provincial relations in contemporary 
China. It rejects the "centrist" perspective of the state capacity paradigm so 
dominant in the existing literature on central-provincial relations in China. The 
centrist perspective, it is argued, disables analysts from explaining prevalent 
bargaining activity and discretionary behaviour by the provinces, other than in its 
precarious speculation on the disintegration of the Chinese state. It also precludes 
any hypothetical possibility of qualitative change within the central-provincial 
relationship, and is biased towards a static interpretation.
This dissertation employs a concept of power originated by Talcott 
Parsons, and discusses the process whereby the Centre and the provinces— 
Guangdong and Shanghai as two case studies—bargain with and manipulate one 
another. I thus adopt a rational-choice-institutional approach that emphasizes the 
coexistence of institutional constraints and actors' choice. The case data shows that 
whilst provincial discretionary behaviour is heavily influenced by central policies, 
the provinces are by no means merely the passive respondents to central stimuli. 
They exercise discretionary behaviour and multiple compliance strategies. The 
Centre and provinces constrain one another and are locked in a perpetual positive- 
sum game of bargaining.
This dissertation suggests that the central-provincial interface is like all of 
decision "points" in the Chinese political system—fluid and prone to pertpetual 
bargaining. However, central-provincial interdependence compels both parties to 
compromise in order that their own interests can be maximized and advanced. The 
central-provincial relationship is not, therefore, a zero-sum game. As conflicts 
between the Centre and the province become more intense since the reform, each is 
obliged to acknowledge that the only way to enhance its own interests is through 
recognizing the legitimacy of the other’s interests. Normative interactive behaviour 
in spatial politics is thus forged, and a devolution of power is cast.
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Preface
The topic of this thesis was first conceived in Spring 1989, before the 
traumatic events in Beijing unfolded to a tragic climax. The original thinking 
behind it was to contribute towards the identification of factors which underline the 
“cyclical" pattern of national integration and disintegration throughout Chinese 
history, and thereby to explore the possibilities of qualitative change in the political 
processes.
The main body of the thesis has, however, a narrower focus and a humbler 
objective. It examines how two apparently "atypical" provincial-level governments, 
Guangdong and Shanghai, sought to achieve their respective objectives in 
investment expansion and economic development since 1978 within the constraints 
of the central government. The findings of this examination have, however, 
indicated that the central-provincial interface may be the locus where qualitative 
changes in political processes will first occur in China.
I have benefited from the assistance and guidance of numerous individuals 
from the initial stage of ponderances to the production of the thesis in this present 
form. My supervisor, Dr. David L. Shambaugh, guided me through the entire 
process, whether it be in London, in Hong Kong, or in Beijing. I am indebted to his 
critical comments as well as to his insistence for the best quality as an end product. 
Professors Lynn White III, George W. Jones, Nicholas Lardy, Kuan Hsinchi and 
Brantly Womack read through earlier drafts of various chapters and gave their 
invaluable comments, as did Dr. Christine P.W. Wong and Dr. Keith Forster, and 
Dr. Sung Yun-wing. Professor Audrey Donnithome, Dr. John P. Bums, and Dr. 
Thomas Chan gave their advice when this thesis was first conceived in 1989 in 
Hong Kong, while Dr. Yuan Cheng gave his advice whilst I first came to London. 
Dr. Julia Strauss read an earlier version of the entire manuscript and offered 
perceptive comments and suggestions for improvement Moreover, Jane Duckett, J. 
Wibowo Wibisono, and S. B. Ko, fellow doctoral candidates with Dr. David 
Shambaugh, offered gratifying intellectual as well as emotional support during the 
process of writing and research in the field.
This list of acknowledgement will go on and indeed could be at least 
quadrupled in length, if not because of the need for prudence regarding the 
unpredictable political circumstances in China that might endanger certain 
individuals. The brevity of this acknowledgement thus by no means reflects the 
extent of gratitude I feel to those individuals in China who inspired me through the
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process of this work. Although not without stress and difficulties, the field research 
in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou has been a gratifying and fulfilling 
experience. I have also benefited from in-depth discussions with many students 
from China in London,
I am grateful to Pamela Lord for her assistance with copy-editing. A 
number of close friends, in Hong Kong as well as in London, have provided the 
tacit encouragement and emotional support at various difficult times during the 
long period of gestation of this thesis. Last but not the least, my family has been the 
reliable source of support to which I turned during times of stress. My mother, 
sisters and brothers, and, above all, my husband, Johnny Ng, have provided the 
quiet but solid backing throughout the years, when my career has seen twists and 
turns. My gratitude to their understanding is beyond my words.
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Introduction
Statement of Topic
This dissertation is a study of central-provincial politics regarding 
investment in post-Mao China. It enquires into the ways in which provincial 
governments manoeuvred their way within the constraints and opportunities 
provided by the institutional context to achieve their agenda. It examines how 
provincial leaders bargained with central leaders regarding the formulation of 
central policies which have a bearing on investment and the allocation of centrally 
controlled resources so as to make the institutional context work to their advantage. 
It examines the strategies which provincial officials used to stretch the "loopholes" 
in established institutions and practices to make them work far beyond their 
original limits. The study shows that provincial governments were remarkably 
active political "actors" who engaged in a wide range of discretionary behaviour in 
order to advance their objective of investment expansion. The picture shown is not 
however one of one-sided activism by the provinces. Provincial governments were 
always constrained by central policies, which explains their eagerness to bargain 
with the Centre for a more favourable institutional context.
The purpose of this dissertation is to ascertain this linkage between 
institutional context and discretionary behaviour. It aims to explore the relationship 
between the constraining/facilitating power of the Centre and the ability to engage 
discretions on the part of the provinces. Accordingly, the research questions 
undertaken in this study can be grouped into two categories. The first group 
concerns the influence of the Centre: what parameters did the Centre set for the 
provinces regarding investment? What were the substantive central policies 
involved? In what ways did the Centre influence, whether it be to facilitate or 
constrain, the discretionary behaviour of the provinces? The second group of 
questions targets the discretions of the provinces. How did provincial governments 
manage to manoeuvre under, and regardless of, central government constraints? 
What strategies did they employ? To what extent did the provinces participate in 
formulating the very central policies which constituted their institutional context? 
These two groups of questions obviously cross-cut one another. This dissertation 
concludes that the Centre and the provinces engage in an interactive relationship.
This dissertation employs a rational-choice institutional approach in 
disentangling this interactive relationship between the central and provincial 
governments. The analysis is targeted at the process of central-provincial
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interactions, rather than engaging in correlational tabulations of attributes and 
characteristics. An institutional approach means that the thrust of analysis is placed 
on institutions and the effect of the institutional context on behaviour. Individual 
actors, whether at the Centre or in the provinces, are studied in terms of their 
interaction with the institutional context. The starting point is that institutions 
undoubtedly affect the behaviour of political actors. While idiosyncratic factors, 
such as the quality of leadership and the temperament of individual leaders, also 
come into the picture, they nevertheless work within the context of the institutions. 
The existence of these other factors, however, implies that the effect of institutions 
on behaviour is not total, and that an institutional approach by no means suggests 
any sense of institutional determinism.
The prefix "rational choice" emphasizes that actors in central-provincial 
politics exercise choice on their behaviour in a rational manner, albeit within the 
constraints of the institutional context. Acting within a host of rules and norms did 
not rob the actors of their freedom to choose, by rational articulation, those specific 
courses of action which could best serve their interest.1 Institutions and rules 
prescribe certain limits to behaviour, but actors can nevertheless exercise 
considerable choice within the limits. In fact this possibility of choice within 
institutional rules represents the basis of the very existence of discretions.
The approach of a study, it has been noted, very often affects and, to a 
certain extent, predetermines its conclusions.2 Therefore a study which focuses 
attention on the top elite for explanations of policy changes is most likely to argue 
for a potent role of the elite in the policy process.3 By starting from the bottom end 
of the hierarchical relationship, this dissertation aims to provide a deeper 
understanding of central-provincial politics through another perspective, and
lrThe complementarity of the institutional approach with rational choice is cogently discussed in 
Elinor Ostrom, "Rational Choice Theory and Institutional Analysis: Toward Complementarity", 
American Political Science Review, Vol.85, No.l (March 1991), pp.237-43. Susan Shirk also 
employs the rational choice institutional approach in her The Political Logic of Reform in China 
(Berkeley: University of Califiomia Press, 1993), but her focus is more on the institutional context 
of rational choices of the actors, that is, how rational choices of actors can be explained by incentive 
structures built in to the institutional context, rather than emphasizing the room for  active choice 
within the constraints of institutions.
2See, for instance, Paul A. Sabatier, "Top-down and Bottom-Up Approaches to Implementation 
Research: A Critical Analysis and Suggested Synthesis", Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 6 (1986), 
pp.21-48.
3 An example is Joseph Fewsmith's study of the origins of economic reform programs of post-Mao 
China, Dilemmas of Reform in China (Armonk, New York: M.E, Sharpe, 1994). By focusing 
attention on the top leaders and their advisers, Fewsmith unsurprisingly found that politics at the top 
was the major propelling force behind the formulation of reform policies, (p.241) This research 
focus on the top becomes more precarious as Fewsmith extends his analysis to the later years of 
1980s.
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thereby to bridge the gap in the existing literature which mostly adopts a top-down 
perspective to the relationship. Given the recognition of the interactive relationship 
between the Centre and the provinces, this study has placed more emphasis on the 
part of the provinces. The Centre has been intensively scrutinized by the existing 
literature on China, whilst activity at provincial level has been relatively under- 
studied. Two provincial-level governments, Guangdong and Shanghai, are chosen 
as comparative case studies to enable a study of the behaviour of provincial 
governments in some detail while engaging in meaningful comparisons, and 
thereby drawing implications for the general picture of China's central-provincial 
relations as a whole.
Significance of Topic
Why should we be interested in central-provincial relations at all? What is 
the relevance of central-provincial relations when trying to understand Chinese 
politics and political processes in general? The short answer is that politics 
between the Centre and the provinces reflects the longstanding concerns of 
political practitioners and observers regarding national integration in China: the 
most populous country of the world. More importantly, examination of this 
relationship illuminates the unresolved historical problem of the distribution and 
institutionalization of power within the Chinese political system.
The spatial dimension of politics is a perennial and persistent issue within 
political systems worldwide. However, the substantive content and degree of 
concern may vary among different countries. In developing countries, such as those 
in Africa, policy preferences regarding decentralization/centralization are possibly 
those most debated within the common endeavour to increase productivity and, 
therefore, wealth. It is argued that in some Western industrialized countries centre- 
periphery relations are largely an academic issue.4 Nonetheless, developments in 
Canada over the Quebec issue in the 1980s and early 1990s, controverises in 
Europe over "subsidiarity" in the European Union and the upsurge of nationalism 
in former Soviet republics since the end of the Cold War all demonstrate that the 
territorial aspect of politics, national integration and the identity of nations are still 
hot issues in the national development and political science of the West.
4See Harold Wolman, "Decentralization: What It Is and Why We Should Care", in Robert J. Bennett 
(ed.), Decentralization, Local Governments, and Markets: Towards a Post-Welfare Agenda 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 29-42.1 also benefited from discussions on this point with Dr. 
Julia Strauss, Department of Political Studies, School of Oriental & African Studies, University of 
London, October 1994.
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Underlying the interest in spatial politics within the national boundaries of 
different political systems is the generic concern regarding the gap between policy 
formulation and implementation or, simply, the "implementation gap". 
Governments exist to rule and perform. The existence of substantial differentials 
between policies as formulated and that which is eventually implemented begs the 
question of effective governance.5 The policy-implementation gap also invites 
questions as to what the process of governance actually consists of. Who are the 
"powerful ones" who make the decisions which affect the everyday lives of 
citizens? When pluralism dominated political studies in the West, the emphasis on 
inputs to the political system relegated the dynamic political processes within the 
state apparatus to the status of the "black box" of politics.6 With the "return of the 
state institutions" as a focal subject of political studies, especially since the 1970s 
and the 1980s,7 questions have been asked regarding the roles of the various 
bureaucratic actors in the state apparatus in agenda formulation and policy 
implementation. It has subsequently been recognized that the structure of state 
institutions does indeed affect what and how things are done. The national and 
subnational levels of government constitute a major part of the bureaucratic maze 
where political agendas are struck, and policies decided and implemented. Therein 
lies the reason for persistent interest of political systems worldwide in the spatial 
dimension of politics.
5This dissertation employs the notion that politics is both a matter of allocation of "who gets what 
and how", and a matter of domination, rule and governance, of "us versus them". That these two 
views of politics, derived from David Easton and Der Begriff Schmitt, can in fact be reconciled and 
complement one another is cogently argued in Gianfranco Poggi, The Development of the Modern 
State: A Sociological Introduction (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978), pp. 2-12. Vivienne 
Shue also recognized the relevance and utility of the notion of politics as governance, vis-a-vis the 
dominant notion of politics as allocation in most China political studies in the West. See Vivienne 
Shue, The Reach of the State: Sketches of the Chinese Body Politics (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1988), p. 19.
6See Patrick Dunleavy and Brendan O'Leary, Theories of the State: The Politics of Liberal 
Democracy (London: Macmillan Education, 1987), p. 108.
7There were disagreements as to when the state became again the focal point of Western political 
studies, or indeed whether there was any departure from the study of the state at all. One cause of 
such differing perceptions is the variety of conceptions of the "state" as a subject of study which 
disputing parties had in mind. Those arguing for a break in the study were probably thinking in 
terms of the study of state structures and the constituent parts and institutions of the state, while 
those arguing against a break thought in terms of the state as the "polity"; of the state as a whole. For 
examples of the former view, see Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., 
Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Stephen D. Krasner, 
"Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics", Comparative Politics, 
(January 1984), pp.223-46. For the latter view, see for instance Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and 
Weak States: State Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 10 (footnote 1); and Patrick Dunleavy and Brendan 
O'Leary, Theories of the State: The Politics of Liberal Democracy, which, in summarizing the 
concepts of the state in the various streams of political thoughts, implies that the state, either in 
terms of its institutions or as a whole, has always been a persistent focus of Western political 
studies.
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However, in China the concern for spatial politics goes beyond mere 
generic concern over the "implementation gap". It is a more fundamental issue 
related to the latent yet perennial fear of national disintegration. The historical 
experience of disintegration results in a heightened sense of concern among 
students of Chinese politics and Chinese political actors regarding the political 
ramifications of an implementation gap.8 This concern over the spectre of national 
disintegration begs questions as to why the fear should have arisen in the first 
place. What is the linkage between the observance of implementation gap and the 
fear of national disintegration? Is it because the gap is so "large" in China that the 
centrifugal tendencies verge on secession and disintegration? How then can we 
measure the gap, in comparison with the gaps in other political systems? 
Alternatively, are there other issues associated with the implementation gap that 
cause the concern?
This study argues for the latter position, i.e., that other issues are pertinent. 
The issues involved are those concerning the institutionalization and the 
distribution of power between the constituent levels of the Chinese state. The 
contention is that underlying the concern for national disintegration lies the yet 
unresolved historical problem of power distribution and institutionalization within 
the Chinese political system. An examination of central-provincial politics in China 
leads us, therefore, to the core issue in Chinese politics: that of power distribution 
and institutionalization of the distribution. Policy implementation gaps in the post- 
Mao period, of the magnitude as to cause alarm at the prospect of a possible 
disintegration of the Chinese state, resulted from the failure of the Chinese political 
system to institutionalize any system of power distribution between the Centre and 
the provinces, and to provide a regularized avenue of reconciliation and arbitration 
when conflicts arose.
8David Goodman also noted the persistent concern of Western China scholars and Chinese 
politicians for the centrifugal tendencies and threat of national disintegration in China. See David S. 
G. Goodman, Centre and Province in the People's Republic of China: Sichuan and Guizhou, 1955- 
1965. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p.4. The increasing reported occurence of 
implementation gap in post-Mao China as a result of subnational discretions has attracted wide 
attention among Western students of Chinese politics. Many described the discrepancies between 
central policy prescriptions and local implementation as the reflections of regionalistic tendencies, 
and some even pondered the possibilities of national disintegration. See, for instance, Gerald Segal, 
China Changes Shape: Regionalism and Foreign Policy. Adelphi Paper 287 (London: International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994); Maria Hsia Chang, "China's future: regionalism, federation, or 
disintegration", Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol.25, No.3 (September, 1992), pp. 211-27; 
Ellis Joffe, "Regionalism in China", Pacific Review, No.l, 1994; and David Goodman, "The PLA 
and regionalism in Guangdong", Pacific Review, No.l, 1994.
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Research Design
Fixed Asset Investment as the Political Arena
This dissertation studies the politics between the central and provincial 
governments within the context of investment policy. Unlike the focus of most 
previous works on Chinese spatial politics which have been based largely on the 
resource, or input, aspect of policy processes, such as fiscal revenue allocation and 
personnel control, fixed asset investment forms one of the many categories of 
substantive policies on which revenues and resources are spent. Taking a 
substantive policy as the arena means starting the inquiry into the political 
dynamics from the output end of policy. The idea is first to discern discrepancies 
between central policy and provincial implementation in the substantive output of a 
policy area, and then work through the process whereby the discrepancies evolved 
in the first place. In this way the study identifies factors which gave provincial 
governments room to manoeuvre, and conversely, the instruments through which 
the Centre exerted its influence over the provinces. As it turns out, the fiscal 
system is, among others, a major institutional factor shaping discretionary 
behaviour over fixed asset investment.
What is the advantage, then, of starting from the output end, rather than 
from the input side of policy processes? The advantages are two-fold.9 First, 
starting from the output end focuses attention on the "implementation gap". It is 
then possible to pinpoint the input factors which contributed to such a gap. This 
approach ensures that the analyst always relates what is observed in the interaction 
between the central and provincial actors, the institutional context, and whatever 
other information is considered relevant to the study, to the original phenomenon 
of an implementation gap in the chosen policy area. The study is thereby process- 
oriented. Input factors and institutional arrangements will be studied in the search 
for an explanation of the implementation gap. Their relevance and role with respect 
to how the provinces manoeuvre their discretions or how the Centre sustains its 
control will also be clearly defined.
Second, working from the output side of "an implementation gap" back to 
the input institutions in identifying its causes safeguards analysts from falling into 
the analytical trap of static institutional analysis. For instance, it is common for 
studies focusing on fiscal aiTangements to conclude that, as a result of the
9See Jae Ho Chung, "Studies of Central-Provincial Relations in the People's Republic of China: A 
Mid-Term Appraisal", forthcoming in the China Quarterly, No. 142 (June 1995).
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significant transfer of fiscal resources and authority from the Centre, there has been 
a substantial loss of central power vis-a-vis the provincial governments since the 
1980s. The linkage between the transfer of fiscal authority and resources on the 
one hand, and the loss of central power on the other, is assumed to be direct and 
straight-forward. This assumption is itself problematic, since, as Chung has noted, 
the fiscal status of a province can "cut both ways of having a stronger (or weaker) 
say in policy-making and, at the same time, of being placed under tighter (or 
looser) control by the centre".10 A static institutional focus also fails to illuminate 
the rich shades of interaction between the central and provincial actors—i.e. the 
process by which actors interact within the institutional context to bring about the 
implementation gap or its absence.
Amongst the various substantive policy areas, fixed asset investment is the 
most important policy output of the socialist Chinese state in terms of the amount 
of resources put to its use. While class struggle still dominated political life prior to 
the Third Plenum in December 1978, investment as an item in the state budget was 
always the most important single issue, accounting for up to 56% of total annual 
fiscal expenditure.11 Since 1978, with the shift of national focus in political life 
from class struggle to economic construction, investment activities have gained 
greater significance in the task of fulfilling the national goal. The materialistic 
emphasis of socialist ideology as well as the nationalistic bent of central leaders 
have made investment the most important expenditure item of the state, at both 
central and provincial levels. As an important activity of both the central and 
provincial governments, fixed asset investment therefore provides the best vantage 
point from which to view political processes in China, most particularly central- 
provincial politics. Prima facie evidence also suggests that investment is a mature 
policy area through which to explore the politics between Centre and provinces. 
Reports referring to difficulties experienced by the Centre in attempting to rein in 
the excessive investment enthusiasm of provincial governments have abounded. 
Provincial governments have consistently sought to increase the level of 
investment activities beyond the limits imposed by the Centre, often resulting in 
lacklustre economic efficiency. Localistic orientation in investment and market 
protection by provincial governments has demonstrated the increasing 
contradictions between the Centre's preferences and policies on the one hand and 
provincial incentives and policy outcomes on the other.
10lbid.
HThe highest proportion was attained in 1958, the year of Great Leap Forward. See Ministry of 
Finance ($&.),China Finance Statistics 1950-1991 (Beijing: The Science Press, 1992), p. 116. For 
more discussion see Chapter Two.
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The Provincial-Level as the Level of Analysis
In this dissertation I have chosen the provincial level as the level of analysis. 
The reasons are three-fold. First, the provincial level with its size and command of 
substantial resources has the potential of posing a political challenge to the Centre 
which is impossible in the case of more localized units. As Whitney has written on 
this point, "the diminuitive size of the lowest echelon units precludes them from 
acquiring too much power. It is the units of the intermediary tiers with their more 
extensive span of control and resource base that are most likely to challenge the 
Centre."12 Studies of the more localized levels, especially with respect to the 
township and the village, and their relations with the Centre, are essential in order 
to understand the extent of state penetration into society, and vice versa, within a 
state-society analytical framework. In order to tackle the recurrent concern over 
national disintegration and the threat to central power in the political system, 
however, one has to start from the main candidate for potential power contention 
with the Centre: the provinces.
Second, the importance of the provincial-level and its equivalent in the 
Chinese political system has been underlined by its persistent historical continuity, 
despite frequent attempts by the Centre to manipulate provincial boundaries. 
According to Whitney,
"From 756 A.D. (middle of T'ang Dynasty) onward the provincial-level 
groupings began to acquire greater authority, and they now controlled areas 
containing sufficient resources and population to be able to challenge the 
power of the centre and to usurp many of its functions including that of 
financial control. These areas now formed a permanent intermediate link in 
the chain of command between the centre and the districts."13
The fact that the boundaries of the provincial-level were often changed reflects, to 
an extent, the perceived threat of this intermediary level of government to the 
Centre. As Whitney has written,
"the chun of the Western Han and the tao of the early T'ang were created 
originally to lie conformally upon existing natural regions, since (these 
intermediary levels), at the time, posed no threat to the centre...As the latter 
areas began to acquire power..., attempts were made to weaken their base of 
support either by merging areas together or by dividing them still 
further..."14
12See Joseph B. R. Whitney, China: Area, Administration, and Nation-Building (Chicago: 
University of Chicago, 1969), Department of Geography, Research Paper No. 123, pp. 79-80.
13Ibid.,p.ll9.
14Ibid., p. 120, quoting from Wang Gungwu, The Structure of Power in North China during the Five 
Dynasties (Kular Lumpur: The University of Malaya Press, 1963).
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The argument is that as the imperial bureaucracy developed, more power 
resided at the intermediary level between the central government and the lowest 
level of formal state bureaucracy, the county. The Centre, however, became uneasy 
about the growth in power of the intermediary level and periodically attempted to 
constrain its power by gerrymandering the boundaries. However the need for an 
intermediary level of government as a means to enabling the Centre to retain its 
hold over the more than one thousand units of county government meant that the 
provincial level would nevertheless continue to exist.15 Moreover, despite the 
repeated central manipulations of provincial borders, and the creation and abolition 
of entire provinces, evidence exists which also indicates the relative continuity of 
provincial sizes over time,16 and points to those specific occasions when the 
Centre had to abandon its attempts at gerrymandering,17 This suggests that 
provincial-level government has long been a potent political force within the 
Chinese political system, and therefore deserves serious attention.
Thirdly, the provincial-level has been chosen as the level of analysis 
because it has not been adequately covered in existing literature on Chinese 
politics.18 This dissertation aspires, therefore, to go some way towards rilling the 
"gap" in this area. Most previous works on Chinese spatial politics have focused on 
the lower echelon levels. The reason for this focus can be traced to the development 
of the field of Chinese political studies in the West.19 Research at county and
15The number of county-level governments varies from exactly 1000 in the Ch'in Dynasty 
(221B.C.) to around 1400 units in Ming and Ch'ing Dynasties (1368-1911 A.D.). The number stood 
at around 1600 in the early years of the People's Republic of China, albeit drastic reductions by over 
300 units during the communization and Great Leap Forward campaign in the late 1950s. See 
Whitney, China: Area, Administration, and Nation-Building, pp.75-8 (Table 6).
16Whitney argues that if the size of provinces was to be rationally decided to facilitate optimum 
control from a management point of view, size should be inversely correlated with the population 
density of the area. His findings show that the designation of provincial boundaries more closely 
conformed with this rational management principle in older times than in more recent years, 
suggesting that there was a substantial inertia and continuity in the provincial sizes, and a relative 
disability of the Centre to radically change them. See Whitney, China: Area, Administration, and 
Nation-Building, p.129,
17One such instance occurred in 1906, when an attempt of the Qing central government to divide 
Jiangsu Province into two was aborted as a result of widespread resentment to the move. Ibid.,
p.121.
18This is recognized and noted by China studies scholars, who called for more work to be done on 
the spatial aspect and on the provincial level in particular. See for instance Harry Harding, "The 
Evolution of American Scholarship on Contemporary China", in David Shambaugh (ed.), American 
Studies of Contemporary China (Armonk, New York and Washington D.C.: M.E. Sharpe and the 
Wilson Centre Press, 1993), p.30.
19For a discussion of the development of the field, see David Shambaugh (ed.), American Studies of 
Contemporary China. See also Elizabeth J. Perry, "Trends in the Study of Chinese Politics: State- 
Society Relations", China Quarterly, No,139 (September 1994), pp.704-13. Perry attributes the 
focus of previous research on the state-society interface and the lack of attention to the 
interrelationships between political actors within the state and within the society to the status of the 
field of China studies being a "consumer field" borrowing analytical constructs from elsewhere,
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township levels enabled analysts a small peep into the triangle of forces between 
the Centre, the local officials, and the rural society over which the local officials 
have direct jurisdiction and of which they are a part.20 The findings of this research 
refine and modify one’s view as to the reach of the state to society, and as such 
constitute an important critique of the previous totalitarianism model. While the 
implementation gap has been the subject of a good number of works in this area, 
and explanations have been sought within the state apparatus, there has not been 
similar scrutiny at the provincial-level.21 The gap in literature is obvious, thus the 
pertinence of a provincial-focus of analysis.
The Choice of Case Studies
This dissertation bases its arguments on the findings of two case studies: 
Guangdong and Shanghai. These case studies enable an indepth examination of 
the political dynamics on which generalizations can be built. Comparative case 
studies provide an additional dimension which single case studies do not give. 
Variations among the comparative cases draw analysts to issues which may 
otherwise have escaped attention. It is, therefore, with the advantage of comparison 
in mind that this study has adopted a comparative approach.
But why are Guangdong and Shanghai chosen? What does a comparison of 
this pair highlight? What can a study drawing on a comparison between Guangdong 
and Shanghai, probably the two most atypical areas in China since the 1980s, tell us 
about central-provincial relations in China as a whole? In other words, to what 
extent are the findings and conclusions drawn on the comparative case studies of 
Guangdong and Shanghai generalizable? Moreover, since Shanghai is actually a 
municipality, albeit of provincial-level administrative status, and Guangdong is a
rather than being a "producer field" drawing insights from China's historical experiences and 
generating original analyses of interest to comparativists in general. Specifically, she argues that the 
European construct of "state versus the civil society", being a concept stemming from an attempt to 
explain the emergence and transformation of captialism in Europe, may be a too crude concept to 
analyse political processes in China where capitalism of the European sort has never taken root. 
(P-709)
20Some seminal works of this category are Vivienne Shue, The Reach of the State; Jean Oi, State 
and Peasant in Contemporary China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); and Helen 
Siu, Agents and Victims in South China: Accomplices in Rural Revolution (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1989).
21See for instance David M. Lampton,"Chinese Politics: The Bargaining Treadmill", Issues and 
Studies, Vol.23, No.3 (1987), pp.11-41; David M. Lampton (ed.), Policy Implementation in Post- 
Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel 
Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structure and Process (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1988); Kenneth Lieberthal and David Lampton (eds.), Bureaucracy, 
Politics and Decision-Making in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). 
In disaggregating the state institutions, most of these works focused on the bureaucratic vertical 
"systems" in explaining variations between policy intentions and implementation.
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"province-proper", are the two areas comparable?
What the Pair Can Highlight
Guangdong and Shanghai make a good pair for comparative study with 
respect to their relations with the Centre because it is possible to "isolate" the effect 
of central policies on the behaviour of two provincial-level governments. The 
isolation of independent variables in real-life observation requires a substantial 
level of relevant similarity in other aspects of the objects of analysis. The first 
precondition of a good pair for comparison is, therefore, that the areas are 
sufficiently similar in those aspects which may have an effect on the dependent 
variable but which are not the subject of the current study.22 In the arena of 
investment and economic policy implementation, Guangdong and Shanghai in the 
late 1970s were situated at a similar base-line regarding their potential in attracting 
foreign investment and developing an export-oriented, internationalized economy 
ahead of the rest of the country. Both Guangdong and Shanghai are situated along 
the coast of China. This gives both areas—relative to the inland provinces—a 
similar edge insofar as being able to take advantage of the reforms since 1979. 
Historically both areas are commercial centres with substantial experience in doing 
business with foreigners. Guangzhou (then known as Canton) was among the five 
earliest trading ports opened to foreign trade in the middle of the Nineteenth 
Century, and Shanghai was the largest industrial and economic centre of the 
country as well as being the hub of foreign commercial and industrial activity in 
the early 1920s. Both have extensive overseas linkage. In particular, the first pool 
of enterpreneurs in Hong Kong came from Shanghai around the time of the 
communist takeover in 1949. Guangdong has been the largest source of emigration 
to Hong Kong. This linkage means that both areas already had a large reservoir of 
overseas Chinese capital and management expertise to tap when the Open Door 
Policy took effect in 1979.
The second requirement for a good pair of comparison is a large difference 
in the independent variable: the central policies. In this respect the differences 
between Guangdong and Shanghai are as important and obvious as their 
similarities outlined above. The Guangdong government obtained very favourable 
preferential policies early in 1979 which allowed the provincial government an
22The similar potential of Guangdong and Shanghai in economic development and expanding 
investment enables this study to avoid the problems of isolating the effect of multiple independent 
variables on provincial behaviour. See David Goodman, Centre and Province in the People's 
Republic of China: Sichuan and Guizhou, 1955-1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1986).
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unprecedented latitude in manoeuvres and control over local resources. In contrast, 
the Shanghai government was stuck with the old centralized system for nearly the 
whole of the 1980s. The imposition of tight central centrol over a resourceful and 
wealthy area highlights the impact of central policies on provincial behaviour. The 
marked differences in central policies towards the two areas indicates that the 
dynamics between the two provincial governments and the Centre are substantially 
different. Interesting comparisons can then be made to reveal the discrete effect of 
central policies on the discretionary behaviour of the two provincial-level 
governments.
Implication for the General Picture
Guangdong and Shanghai are atypical areas. Guangdong was the favoured 
site of the Centre on which to pioneer reform experiments. As a result for a 
considerable period in the 1980s the provincial government enjoyed a degree of 
leverage which was the envy of other provinces. Its proximity to Hong Kong also 
gave the province a great advantage in obtaining otherwise hard-won capital and 
access to the international market. Meanwhile, Shanghai has been acknowledged as 
the most important economic centre of China this century. Shanghai has always 
topped the list of provincial-level units in terms of national income per capita and 
fiscal revenue per capita.23 The huge gap between the "affluence" of Shanghai and 
relative poverty of some of the interior provinces made the municipality look as 
much as like "the other China" as it was in the treaty-port period in the 1920s and 
1930s.24 The question therefore arises: how do findings on Guangdong and 
Shanghai reflect the dynamics of central-provincial politics in China in general?
Guangdong and Shanghai may be too "peculiar" to make findings on them a 
representative case of every other province in China. However, the atypicality of 
the pair is perhaps an advantage. After all, the generalizability of an apparently 
typical case is often assumed rather than demonstrated. The apparent 
unrepresentativeness of Guangdong and Shanghai has the desirable, effect of 
requiring the analyst to confront squarely the wider implications of the case studies, 
and to explicate what is otherwise often assumed.
23 As of 1990 Shanghai's national income per capita amounted to 4822 yuan and fiscal revenue per 
capita 1180 yuan, a long way ahead Beijing at the second place, at 3577 yuan and 702 yuan, 
respectively. Guangdong had only 1842 yuan and 206 yuan due to the much larger population. See 
China Finance Statistics, 1950-1991 (Beijing: Science Press, 1992), pp. 336,348,
24For the reference of "the other China", see Marie-Claire Bergere,'"The Other China': Shanghai 
from 1919 to 1949", in Christopher Howe (ed.), Shanghai: Revolution and Development in an Asian 
Metropolis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 1-34.
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Guangdong and Shanghai had experiences in opposite extremes with 
respect to central economic control in the late 1970s and most of the 1980s. 
Guangdong was exempted from implementation of some national policies, and in 
fact given a new set of custom-made policies allowing a large degree of provincial 
discretion. On the other hand Shanghai's huge resource base continued to be tightly 
controlled by the Centre, the level of extraction remaining continuously high. Their 
extreme treatment by the Centre posits them as two poles of a continuum, between 
which the position of other provinces is likely to fall. The choice of two resourceful 
areas along the coast enables this study to highlight the conflict, and the political 
dynamics therein, between the demands and constraints posed by the Centre on the 
one hand, and the opportunities for discretions allowed by provincial socio­
economic conditions on the other. The larger resource base the Guangdong and 
Shanghai leaderships had at their disposal, as relative to many other more "typical" 
and, therefore, poorer interior provinces, is indicative of the extent of choice of 
provincial leaders in the face of often contradictory pressures from the Centre. The 
Guangdong-Shanghai comparison, therefore, leads to the core question 
concerning central-provincial politics: would provincial leaders comply with 
central policies if they had the means not so to do?25 As the findings of this 
study show, despite the great differences in central policies (the independent 
variable) in Guangdong and Shanghai, discretionary behaviour of the Guangdong 
and Shanghai governments in the 1979-1993 period had as many striking 
similarities as differences. Their similarities provide evidence of the prevalence of 
provincial, discretionary tendencies in the provincial-level governments 
independent of central policies, while their differences point to the impact of central 
policies on the forms, strategies, and scope of manoeuvres.
Comparability
Another issue which arises when comparing Guangdong and Shanghai is 
whether they are comparable at all. Guangdong is a province with a sizable rural 
hinterland, while Shanghai, as a municipality, is an essentially urban area, albeit 
with a number of suburban counties. This geographical difference means that
25In Goodman, Centre and Province, it is concluded that both provincial conditions and national 
policies determined provincial discretions. While this must be true, what the case of Guizhou, an 
extremely poor province, illuminates is at best indeterminate. The extremely deprived conditions in 
a province might have literally deprived the provincial leaders' ability to follow central policies, as 
Goodman has concluded. Alternatively, the difficult provincial conditions might have the effect of 
increasing bottom-up pressure on the provincial leaders to stand up against inappropriate central 
policies. Regrettably, this possibility was simply overlooked and ignored in Goodman's analysis. In 
other words, the contention is that the case of a poor province would not be able to highlight the 
difficult choices provincial leaders might have to make between their agency role for the Centre and 
the representative role for the province.
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Shanghai has been much more dependent on other provinces for raw materials and 
food supplies than has Guangdong. This factor might indicate that Shanghai was 
more dependent on the Centre for coordinating planned supplies from other 
provinces, and for adjudicating conflicts with their suppliers as and when they 
arose. The larger span of control required for the Guangdong Provincial 
Government relative to Shanghai's is also likely to have an effect on their 
differential treatment of subprovincial delegation. The quesdon therefore arises: is 
the spatial politics in a municipality comparable to that of a province at all?
The answer lies in the basis of comparability of Guangdong and Shanghai, 
and for what purposes the two areas are compared in this study. The purpose of this 
study is to illuminate the politics between the central and the provincial levels of 
government. Guangdong and Shanghai are both provincial-level governments. This 
single fact firmly establishes their comparability in a study of central-provincial 
(level) politics. The fact that Shanghai is a provincial-level municipality, rather 
than a "province-proper", may have implications as regards its relations with the 
Centre. But this does not disable Shanghai as the object of study of central- 
provincial politics. The reason is obvious. In a central-provincial study, the focus of 
analysis is obviously on, first, the different ways in which the Centre deals with 
different provincial-level governments with all their varieties of provincial 
conditions. A second focus is the ways in which the different central treatment 
affects the behaviour of different provincial-level governments. In other words, the 
differences between the relationship between Centre and Shanghai on the one hand, 
and between Centre and other provinces on the other, arising due to Shanghai's 
municipal characteristics, constitute a valid part of the explanandum.
This rationale of comparability is based on the political/administrative 
status of the Shanghai government within the Chinese political hierarchy. The 
assumption is the relevance of formal hierarchical status in Chinese politics. While 
fully acknowledging the importance of personal status of leaders in the political 
processes of the Chinese system, a good number of works have underlined the 
importance of formal hierarchical status.26 Communication within the state system 
is very much regulated by the structure of the hierarchy. As Lieberthal and 
Oksenberg have pointed out, the Centre in 1985 had to upgrade the Ministry of 
Education to a supra-ministrial rank of the State Education Commission in order to
26See for instance A. Doak Barnett, with Ezra Vogel, Cadre, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in 
Communist China. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p.72; Kenneth Lieberthal and 
Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making in China, pp. 142-148; and Susan Shirk, The Political Logic of 
Reform.
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give the former ministry a higher bureaucratic standing enabling it to issue 
instructions to other ministries concerning educational matters in their "systems".27 
Instead of sending an influential and powerful official to head the then Ministry of 
Education, the Centre had to lift the rank of the entire ministry. This aptly 
demonstrated the relevance of formal bureaucratic ranking in regulating 
interactions between state agencies. The provincial-level ranking of Shanghai 
Municipality, therefore, accords the same formal avenue of communication and 
interaction between the Shanghai government and the Centre as in the case of other 
provinces. This fact underlines the basis of the comparability between Shanghai 
and Guangdong in this study.
Organization of the Study
This dissertation has a total of eight chapters. Following this introduction 
Chapter one provides a theoretical statement of the study. The chapter elaborates 
the ways in which this study seeks to advance our understanding of China’s spatial 
politics, and political processes in general. It outlines the development of the 
central-provincial literature, identifies the gaps this study strives to fill, and 
explicates the approach taken to achieve this task. The first chapter points to the 
need for an alternative concept of power and an alternative approach to the issue of 
central-provincial relationship.
Chapter Two provides a background discussion of the failure of central 
control over provincial investment implementation during the post-Mao period. 
The discussion proceeds in two parts. The first section explicates the problem of 
investment administration and weakening central control. It also provides an 
operational definition of the investment problem for the purpose of this study. The 
amount of fixed asset investment, measured in terms of the monetary value spent 
on the completion of investment projects, will be the focus of analysis throughout 
this dissertation. The second section seeks an explanation. To what extent is the 
problem a result of the economic reforms in the 1980s, and which reforms are the 
most crucial? This chapter observes that the Centre itself is partly to blame for its 
present problems. This is manifest in several aspects. First, fiscal and planning 
reforms approved by the Centre were pertinent in invigorating provincial 
incentives for investment expansion. Second, the Centre had sent contradictory 
messages to the provinces at different times, urging provinces to achieve ever- 
higher growth rates at one time and asking for restraint at another. This has had the
27Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Policy Making in China, p. 144.
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effect of enabling provincial leaderships to play off the "control" message against 
the "accelerated growth" instruction.
Chapters Three to Six cover the details of the two case studies. Chapters 
Three and Four serve a dual purpose. First, the two chapters provide background 
information regarding the development of fixed asset investment in Guangdong 
and Shanghai, and identify the presence or absence of a provincial implementation 
gap regarding investment policies. Second, the chapters outline the institutional 
context of provincial investment behaviour. Specifically, two institutional 
arrangements, the fiscal system and the fixed asset investment planning system, are 
identified as being of crucial significance to the implementation of investment 
policy. Their development in Guangdong and Shanghai since 1949, and especially 
since 1979, is outlined.
Chapters Five and Six describe the discretionary behaviour of the 
Guangdong and Shanghai governments in their pursuit of investment expansion. 
The chapters show how the provincial leaders manoeuvred within the institutional 
constraints of central policies to bargain for more favourable central policies as 
well as to redefine and bypass the institutional rules. A typology of discretionary 
behaviour classifies provincial discretions according to the relative dependence of 
discretionary behaviour on the Centre. Using a single typology facilitates the 
comparison of the differences, as well as the similarities, of Guangdong and 
Shanghai as regards their discretionary behaviour. The findings of these two 
chapters reveal the rich varieties of discretionay behaviour of the Guangdong and 
Shanghai governments, thus demonstrating the vitality of the provincial-level 
government as a political actor.
Chapter Seven concludes the case studies with an explicit discussion about 
the linkage between institutional constraints and actors' choice, and in particular 
between central influences and provincial discretions. The influence of the Centre 
on the discretionary behaviour of provincial governments is undeniable. The 
model of central-provincial relations this study puts forward is, however, not 
a Centre-led model with the provincial governments relegated to the agent 
role passively reacting to stimuli of the Centre, but an interactive and 
dialectical model which sees the policies of the Centre, the attitudes and role 
perceptions of provincial officials and the discretions of provincial 
governments as being constituent parts of a dynamic and interactive process. 
The thesis can be boiled down to a simple statement: provinces are also the forces 
of changes at the Centre. Provincial governments are not mere passive recipients of
26
central resources, subject to the manipulation of the Centre. The resources and 
authority once delegated by the Centre to the provincial governments would 
become part of provincial resources and authority, which the Centre could find 
very difficult to withdraw.28 In fact every wave of delegation gives the provinces 
additional leverage to enable them to enhance their position in the political system.
In conclusion, Chapter Eight identifies the emerging trends of central- 
provincial relations since the reform period. The chapter argues that the changes 
are resulted from compromises by the Centre and the provinces to improve their 
respective situation. It is impossible for the Centre totally to "eliminate" the power 
of the provincial governments as an intermediary level of the state hierarchy. From 
the perspective of provincial governments, other than at times of extreme 
secessionism, they have to live with the power of a central government. The mutual 
indispensability of the central-provincial relationship forces both parties to learn to 
live with one another. As conflicts protracted and bargaining became more intense, 
both the Centre and the provinces gradually came to acknowledge the necessity for 
a better institutionalization of their power relationship. Ambiguity was giving way 
to clarity as the defining character of central-provincial interactions, albeit 
gradually. The low level of institutionalization in the regulation of power 
relationships has often been regarded as the root of many problems in Chinese 
politics, such as intense elite rivalries, and uncertainty over regime succession. The 
trend towards increasing institutionalization in the spatial arena between Centre and 
provinces could signal the development of a politics of compromise and co­
existence, which would radically change the character of Chinese politics.
■^Gerald Segal asserted a similar observation. See Segal, China Changes Shape: Regionalism and 
Foreign Policy. (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994), pp.3,11, 54.
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Chapter One
Understanding Central-Provincial Relations: Towards an Analytical 
Framework
Central to the relationship between the Centre and the provinces is the 
concept of power. What degree of power does the provincial government command 
within the Chinese political system, and what is the nature of this power? This is 
the fundamental question which runs through the literature of central-provincial 
relations in contemporary China. In trying to understand this concept of power, 
other analysts have often dwelt on the roles of provincial leaders and the nature of 
the political system within which they operate. This chapter reviews the manner in 
which, and to what extent, existing literature has addressed and answered the 
following questions. To what extent do provincial leaders act as the loyal agents of 
the Centre, and, conversely, as representatives of their province? How can we make 
sense of the prevalence of bargaining behaviour between the Centre and the 
provinces, and the intensity of conflicts in their interactions? Do the instances of 
China's previous disintegration and emergence of separatist movements in some 
provinces signal a movement towards independence by the provinces? Or do they 
represent the reaction of provincial forces to a weak Centre? How should these 
tensions between the Centre and the provinces be interpreted? Moreover, by what 
approach may changes in the balance of power between the Centre and the 
provinces be better understood?
When examining the pertinent secondary literature, this chapter identifies 
its limitations and elaborates an approach that might fill the gaps. It will be argued 
that the major shortcoming of the existing literature stems from its interpretation of 
the concept of power. Specifically, one recurring problem has been that of the 
asymmetrical relationship between the Centre and the provinces, and whether it is 
of a zero-sum nature. Drawing from insights gained from Talcott Parsons' works, 
this dissertation seeks to develop a more appropriate analytical framework through 
which to understand China's central-provincial relations.
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The Literature on Central-Provincial Relations
The Development of Central-Provincial Studies
The development of Western studies on China's post-1949 central- 
provincial relations has been heavily influenced by Western studies on the Chinese 
political system in general.1 From the totalitarian literature of the 1950s and 1960s, 
to the "pluralist" and "conflict" approach of the late 1960s and 1970s, and through 
to the reform studies of the 1980s, the topic of central-provincial relations has 
always attracted diverse levels of attention within China studies. The different 
emphases in these approaches have been influenced by their interpretation of the 
central-provincial relationship.
Totalitarian Literature: Provincial Leaders as Agents of the Centre
From the 1950s to early 1960s, the prevalence of the Soviet model of 
totalitarianism within China studies resulted in a three-fold image of the post-1949 
political system. It was characterized by the pervasiveness of Marxist-Leninist- 
Maoist ideology, a high level of centralization of political power, and an 
unprecedented penetration of the state into society. This early literature attempted 
to explain the success of the Chinese revolution in terms of ideology, leaders and 
organization. As such the literature saw the central-provincial relationship as one 
between the superordinate and the subordinate. The provincial government, as the 
major intermediate level between the Centre and the vast rural expanse, was 
perceived as acting as the Centre's agent.
This literature did not, however, deny that the intermediate level of 
government was granted a certain discretion as regards policy decisions. A. Doak 
Barnett, for instance, when describing the post-1949 Chinese system as totalitarian, 
admitted that the degree of autonomy granted to provincial departments by central
iln  this discussion due to practical reasons the coverage will mostly be on studies done in the 
United States, Britain, and to a lesser extent Australia. The discussion on the China studies literature 
draws hearvily from David Shambaugh, (ed.), American Studies of Contemporary China (Armonk, 
New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1993); Victor Nee, and David Stark, "Towards an Institutional Analysis 
of State Socialism", in Victor Nee, and David Stark, (eds.), Remaking the Economic Institutions of 
Socialism: China and Eastern Europe (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), pp. 1-31; Michel 
Oksenberg, "Politics Takes Command: An Essay on the Study of Post-1949 China", in John K. 
Fairbank, and Roderick MacFarquhar (ed.), The Cambridge History o f China Volume 14, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 543-90; Harry Harding, "The Study of Chinese 
Politics: Towards a Third Generation of Scholarship", World Poltics, Vol. 36, No.2 (January 1984), 
pp.284-307.
29
ministries was at times substantial.2 He also acknowledged that the provinces were, 
as a rule, given the task of refining central policies for the subprovincial levels of 
government. They therefore enjoyed considerable room for manoeuvre as well as a 
measure of power as intermediary.3 Similarly, when discussing the two types of 
decentralization analysed in the literature, Franz Schurmann argues that the 
decentralization of power from the central level of the state to lower levels and the 
decentralization of power from the state to production units were equally "real".4 In 
Schurmann's view, policy decentralization was an effort by the state to resolve the 
historical tensions between the Centre and the provinces. As such they should be 
considered as bona fide decentralization, which, in Schurmann's own words, 
essentially means that "decision-making powers are transfered downward from 
some central point".5
Not only was the importance of this decentralization from the Centre to the 
provinces recognized; Barnett attributed the unprecedented success of the post- 
1949 state to the Communist leaders' success in consciously building flexibility 
into the system.6 The Communist leaders were described as capable of placing 
"greater real responsibility for policy implementation upon local leaders than has 
been the case in the past and have demanded initiative and even innovation on the 
part of low-level cadres, within the limits set by centrally defined policies."7 It was 
impossible for the Centre to prescribe in detail the specifics of policy 
implementation in a way that could suit all local conditions. Therefore it was better 
openly to recognize the necessity to "adapt according to local conditions", and to 
contain discretions by defining their parameters. As Schurmann acknowledges, "the 
problem of center versus region has bedeviled Chinese governments for centuries", 
and this has not changed, despite the revolution, and the following dramatic 
centralization during the first few years after 1949.8
The nature and extent of provincial power as envisaged in totalitarian 
literature was, however, pretty limited. It was perceived mainly as an agency role. 
Literature of this genre also assumed a hierarchy with regard to the formulation and
2A. Doak Barnett, Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Poltical Power in Communist China (New York and 
London: Columbia University Press, 1967), p.72.
3 Ibid., p.73.
4Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China New, enlarged edition, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), p. 175. The then prevailing view among Western 
scholars as mentioned by Schurmann was that only decentralization to production units reflected 
"genuine” decentralization.
5Ibid.,pp.l75,213-15.
6Bamett, Cadres, p.439.
7Ibid.
8 Schurmann, Ideology, p,215.
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implementation of policy.9 Policy formulation was by definition the job of the 
Centre, with provinces allowed to exercise initiative and innovation only when 
implementing these policies. Although provincial leaders have, at times, been 
accused of building up their own independent power bases and of deviating from 
central policies, Frederick C. Teiwes argues that such accusations of localism 
merely camouflaged changes within the Centre.10 Having implemented the central 
policies of an earlier time, provincial leaders subsequently fell prey to the "house- 
cleaning purges" of the new central leadership. In fact, Schurmann has suggested 
that the Centre implemented the purges of 1957 and 1958 in order to ensure that its 
intermediaries were loyal ahead of a radical decentralization program.11 Moreover, 
as the source of power was at the Centre, the provinces were at its mercy. In 
Barnett's words, "The province and other local organs had no inviolable 
autonomy."12 The discretions and powers of the provinces were perceived in terms 
of central policy. In essence, the totalitarian literature sees a centralized state 
in which power distribution is essentially an issue concerning, exclusively, the 
Centre. The provinces are regarded as passively abiding by decisions of the 
Centre as to whether more or less discretionary power should be left to them.
Pluralist Literature: The Province as a Coerced and Responsive Entity
The outbreak of the Cultural Revolution revealed the vast mix of interests 
within the Chinese political system but beneath the superficial unity described in 
totalitarian literature. The experience of the Cultural Revolution demonstrated that 
actors outside the Centre could influence events. In order to explain the new 
phenomenon, a new theory, and a new set of concepts, was needed . After the 
pioneering steps of Soviet studies, China scholars turned to the pluralistic theory 
for new tools to understand the dynamics of the Cultural Revolution.13 
Specifically, provincial leaders were analysed as an interest group with interests of 
their own to advance.14 Others disagreed with the notion of interest groups,15 and a
9Ibid., p.216; Barnett, Cadres, p.74.
10See Frederick Teiwes, "The Purge of Provincial Leaders, 1957-1958", China Quarterly, No.27, 
1966, pp. 14-32.
^Schurmann, Ideology, p.216.
12Bamett, Cadres, p.73.
13For a pioneering Soviet study using the pluralism theory to analyse the Soviet political system, 
see Frankly Griffiths, and Gorden Skilling, (eds.) Interest Groups in Soviet Politics. (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1971).
14The first explicit attempt to borrow the analytical tools of pluralism and interest group literature 
on the Western political system and follow the pioneering steps of Soviet studies in China political
studies is David S. G. Goodman (ed.), Groups and Politics in the People's Republic of China 
(Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1984); followed by Victor C. Falkenheim (ed.), Citizens and 
Groups in Contemporary China (Ann Arbor: Centre for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 
1987). For studies specifically on the appropriateness of analysing provincial leaders as an interest
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wide range of models was created to explain central-provincial relations.16
The goal of this search is to define the role of the provincial leaders. By 
"role", I mean the purposes which provincial leaders are perceived to serve. This 
search concentrates on the question of whether provincial officials act on behalf of 
the Centre or the provinces. To what extent do provincial leaders work with the 
Centre on a basis of mutual support within such an insecure and volatile political 
environment? And to what extent are provincial leaders advocates and spokesmen 
of provinces advancing their own interests alongside provincial interests? Should 
the various provincial leaders possess similar interests, do they undertake collective 
actions similar to a typical interest group in the West?
A favourite starting point for the literature in assessing the relationship is to 
study examples of conflict between the two bodies. The threat to the very survival 
of provincial leaders during the Cultural Revolution is an apt vehicle through which 
to assess the response of provincial leaders to unpopular central policy. The ferocity 
of the Cultural Revolution dramatized the conflict between provincial leaders' 
"parochical" interests—self-preservation—and their duty loyally to implement 
central policy. The excesses of this period gives observers a clear view of the 
conflicting roles of provincial leaders vis-a-vis the Centre. Parris H. Chang's work 
on the survival strategies of provincial leaders illuminates in detail how they 
reacted to the rapidly changing, opaque and highly uncertain political 
circumstances of the period 1966 to 1968,17 Chang's account shows that provincial 
leaders changed and adjusted their strategies in order to cope with the "shifting 
goals of the Cutural Revolutions and with changes in both the actors in and the 
scope of the conflict."18
group, see Goodman, "Provincial Party First Secretaries in National Politics: A Categoric or a 
Political Group?", in Goodman (ed.), Groups and Politics, pp.68-82; and Peter Ferdinand, "Interest 
Groups and Chinese Politics", in Ibid., pp.10-25.
notable opponent was Lucian Pye, who maintained the inappropriateness of trying to 
understand Chinese politics, and therefore central-provincial relations, as bureaucratic politics. 
Provincial leaders form part of the vertically organized factions, instead of part of the horizontally 
organized interest groups. See Lucian Pye, The Dynamics of Chinese Politics (Cambridge: 
Massachusetts, 1981).
16The search for appropriate conceptions of the role of provincial leaders in the political system was 
part of a larger search for appropriate conceptions of the classification and alignment of actors when 
the homogeneous image of totalitarianism broke down. For a discussion of the models, see Harry 
Harding, "Competing Models of the Chinese Communist Policy Process: Toward a Sorting and 
Evaluation", Issues and Studies (February 1984), pp. 13-36; and John Bryan Starr, "From the Tenth 
Party Congress to the Premiership of Hua Kuo-feng: The Significance of the Colour of the Cat", 
China Quarterly, No.67 (September 1976), pp.98-114.
17Parris H. Chang, "Provincial Party Leaders' Strategies for Survival during the Cultural 
Revolution", in Robert A. Scalopino, (ed.), Elites in the People's Republic of China (Seattle & 
London: University of Washington Press, 1972), pp.501-39.
18IbicL,p.511.
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A brief description of these strategies used by provincial leaders during the 
most turbulent period of the Cultural Revolution is illuminating on how creative 
and flexible provincial leaders in manoeuvring for survival can be.19 The strategies 
include, first, a strategy of evasion and diversion with the objective of "sacrificing 
the knights to save the king", which required provincial leaders to select some 
subordinates to be the scapegoat, and to dismiss them after alleging them being the 
"representatives of the bourgeosie". The objective of the provincial leaders was to 
impress on central leaders that "class enemies" within their provinces had been 
rooted out, thus saving their own positions. Second is the strategy of deception, i.e., 
"news management". By manipulating the flow of information from their provinces 
in the official press and portraying themselves as resolute supporters of the Cultural 
Revolution, provincial leaders sought to ward off pressures from the Centre. Third, 
as pressure built up and the above two strategies proved inadequate, provincial 
leaders would engineer the organization of "royalist" red guard organizations. By 
so doing they learned from the Centre's revolutionary rhetoric and, in particular, 
from Mao's political strategy of outmanoeuvring his party rivals at the Centre by 
enlarging the scope of conflict. By creating their own Red guard groups to fight 
groups that were threatening to their survival, provincial leaders acted in a 
proactive manner to protect their own political survival. The fourth strategy is 
deterrence and repression. When necessary, provincial leaders would not hesitate to 
use their formal positional power as the state authority at the intermediate level to 
suppress the revolutionary rebels. In fact, because provincial leaders had so 
successfully employed the instruments of state coercion against rebel forces which 
threatened their survival, "Mao had to urge his (rebel) supporters repeatedly to 
'thoroughly smash the public security, procuratorate, and justice organs'". This 
brings provincial leaders to the fifth strategy, which is forming civilian-military 
alliances. The army is the most important instrument of coercion at a time of chaos 
and survival. Provincial leaders therefore were keen on securing the support of 
local PLA commanders, using personal ties as well as calling upon the professional 
inclination of the army in maintaining law and order. However, given the 
importance of the army and the counteracting influence of the central leadership, 
cooperation was not forthcoming in all cases. In fact, eventually the PLA had been 
instrumental in a comprehensive power seizure from the incumbent provincial 
leaders starting in January 1967. Lobbying in Peking, the sixth strategy, was 
particularly used during the early stage of conflicts and possibly during some 
critical moments. The strategy of cooptation, the seventh strategy, refers to the
19The description of this paragraph summarizes the discussion in ibid., pp.511-39.
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attempt of provincial leaders to neutralize workers by acceding to their demands for 
better pay and working conditions. In face of the imminent threat of a seizure of 
power by military force in early 1967, some provincial leaders tried to preempt the 
seizure by handing power to the rebel groups they controlled and thereby managed 
to exercise control behind the scenes. This is the eighth strategy, the strategy of 
pre-emption. Finally, but not the least, there is the strategy of joining the "three- 
way alliance". By cooperating with the rebels and the military who were taking 
over the provincial leadership in 1967 during the power seizure, provincial leaders 
managed to remain part of the new provincial leadership and await for new 
opportunities to recapture their former power.
The flexibilities and opportunism of provincial leaders in adjusting their 
strategies to changing political circumstances were also vividly demonstrated in 
David L. Shambaugh's case study of Zhao Ziyang's provincial career.20 Because of 
such success of provincial leaders dining the Cultural Revolution, the Maoist 
leadership was eventually forced to call in the army to seize power at the provincial 
level. In Chang's view, the necessity to employ the army to exert the Centre's will 
was more a reflection of the Centre's weakness than of its power over the 
provinces. At the very least, it suggests that the strategies of provincial leaders had 
been effective in warding off challenges from rebel groups sanctioned by the 
central leadership.21
This is a very important observation. That provincial leaders were not blind 
to parochical interests might not come as much of a surprise. After all, the stakes 
were so high. It was not only their political future that was at risk, but also their 
physical survival, as well as the well-being of their families. However, it is 
important to interpret the significance of these central-provincial tensions in terms 
of the power relationship between the Centre and the provinces. For Chang, the use 
of coercion by the Centre suggests the shallowness of its power over the provinces.
The ability of the provinces to withstand the Centre was also noted in 
David S. G. Goodman's analysis of revolutionary committees.22 Goodman 
convincingly demonstrates that revolutionary committees were installed in order to 
enable the Centre to reimpose control over the provinces during the Cultural 
Revolution. Control was not, however, achieved easily or without resistance.
20David L. Shambaugh, The Making of a Premier: Zhao Ziyang's Provincial Career (Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1984).
21Parris H. Chang,"Provincial Party Leaders' Strategies for Survival", p.537.
22David S. G. Goodman, "The Provincial Revolutionary Committee in the People's Republic of 
China, 1967-1979: An Obituary", China Quarterly, No.85, (March 1981),pp.48-79.
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Notwithstanding their different focuses, the messages of Chang and Goodman are 
similar on one important point: both the incumbent leaders of provinces in 1966 
and the "revolutionary" leaders of 1967 were able to resist the will of the Centre for 
a long while, and yielded only when the Centre deployed the military. In Chang's 
view, the military was used to seize power from the pre-1966 power-holders. In 
Goodman's view, the military was used to reimpose control over the Red Guard 
groups active in the provinces. Thus, both accounts present an image of provincial 
power.
This image is reinforced by the accounts of economists and sociologists 
which question the limits of central penetration into the local economy. Drawing 
from William G. Skinner's work on the Chinese rural marketing structure, Audrey 
Donnithome maintains that the structure of the post-1949 Chinese economy has 
remained largely cellular.23 The primitive stage of modernization in China's 
economy disabled the central state from effectively penetrating into the vast 
expanse of the periphery. The strong autarchic tendencies of provinces were hence 
technologically rooted and, with the crudeness of the central plan, provinces simply 
fell back on their own resources.24 In Donnithome's view, the decentralization 
reforms of 1957-58 carried out both before, and in association with, the Great Leap 
Forward were a cause and a result of the traditionally centrifugal tendencies of the 
provinces. The inability of the Centre to reach effectively the lower-levels 
necessitated the delegation of power to the provinces; and the centrifugal 
tendencies of provinces were further reinforced by decentralization.25
This conclusion reached of provincial power was, however, an anomaly in 
the literature on central-provincial relations. Most works argued for a central 
dominance over the provinces, where the balance of the provincial dual roles of 
central agent and provincial spokesman weighs in favour of the former.26 Frederick 
C. Teiwes, like Parris H. Chang, studied the responses of provincial leaders to 
central policy at a time of great stress, namely the period preceding and following
23Skinner, G. William, "Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China" Parts I-m, Journal of 
Asian Studies Vol.24,1964-1965; Audrey Donnithome, "Central Economic Control in China" in 
Ruth Adams ed. Contemporary China (London: Peter Owen, 1969); "China’s Cellular Economy: 
Some Economic Trends since the Cultural Revolution", China Quarterly, No.52 (1972), pp. 605-19.
24Audrey Donnithome, China's Economic System (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1967), pp.504- 
5.
25Audrey Donnithome, "Comment: Centralization and Decentralization in China's Fiscal 
Management", China Quarterly, No,66 (1972), pp. 328-40; "Central Economic Control", p.151.
26In David M. Lampton’s case studies of six upwardly mobile leaders, half of which had strong 
territorial power bases, it is concluded that the six secured their advancement in the political system 
by largely serving as followers. See David M. Lampton, Paths to Power: Elite Mobility in 
Contemporary China (Ann Arbor: Centre for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1986), p. 
294.
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the provincial purges shortly prior to, as well as during, the Great Leap Forward in 
1957-1958 27 His conclusion however indicates a predominant Centre, and 
provincial leaders who respond passively to every whim of policy change at the 
Centre. Provincial leaders were eventually purged, in Teiwes1 view, because the 
policies at the Centre had changed too rapidly, as a result of the ascendancy of 
different groups of central leaders, for provincial leaders at a distance from the 
power centre to follow.28 Teiwes found a lower level of elite turnover in more 
resourceful provinces and interpreted this as a possible confirmation of the view of 
a predominant Centre over the provinces. Provincial leaders were "basically" 
responsive to the Centre, because "the rules of the game stressing provincial 
responsiveness to the center are clear".29 Those that could more successfully 
respond to central demands enjoyed a better chance of political survival. As a 
result, the "haves prosper, the have nots struggle as best they can."30
The case of provincial responsiveness to predominant central power is best 
elaborated by David Goodman. In his case studies of Sichuan and Guizhou at the 
period preceding the Cultural Revolution, Goodman found little evidence for the 
case of provincial power.31 As he has argued, provincial variations of policy 
formulation and implementation were often the result of provincial participation in 
the incremental process of national policy-making. In other words, provincial 
variations were often centrally mandated flexibilities and policy experiments, rather 
than an "exercise of provincial political power".32 Provincial conditions may have 
affected the form of these variations, but their effect was primarily either to 
constrain or facilitate the ability of provincial leaders in responding to central 
policies. Therefore, Guizhou's provincial first secretary, Zhou Lin, was removed in 
1965 "not simply because he had succumbed to provincial political traditions but 
also because he had failed as a political middleman."33 More precisely, what 
Goodman means is that Zhou was removed because he had been ineffective in 
carrying out the expected job of a central agent. The poverty and lower degree of 
social integration of Guizhou constrained the ability of provincial leaders to act as a 
central agent; whilst Sichuan's relative wealth and social homogeneity enhanced its
27Teiwes, "The Purge of Provincial Leaders"; "Provincial Politics in China: Themes and 
Variations", in John M. H. Lindbeck (ed.), China: Management of a Revolutionary Society 
(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1972), pp. 116-89.
28Ibid,, p. 132.
29Ibid., p.177.
30Ibid., p. 178.
31David S. G. Goodman, Centre and Province in the People's Republic of China: Sichuan and 
Guizhou, 1955-1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986)
32Ibid.,p,23.
33Ibid., p.183.
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leaders' ability to respond to the demands of the Centre.34
But why are provincial leaders "responsive" to the Centre? What leads 
these analyses to conclude that central predominance prevails, when the ability of 
provincial leaders to engage in various strategies of self-protection and 
enhancement against unwelcome central control has been demonstrated by both 
Chang and Goodman themselves? Is provincial responsiveness a sign of provincial 
weakness, as the "central predominance thesis" would imply, or of provincial 
strength? Chang obviously argues for the latter, but his seems to be a lone voice.35 
What, then, has made the case of central predominance so prevalent in the 
literature?
An explicit answer is given in Victor Falkenheim's work. In Falkenheim's 
words, "The case for provincial power...requires that it be shown to be autonomous. 
This case is difficult to make in the face of the historically clear ability of the 
central government to exact compliance...and to remove (provincial leaders) from 
office when necessary."36 Therefore, the command of coercive force by the Centre 
in the form of the power to hire and fire provincial leaders, and, as a last resort, the 
ability to deploy the military to suppress opposition, prescribes clearly the "rules of 
the game" under which provincial leaders are to be seen to be responsive to the 
Centre in order better to advance their self interests. Lynn White Hi's studies of 
Shanghai have shown sensitivity to the complexities of the concept of "local 
autonomy", and to the existence of activism amongst Shanghai's leaders and social 
groups.37 However, White nevertheless sees provincial activism as subsumed into 
the pulling force of the Centre. Shanghai's dominance in the national economy and 
the national ambition of its leaders amounted to Shanghai's leaders constituting a 
part of the Centre.38 Shanghai's leaders have been powerful, according to this view, 
not because Shanghai, as an industrialized city, produces a substantial share of the
34IbidL, p.20.
35See Parris Chang, "Decentralization of Power", Problems of Communism, Vol.21, No.4 (1972), 
pp.67-75; and an example of opposing views in Victor C. Falkenheim, "Continuing Central 
Predominance", Problems of Communism, Vol.21, No.4 (1972), pp.75-83. Similarly, Donnithome's 
view of a cellular socio-economic structure with decentralized political authority in the provinces 
was disputed by other economists. See Nicholas Lardy, "Centralization and Decentralization in 
China's Fiscal Management", China Quarterly, No.61 (March 1975), pp.25-60; "Reply", China 
Quarterly, No.66 (1976), pp.340-54.
36Victor C. Falkenheim, "Provincial Leadership in Fukien: 1949-66", in Scalapino (ed.), Elites in 
the People's Republic of China , p.202.
37Lynn White III, "Leadership in Shanghai, 1955-69", in Scalapino (ed.), Elites in the People's 
Republic of China, pp.302-77; "Shanghai's polity in Cultural Revolution", in Lewis (ed.), The City 
in Communist China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971), pp. 325-72; and "Local 
Autonomy in China During the Cultural Revolution: The Theoretical Uses of an Atypical Case", 
American Political Science Review, Vol.70 (1976), pp.479-91.
38Lynn White m , "Local Autonomy in China During the Cultural Revolution".
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nation's wealth, but because of their close connections with the central leadership. 
In fact, analysts have gone so far as pronouncing that the Shanghai leaders are 
national leaders in Shanghai.39 Provincial leaders were, therefore, invariably 
regarded as led by the Centre as an inevitable consequence of the latter's overriding 
power over their future and welfare.
The dominant view is, therefore, of an authoritarian unitary state where the 
Centre may freely impose its command of coercive force in order to extract 
compliance and penalize noncompliance. Provinces are consequently in an inferior 
and disadvantaged position. Indeed, in trying to distinguish the dual role of 
provincial leaders—central agent or provincial representative, Goodman assumes 
that the former is the more dominant role. His definition of the concept of "political 
middlemen" expresss this assumption clearly. In his own words, provincial leaders 
are by definition "political middlemen" as they "are appointed by the centre and 
dependent on it for their political future. However, the provincial leader who does 
not also satisfy local requirements will find it difficult to implement national 
policy."40 According to this definition, local requirements affect the behaviour of 
provincial leaders only because provincial leaders cannot ignore local conditions in 
their efforts to implement national policy. The dominance of the Centre is, 
therefore, a foregone conclusion. According to this view, the ability of provincial 
leaders to engage in a wide range of self-preservation strategies in conflict 
situations merely demonstrates the responsiveness of provincial leaders to shifts in 
policy and power configurations at the Centre. Their eventual defeat at the hands of 
the Centre during previous conflict situations therefore confirms the Centre's 
predominance over the provinces. The literature does not deny the existence of 
"parochical" provincial interests. These are seen to be the self-interests of 
provincial leaders for political advancement and physical survival, or that which is 
perceived by provincial leaders as in the interest of the province.41 But these "local 
requirements" are not considered as constituting autonomous provincial power.
39Ibid. See also David S. G. Goodman, "The Shanghai Connection: Shanghai's Role in National 
Politics", in Christopher Howe (ed.), Shanghai: Revolution and Development in an Asian 
Metropolis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp.125-52.
40Goodman, Centre and Province, p. 13.
4 iFor an insightful discussion of the meaning of "provincial interest", see Peter Ferdinand, "Interest 
Groups and Chinese Politics", in David S. G. Goodman (ed.), Groups and Politics in the People's 
Republic of China (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1984), pp. 18-9. Ferdinand argues that since 
it is impossible to determine with any certainty the motives of any individual's action, it is 
immaterial to attempt to limit the definition of provincial interest to the "self-interests" of individual 
leaders, or to the subjective perception of leaders of what should be in the "public interest" of the 
province. In other words, provincial interest simply means a conscious desire on the part of 
provincial leaders to have public policy move in a specific direction. The motives of the leaders, 
whether they are acting for self or public interest, are irrelevant because the two are often mixed and 
indistinguishable in real terms.
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They are no match for the coercive power commanded by the Centre. The emergent 
dominant image of provincial leaders is, therefore, of a group of agents responsive 
to the Centre, albeit through coercion.
Reform Studies: Province as the Unequal Bargaining "Partner"
The 1980s saw an unprecedented relaxation within the research 
environment as a concomitant development of the economic liberalization policies 
since 1979. Field work and collaborative research in China has since become 
possible, while previously researchers often had to speculate and infer from sketchy 
information. Developments in the discipline have also had an impact on the 
research agenda of China studies. The new institutionalism renews interest in the 
state structure's effect on the formulation and implementation of policies. As a 
result, China scholars also turned to the study of the importance of institutions in 
addition to their previous emphasis on leadership and elite preferences.42
The resultant literature has highlighted the complex and multifaceted 
relationships between bureaucratic actors in the political system as regards the 
formulation and implementation of policies.43 Not only do analysts find it 
necessary to account for the obvious gaps between reform policies as formulated 
and the results of their implementation, they are also finding it increasingly 
difficult clearly to define exactly what constitutes "failures of implementation".44 
Indeed, if there is "no chain of command", as such, in the political system,45 in the 
sense that there is no simple, straight-forward, and one-way flow of power between
42The impact of the changes in research environment and of certain other events in China is 
discussed in detail in Harding, "The Evolution of American Scholarship on Contemporary China", 
in Shambaugh (ed.), American Studies, pp. 14-40. On the influence of intellectual developments in 
the disciplines on China political studies, see Nina P. Halpem, "Studies of Chinese Politics", in 
Ibid., pp. 120-37. See also Harry Harding, "The Contemporary Study of Chinese Politics: An 
Introduction", China Quarterly, No.139 (September 1994), pp.699-703; Avery Goldstein, "Trends 
in the Study of Political Elites and Institutions in the PRC", China Quarterly, No.139 (September 
1994), pp.714-30.
43Major works taking the institutional approach include: David M. Lampton, "Chinese Politics: The 
Bargaining Treadmill", Issues and Studies, Vol.23, No.3 (1987), pp.11-41; Lampton (ed.), Policy 
Implementation in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); Kenneth 
Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988); Zhao Suisheng, "The Feeble Political 
Capacity of a Strong One-Party Regime—An Institutional Approach Toward the Formulation and 
Implementation of Economic Policy in Post-Mao Mainland China", Issues and Studies, Parts I & H, 
Vol.26, Nos. 1-2 (1990), pp.47-80,35-74; Lieberthal and Lampton (ed.), Bureaucracy, Politics and 
Decision-Making in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); and Susan 
Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1993).
^ S ee  David M. Lampton, "The Implementation Problem in Post-Mao China", in Lampton (ed.), 
Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China, pp.5-7.
45 Ibid., p.3.
39
one bureaucratic actor and another, and between the upper levels and lower levels, 
any clear distinction between policy formulation and implementation is inevitably 
elusive. Rather than focusing on the gap between policy formulation and policy 
implementation, the question which might have been raised within implementation 
literature is: whose policies are actually being put into practice?
This literature has, however, stuck largely to the traditional conception of 
policy formulation and implementation, albeit with multiple qualifications and 
redefinitions. The Centre is considered as the locus of policy formulation, and the 
provinces that of implementation. Given this, it is surprising that research regarding 
the central-provincial interface has been on such a limited scale, bearing in mind 
the importance of the provincial level as the intermediary of policy 
implementation.46 On the occasions when central-provincial relations has been 
considered, this has been on the basis of its being one of the numerous interagency 
relationships in the bureaucratic maze of interactions 47
The picture of central-provincial relations, as part of inter-agency 
relationships, as expressed in this new body of literature, is one of intense 
bargaining relationships. The image is one of "a center forced to bargain with very 
powerful localities"48, who are able to distort central policies to their advantage. 
Along this line Barry Naughton has described the Chinese system as characterized 
by a strong "implementation bias", as central policies have been distorted in ways 
advantageous to their implementors.49 Similarly, when discussing tax policy 
reforms, David Bachman notes the rule of an "iron law of autarky" as local 
authorities have deliberately withheld revenues that should, in theory, have gone to
460ne major reason was data accessibility, i.e., that Western scholars have found it easier to gain 
access to central bureaucratic agencies than to those of the provinces. Kenneth G. Lieberthal 
acknowledged that "No scholar, to our knowledge, has enjoyed sufficient access to the...territorial 
Party secretaries to provide major insights into these bureaucratic clusters." Kenneth G. Lieberthal, 
"Introduction: The 'Fragmented Authoritarianism' Model and Its Limitations", in Lieberthal and 
Lampton (eds.), Bureaucracy, Politics and Decision-Making, p.5. Studying the central-provincial 
interface requires observation at both the central and provincial levels, and ideally, of the central- 
provincial relationship in one province in relation to that of another, and a third province. More 
research efforts, over twice that of a central focus, are required. This however gives rise to the 
concern that the analytical perspectives of Chinese studies are often influenced by data accessibility. 
See Steven M. Goldstein, "Reforming Socialist Systems: Some Lessons of the Chinese Experience", 
Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol.21, No.2 (Summer 1988), p.231,
47 An exception has been found in a recently published edited volume by scholars of largely 
Mainland China origin which is solely dedicated to the theme of central-local relations. See Jia Hao 
and Lin Zhimin (eds.), Changing Central-Local Relations in China (Colorado: Westview Press,
1994).
48Goldstein, "Reforming Socialist Systems", p.228.
49Barry Naughton, "Decline of Central Control over Investment in Post-Mao China", in Lampton 
(ed.), Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China, pp.52-3.
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the central coffers.50 The prevalence of bargaining behaviour and the propensity of 
lower level authorities to abort and distort central reform policies has led Lieberthal 
and Lampton to characterize Chinese politics, as situated below the apex and above 
grassroots level, as a "fragmented authoritarianism" model.51 While the Chinese 
system is portrayed as necessarily authoritarian, such authority is nevertheless seen 
as highly fragmented in the "no man's land" between the very top and the very 
bottom.
This model of of Chinese politics as "fragmented authoritarianism", and its 
implication of a potent province, has to a large extent vindicated the "minority 
view" of strong provincial power as expressed in pluralist literature. Indeed, 
Lieberthal sees their approach as an attempt to synthesize two competing models. 
The more dominant model focuses on elite preferences and positing a centralized 
and top-down view. The other argues for a decentralized and "cellular" socio­
economic structure.52 As it turns out, the factors identified within implementation 
literature as being major obstacles to the smooth implementation of central reform 
policies, for instance, the decentralized control of vital resources, are precisely the 
product of the "cellularity" and decentralization thesis espoused by the "minority 
view" in the 1970s.53 This view is reinforced by a new generation of economists 
who, in the 1980s, started to refute the earlier dominant view of a highly 
centralized economic system in Maoist China. The work of Thomas P. Lyons on 
central planning and interprovincial integration, for instance, supports 
Donnithome's view of a decentralized economic structure. It argues that the central 
plan was simply too crude, communication gaps between the Centre and the 
provinces too common and subsequent failures too frequent and substantial for 
central planning to work effectively at provincial level.54 The politicial 
ramifications are thus clear. As Vivienne Shue has elaborated, the central state has 
never had an effective reach over the vast rural expanse at the periphery.55 The 
socio-economic-political structure of Maoist China was "honeycombed and 
cellular"; and in the post-Mao period, it was "fragmented". The affinity cannot be 
closer.
This affinity, in an institutional context, applies also to actors' behaviour.
50Bachman, "Implementing Chinese Tax Policy", p. 144.
5Lieberthal, "Introduction: The 'Fragmented Authoritarianism Model"', pp.8,20.
52Ibid., pp. 10-11.
53See Goldstein, "Reforming Socialist Systems", pp,226-27, for an explicit acknowlegement.
54Thomas P. Lyons, Economic Integration and Planning in Maoist China (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1987); "Planning and Inter-provincial Co-ordination in Maoist China", China 
Quarterly, No. 121 (March 1990), pp.36-60.
55Vivienne Shue, The Reach of the State (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988).
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The image of powerful provinces subverting the Centre's preferences through their 
implementation of reform policies tallies with the earlier view of Parris Chang's 
regarding the power of provinces to withstand unwelcome central policy. In Susan 
Shirk's comparison of the Chinese reform experience with that of the Soviet Union, 
the provinces are considered to have provided the Chinese reformist leaders with an 
alternative power base from which to start reforms that would undoubtedly affect 
the vested interests of the central bureaucracy.56 However, at times when reform 
has posed a threat to the interests of provincial governments, they have invariably 
acted in such a way as deliberately to resist or abort its progress. Therefore, the 
power of provinces vis-a-vis the central bureaucracy enabled reform to take off on 
a large scale in the early 1980s; but, on the other hand, the provincial power 
reinforced through reform enabled provinces to obstruct subsequent reforms. In 
Shirk's words, "Chinese-style economic reform was a policy equilibrium in the 
context of Chinese political institutions. Every time politicians or economic 
advisers tried to deviate from this formula—for example, by introducing 
universalistic price and tax reforms—or by recentralizing the fiscal system—they 
failed."57
Indeed, the framework of provincial bargaining behaviour had been 
remarkably consistent. While provincial leaders were perceived as highly 
successful in their ability to resist unwanted central interference during the Cultural 
Revolution, they were also regarded as "enterprising" actors, being selective in 
their support or sabotage of central reform policies. The substantive policies differ: 
class struggle versus economic reform. However, the manner in which these, 
ostensibly, disparate actors tailor their behaviour so as to maximize their perceived 
interest is remarkably similar. During both periods provincial leaders were equally 
"Machiavellian" in their substantive stances. During the Cultural Revolution, 
provincial leaders emulated the revolutionary rhetoric of the Centre, cultivating 
"royalist" rebel groups whilst suppressing those hostile to them. In true essence 
they "waved the red flag in order to oppose the red flag". During the reform period, 
provincial leaders have both supported and opposed reforms. They supported those 
reforms which advanced their perceived interests and opposed those working 
against them. Moreover, when opposing unwanted reforms, provincial leaders 
manipulated the language of reform in the same way as their precedessors had 
manipulated the language of political struggle when opposing struggles against 
themselves. They would stress, for example, the adverse effects of the unwelcome 
reforms on the "enthusiasm" of the lower levels to increase production. During the
56Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform.
57Ibid.,p.l6-7.
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Cultural Revolution, provincial leaders had suppressed "hostile" rebel groups by 
declaring them "counterrevolutionaries".58 The events of both periods show that 
provincial leaders were not passive actors. Rather than merely responding to central 
demands, provincial leaders mobilized substantial resources for their own use. 
Their lower status in the state hierarchy may have made them the weaker partner of 
the bargaining relationship with the Centre. However, despite the disparity in 
theoretical power, the provinces have shown themselves nonetheless to have no 
small measure of power in their own right.
Unresolved Questions
Indeterminacy of Provincial Power
Through the progression of "central agent" to "responsive province", to the 
asymmetrical bargaining relationship with the Centre, Western China scholars have 
deepened their understanding of the place of the provinces within the Chinese 
political system. It has been eventually recognized that provinces do, in fact, wield 
power. However, this conclusion on provincial power is often drawn from the post- 
Mao reform period based on observations of discrepancies between pronounced 
central policy objectives and the outcome of implementation, as well as on the 
frequent expositions of "localistic behaviour" of provincial and lower level officials 
by central officials. Field work opportunities and the proximity of researchers to 
the field since the 1980s has made researchers more prone to accept the localism 
descriptions by Chinese officials at face value than researchers of an earlier period 
relying mostly on official documentary material for information might have been. 
While discrepancies of some kind undoubtedly existed, a suitable approach 
regarding the interpretation of the meaning of such discrepancies has remained 
elusive. How is the significance of the prevalence of provincial bargaining 
behaviour in the context of central-provincial power relations assessed? What is 
meant when describing provinces as powerful but unequal bargaining partners? 
Does the new implementation literature and, in particular, the "fragmented 
authoritarianism" model, imply that provinces are in the process of gaining more 
power, but have still not approached a level which would make them equal 
bargaining partners with the Centre?
58Reference about the framework of bargaining in post-Mao China is found in Susan Shirk, "The 
Chinese Political System and the Political Strategy of Economic Reform", in Lieberthal and 
Lampton (eds.), pp.59-91. Details of the Machiavelli strategies of provincial leaders and how they 
usurped the language of Maoist leadership in the effort of self-preservation during the 1966-1968 
period are found in the illuminating article of Chang, "Provincial Party Leaders’ Strategies for 
Survival".
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The fact that these important questions are as yet unanswered poses an 
indeterminate element in the understanding of central-provincial relationship as 
expressed in literature on this subject. On the one hand, the literature has made a 
strong case for provincial power. Provincial leaders are undoubtedly not merely a 
central agent. On the other hand, the literature maintains that the central leadership 
has continued to play a dominant role in the course of events. They find that, in 
many instances, "higher-level leaders were able to impose their will on lower levels 
without serious institutional constraints".59 Therefore, the power of the provinces 
during the reform period may only amount to another form of "delegated provincial 
flexibilties". As Naughton argues in his analysis of declining central control over 
investment, the central leadership "have shown themselves willing to accept a 
dramatic decline in their own control over investment resources in the pursuit of 
the elusive goals of 'reform'. The struggles between the Center and locality for 
control...thus remain fundamentally unequal because the Center fights with one 
hand tied behind its back."60 (emphasis added) The apparent conclusion on the 
central-provincial relationship is, therefore, that the substantial power which the 
provinces have been seen to enjoy is, again, merely a result of central policy. As 
and when the Centre decides otherwise, and as long as the central leadership is not 
weakened by divisions among its own ranks, the will of the Centre should 
invariably prevail.61
It is tenuous entirely to attribute the power of provinces, as exhibited in the 
intensity of their bargaining behaviour, and in the substantial distortions of reform 
policies at provincial level, to the decision of the central leadership not to impose 
its will. To suggest such immediately leads one to ask: why have the central leaders 
not acted sooner and more decisively in curbing the "power" of the provinces about 
whom they frequently and openly complained? When answering this question, it is 
necessary once more to look at the nature of provincial power.
The fact that this question has yet to be answered would probably explain 
why scholars have chosen a "middle-of-the-road" conclusion regarding the balance 
of power between the Centre and the provinces. As Lieberthal observed of their 
fragmented authoritarianism model, this model "does not present the Center as
59Lieberthal, "Introduction: The Fragmented Authoritarianism' Model", p. 16.
60Naughton, "The Decline of Central Control", p,78.
61In this connection see David Zweig, "Context and Content in Policy Implementation: Household 
Contracts and Decollectivation, 1977-1983", in Lampton (ed.), Policy Implementation in Post-Mao 
China, pp.255-283. Zweig argues that elite constancy, commitment, and attention were crucial 
factors to successful implementation of agricultural responsibility policy.
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helpless, the bureaucracies as unable to co-operate, or the locales as all 
powerful."62 Nevertheless, the inclination is towards central power. This inclination 
is incorporated within the scope of the "fragmented authoritarianism" model. This 
model describes the political scene situated below the apex of the system and above 
local level, focusing on the part of the political system in-between the ministries 
and the provinces. At both ends of the political system, centralization rather than 
fragmentation is the dominant theme.63 Ministers and provincial leaders are of the 
same bureaucratic rank; and bargaining is rife between equals. However, whenever 
the central leaders at the apex of the system choose to intervene, the model of 
"fragmented authoritarianism" ceases to apply as provincial leaders will be 
overpowered. Lieberthal has therefore written, "In sum, the picture... suggests that 
the top leadership in China remains very powerful, despite the reforms."64 
Lieberthal and Oksenberg have earlier come to a similar conclusion: "(B)oth Center 
and province command resources that the other needs, with the balance-of-power 
between the two in the Center's favour."65 This conclusion of greater dominance of 
the Centre is, on the whole, similar to that of the "majority view" as expressed in 
pluralist literature. Studying central-provincial relations of an earlier period, this 
majority view argued that, despite the multitude of self-enhancement strategies of 
provincial leaders and decentralization reforms, the Centre nevertheless continued 
to be the predominant party.
It is, therefore, ironical that after the documentation of numerous instances 
of "localistic" behaviour, and subsequent rejection of the earlier view of a highly 
centralized political system (at least for politics within the state bureaucracy below 
the apex), the understanding of central-provincial relations has turned full circle. 
The Centre is, once more, regarded as the predominant force overpowering in its 
relationship with the provinces. However, as a result of new data available since 
implementation of reform policies, this conclusion of central predominance is 
precarious. Consequently, it seems that either way of understanding central- 
provincial relations—central predominance or provincial power—stands on 
slippery ground. A conclusion acknowledging provincial power disputes the 
obvious superiority of central power, particularly taking into account the Centre's 
power to appoint and dismiss provincial leaders, and when necessary, to deploy the 
army to obtain compliance. However, a conclusion arguing for continued central 
predominance is equally unsatisfactory. It is unsatisfactory because it is almost
62Lieberthal, "Introduction: The ’Fragmented Authoritarianism' Model", p.10.
63Ibid, pp.8,20.
^Ibid,, p.16.
^Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Policy Making in China, p.350.
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tautologically true, other than in the extreme case of secessionist movements and 
the break-up of China as a unified nation. Moreover, if one concludes that the 
provincial discretions make no substantive difference to the central-provincial 
relationship, one is still necessary to state precisely what differences the discretions 
do make. There is obviously a need to explain the meaning of this discretionary 
behaviour which researchers have so avidly observed and which the literature has 
so laboriously documented. This sustained failure yet to do so makes a conclusion 
forseeing continued central predominance highly questionable.
The Inability to Explain Change
As a result of this failure to make sense of the meaning of bargaining 
activities and increasing provincial discretions, the secondary literature has thus 
been unable to account for changes within the central-provincial relationship. It 
might reasonably be surmised that bargaining activities have significance, and they 
do make some difference. But the question is: what kind of difference? Some 
scholars have attributed the difficulty in its identification and explanation to data 
deficiency.66 It has been argued that inadequate access to information on the pre­
reform period has disabled analysts from assessing the full extent of continuity and 
change before and after post-Mao reform.
However, data deficiency is not the only problem, and is certainly not the 
sole cause of the inability of literature to account for any change. The solution to 
such failure is more in the literature itself, and in its conceptual framework and 
methodology. This can be clarified by means of a hypothetical situation. It may be 
assumed that it is now possible to obtain enough data on the Maoist period to 
compare the extent of provincial power during both periods. The comparison could 
take the form of a chart showing the differential of power between the provinces 
and the Centre at different times.
Two crucial problems remain unresolved, however. First, by what yardstick 
can we compare the power of provinces and the power of the Centre, and thereby 
arrive at a view of their relative balance of power? The root of the question is: what 
constitutes "power"? The literature on central-provincial relations has so far tended 
to be ambivalent on the question of that which constitutes the power of the 
provinces, whilst unanimous in stressing the importance of the coercive power of 
the Centre over the provinces. With this predisposition, the balance of power will
66Lieberthal, "Introduction: The Fragmented Authoritarianism' Model", pp.25-7.
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inevitably tilt in the Centre's favour, as observed above.
Second, the chart of provincial power and central power is likely to show 
variations over different periods. The problem is how to make sense of the 
variations. Does this mean that the development of provincial power may be 
conceived in some sort of continuum? Also, if there is a higher occurrence of 
provincial discretions during the reform period, does this then amount to an 
incremental accumulation of provincial power vis-a-vis the power of the Centre? 
The implementation literature has apparently answered in the affirmative. As 
Steven Goldstein points out, the assumption of some kind of evolutionary 
framework of central-provincial relations is evident within implementation 
literature.67 The existence of an evolutionary process is clearly assumed in 
Lieberthal's writings on the state of the fragmented authoritarian polity as of the 
early 1990s, "The fragmentation has not reached the point where its constituent 
parts have the legitimate autonomy characteristics of a pluralist system."68 From 
this perspective, the central-provincial relationship thus resembles a unilinear 
framework within which the forces of fragmentation at provincial level accumulate 
in the process of its operation.
The simplicity of a linear model is disturbing. It is disturbing because it 
suggests, implicitly at least, that as fragmentation forces accumulate, the forces of 
centralization will in due course be overwhelmed. The unanswered question is how 
this "overwhelming" can be effected. In this aspect the evolutionary framework 
remains silent. As Lieberthal himself rightly noted, the gap between fragmentation 
and legitimate autonomy is huge and of a qualitative kind. More fragmentation will 
not automatically and by the sheer force of its accumulated weight bring about 
legitimate autonomy. The literature, however, provides no room to explore the 
question of how exactly qualitative change can take place, even though it 
acknowledges, somewhat intuitively, the possibility of qualitative change. Its 
implicit linear framework of change precludes such an exploration.
Theoretical Issues
The failure of central-provincial relations literature to explain the meaning 
of provincial discretionary behaviour and to account for change are the result of 
theoretical failures over the conception of power. First, confusion has arisen over 
the role of coercion within a power relationship. This is behind the tautology of the
67Goldstein, "Reforming Socialist Systems", p.231.
68Lieberthal, "Introduction: The Fragmented Authoritarianism' Model", p. 12.
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thesis of "continued central predominance". Second, in most studies of central- 
provincial relations the dominant concept of power as zero-sum and that of the 
centrist perspective reinforce one another. The result is a static picture of central- 
provincial relations where the Centre and the provinces are in a seemingly endless 
cycle of conflict.
Coercion and Power
This is not the place to discuss the full range of the debate over the concept 
of power,69 The task to be undertaken here is much more limited: to identify the 
implicit concept of power within the central-provincial literature discussed above, 
and to suggest an alternative concept. The purpose of this discussion is to provide a 
better analytical tool through which to understand China's central-provincial 
relations.
A central question in this discussion is: what is the relationship between 
coercion and the concept of power? Scholars writing on China's central-provincial 
relations and interagency relations have generally eschewed explicit discussion of 
their specific concept of power. In most cases when explicit reference has been 
made to the sources and bases of power of the Centre or the provinces, it has been 
based on Robert A. Dahl's notion of power "between the lines". It would be 
material, therefore, to start this discussion with a brief summary of Dahl's concept 
of power.
As the major theorist of the pluralism school in the study of the Western 
political system, Robert A. Dahl considers power as a relation amongst people. His 
intuitive idea of power can be expressed in his statement: "A has power over B to 
the extent that he can get B to do something that B wound not otherwise do."70 
Dahl understands "power" in terms of its four aspects: the base of power, means of 
power, amount of power, and scope of power.71 The base of an actor's power 
"consists of all the resources, acts, objects, etc—that he can exploit in order to 
affect the behaviour of another."72 A major characteristic of the base of power is 
that it is "inert, passive". To activate the base, therefore, an actor has to engage in
69For a glimpse of the debate and the complexities of the concept, see Roderick Bell, David V. 
Edwards, and R. Harrison Wagner (eds.), Political Power: A Reader in Theory and Research (New 
York: The Free Press, 1969); and Dennis H. Wrong, Power: Its Forms, Bases and Uses (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1979).
70Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power", originally printed in Behavioral Science, (1957), 
pp.201-15, reprinted in Bell, Edwards, and Harrison (eds.), Political Power, p.80.
71Ibid., p.80.
72Ibid„p.81.
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some actions. Such actions engaged are the "means of power". For instance, while 
the ability to exercise patronage, and the option of a veto are amongst the bases of 
power available to the President of the United States over the Senate, the President 
has nevertheless to pledge promises of patronage, or indicate a threat of veto in his 
attempt to influence the Senate. Therefore "the means is a mediating activity by A 
between A's base and B's response."73 Meanwhile, the "scope" of A’s power refers 
to the reach of A's means of power, and what possible responses B might make. 
The resultant ability of A to bend B to its will constitutes the "amount" of power 
which A has. In Dahl's words, the amount of power can be "represented by a 
probability statement: e.g. 'the chances are 9 out 10 that if the President promises a 
judgeship to five key Senators, the Senate will not override his veto1".74
The similarity between Dahl's concept of power and that employed by the 
central-provincial relations literature is obvious. In the mainstream of this 
literature, the sources of central control are identified as: (1) the power of the 
Centre to appoint and dismiss provincial leaders, (2) the Centre’s effective control 
of physical forces of coercion, specifically the military, (3) the Centre's control 
over the propaganda apparatus, and (4) the Centre's control over key economic 
resources.75 Meanwhile, the sources of provincial autonomy are (1) the sheer size 
of the country, (2) the cumulative result of temporary grants of authority by the 
Centre in the past, and (3) its intermediate position within the state hierarchy, 
which makes the province "the gatekeeper guarding and providing access (of the 
Centre) to local levels."76 A shift in terminology reveals that these "sources of 
power" are actually Dahl's "bases of power" by another name.
The strength of Dahl's concept of power lies in its distinctions between the 
different aspects of power. Since the "base of power" is inert and passive, it is 
irrelevant to the "amount of power" A is able to exert on B unless it is effectively 
activated by some "means of power". Therefore, while the "base of power" 
encompasses all resources A may potentially employ in order to effect the 
behaviour of B, the extent of power A eventually exercises over B depends very 
much on what "means" of power A possesses, and how effective these are. There is 
hence a significant gap between one's bases of power and the amount of power one 
actually has over others, the gap depending on the means, which is the mediating 
process, and the variables which affect it. Dahl's differentiation of the four aspects
73Ibid,
74Ibid.
75Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Policy Making in China, pp.347-48. 
76Ibid., pp.349-50.
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of power highlights the existence of this gap between one's potential power and 
one's actual power on a specific occasion.
The danger of employing Dahl's concept of power is the greatest when one 
is not sensitive to these distinctions, which is the major problem relating to the 
literature on central-provincial relations.77 In such literature the base of power is 
often confused with the amount of power actually exercised. The lists of sources of 
central and provincial power noted above include all identifiable sources of 
potential power upon which the Centre and provinces may draw in their 
interactions with one another. However, analysts have neither identified nor 
explained the mediating process whereby the extent of applicability of the sources 
of power in an actual situation is specified. Rather than being identified as the 
dependent variable in accordance with Dahl's concept, the base of power has been 
taken as the independent variable through which to interpret the meaning of 
bargaining activity between the Centre and the provinces. On taking the base of 
power as the actual power in force, this literature tends to compare two "lists" of 
power, one of the Centre and one of the provinces, and somehow arrive at a 
judgement on the balance of power.
Mistaking the base of power for actual power has serious implication when 
attempting to understand the central-provincial relationship. By definition, 
provincial governments are in a subordinated position vis-a-vis the Centre, which 
commands superior control over vital resources through its superior organizational 
status. For instance, control over the military certainly constitutes a base of power 
of the Centre, as it can deploy this resource as a means to extracting compliance 
from provinces. As a result, an empirical analysis of the process of bargaining 
behaviour and policy making appears immaterial to an understanding of central- 
provincial relations. A simple calculation of the balance of military power between 
the Centre and provinces will suffice.
Here it is noteworthy that some scholars do in fact recognize the 
complexities of the power concept. Specifically, Victor Falkenheim, in admitting to 
the "ambiguities in the concept of power itself",78 notes that there are limits to 
which the Centre can use its coercive power on the provinces. Referring to
77For an example of analysts focusing on the analysis of the "bases of power" of political actors in 
attempting to explain their success and failure in political survival, disregarding the gap between the 
potentiality of such power and the actual power wielded, see Lowell Dittmer, "Bases of Power in 
Chinese Politics: A Theory and an Analysis of the Fall of the 'Gang of Four1", World Politics, 
Vol.31 (October 1978), pp.26-60.
78Falkenheim, "Provincial Leadership in Fukien", p.200.
50
provincial purges as one form of the Centre's coercive power over provinces, he 
notes that "purges are an extreme and relatively infrequent manifestation of central 
dissatisfaction and as such are too gross an indicator to enable us to monitor 
accurately central responses to provincial performance...Understanding the normal 
process of provincial administrative leadership...involves understanding what goes 
on within those (tolerable) limits (when there are no purges) and what precisely 
those limits are."79 (emphasis added) In other words, the crucial focus of 
understanding of the central-provincial relationship should be on normal periods 
when military coercive force or purges are not used. Rather than dwelling on the 
established fear of the superior coercive power of the Centre, it is important to 
identify its limits.
However, as noted in earlier discussion, these theoretical ponderances have 
not borne fruit in their subsequent conclusions. For instance, despite his awareness 
of the role of coercion, Falkenheim, in his empirical analysis of Fujian, 
nevertheless explains events in terms of the superior coercive power of the Centre 
over the provinces. According to his argument, as the Centre can hire and fire 
provincial leaders, power essentially flows downwards from the Centre. Any 
occurrence of provincial discretions in Fujian prior to the Cultural Revolution was, 
therefore, merely a result of "mandated flexibility".80 The implicit use of Dahl's 
"base of power" concept led Falkenheim to a conclusion based on the very 
precarious assumption he had originally guarded against. It is obvious, therefore, 
an alternative concept of power is necessary to provide the analytical key to a better 
understanding of the role of coercion in the power relationship between the Centre 
and the provinces, and to end the tautological nature of central power.
This alternative is found in Talcott Parson's concept of power. The major 
difference between Parsons and Dahl is that while coercion is clearly one of those 
resources forming the base of power in Dahl's concept, according to Parsons, 
"securing compliance...simply by threat of superior force is not (in itself) an 
exercise of power."81 As such, Parsons regards the focus for analysis of a power 
relationship as exclusive of the use of coercion. However, this does not mean that 
coercion has absolutely no position in Parsons' concept of power. Power for 
Parsons is a phenomenon of both coercion and consensus, but coercion, as such, is 
not the crucial variable in the exercise of power in a complex society.
79Ibid., pp.202-3,
80Ibid,, p.244,
81 Talcott Parsons, "On the Concept of Power", in Bell, Edwards, and Wagner (eds.), Political 
Power, p.257.
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So what is the role of coercion in this concept of power, and if coercion is 
not the pertinent variable in understanding a power relationship, what is, then, 
pertinent? The role of coercion in any exercise of power, according to Parsons, is 
the "ground" of power.82 As the "ground" its role is akin to the role of gold metal as 
regards the value of money within a gold-based monetary system. The value of the 
precious metal gives some kind of security to the exchange value of money, but the 
value of money as a medium of exchange is not reducible to the total value of gold 
in the market. Likewise, while any exercise of power by A over B embodies 
coercion as the "ground" of power, the amount of power, in Dahl's terminology, is 
not reducible solely to the amount of coercion A possesses. For power to be 
assessed solely in terms of coercion potential, the system would need to be very 
primitive. In Parsons' own words, "just as a monetary system resting entirely on 
gold as the actual medium of exchange is a very primitive one,...so a power system 
in which the only negative sanction is the threat of force is a primitive one which 
cannot function to mediate a complex system of organizational coordination—it is 
far too "blunt" an instrument."
In other words, whilst coercion is the "ground" of power, the crucial 
variable of the exercise of power in a complex society lies elsewhere. Given the 
limited amount of coercion in any system, possessed by any actor, it is the ability 
of the actors to obtain compliance via symbolic means which reflects the power of 
the actor. Power in this stricter sense must, in Parsons’ words, "be generalized and 
not solely a function of one particular sanctioning act which the user is in a position 
to impose, and the medium used must be 'symbolic'".83
Parsons' concept of power carries significant implications. Unlike Dahl, 
and others, who treat coercion as one of the bases of power, and see the exercise of 
power as sometimes relating to the use of coercion, and at other times to consensus, 
Parsons insists that power is a phenomenon which essentially integrates both 
coercion and consensus. By seeing power as oscillating between different "forms of 
power", Dahl's concept posits an indeterminate picture of power relations between 
the Centre and the provinces. As the literature on China's central-provincial 
relations has shown, provinces are sometimes portrayed as powerful actors, and at 
other times as passive and virtually helpless. The "superiority" of the coercive form 
of power has also cast doubt on the significance of other forms of power, for 
instance economic power in economic policy bargaining. By rejecting this eclectic
82Ibid., p.260.
83Ibid„ p.257.
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concept of different forms of power, and by specifying the role of coercion as the 
ground of power, Parsons has successfully clarified the essence of a power 
relationship as well as the focus of power analysis.84
Parsons' concept of power has particular utility in the analysis of power 
relationships in which the distribuition of coercive resources is inherently unequal: 
the central-provincial relationship. As the national level of government, the Centre 
is in a superior organizational position in its role. The extent and locus of superior 
authority of the Centre over the intermediate level may vary depending on the 
details of the political system. However, there is always some superiority, one 
invariable area of central superiority being the Centre's control over the nation's 
military force. By excluding the use of coercion in the study of power, therefore, 
Parsons avoids the tautological trap of Dahl's concept, which leads analysts to 
conclude that the Centre is powerful because it is the Centre.
Power as Zero-Sum Game?
A related issue of equal importance is whether power between the Centre 
and the provinces constitutes a zero-sum game. Like the role of coercion in power, 
the ambivalence of this issue within the secondary literature has contributed to gaps 
in previous interpretations of China's central-provincial power relations. When 
refuting the generality of the "game theory", Parsons argues that power within a 
system does not necessarily constitute a zero-sum game. On drawing an analogy 
with the creation of credits in the bank system, and the contraction of the value of 
money under inflation, Parsons maintains that the total supply of power in a 
system, as the generalized medium of exchange in the realm of politics, can expand 
as well as contract, in a way similar to the supply of money in the realm of 
economics.85 Nevertheless, as Jae Ho Chung has noted, the dominant assumption 
within central-provincial relations literature is that power between the Centre and 
the provinces is a zero-sum game.86 This is evident from the attempts of literature 
to draw conclusions on the question of the balance of power. Somehow a balance 
sheet of power between the Centre and the provinces has to be presented, and a 
judgement made as to which party is more powerful on balance. This assumption 
predates the post-Mao reform period, yet it is further reinforced by the 
concentration of research attention on the fiscal system in the reform period.87 As
84Ibid., pp.251,256-7,280.
85Parsons, "On the Concept of Political Power", pp.271-79.
86Jae Ho Chung, "Studies of Central-Provincial Relations in the People's Republic of China: A 
Mid-Term Appraisal", China Quarterly, (forthcoming in No. 142, June 1995)
87This concentration on one aspect of central-provincial relations—the fiscal relationship—is
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Chung has noted, the simplicity of the fiscal relationship, as expressed in 
percentage terms of provincial remittance and retained revenue, easily projects a 
"zero-sum" image of central-provincial relations.88 However, the implications of 
these fiscal changes in relation to the respective powers of the Centre and the 
provinces over policy formulation and implementation have been largely 
overlooked. The important question, "so what?", remains unasked within the 
compelling simplicity of budgetary figures.89
The assumption of the zero-sum nature of central-provincial power 
relations can be attributed to the dominance of the centrist perspective in such 
literature. Central-provincial relations have been studied primarily as a 
phenomenon of declining central control and weakening state capacity.90 This is 
especially the case in the more recent body of literature focusing on the post-Mao 
period. The focus of analysis of these works is invariably one: the factors and 
process which lead to the apparent decline of central control over policy 
implementation by the provinces. The perspective is from the top-down.
As noted earlier, reform studies have tended to adopt the traditional 
distinction between policy formulation by the Centre and implementation by the 
provinces. However, analysts do recognize the fact that policies are often 
formulated at the top as well as at the lower levels. They also fully acknowledge 
that the original intentions of central leaders with regard to a policy are often at 
variance with that which eventuates after implementation. Nevertheless, the 
insistence on posing the explanandum of research as an implementation bias leads
largely led by the course of events during reform. Some examples of these works are: Michel 
Oksenberg and James Tong,"The Evolution of Central-Provincial Fiscal Relations in China, 1971- 
1984: The Formal System", China Quarterly, No. 125 (March 1991), pp. 1-32; James Tong, "Fiscal 
Reform, Elite Turnover and Central-Provincial Relations in Post-Mao China", Australian Journal of 
Chinese Affairs, No.22 (July 1989), pp.1-28; Susan Shirk, "Playing to the Provinces: Deng 
Xiaoping's Political Strategy of Economic Reform", Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol.23, 
No.3 (Autumn/Winter 1990), pp.227-58; Wang Shaoguang, "Central-Local Fiscal Politics in 
China", and Lin Zhimin, "Reform and Shanghai: Changing Central-Local Fiscal Relations”, in Jia 
Hao and Lin Zhimin (eds.), Changing Central-Local Relations in China, pp. 91-112, 239-60; 
Christine P.W. Wong, "Central-Local Relations in an Era of Fiscal Decline: The Paradox of Fiscal 
Decentralization in Post-Mao China", China Quarterly, No.128 (December 1991), pp.691-715; 
Reeitsu Kojima, "The Growing Fiscal Authority of Provincial-level Governments in China", The 
Developing Economies, Vol.30, No.4 (December 1992), pp.315-46; and David Bachman, 
"Implementing Chinese Tax Policy", in Lampton (ed.), Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China, 
pp. 119-56.
88Ibid., p. 17.
89Ibid. See Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Policy Making in China, p.351, for a similar observation of 
the indeterminacy of the meaning of a revenue flow between the Centre and a province about their 
relationship.
90Two works which explicitly employed the state capacity paradigm are: Jia Hao and Lin Zhimin 
(eds.), Changing Central-Local Relations in China; Zhao Suisheng, "The Feeble Political Capacity 
of a Strong One-Party Regime".
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researchers to view the relationship between the Centre and the provinces as an 
issue of central control and provincial compliance.91 When posing the research 
question in terms of the rise and fall of central control, analysts invariably see the 
answer in terms of a corresponding rise and fall in centraAprovincial power. In 
other words, the relationship is bound to be of a zero-sum nature.
But how does a power relationship resemble a zero-sum game, if, as 
Parsons has argued, the total supply of power is a variable? The answer is found in 
the absence of a regularized and institutionalized system of conflict resolution 
within the Chinese political system. As Tang Tsou has noted, political conflicts 
throughout the Chinese history are characterized by a "total victory versus total 
defeat" situation in which the winning side retains "all real power to make 
decisions, whereas the other side is totally defeated."92 Because of the low level of 
institutionalization of power and the absence of a regularized system to resolve 
conflicts among different forces of power within the system, political struggles in 
China are notable for their ferocity. If there is a prospect of total victory, it is 
argued, the actor with the upper hand in the conflict will not hesitate totally to 
smash its opponent. The target is total victory, and the defeated opponent is thus 
totally "eliminated" from the scene. In Tsou's words, although "at times there were 
compromises, concessions, admissions of defeat, negotiations, and even co­
operation with...opposing forces,..those were tactical measures" in search for a 
better opportunity to strike the final blow 93 Therefore, actors may temporize but 
not compromise. The tradition of political authoritarianism from imperial times has 
forestalled the development of "a politics of compromise" in China.94 The power 
relationship in this context is therefore a "A wins, B loses", zero-sum, situation.
To understand central-provincial relations with the above zero-sum 
framework, however, raises unsurmountable questions. Specifically, this 
framework disables the analyst from envisaging the circumstances whereby the 
rules of the game may be changed. While analysts agree that the ferocity of 
previous political struggles in China was due to the authoritarian nature and the low 
level of institutionalization of the political system, their zero-sum analysis of the
91The irony of the recognition of the complexities of a definition of "implementation failures", and 
the eventual decision to take policy formulation as a static concept and solely as reflected in the 
declarative policy statement of the Centre, is most remarkable in Lampton (ed.), Policy 
Implementation. See especially Lampton, "The Implementation Problem", p.7.
92Tang Tsou, "The Tiananmen Tragedy: The State-Society Relationship, Choices, and Mechanisms 
in Historical Perspective", in Brantly Womack (ed.), Contemporary Chinese Politics in Historical 
Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.266.
93IbitL, p.319.
94Joseph Fewsmith, Dilemmas of Reform in China: Political Conflict and Ecommic Debate 
(Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), pp.10-12.
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central-provincial relationship suggests a static picture of power in which 
centralization and decentralization appear in an endless cycle. As a result they have 
been unable to discern any possibility of change within this cyclical pattern, other 
than through the mutual goodwill of central and provincial leaders to reach 
between themselves a "historical compromise".95 In other words, while analysts 
recognize that successive decentralizations have resulted in a dispersion of 
authority and resources from the Centre, and feel intuitively that the system might 
evolve towards genuine autonomy for the provinces, the literature is silent as 
regards the possible circumstances under which this "qualitative" change in the 
nature of central-provincial relationship could come about.96 The Chinese system, 
it would seem, is stuck in its historical tradition of authoritarianism and in a cycle 
of decentralization and centralization. The only possible way out, as the literature 
has implicitly suggested, is through the emergence of "enlightened" leaders.
To escape from such pessimistic determinism it is necessary to depart from 
the centrist perspective and the state capacity paradigm. Instead of posing the 
research question in terms of the decline of central control over unruly provinces, 
there should be a reconceptualization of central-provincial relations as an 
interactive process in which both the Centre and the provinces struggle hard in 
order to attain their respective objectives. The asymmetry of the relationship means 
that changes in institutional rules have to be agreed to and formally laid by the 
Centre. However, the Centre does not have "carte blanche" in this respect. Nor is it 
the case that that which is laid down by the Centre is invariably subverted by the 
provinces. It is rather pressure from the provinces which leads the Centre to 
prescribe the rules in such a way that they protect its interests as well as those of 
the provinces.
An illustration of this interactive process between the Centre and the 
provinces is found in Susan Shirk's study of economic reform.97 In studying the 
decision mode in 1979 to implement nationwide fiscal reform, Shirk found that 
reform was a means employed by the central bureaucracy to "divest (themselves 
of) responsibility", as opposed to being a preconceived plan to decentralize fiscal 
autonomy to the provinces, as has previously been assumed by Western scholars.98 
Given the status quo of the 1970s, central officials at the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) concluded that the only way to improve the interests of the central coffers at
95See Jia Hao and Lin Zhimin, Changing Central-Local Relations in China, p. 10.
96For an example, see Lieberthal, "Introduction: The 'Fragmented Authoritarianism' Model", p. 12.
97Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform.
98Ibid., p.163.
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that time was through the further step of decentralization. In Shirk's words, "the 
MOF had a hard enough time managing the family without enough money...The 
children (the provinces) argued among themselves and complained that the family 
head had mistreated them. In that situation, (the MOF leaders clearly felt that) it 
was better for the family head to divide the family and put the children off on their 
own. Hence, the family metaphor of the decentralization policy: dividing the family 
by splitting up the kitchen."99
Therefore the 1980 nationwide fiscal reform was the result of a 
compromise between the Centre and the provinces. From the perspective of the 
Centre, further decentralization of fiscal authority was the only possible way to 
improve its fiscal situation. The Centre was constrained in the options it could take. 
The dispersion of resources in the early 1970s had led to a drastic decline in central 
fiscal revenue throughout the decade in both relative and absolute terms. It was 
considered impossible to recentralize enough resources from the provinces and to 
reimpose the centralized fiscal regime of the early 1950s. But without such 
recentralization, the Centre, with its shrinking share of resources, could not cope 
with its share of responsibility. The major fiscal problem of the Centre on the eve 
of fiscal reform was thus one of arresting the decline in central revenue, whilst 
delegating more spending responsibility to the provinces. By signing a multiple- 
year contract with provinces guaranteeing a fixed share of central revenue, the 
Centre therefore "clarified the responsibilities as well as resources of each tier of 
government and guaranteed central income at current levels."1®0 (emphasis added)
Shirk's account reveals, therefore, a dynamic picture of central-provincial 
relations in which both the Centre and the provinces act within each other's 
constraints. Rather than seeing the relationship as one between a weakening but 
"all-powerful" Centre and the subordinated, responsive, yet "undisciplined" 
parochical provinces, Shirk sees the Centre responding to powerful provinces 
whilst seeking to strike the best deal to enhance its interests. Power between the 
Centre and the provinces is therefore not one of control versus disobedience, but 
one of calculated compromise on both sides.
However, Shirk's account nevertheless draws heavily on data from the
"ibid.
100Ibid. The fact that the Centre had subsequently felt that it, again, was losing out to the provinces 
after the implementation of the 1980 fiscal reform is, however, a separate story. It tells the success 
of the provinces to outmanoeuvre the Centre and the shifting perceptions by both the Centre and the 
provinces regarding their interests. This process of provincial manoeuvring, in the context of 
investment policies, is the subject of discussion of subsequent chapters in this dissertation.
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central side. Little, if at all, is said about the manner in which provinces sought to 
expand their interests within the constraints of the Centre. The perspective from the 
provinces is particularly important to understand why the original intentions of the 
Centre in embarking the 1980 fiscal reform were subsequently outmanoeuvred by 
the provinces. This provincialist perspective, in the context of investment 
implementation, will be elaborated in detail in later chapters of this thesis. 
Notwithstanding the focus on the centralist perspective, Shirk's analysis shows that 
power between the Centre and the provinces is not a zero-sum game. At that stage 
of fiscal reform in 1980, both the Centre and the provinces had enhanced their pre- 
1980 position. Both "won" in the "positive-sum" game.
But how could the politics of compromise be possible at all, if according to 
Tang Tsou's analysis, most political struggles in Chinese history have taken on a 
zero-sum game nature? Is the fiscal reform decision of 1980 merely an exception to 
the general rule? If not, and if as a general rule the Centre has to compromise with 
the provinces, from where do the provinces derive their strength? If the ground of 
the Centre's power, in Parsons' terminology, lies in its superior command of 
coercive force, what is the ground of provincial power? Why should the Centre feel 
compelled to reach a compromise with the provinces? Why does the Centre not 
"smash" all provincial resistance and emerge as a "total victory" winner?
The answer to these questions is found, as this study argues, in the 
intermediate position of the province in the state hierarchy. Existing works in 
literature have also stressed the power of the province as the intermediary. But in 
such studies the power of the intermediary is always double-edged. On the one 
hand, it gives the province substantial discretions and control over resources, 
whilst, on the other, making it the object of central manipulation and control. So if 
the ground of provincial power lies in its intermediate position, what does this 
strength of the intermediary consist of?
At this point it is important to note that Tang Tsou, when commenting on 
the zero-sum nature of political struggles in Chinese history, also notes that there 
are limits to which the logic of total victory versus total defeat applies. In Tsou's 
own words, political conflicts acquire the zero-sum nature only "if one side 
believes that it can win in a final confrontation and is willing to pay the necessary 
price."101 In other words, where there is a "mutual perception that a stalemate will 
continue indefinitely into the future, ... the expectation that there will be a final
101Tsou, "The Tiananmen Tragedy", p.320.
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confrontation and settlement of accounts" will gradually change. 102 With no 
prospect of total victory for oneself, one is therefore forced to compromise with 
one's opponent.
Herein lies the strength of the intermediary. It is impossible for the Centre 
to win a total victory over its intermediary. As the intermediary of the Centre, 
provincial governments are an indispensable ally of the Centre in governance. The 
Centre has to rely on provincial leaders and lower level officials to govern society. 
As individuals, provincial leaders may be purged and replaced, but as a group 
and an institution, provincial leaders and the provincial-level government are 
there to stay. Tsou's thoughts on the limits of the zero-sum nature of political 
conflicts is set out in the context of state-society confrontation in the Tiananmen 
tragedy of 1989. In that case, the state can still rely on coercive power as the last 
resort in order to achieve an apparent "total victory", although the use of naked 
force to extract compliance reveals its weakness and illegitimacy.103 The hands of 
the Centre in its struggles with the provinces are more tied and constrained. As 
power holders, provincial leaders possess more resources which they can use to 
protect themselves against the encroachment of the Centre, than that are normally 
available to private individuals in the case of a state-society confrontation. Indeed, 
it is argued that the indispensability of the province as an intermediary constitutes 
"the basis for a bargaining relationship between the (Centre and the 
provinces)...(As a result), over time,...the balance (of power) may have gradually 
shifted somewhat in the province's favour."104
What the literature has yet to contemplate is that the structural 
indispensability of the intermediate level in the state hierarchy has precluded a 
"total victory" situation for the Centre. The Centre may win in specific instances of 
confrontation, but the necessity to rule through an intermediary dictates that its 
victory is short-term and incomplete. An ideal example are the cycles of 
centralization and decentralization since 1957. Each round of recentralization 
reclaimed only part of the power and resources which had been decentralized 
earlier, and each subsequent round of decentralization brought the provinces 
control over more resources and a broader room for manoeuvre. 105 The
102Ibid., pp.320-1,
103 Ibid. , pp.316. On this point, Tsou's remark bears remarkable affinity with Parris Chang's over the 
Cultural Revolution, and Parson's over the role of coercion in the concept of power in general.
104Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Policy Making in China, p.350.
105For discussions on the "disminishing returns of repeated recentralization" and the cumulative 
effect of successive decentralization-recentralization cycles in the province's favour, see Zhao 
Suisheng, "The Feeble Political Capacity of a Strong One-Party Regime", Part 2, p.55; Lieberthal 
and Oksenberg, Policy Making in China, p.349; Carl Riskin, "Neither Plan nor Market: Mao's
59
organizational position of the province guarantees therefore that it cannot be 
"totally eliminated" by the Centre in any central-provincial conflicts. As the 
stalemate persists, the Centre is forced to compromise with the provinces, as 
happened at the time of the 1980 fiscal reform decision. Rather than seeing the 
course of economic reform as a process through which central policies are distorted 
by provincial implementation, this new picture of central-provincial relations 
shows a process of accommodation and compromise. As neither the Centre nor 
the provinces can decisively win over and eliminate the other, both are forced 
to accommodate the interests of the other and to compromise.
The implication of the non-zero-sum nature of central-provincial power is 
significant. It envisages change. In a zero-sum framework, any possibility of 
change awaits the wisdom of the victor after all accounts have been settled and its 
opponent eliminated. In a non-zero-sum framework, the forces of change are built 
in to the system through the power of the actors over one another. The amount of 
power at the disposal of the Centre and of the provinces differs, but their 
interdependence and long-term co-existence requires both parties to compromise. A 
strong Centre during the 1950s, for instance, still found it necessary to decentralize 
power to the provinces in order better to implement its policies. Something has to 
be given out in order to get back something in return. Consequently, as provinces 
gather more and more resources as a result of successive decentralizations, their 
bargaining power vis-a-vis the Centre increases. With increased power, the 
provinces are in a position to demand more concessions from the Centre than 
before. The result is the increased occurrence of central-provincial conflicts as 
manifested during the reform period. In these circumstances, if increased 
institutionalization of the power distribution is the way out of protracted 
conflicts, it will not come into being as a result of the wisdom of some 
enlightened leaders. Rather the leaders, central and provincial, will become 
enlightened of the need to institutionalize when they see this as the only way 
out of such protracted conflicts and as the best means available through which 
to protect their interests, given the constraints of their opposite number.
Toward An Analytical Framework
Building on what has been achieved in existing central-provincial studies, 
and gaining from the above an insight into an alternative concept of power, this
Political Economy", in William A. Joseph, Christine P. W. Wong, and David Zweig (eds.), New 
Perspectives on the Cultural Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University, The Council on East 
Asian Studies, 1991), p. 143.
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study aims to arrive at a better understanding of this relationship. Above all, this 
will be a story about the provinces. Compromise requires the cooperation of both 
parties. Shirk's account has focused on the Centre's story. This study, therefore, 
seeks to show the story from the provincial perspective and also elaborate on two 
concerns. First, how do the provinces constitute an unsurmountable "opponent" of 
the Centre? This involves the description of strategies which provincial leaders 
have deployed in order to enhance their interests and to disable the Centre from 
winning a "total victory". This part of the story also forms a sequel to, and a 
substantiation of, Shirk's story of the Centre. It explains in detail how and why the 
Centre, in the context of investment implementation, has found itself unable to 
recentralize the system. The second issue concerns the way in which the provinces 
seek to advance their own interests and to contain the power of the Centre by 
striking compromises with the Centre which, by definition, also works in the 
interests of the Centre. In other words, while the first aspect elaborates on the 
power of the provinces vis-a-vis the Centre, the second aspect of the story 
demonstrates how that power, together with the power of the Centre, achieves 
qualitative changes within the central-provincial power relationship.
Main Features of the Framework
Rational-Choice Institutionalism
This study employs the rational-choice institutional approach in examining 
central-provincial relations. The term "rational-choice institutional" approach has 
two alternative meanings. First, it refers to an approach in which the rational 
behaviour of actors is analysed in terms of the structures of incentive built in to the 
institutions of a system. That is, the emphasis is on the institutional context of 
rational choices. This approach stresses the impact of institutions on the rational 
choices of actors, and is an "institutional" approach par excellence. The prefix 
"rational choice" is meant as a minor qualifier. It is the definition used in Susan 
Shirk's rational-choice institutional study of economic reform. 106 Another meaning 
of the term stresses the co-existence of a rational choice of actors, and of 
institutions setting the basic parameters and rules for the exercise of such choices. 
The emphasis is on what institutions do not constrain. The message is that, 
notwithstanding the impact of institutions on the choices of actors, institutions are 
not so "totalitarian" that they leave no room at all for choices. This second meaning 
of "rational-choice institutionalism" therefore presupposes and builds on the first
^  Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform, p.7.
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meaning. Indeed, it is an improvement on the first in the sense that the reemergence 
of institutionalism as a major analytical framework in political science in the 1970s 
has led to debates regarding its scope and relation to the earlier rational choice 
approach.107 Whilst, in the first meaning, rational choice is subsumed into an 
institutional approach, in the second meaning the two are regarded as 
complementary to each other. The second meaning does not refute the first 
meaning, but questions its claim regarding the scope of the impact of institutions 
on behaviour. In this sense the term could be modified to read "rational-choice- 
cum-institutionalism’’ to identify more clearly the fundamental complementarity of 
rational choice and institutions. In this study it is this second meaning of rational- 
choice institutionalism which is adopted.
The rational-choice institutionalism in this study focuses on the linkage 
between institutions and actors' choice. Both the institutional context and actors’ 
choice within this context are covered, with the focal point of analysis on their 
interactions. In China political studies, it is increasingly recognized that 
institutional rules and choices of action by individuals together determine the 
course of events. 108 Institutions and actors' choices respectively form the focus of 
analysis of two major approaches of China political studies—the institutional 
approach and the elite model. Despite the recognition of the limitations and 
partiality of both approaches by their proponents, there have been no conscious 
efforts to reconcile the two and incorporate their perspectives.109 By studying both 
the institutional context and actors' choices, this study attempts a synthesis. In the 
context of central-provincial relations, the Centre and the provinces pose the most 
important institutional constraint on each other. Therefore the application of 
rational choice institutionalism to a study of central-provincial relations directs the 
analyst to identify the choices made by provinces under the institutional constraints 
posed by the Centre, and vice versa, as well as to illuminate the processses through 
which the choices are made.
107See Elinor Ostrom, "Rational Choice Theory and Institutional Analysis: Towards 
Complementarity", American Political Science Review, Vol.85, No.l (March 1991), pp.237-43, for 
an excellent exposition on the fundamental complementarity of rational choice and institutional 
analysis in this latter sense.
iOSpor instance, Shirk towards the end of her work noted the limitation of the institutional 
approach. She has written "I often found myself unable to explain changes in policies by the 
institutional context and fell back on ad hoc explanations instead." The "ad hoc" explanations are, in 
an "rational-choice-cum-institutional approach", the roles played by actors' choices within the 
constraints of the institutional context. Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform, p.339,
109See Goldstein, "Reforming Socialist System", p.231.
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Provincialist Perspective
As noted above, this study adopts a primarily provincialist perspective. 
This means that the focus of the study will be on the choices of provinces under the 
institutional constraints of the Centre, but not vice versa. The reason for adopting a 
provincialist perspective is simple. Relatively more has been done from the 
perspective of the Centre. Specifically, as noted above, Shirk has shed light from 
the Centre's perspective.110 For this reason it is believed that more may be 
illuminated about the central-provincial relationship in a study focused on the 
provincial side of the story.
The adoption of a provincialist perspective has more deep-seated 
considerations, however. The literature on China's central-provincial relations, as 
discussed above, has adopted a primarily top-down, state capacity paradigm. This 
is, in part, the result of the relatively greater visibility and accessibility of the top 
levels of the political system, and, in part, the result of the influence of theoretical 
constructs such as the centre-periphery paradigm on the analytical framework of 
the analysts. The centre-periphery paradigm starts with the simple idea that 
"societies have a centre to which their members orient themselves and which 
influences their conduct".111 As Shils explains, "The centre, or the central zone, is a 
phenomenon of the realm of values and beliefs. It is the centre of the order of 
symbols, of values and beliefs, which govern the society."112 But values and beliefs 
have to be acted upon. Therefore "the Centre is also a phenomenon of the realm of 
action. It is a structure of activities, of roles and persons, within the network of 
institutions."113
In theory, the construct itself is not a spatially delimited concept. The 
central zone in different societies may reside in different actors and different 
institutions, and within a society the locus of "the centre" may well differ according 
to different subjects of concern.114 However, in practice, the authority of the 
national government has often led analysts to assume that the national government 
is "the centre" in the society. The source of this bias towards the national Centre in 
the search for the "centre" is rooted in the definition of "centre". In the words of 
Edward Shils, "The decisions made by the elites contain...values...(which) we shall
110Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform.
1 ^ Edward Shils, Centre and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1975), p.xxxi.
112Ibid., p.3.
113 Ibid.
114Ibid.
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call the central value system of the society ...It is central because it is espoused by 
the ruling authority of the society...:One of the major elements in any central value 
system is an affirmative attitude toward established authority."115 (emphasis added) 
Shils thereby links the "central zone" to the ruling authority of the society. In so 
doing, the identification of the "central zone" with the national government, which 
is undoubtedly the most established ruling authority in modem societies, and above 
all of a political system, is perhaps inevitable.
This in turn has profound significance in terms of how the central- 
provincial relationship is understood. As the "central zone", from where values 
flow to the periphery, the central government is by definition the source of 
authority and the originator of policies. The provinces, as the "periphery", are the 
object of rule and of integration by the Centre. The occurrence of noncompliance 
signals the refusal of the "periphery" to integrate with the "centre" and is a 
deviational and dysfunctional phenomenon, leading to a "weakening" of the 
capacity of the "centre" to govern. Any notion of local autonomy in this analytical 
framework is thus anomalous. To the extent that autonomy assumes some kind of 
legitimacy and independence of discretions by the lower-levels, there is no place 
for local autonomy in this conception of the political system.
The provincialist perspective of this study, therefore, seeks to avoid the 
pitfalls of the assumption regarding the locus of the "central zone" in the existing 
literature. By focusing research attention on the behaviour and choices of 
provincial actors, this perspective seeks to highlight the activism in parts of 
political system other than the national Centre. Specifically, it calls attention to the 
possibility that the province, as well as the national Centre, could be the 
"central zone” of values, beliefs, and actions. Provincial autonomy is not some 
kind of residual category which exists beyond the reach of the Centre.116 It is 
the product of compromise between the Centre and provinces based on the 
insurmountable power of both over the other. It is noteworthy that previous 
works have noted the multiplicity of "centres" within the political system, the loci 
of "centre" shifting according to the arising issues, and that the lower-level units of 
the state could be, and have been, the "fountain of political ideas and administrative
115 Ibid., pp.3-5.
116 So should be the case of the power of the society in the state-society paradigm. However, most 
works in the state-society paradigm have assumed a statist perspective, and tend to regard the state 
as the "centre", and the society as the "periphery" in a centre-periphery analytical framework. Shue's 
analysis of state-society relations in Maoist China is an example of this assumption. See Vivienne 
Shue, The Reach of the State, pp.42,54-69.
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techniques".117 A provincialist perspective facilitates a better elaboration of these 
insights and observations, and, consequently, a deeper understanding of their 
significance.
Clarifications and Definitions 
The Centre
Unless otherwise specified "the Centre" in this study means the national- 
level government vis-a-vis the subnational levels. The central actors in this study of 
central-provincial relations are primarily the State Council, and the various central 
government ministries and agencies subordinated to it. Given the heterogeneity of 
interests amongst these constituent units of "the Centre", the concept of "the 
Centre" does not assume the existence of a unified entity acting coherently in its 
interaction with the provinces. Rather it is acknowledged that there are often 
contradictions and inconsistencies in the instructions and guidelines issued by 
different central actors to the provinces, adding to the complications to the central- 
provincial relationship. In fact, provinces have often benefited from such 
inconsistencies within the Centre by playing one central actor against another, thus 
advancing further their interests. Accordingly, the locus of "the Centre" shifts 
according to contexts and issues being discussed, since a different policy matter 
involves a different group of central actors. When the context of discussion is non­
specific, "the Centre" in this study generally refers to the top central leadership of 
the State Council.
The Province
"The province" means the provincial-level govenment, including provinces, 
provincial-level municipalities, and autonomous regions. Specifically, "the 
province", as in the case of "the Centre", refers basically to the provincial 
leadership. In a similar heterogeneity to that of "the Centre", "the province" is 
composed of various provincial departments and agencies. Horizontally there are 
numerous provincial departments; vertically the choices and preferences of the 
"provincial-level" are in part a function of the choices and preferences of the 
subprovincial levels, i.e. the cities, counties and townships. Within each provincial
117Lynn White, "Local Autonomy in China", p. 490. On the multiplicity of centres, see Ferdinand, 
"Interest Groups and Chinese Politics", p.21. On Guangdong and Shanghai serving as the sources of 
inspirations for national economic reform policies in the post-Mao reforms, see Jia Hao and Lin 
Zhimin (eds.), Changing Central-Local Relations, p.5.
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department there is also a heterogeneity of actors, from the head of department to 
working-level officials. However, as in the case of the Centre, there is a hierarchy 
amongst the actors of the province, and it is possible to speak of the province as a 
single actor in its relationship with the Centre. The heterogeneity of the province 
forms part of the story of how strategies and courses of actions are formulated in its 
relations with the Centre.
The Subprovincial-Level Actors
The subprovincial levels enter this study as variables that help to explain 
behaviour at provincial level. These actors include the subprovincial levels of 
government, namely, the city, the county, and the township. They also include the 
actors in the semi-governmental sectors: the state enterprises (budgetary or 
extrabudgetary) and the collective enterprises. The dominant role of the state in the 
public sector, and in the economy in general, enables us to regard state and 
collective enterprises in the province as part of the state at sub-provincial levels. In 
particular, this study shows how the extrabudgetary sector has enabled the 
Guangdong and Shanghai governments to outmanoeuvre the Centre in respect of 
revenue and investment policies. Moreover, as a result of extensive subdelegation 
of investment authority and decentralization of fiscal resources to the subprovincial 
levels of government, Guangdong’s Provincial Government has been able to sustain 
a rapid growth of investment in the face of repeated pressures to contain investment 
from the Centre.
In existing literature on Chinese politics the term "local" has been used to 
refer to different subnational levels of government. Depending on the level of 
analysis of the study, the term "local government" could mean the provincial-level, 
or the more grassroots level of county or township, and sometimes of the village. 
The former has the predominant usage in literature on central-provincial relations 
within China, or literature written by Western-trained scholars from the Mainland. 
The identification of the term "local government" or, in Chinese, "difang", with the 
provincial-level as opposed to "the Centre" or, in Chinese, "zhongyang", reveals 
the importance of the provincial-level government in China's spatial politics as 
accorded by Chinese scholars. Conversely, the more frequent use of the term to 
refer to the grassroots level of government amongst Western scholars reflects their 
greater interest in the interface of the state and the society at the grassroots level.
To avoid confusion about the referent of the term "local", this study seeks 
to avoid its use as far as possible. Wherever possible more specific terms such as
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"provincial-level", "subprovincial" and "municipal" are used. The term "lower 
level" is often used to refer to subprovincial levels of government in the context of 
discussion within the province and, at times, to all subnational levels generally 
when it is used as opposed to the central level. However when discussing fixed 
asset investment in Guangdong and Shanghai, as well as nationally, the usual usage 
of central as opposed to local investment will be followed. This also applies to the 
discussion about "local" fiscal revenue in the two areas. In both cases "local" 
means "provincial/municipal", as a whole, encompassing the subprovincial 
grassroots levels, rather than refering to the grassroots levels only.
Methodology
The research design of this study is detailed in the Introduction chapter. 
This last section of Chapter One describes the methods of data collection as well as 
some observations made during the process. Documentary research was done in the 
Universities Centre, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, where there is a 
comprehensive collection of provincial newspapers, periodicals, monographs and 
reports from China. A substantial portion of the materials for the case studies was 
also obtained in the field.
The documentary materials used in this study can be classified into five 
general types: (1) national and provincial newspapers; (2 ) monographs and edited 
volumes; (3) national and provincial periodicals; (4) statistical information; (5) 
policy documents, rules and regulations, as well as records of central-provincial 
communications. All are important in shedding information, from different angles, 
on central-provincial relations regarding fixed asset investment.
In general information drawing from newspapers serves both to sensitize 
the author to the pertinent issues on the subject at an earlier stage of the research, as 
well as providing data on a specific aspect. At times the information from the 
newspapers is very important and revealing. In an example, the Guangdong 
government articulated their oppositions in a provincial newspaper in early 1989 to 
the central restrictive measures imposed during the retrenchment started in late 
1988.
Monographs and edited volumes span diverse topics and cover materials 
written by authoritative figures including senior officials in the provincial and 
central governments and research reports and views espoused by individual 
scholars. In general, they are important in providing detailed information on
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pertinent topics such as the administration system of fixed asset investment, the 
"problems" regarding the implementation of investment policies and reforms to the 
various relevant economic management systems nationwide and in the two 
provinces. Apart from books shedding light on the institutional context of central- 
provincial relations and the implementation of investment policies, often from a 
centralist perspective, there have also been an increasing flow of books written 
from the provincialist perspective. These books, sometimes written and published 
by senior official sources in the provinces, themselves represent the efforts par 
excellence by the provinces to influence the agenda of discussion in the nation over 
their work. This kind of "lobbying" publication is particularly prevalent in 
Guangdong since the late 1980s.
Periodicals published by relevant national and provincial units have 
provided probably the most important source of documentary information in terms 
of its scope and depth. Since nearly all major government units in the Chinese 
government publish their own periodicals, this source provides invaluable 
information regarding the most up-to-date situation in the relevant areas. For 
instance, the periodicals published by the provincial finance bureaux of the 
Guangdong and Shanghai governments, as well as by the Ministry of Finance in 
Beijing, give detailed and revealing information regarding the fiscal system and its 
operation nationally and in the two provinces. Similarly, there are the periodicals 
by the provincial as well as national statistical bureaux providing statistical 
information and analyses regarding the implementation of fixed asset investment 
and the economic situation in general. The periodicals by the national and 
provincial-level planning commissions provide information regarding the 
deliberations on the planning system, as well as more general and comprehensive 
economic management concerns of the national and provincial government. The 
periodicals by the national and provincial commissions on economic system reform 
or by other senior "think tank" units provide information regarding the latest 
thoughts and plans about reforms, as well as in-depth reviews of the 
implementation of previous reform measures. The periodicals by the national and 
provincial banks provide information on finance as well as investment, while 
periodicals by the audit bureaux illuminate the channels whereby provincial and 
lower-level governments use to maximize locally retained revenue. The authors of 
articles in these periodicals are usually officials of the units publishing the 
periodicals, and their articles constitute some kind of reports of their work. A 
careful combing of these sources can in fact startle the researcher as to the amount 
as well as richness of information which is available for public scrutiny within this 
ostensibly "closed" political system. Although some of the periodicals are stamped
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as "internal" (neibu) publications, they are nevertheless openly available in public 
libraries in the country, for instance, in the National Library in Beijing. In fact, as 
the macro environment becomes more liberalized, more and more "neibu" 
periodicals are being turned into "open" publications.
Statistical information on fixed asset investment and fiscal finance is 
important to this study of central-provincial relations since objective information of 
this kind provides the necessary context for the interpretative discussion of central 
and provincial manoeuvres and counter-manoeuvres. Such information is found in 
openly published national and provincial statistical yearbooks, as well as in various 
diverse sources. In general, statistical information on fixed asset investment and, to 
a less extent, on fiscal finance, abounds, but more specific information, for 
instance, that on the flows of central investment funds to provinces, and vice versa, 
is less readily available. However, specific information of this kind is of pertinent 
interest to this study of central-provincial relations. In this respect, more 
information has been found in the field regarding Guangdong as opposed to 
Shanghai.
The last, but not the least, type of documentary information is information 
on relevant national and provincial rules and regulations, as well as on central- 
provincial communications. There are a good number of published compendia of 
national and provincial rules which provide the basic framework of formal policies 
regarding the operational environment of the two provincial governments. In 
general information of this kind is quite adequate. Regarding information on 
central-provincial communications, however, information is more scant. This is, 
however, a very important area since this points directly at the interface of central 
policies and provincial discretions. A detailed record of central-provincial 
communications also illuminates the process of central-provincial bargaining and 
how deals have been striken. The utility of this kind of source is illustrated by the 
four volumes of records of central-Guangdong communications between 1979 and 
1987, compiled by the Guangdong authorities, and available in the Universities 
Services Centre, Chinese University of Hong Kong. The availability of this 
importance source on Guangdong enables this study to break through much of the 
"black box" in the process of interactions between the central and Guangdong 
leaders. No similar information on Shanghai is, however, available.
Whilst these documentary materials have been very important in providing 
information for this study, interviews conducted in the field with central and 
provincial officials of Guangdong and Shanghai are equally important and
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revealing. The interviews have been important in four aspects. First, some 
important documentary materials which were otherwise unavailable have been 
obtained only through the interviews. Second, the interviews enabled the author to 
clarify, confirm or elucidate information contained in documentary materials. 
Third, discussions in interviews alerted the author to pertinent documentary 
information which would otherwise remain "buried" in the vast quantities of 
materials. Fourth, interviews produced new information which was not available in 
the documentary materials. An important area of information which has relied 
heavily on interviews is the process of central-provincial bargaining and 
interactions. Another important area concerns the factors of consideration of and 
strategies used by the provincial governments in handling their relationship with 
the Centre. Interviews were also pertinent to understanding the "grey areas" of 
legitimacy regarding provincial discretionary behaviour, through, for instance, 
getting information from central respondents regarding the "informal" 
interpretation of formal central rules and policies.
I made three trips to Guangzhou, the provincial captial of Guangdong, in 
1993, and two to Shanghai in 1994. From October 1993 to August 1994 I lived in 
Beijing and was able to carry out a good number of interviews with the relevant 
authorities. Altogether there have been about 50 face-to-face interviews with over 
40 different individuals, supplemented by shorter, follow-up telephone 
conversations. On the whole, the officials I contacted were very helpful. The level 
of contact is mostly at the middle level of the hierarchy in a government 
department. Although there were no interviews with mayors, governors or 
ministers, I did not find this at all inhibiting to my research. Officials I interviewed 
generally had a very good knowledge of how policies were worked out and 
implemented. As the ones who were actually responsible for the "implementation" 
of policies, they provided details of how the system actually worked. This is 
especially valuable for this study, whose focus is on what actually happens on the 
ground.
Getting to the apex of the provincial-level government may, however, 
reveal more about the details of dynamics during provincial bargaining with the 
Centre. The fact that no interviews were held with a mayor, governor, or party 
secretary does put certain limitations on this study. However, it is unlikely that 
provincial leaders would want to reveal their bargaining details to an outsider. To 
do so would both embarrass and annoy the Centre, or, should it have lost in its past
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bargaining with the Centre, cast the province in a poor light.118 It is therefore the 
speculation of the author that more information on this aspect is limited in the 
foreseeable future.
In Guangdong I was able to conduct interviews with officials involved in 
planning, finance, statistics, audit, tax, land administration, and banking, as well as 
with members of the local academic community. The ranks of officials interviewed 
ranged from the division-chief level to section-level of a provincial department. 
Impressions gathered from these interviews suggest the development of a fairly 
open attitude within the provincial bureaucracy. Officials were mostly frank and 
willing to talk, although their sensitivity was apparent as regards the need for 
confidentiality. However, in general Guangdong's officials displayed a sense of 
independent judgement regarding the boundary of confidentiality, and appeared to 
feel quite comfortable and confident in taking discretions. In a few cases, I was 
able to obtain interviews through direct calls to the relevant departments without 
any formal introduction from other official units. The Guangdong government 
appears to be operating like any government bureaucracy in terms of its openness, 
albeit at an earlier stage of development.
In Shanghai, interviews covered officials from streams spanning finance, 
planning, Pudong administration, banking, policy research, as well as members of 
universities and independent researchers in the burgeoning "private sector" of 
research-consultancy. The range of rank of the officials is similar to that of 
Guangdong. Shanghai's officials were, however, generally more cautious than their 
Guangdong counterparts. They showed less willingness to take discretions over 
the dissemination of information. However, there were exceptions and, in general, 
their caution did not mask their intellectual capacities or their ability to reflect and 
analyse. As long as one could break the ice, they were willing to talk and a few 
were particularly helpful. Shanghai's officials often had rather strong feelings 
concerning their relationship with the Centre. They were also inclined to compare
1 ^ Information about bargaining details was considered sensitive and highly confidential by both 
the Centre and the provincial governments concerned. An example is the annual control figures of 
fixed asset investment the Centre (via the State Planning Commission) strikes with each provincial 
government every year as a central control instrument of the level of total investment in the 
localities. The Centre wanted to keep the information confidential not because of any concerns of 
national security considerations, but because the Centre would not like provinces to know how 
others had fared, so as to avoid the situation that one province might exert pressure on the Centre 
based on what the Centre had or had not done to other provinces. (Respondent No. 29, Beijing 
interview, May 1994) Similarly, provinces normally took a low profile about their successes in 
gaining concessions from the central government so as not to embarrass the Centre and avoid other 
provinces from learning from their "tricks" and strategies. (Respondent No. 9, Guangzhou 
interview, December 1993).
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their situation with that of Guangdong, pointing out the preferential treatment 
Guangdong had received ahead of them and to the prospect of Shanghai overtaking 
Guangdong in the near future. In some aspects, the latter was regarded as already 
accomplished.
Interviews in Beijing focused on more or less the same group of 
institutions. These included finance, planning, audit, policy research, law, and the 
universities. The range of the rank of officials is similar to the case in Guangdong 
and Shanghai. Most were of the division-chief rank, with some of a higher and 
some of a lower rank. The purpose of the interviews was to obtain information on 
the Centre's side of the story. The focus of the interviews was three-fold. First, 
questions were asked regarding information on relevant central policies, especially 
those "informal" policies which existed beyond the letters of the formal rules and 
regulations. These usually involved interpretations of the formal rules which were 
adopted by the central officials in their interactions with the provinces, and were 
material in defining which specific discretionary actions by provinces were 
tolerated or considered deviant by the Centre. Second, questions were directed to 
obtain the Centre's assessment regarding the implementation of relevant central 
policies by the Shanghai and Guangdong governments, and by other provinces in 
general, and the difficulties which the Centre had experienced in imposing its will. 
Third, questions were asked regarding the Centre's previous actions, as well as 
existing and future plans of action, in view of the above difficulties caused by the 
provinces. Questions were also asked on the process of bargaining between the 
Centre and the provinces.
In general the interviews in Beijing were very useful in shedding light on 
the difficulties experienced by the Centre in imposing their will on the provinces. 
But officials at the Centre generally did not know much about the workings of 
provinces. Except for those who had previous experience of working in the 
provinces, most respondents elaborated on the difficulties of the Centre and the 
contradictions of the existing system. Moreover, most respondents from Beijing 
appeared to have adopted an implicitly centrist perspective. Some were adamant 
that the provinces should be reined in for their "unscrupulous” behaviour. Others 
were more resigned to provincial power and unruliness. Officials at the Centre 
were obviously, and understandably, more involved in the power and 
predominance of the Centre than were officials in Shanghai and Guangdong. Some 
even expressed a conspicuous sense of cultural or intellectual superiority over the 
provinces. As a result they expressed a predisposition to exerting control in a 
traditional way, although they also recognized that any such attempt would
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probably be futile. On the occasions when such attempts have failed, they have had 
no option but to work out alternative measures together with the provinces. The 
affective inclination of central officials is, therefore, for centralization and control, 
but this is an increasingly impossible task, now that the provinces have 
accumulated power as a result of the successive decentralization programs by the 
Centre. The overall impression that arises from the interviews is: the forces of 
"qualitative" change in the relations between Centre and provinces, from one of 
fragmentation to legitimate autonomy, reside more within the provinces than within 
the Centre. The Centre is, more and more, being forced to seek compromise with 
the provinces.
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Chapter Two
Fixed Asset Investment Administration: Decline in Central Control
As a developing country, the channelling of investment resources has been 
a major task for the government of the People's Republic of China. Regardless of 
changes in their political agenda, the Chinese leaderships have, since 1949, sought 
to build up the economic strength of the country by increasing investment. 
Therefore while before 1976 the central leaders were preoccupied with social 
transformations and political struggles, various investment programmes had 
nevertheless been launched, irrespective of political rhetoric.1 For the periods of 
1953-57, 1958-60, and 1971-75, the percentage of capital construction investment 
expenditure within the total national budget reached 37.1%, 55%, and 40.2% 
respectively. From 1950 to 1978, the average percentage was 35%, whilst the peak 
figure for a single year stood in 1958 at 56%.2 When the national agenda was 
shifted to modernization and economic development in 1976, and after the Third 
Plenum in 1978 particularly, the linkage between investment and the attainment of 
the national goal became still more direct. However, as a result of the 
decentralization reforms of the 1980s, the percentage share of investment 
expenditure, as part of the total national budgetary expenditure, has, ironically 
enough, declined conspicuously. For instance, in 1979 the share stood at 40.4%. 
However, by 1991 it had more than halved to 19.4%. Investment has, nevertheless, 
remained the largest expenditure item in the state budget.3
The importance of investment within the agenda of the post-1949 Chinese 
government makes it an ideal medium through which to observe the dynamics of 
political processes, and specifically, of the processes between the central and 
provincial governments. Both the Centre and the provinces have been heavily 
involved in investment decisions. The decline of investment expenditure as a 
proportion of the total fiscal expenditure since the 1980s by no means denigrates its 
importance as a function and a task of the Chinese state. It rather reflects the 
changes in the relationship between the central and the provincial governments
1 These include, for instance, the industrial construction projects of the First Five-Year-PIan period 
(1953-57), the campaign to increase steel production capacity during the Great Leap Forward in 
1958-60 and the construction of the "Third Front" industries from the early 1960s to the 1970s. Of 
course, very often these economic projects form part and parcel of the political campaigns, the most 
spectacular being the industrial projects during the Great Leap Forward.
^Calculated from Ministry of Finance (ed.), China Finance Statistics, 1950-1991 (Beijing: Science 
Press, 1992), pp. 116-19. The average percentages are arrived at by averaging the annual percentage 
shares.
^Ibid. By 1991, however, the expenditure on education, science and health had caught up and, at 
18.6%, was only marginally below the share of capital construction investment.
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over investment since the reforms in the 1980s.
In this respect, Barry Naughton has documented the inability of the Centre 
to impose its will on investment, which has increasingly become an "internalized", 
and thus independent, activity of subnational governments.4 Decentralization of 
investment administration had been intended as a means and a strategy through 
which to encourage subnational governments to develop the local economy and 
facilitate the implementation of the Open Door Policy. Decentralization was, in 
itself, never the objective of the Centre's reform program.5 However, in practice, 
the reform has resulted in a significant dispersion of investment resources and 
authority from the Centre to the provinces and below. Two processes were at work 
to result in this "unintended outcome". The first is the "implementation bias" of 
subnational governments, whereby they tilt central policies in their own favour, and 
the second is the political difficulty involved in challenging what is, on the whole, 
in the vested interests of the system. According to Naughton, this development has 
led to a major shift in the balance of power between the Centre and the provinces 
since the 1980s.
This chapter looks into this dispersion of investment resources and 
authority on a national level. The dispersion at a provincial level, within 
Guangdong and Shanghai, will be discussed as case studies in Chapters Three and 
Four respectively. This chapter has specifically two purposes. The first is to state 
and provide a working definition of the main investment problems in the context of 
this study: central-provincial relations. The second is to examine and explain this 
problem. The structure of this chapter is accordingly organized into two major 
sections: (1) disaggregating the investment problem; and (2 ) explaining the 
phenomenon.
4See Barry Naughton, "The Decline of Central Control Over Investment in Post-Mao China", in 
David Lampton (ed.), Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China (Berkeley, University of California 
Press, 1987), pp.51-80. By "internalised" activity, Naughton means (p.75) that the local 
governments as a result of the reforms in the 1980s are controlling most resources needed to plan 
production and investment As a result the Centre is increasingly at a loss to find adequatte devices 
with which to control the localities. Naughton later qualifies some of his conclusions in a 1992 
article, when he notes that the Centre is also developing more sophisticated instruments with which 
to improve its grasp of information and enhance effective and efficient information flows between 
the Centre and the localities. See Naughton, "Hierarchy and the Bargaining Economy: Government 
and Enterprise in the Reform Process", in Lieberthal and Lampton (eds.), Bureaucracy, Politics and 
Decision-Making in Post-Mao China (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1992), pp.245-79.
5See Naughton, "The Decline of Central Control", p.51.
75
Disaggregating the Investment Problem
A prerequisite for analysing central-provincial interactions in investment 
policy is that of assessing the Centre's control over (1) the total amount of 
investment, and (2) the direction and allocation of investment resources. 
Concerning the former, the Centre has, since the reform period, failed to exercise 
effective control over the total amount of fixed asset investment made each year. In 
the process of investment planning and implementation since 1979, the annual 
planned quotas of total investment as applied to the provinces, described by 
Chinese economists as "central control figures", have, as a rule, been surpassed 
rather than observed. The amount of investment implemented in a province over 
and above the prescribed annual quotas of total investment scale—the "central 
control figures"—is described as "excess investment" in this study. Regarding the 
second aspect, the Centre has since the 1980s been unable to control the allocation 
of investment resources. As a result of the decentralization reforms, as will be 
noted later in this and the case study chapters, the power to allocate investment 
resources has been effectively dispersed amongst numerous other actors at 
provincial and lower-levels. Consequently, a sizeable portion of investment 
resources have been used in projects which, from the perspective of the Centre, 
bring only dubious benefits to the national economy as a whole.
Underlying the concern over total investment scale and the allocation of 
investment is concern over the efficiency of investment. The Centre has often, 
publicly, blamed excess investment at provincial level for causing "overheating" in 
the economy, and for constraining the supply of raw materials to more desirable 
projects. However, in reality the fundamental concern of the Centre is that a 
substantial portion of investment taking place in the provinces has been spent on 
projects regarded by the Centre as being of questionable benefit from the national 
perspective—that more investment might result in more waste.6 In other words, 
concern over the scale of investment in practice has subsumed and presupposed the 
concern over investment direction and efficiency.7
I^n a survey by the Construction Bank of China on the 275 medium-large sized capital construction 
projects completed between 1984 and 1986, it was discovered that overspending amounted to 28% 
of the total original estimates. A total of 174 projects did not attain the originally designed 
production capacity — 74% of the total number of projects. 206 projects, or 87.7% of the total, 
spent more than they were originally budgeted. 70% of this overspending is attributable to 
mismanagement and faults in the original plans while the remaining 30% may be due to inflationary 
factors or upward adjustment of spending standards of the original plans. See Wang Haibo (ed.), 
Zhongguo Guomin Jingji Gebumen Jingji Xiaoyi Yanjiu (A Study of the Economic Efficiency of 
the Various Sectors of the Chinese National Economy) (Beijing: Jingji Guanli chubanshe, 1990), 
pp.430,432.
7There are, broadly speaking, two schools of thought among economists in China on what is the
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That the total scale of investment per se is not the issue is supported by the 
fact that during some historical periods exceeding the planned quotas of investment 
was regarded as a good and positive phenomenon. This was particularly so in the 
case of the First Five-Year Plan period between 1953-57, when surpassing the 
planned targets of production and investment was considered as a positive 
economic achievement.8 Investment efficiency was, at that time, relatively high 
and the direction of investment was basically controlled by the Centre. Since then, 
however, investment has gradually moved away from the control of the central 
government, and the efficiency of projects has declined,9
The decline of central control over investment, therefore, refers to the 
Centre's inability to direct appropriate levels of investment resources to those
major issue in investment. The more predominant school places emphasis on the scale of 
investment, and argues that excessive demand for investment relative to resources available is the 
major problem. The other school focuses directly on the inefficiency problem of the supply side, 
and argues that the major problem as it exists rests with the inefficiency of investment decisions 
rather than the level of investment per se. It is clear that in the first school, the efficiency issue is in 
fact assumed and taken for granted. The line of argument becomes that, given that there is 
inefficiency, if there is less investment, there is less waste. Examples of the former school, the 
"demand generated" theory, are Wu Xiaoqiu (ed.), Jin Yunxing Lun (On the Tight Operation) 
(Beijing: People's University of China Press, 1991); Fan Gang et aL, Gongyouji Hongguan Jingji 
Lilun Dagang (A Sketch of the Macro-economic Theories Under a Public Ownership System) 
(Shanghai: Shanghai United Bookstore Press, 1990). For discussions on the "excessive" 
accumulation ratios and the search for a proper level of accumulation, see for instance Wang 
Haibo, "Guanyu Woguo Jilei Yu Xiaofei Bili Guanxi de Chubu Fenxi" (On the preliminary analysis 
of the relationship of the accumulation ratio and consumption ratio in the PRC.) Zhejiang Xuekan, 
No. 1 (1981), pp.13-27. For a full-fledged exposition of the latter school, the "supply inefficiency 
school", see Wu Ruyin, Economics of Inefficiency: The Theory of Centrally Planned Economy 
Reconsidered. 1992. Yang Linfeng criticised the "demand school" for exaggerating the inflationary 
effects of investment, while neglecting the contribution of additional investments to increasing 
effective supply in his "Woguo Guding Zichan Touzi Chanchu Xiaoying" (The efficiency of fixed 
assets investments in China), Touzi Lilun yu Shijian (Theory and Practice of Investment), No.l 
(1989), pp.20-22. Sun Yonghong and Geng Qingjun argue that the scale of investment between 
1979-88 was not excessive in their joint-authored article, "An Assessment of the Yearly Investment 
Scale Between 1979-1988", Investment Research, No. 3 (1990), pp.19-24. For a debate between the 
two competing schools, see Wu Jiang and Wang Yongjun, "Touzi Buzu" (Insufficient Investments: 
A Harsh Reality), "Touzi Buzu Bulun" (The Theory of Insufficient Investments: A Supplementary 
Argument), Investment Research, No. 8 (1988), pp.6-11, and No. 8 (1989), pp.17-21; and Fan Yifei 
and Zhang Hejin "Bo Touzi Buzu Lun" (Refuting the Theory of Insufficient Investments), 
Zhongguo Touzi Guanli (China Investment Management), No,11 (1988)
8This attitude is obvious in Xie Minggan, and Lou Yuanming (eds.), Zhongguo Jingji Fazhan Sishi 
Nian (Forty Years of Economic Development in China) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1990), 
pp. 170-71. When discussing the investment over the decades of the People’s Republic, excess 
investment beyond the targets of the First Five-Year Plan was regarded as a successful "victory", 
while excess investment in later periods were described as causing wastage and reflecting the loss of 
central control.
9For an authoritative discussion of the investment efficiency issue of the various periods by the 
State Planning Commission, see Lin Senmu, and Jiang Guangxin (eds.), Zhongguo Jiben Jianshe 
Gongzuo Shouce (Handbook of Capital Construction Investment in China) (Beijing: Fazhan 
chubanshe, 1992), pp.653-62. Altogether seven indicators were identified through which to reflect 
investment efficiency. The First Five-Year Plan period has the highest rating for most of the 
indicators.
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sectors it sees fit. It refers also to their consequent inability to ensure that waste is 
minimized at the level of project management. However, as will later be noted, the 
failure of the Centre in these issues of efficiency and allocation is one endemic to 
the socialist system of public ownership and the economic management system. 
Short of more fundamental changes to the system, this failure is likely to remain a 
relatively constant phenomenon.
However, since the question of efficiency and allocation is, as noted above, 
subsumed in the concern over the quantity of investment, it is possible, in this 
study, to take the scale of investment as the operational indicator of the level of 
discrepancy between central investment policy and provincial investment 
implementation.10 In other words, the extent of excess investment over and 
above the central control figures is a measure of the level of provincial non- 
compliance regarding the Centre's policy on investment This measure has two 
major advantages. First, it is a relatively simple indicator amenable to 
measurement and comparison across provinces; whereas taking as an indicator the 
level of inefficient investment is more difficult to ascertain and more subject to 
dispute. 11 Second, in the absence of a more precise measurement of efficiency 
levels, it may for the time being be assumed that the level of investment across 
provinces is fairly similar. The scale of investment and the extent of excess 
investment can thus be presumed to subsume the question of efficiency. 
Throughout this study, therefore, the efforts of the provincial leaderships to 
increase the quantity of investment will be the focus of analysis. The issue of 
investment direction is assumed to have been subsumed in the discussion over 
quantity and will not, therefore, be analysed at length.
Successive Excess Investment: Loss of Central Control
As the operational indicator, the scale of investment presents a picture of 
investment over and above centrally prescribed quotas during successive years of 
the 1980s and, therefore, an unambiguous decline, if not a total loss, of central 
control. A report on investment by the State Planning Commission so describes the
* I^t should be reemphasized that the choice of operational indicator does not mean that the author is 
supporting the "demand generated theory" of the problem of investment and the economy. The 
concern here is to find a relatively simple and easily amenable indicator to measure and reflect the 
extent of non-compliance of provincial governments vis-a-vis central orders on investment since the 
1980s, and then to analyse the behaviour of the provincial governments in how they can manage to 
do so.
1 ifiiis  is reflected in the discussion on investment efficiency in Lin Senmu and Jiang Guangxin 
(eds.), Handbook of Capital Construction Investment in China. Multiple indicators do not always 
tally with one another and this injects an element of indeterminancy and ambiguity over the exact 
level of efficiency of investment for a year.
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situation: "Over the years there have been very obvious gaps between the amount 
of investment planned and that eventually spent. In practice, the value of 
investment completed each year was, almost invariably, in excess of the value in 
the plan."12 Table 2.1 below shows the extent of excess investment over and above 
centrally prescribed quotas:
Table 2.1
Period
Excess Investment in Total Investment1 
(Billion Yuan’)
Quotas2 Actual Investment Excess Investment (%)
1981-85
1986-90
3603
1296^
5323
19745
47.8
52.3
Notes and Sources:
1.Figures for 1981-1985 cover investment in the state sector only; those for 1986- 
1990 also include the non-state sector.
2.Figures for both periods are quotas originally prescribed at the beginning of the 
five-year plan periods, prior to amendments and adjustments being made in the 
interim.
3.See Xie Minggan and Lou Yuanming (eds.), Zhongguo Jingji Fazhan Sishi Nian 
(Forty Years of Economic Development in China) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 
1990), p.187.
4.1bid., p. 189.
5.See State Statistical Bureau (ed.), Statistics on Investment in Fixed Assets in 
China, 1990-1991 (hereinafter Statistics on FAI (Year)) (Beijing: Zhongguo 
Tongji chubanshe, 1993), p. 19.
Table 2.1 shows the total value of investment completed as being roughly 1.5 times 
that of the value originally set by the Centre as the limit. In fact, not only were the 
quotas successively surpassed, the Centre was also often forced, in the middle of 
the financial year, to revise and raise the limits originally set by the planned quotas. 
In this way a portion of the excess investment and deviations of the provinces has 
been recognized as legitimate and "legal". Table 2.2 gives more details to the 
picture:
12See State Planning Commission, Investment Research Institute, and the State Statistical Bureau 
(eds.),China Investment Report, 1991. (Beijing: Zhongguo Jihua chubanshe, 1991), p.18.
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Table 2.2
Excess Investment in Total Investment1: Original and Adjusted Quotas
(Billion Yuan")
Year Quotas Actual Investment Excess Investm
1981 (30)383 44.34 (47.7)16.6
1982 (38)44.55 55.64 (46.3)24.9
1983 (36.2)58® 59.44 (64.1)2.4
1984 65’ 74.34 14.3
1985 (140)150* 168.04 (20)12
1986 2289 302.01° 32.5
1987 28711 364.11° 26.9
1988 33012 449.713 36.3
1989 n/a 413.813 n/a
1990 45514 444,915 -2.2
1991 5001® 550.91® 10.2
1992 57017 785.51* 37.8
1993 80015 - -
Notes and Sources:
1. Total investment refers to total "societal investment"13 which comprises 
investment both inside and outside of the state sector. However the coverage of the 
quotas was only extended to the non-state sector from the mid-1980s. The figures 
in the table correspondingly have different coverages: 1981-1984—all figures refer 
to capital construction investment in the state sector; 1985—investment in the state 
sector, 1986 onwards, total investment comprising the non-state sector.
2. The excess investment percentages are calculated from the figures in the other 
two columns of the table. For some years the original figures of die quotas and the 
subsequently adjusted figures are available. The original quotas, and the 
corresponding excess investment percentages, are listed in brackets. Figures for the 
other years are presumably adjusted figures of the quotas.
3. See Xie Minggan, Lou Yuanming (eds.), Forty Years of Economic Development, 
p.187.
4. See Statistics on FAI (1950-1985), p.9.
5. See report on the "1983 National Economic and Social Development Plan", in 
Nanfang Ribao, December 20,1982.
6 . See the "Report of the Sixth Five-Year Plan", in Nanfang Ribao, November 30, 
1982.
7. See the "Report on the 1984 National Economic and Social Development Plan 
Bill", in Nanfang Ribao, May 16,1984.
8 . See Wu Jinglian and Wu Ji (eds.), Zhongguo Jingji di Dongtai Fenxi he Duice 
Yanjiu (An Analysis of the Dynamics of the Chinese Economy and Some 
Solutions) (Beijing: People's University of China Press, 1988), p.38.
13The concept, "societal investment", refers to all investment in a defined geographical jurisdiction 
irrespective of the ownership relations of the units responsible for the investment, or the funding 
channels of the investment. It is a standard statistical measure in official statistical yearbooks. The 
concept is a product of the economic reforms of the 1980s. Prior to the reform, investment was 
basically monopolized by the state sector and most projects were included in the state investment 
plan. The concept "societal investment" was, therefore, then nonexistent. Since the 1980s more and 
more investment was conducted outside of the state sector and, in particular, outside of the state 
plan. It has therefore been necessary to have a new concept through which to measure the total 
value of investment that takes place on the ground. Since then, the value of societal investment for 
the pre-1980 years has been reconstructed and published in statistical yearbooks.
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9. Calculated from data on total investment completed and the amount of excess 
investment. For the former source see Note 10 below. For the latter see China 
Capital Construction, No. 10 (1988), p. 14.
10. See Statistics on FAI (1986-1987), p. 12.
11. See China Capital Construction, No.2 (1988), p.9.
12. See China Investment and Construction, No.3 (1989), p.22.
13. See Statistics on FAI (1988-1989), p. 13.
14. Calculated from State Planning Commission and State Statistical Bureau (eds.), 
China Investment Report, 1992 (Beijing: Zhongguo Jihua chubanshe, 1992), p.l. 
The figure is the quota in the adjusted plan.
15. See Statistics on FAI (1990-1991), p.16.
16. See China Investment Report, 1992, p .l. See also Ma Hong and Sun 
Shangqing (eds.), Economic Situation and Prospect of China, 1991-1992 (Beijing: 
Zhongguo Fazhan chubanshe, 1992), pp. 2,207.
17. See Ma Hong and Sun Shangqing (eds.), Economic Situation and Prospect of 
China, 1992-1993 (Beijing: Zhongguo Fazhan chubanshe, 1993), p. 207.
18. See Statistical Yearbook of China 1993, p. 146.
19. See Ming Pao (Hong Kong) October 30, 1993, p. 13, quoting the vice-director 
of the Construction Commission for the Three Gorges, Guo Shuyan.
Table 2.2 shows that during the four years for which the original and revised 
planned quotas are available, quotas were usually revised substantially upwards in 
order to approach the level of the actual value of investment. Consequently, after 
the revisions, percentages of excess investment could often be slashed by more 
than half. In 1983, to cite a more conspicuous case, the planned quota was revised 
upwards by 60%. As a result the percentage of excess investment was reduced from 
the original 64% to a negligible 2.4%. This demonstrates the success with which 
provincial governments could make the Centre adjust its criteria of control and 
legitimize what would otherwise have been illegitimate. However, the fact that the 
extent of excess investment often remains substantial, even after the central control 
figures have been significantly revised upwards, reflects again the ineffectiveness 
of the Centre’s control over the level of investment undertaken in the provinces.
The statistics above indicate the discrepancy between that which is 
prescribed by the Centre and that which is eventually achieved. Whilst central 
government ministries who, themselves, also implement investment, are 
responsible for part of the excess investment, the trend since the 1980s has 
nevertheless been that provincial governments have been the more important actor 
in the investment scene. Consequently, that which is reflected in the statistics 
measures, to a large extent, the extent of non-compliance of provincial 
governments. Table 2.3 below shows the percentage of total investment which is 
basically the result of investment decisions by the central government14
14The table is adopted from State Planning Commission and State Statistical Bureau (eds.), China 
Investment Report, 1992, p.30. The "central government" here refers to both the State Planning 
Commission and projects by the central ministries.
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Table 2.3
Percentage Share of Centrally Decided Investments in Total Investment (%) 
Year 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Share 41 34 40 32 36 32 31 32 30 32 33
Notes:
1. Centrally decided investments cover (1) those capital construction and technical 
renovation projects in the state sector which are under the subordination of the 
central ministries, in other words, central capital projects; (2) those "above ceiling" 
locally subordinated capital construction and technical renovation projects, thus 
requiring the approval of the State Planning Commission at the Centre.
2. From 1979-1984 the "ceiling" was 10 million yuan; from 1985 to 1990 it was 30 
million yuan.
3. The value of the second part, that is local projects which are above the ceiling, is 
estimated by taking 35% of the total value of medium-large sized projects in the 
state sector for 1980-1984, and 25% for 1985-1990.
Source: The table, including the notes, is adopted from State Planning Commission 
and State Statistical Bureau (eds.),China Investment Report, 1992, p.30.
The share of total investment arising from the decisions of provincial and lower- 
level governments rose, therefore, from an already high percentage of 59% in 1980, 
to 6 8% in 1983. The share of investment approved by the provincial and lower- 
level government, as opposed to the central government, has since remained at this 
high level of around 70%.
Given that an absolute majority of investment is the result of decisions made 
within the provincial boundaries, it is no surprise that the Centre has been largely 
unsuccessful in carrying through its control measures over investment. For 
instance, at times when the Centre sought to reduce the scale of investment, 
provincial governments would often act by reducing investment in less profitable 
but much more needed sectors. The Centre was thus left to fill the gaps, thus 
defeating the original purpose of the clampdown.15 Another example of the power 
of provincial governments is that exercised in the implementation of the new 
Investment Direction Adjustment Tax. The tax was promulgated in April 1991 to 
act as an economic lever to encourage investment actors to invest in sectors 
favoured by the Centre, and to penalize those who continued to invest in others. 
The responses of provincial and lower-level governments ranged from ambivalent 
support to outright opposition. As seen in a survey carried out by the State Planning
15This is a comment frequently made by respondents from the central government. (Author’s 
interviews) An indirect evidence of the move is the growing "similarity" of industrial structure in 
the provinces in the 1980s, as a result of the inclination of all provincial governments to concentrate 
investment in more profitable processing industries. See State Planning Commission and State 
Statistical Bureau (eds.), China Investment Report, 1992, p.23.
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Commission, a few respondents, in their responses to the survey questionaire, 
explicitly expressed their "decision" not to implement the new tax because they had 
"rather significantly different views (vis-a-vis the Centre's view) on this tax".16 
Other respondents gave a politically "safe" response, saying that "the tax could 
have some effects regarding its objectives", rather than giving their unambiguous 
approval.17 The successful implementation of any new tax would require the co­
operation of the provinces, who, in this case, had precisely the opposite incentive. 
This new measure of central control was, therefore, doomed from the beginning.
Explaining the Phenomenon
Why has the Centre been unable to control investment in the provinces? To 
what extent is the failure of control a result of the decentralization reforms in the 
1980s? And what does it tell us about central-provincial relations in China? These 
questions are discussed below.
The root of the problem can be explained in both socio-historical and 
institutional terms. Moreover, this issue is more than a mere question of the Centre 
exerting control over the provinces. On the one hand, resource misallocation and 
subsequent waste on a massive scale has sometimes been the result of investment 
initiatives by the Centre. The most spectacular example of such an instance is the 
Great Leap Forward of 1958-60, during which massive quantities of resources were 
misused and wasted in the blind pursuit of rapid heavy industrialization. On the 
other hand, waste and inefficiency at micro-level had always existed prior to 
investment administration being substantially decentralized in the 1980s.
The fact that investment control is not a problem regarding the provinces 
only has important implications as regards the relationship between the Centre and 
the provinces. It explains why the Centre was so ineffective in exerting control over 
the provinces in the 1980s. To anticipate the following discussion, the Centre itself 
is part of the problem of excessive and inefficient investment and is, therefore, 
problematic also in its capacity of being the object of control.
16Ibid., p.101.
17Ibid., p.100.
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The Socio-Historical Background: Urge for National Strength and Glory
The Chinese socialist revolution is, to a large extent, the action of a country, 
after decades of foreign invasion and humiliation, as a means to regaining its past 
glory. The desire for rapid modernization and ascendancy from humiliation 
underlines the waves of radicalism during the Maoist period.
The impact of such radicalism was that litde consideration was paid to 
objective constraints posed by resource availability when investment decisions 
were made. The limitations of resources were considered secondary. The belief was 
that all difficulties could be overcome by human effort. The general ideology of 
the time was that it is good to plan more investment than is physically allowed in 
terms of available resources. To plan well within what is already known to be 
available would be simply too conservative. It would, on the other hand, be 
"revolutionary" to overfulfill plans. Conversely, it was considered "revisionist" and 
conservative merely to satisfy the plans. Taking the latter course would achieve 
less, and the road to national prosperity and modernization would, therefore, be 
unnecessarily lengthened. A casual glimpse of press reports during the 1960s and 
early 1970s reveals amazingly numerous instances in which substantial amounts of 
materials and equipment were saved by the initiatives of the people. Indeed, it has 
been argued that plans with "gaps" and "the call for progressive balance" have been 
the employed tactics of central leaders within an economic system devoid of 
effective incentives—in order to extract more productivity out of a "slack" 
workforce.1 ^
While radicalism has gradually receded in the political arena since the 1978 
Third Plenum, the urge to develop the economy and strengthen the country rapidly 
has remained the goal of the post-1978 leaderships. Investment, therefore, has 
remained a priority item in the national agenda. A very important feature of this 
nationalistic urge is that the central leaders, as the representative of the nation, are 
often inclined to stress the importance of investment. As national political leaders, 
central officials are naturally more identified with the modernization task than are 
the provincial leaders. This makes the Centre traditionally the major locomotive in 
successive investment waves. The Centre demands more investment because it 
feels the most pressure to strengthen the national economy and guarantee 
prosperity for the population. In its dealings with the international community, on 
both political and economic issues, the central leadership is well aware of the
^See Wu Ruyin, Economics of Inefficiency, p.163.
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importance of a strong economy as regards its international status and bargaining 
leverage. As the People's Republic entered its fourth decade during the 1980s, the 
central leaders knew that, as regards domestic affairs, they did not have too much 
time in which to prove to the population that socialism could produce a better 
livelihood. Economic growth and prosperity was and still is central to the political 
legitimacy of the regime. This urgency was particularly felt when communist 
regimes in the Soviet Union, in Mongolia, and in Eastern Europe collapsed during 
the years 1989-91. Deng Xiaoping's comments in 1990 aptly reflect why the central 
leadership is always so concerned about investment:
"We have to pay special attention to the slide in the economic growth rate. I 
am worried about it... Some countries have encountered problems, in the 
final analysis, because their economy is failing... Why do the people support 
us now? Simply because there have been developments in the economy 
over the last decade, and obvious developments...This question (about 
economic development) is, therefore, not only an economic issue. It is in 
fact political...If only we successfully attain the objective (of improving the 
livelihood of the population), we would be safe regardless regardless of 
what changes take place internationally..."19
At the time Deng was, therefore, concerned about whether or not central leaders 
had set out at the right rate of growth. Was it too low? Could new initatives in any 
way be made to sustain the momentum of economic growth of the 1980s? Deng 
was obviously unconvinced that the 6% annual growth as planned by Premier Li 
Peng for the 1990s was fast enough. He encouraged central leaders to explore new 
development opportunities, and in particular, the development of Shanghai:
"What is proper growth? The criterion is, what can guarantee a doubling of 
our economy in the next decade, at constant prices, discounting inflation, 
and taking population growth into account. Then, at what rate does the 
economy have to grow per annum in order to achieve our objective? Is our 
present calculation correct and reliable? Can an annual 6% growth rate 
really bring us the second doubling (of economic wealth) in the coming 
second decade of reform? We really need to apply our mind to this...People 
are very sensitive about their well being, and we cannot cheat on this..." 
"We have to grasp opportunities and make timely decisions. We have to 
identify places having more potential for development... for instance 
Shanghai. This would be a big move... Developing Shanghai could be a 
quick route to achieving our objective."20
In the end, after some delay and considerable intra-elite debate,21 in 1992 the
19Deng Xiaoping, "The International Situation and Economic Issues", March 3, 1990, in Deng 
Xiaoping, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume 3, (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1993), 
pp.353-56, pp.354-55. This is part of a conversation between Deng and several "third-tier" central 
leaders.
2^bid.
21 Despite the reservations of Deng early in March 1990, as noted above, the rate of growth for the 
1990s was still planned at 6% per annum in the Ten-year Plan and the Eighth Five-Year Plan
85
planned growth rate was raised from the original 6 % per annum throughout 1990s 
to 9-10%, following Deng's southern tour early that year.22
However, nationalism is not the motive for investment of the central leaders 
only. Provincial leaders also may share this urge for modernization. This could be 
the result of political socialization, in which nationalism and patriotism play an 
important part. The importance of modernization is moreover reflected in 
performance appraisal "yardsticks" for provincial leaders, whereby the Centre 
seeks to ensure that provincial leaders work towards the same goal as the Centre. 
Although the yardsticks have not been institutionalised, it is clear that since 1978 
particularly, the levels of provincial economic development and social stability 
have constituted two major yardsticks in the assessment criteria of the performance 
of provincial leaders. Economic development is very often measured in terms of 
the growth rate of societal production,23 and social stability often hinges on job 
opportunities. Both can be achieved through expanding investment and building 
more factories. Provincial leaders are thus effectively motivated to launch 
investment projects which increase the level of production, and provide more jobs 
for the local population 24
submitted by Li Peng the Premier in March 1991 to the National People's Congress. See Li Peng, 
"A Report on the 'Ten Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development' and the Eighth 
Five-Year Plan Outline", March 25, 1991, speech to the Fourth Session of the Seventh National 
People's Congress, printed in Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi (ed.), Shisanda Yilai 
Zhongyao Wenxian Xuanbian (Since the Thirteenth Party Congress: A Compendium of Important 
Documents) (3 volumes), Volume 3, (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1993), p.1486. The 6% rate of 
growth was insisted upon even in the immediate aftermath of Deng's southern tour. When Li Peng 
made the government report to the National People's Congress in March 1992, he reiterated that the 
planned growth rate for the coming year, that is 1992, would be 6%. See Li Peng, "The Government 
Report", March 20,1992, printed in Since the Thirteenth Party Congress, Volume 3, p.1993.
2^See Jiang Zemin, "Deeply Understand and Fully Implement the Spirits of Deng's Talks, to 
Develop the Economy and Carry on Reform and Opening in a Better, and Faster Way", June 9, 
1990, printed in Since the Thirteenth Party Congress .Volume 3, p.2063.
23For instance in both the Twelfth and Thirteenth Party Congresses, the target of the economic 
work of the country was expressed in terms of the total value of agricultural and industrial 
production. In the Twelfth Party Congress in September 1982, the target was to quadruple this value 
from 710 billion yuan in 1980 to 28900 billion yuan in 2000. See You Lin, et al (eds.), ZhongHua 
Renmin Gongheguo Guoshi Tongjian, 1979-1992 (A History of the People's Republic of China, 
1979-1992) (Beijing: Hongqi chubanshe, 1993), pp.114-15. Moreover, back in 1958 the Centre had 
issued a document to provincial officials explicitly requiring them to increase their industrial 
production capacity so that the value of industrial production output could exceed that of 
agriculture. See Fang Weizhong (ed.), Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jingji Dashiji, 1949-1980 
(The Major Economic Events in the People's Republic of China) (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue 
chubanshe, 1984), p.210,
24This paragraph is deduced from the author's various interviews. The yardstick of production level 
is a feature both before and after 1978, but social stability was less a concern for the pre-1978 
decades, when the ideological mobilization of the population meant that stability was not an issue. 
In fact the more social instability there was in the engineered direction of the Central leadership, the 
more "revolutionary" and the better the work of the local leadership was thought to be.
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Institutional Base and Facilitation
In addressing the institutional base of the investment phenomenon, there are 
two levels of analysis which reinforce and sustain the nationalistic motives for 
investment. The first is the more fundamental level whereby the effects of the 
public ownership system, and of the "soft constraints" and "iron bowl" 
characteristics deriving from the public ownership system may be analysed.25 The 
public ownership system is the definitive institution in Marxist economics. 
Investment expansion is, in the final analysis, rooted in the nature of this 
fundamental institution of the socialist economy.
The second level of analysis refers to the specific forms of economic 
management system within the public ownership system. It analyses how public 
ownership is actually effected in practice, and how this affects investment 
behaviour. This second level serves to explicate the ways in which the public 
ownership system, through its specific forms and via specific policies, has brought 
about investment expansion. The central-provincial interface enters the picture at 
this second level.
Public Ownership System and Soft Constraints
There has been a growing body of literature which addresses the linkage of 
the public ownership system in socialist countries with the various problems within 
the economy, including the phenomenon of investment e x p a n s io n .2 ^ Economists 
differ in their views regarding what actually constitutes the crux of economic 
problems in traditionally socialist countries. Some attribute the problems to the 
excessive demand for consumer and investment goods, for instance, while others 
argue for the incapability of the system to supply enough goods of appropriate 
quality. Investment expansion per se, therefore, may or may not constitute the root 
to economic difficulties according to different interpretations. These arguments 
between economists, however, are not the subject of concern here. Rather, the
2^The phenomenon of "soft budget constraints" was first discussed in the classic work by Janos 
Komai, Economics of Shortage (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Co., 1980), p.210, in which 
Komai identifies the soft budget constraints of a socialist firm as sufficient cause for the constant 
phenomenon of insatiable investment and investment tension in socialist economies.
2^In this section, I draw mainly from the following literature on China: Fan Gang et al. A Sketch of 
the Macro-economic Theories Under a Public Ownership System, Wu Ruyin Economics of 
Inefficiency, Liu Guoguang, Zhongguo Jingji Tizhi Gaige Moshi Yanjiu (Analysing the Models of 
China's Economic System Reform) (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue chubanshe, 1988) and Wu 
Xiaoqiu, On the Tight Operation, I also consulted Janos Komai, Economics of Shortage, Paul R. 
Gregory and R. C. Stuart, Soviet Economic Structure and Performance fourth edition, (Harpen 
Collins Publications, 1990), which are on the Soviet and Eastern European experience.
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interest of this study is in the circumstances wherein investment expansion as a 
phenomenon occurs and, in particular, in the ways through which provincial 
governments achieve such expansion regardless of central efforts of control. In this 
respect, it should be noted that, notwithstanding their disagreements regarding the 
significance of investment expansion, there is nevertheless wide agreement 
amongst economists regarding what causes investment expansion in socialist 
economies.
This explanation focuses on one point: the public ownership system is 
unable to define clear boundaries of property ownership or to specify responsibility 
for investment decisions. Ownership signifies rights as well as responsibilities. An 
owner of a property enjoys the right to use and dispose of the property, as well as 
shouldering all liabilities in this connection. The clear assignment of responsibility 
inevitably imposes restraint on the owner. It necessitates careful consideration as 
regards investment plans, and provisions whereby any failures may be cushioned. 
In a society dominated by public ownership, such a natural restraint mechanism is 
conspicuous in its absence.
Ownership by all people, as public ownership is described in China, denotes 
that all the means of production in the society are collectively owned by all the 
people in that society. As regards any single individual, he or she owns all means 
of production in the society, but only as a member of the entire community. In 
practice, public ownership has led to a paradox of ownership relations: an 
individual is both an owner and a "non-owner". The public ownership system 
should in theory render the very concept of "ownership" redundant and useless to 
the practical needs of individuals, who are required to "contribute according to 
capability, and take according to needs". In practice, rights and responsibilities 
must be defined. Since the state has taken up the role of guardian of public 
ownership, it is therefore the representative of "all-people" in exercising its rights 
and bearing all responsibility in its capacity as the owner of the means of 
production. The individual, though still the ultimate owner in name, only takes up, 
in practice, the roles of worker and con su m er.
Consequently, individuals, albeit being ultimate owner, do not have to
2^See Fan Gang et al., An Sketch of the Macro-economic Theories Under a Public Ownership 
System, pp.24-28, for an exposition of this paradox of ownership status in societies with public 
ownership as the dominant system. Some colloquial catchphrases on such a paradoxical situation 
are: "One has everything; and at the same time has nothing"; "Everybody is die owner; nobody is 
the owner". Reflecting the indivisiveness of ownership rights and the confusion arising there is the 
saying: "Mine is yours; and yours is mine".
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shoulder responsibility for the use, reproduction or accumulation of the means of 
production. That is the work of the state. However, the state is not itself a 
monolithic whole. Different tasks must be done by different departments and 
enterprises at different levels. This gives rise to a paradoxical situation. On the one 
hand, each unit of the state is entrusted with responsibility over a certain segment 
of the means of production on the behalf of the public. In this sense units are 
expected to act like the owners of the segment of public property under their 
jurisdiction. On the other hand, each of these units is but an administrative arm of 
the state. As ownership by all the people is a “collective ownership" and is not to 
be distributed amongst individuals, so ownership, when entrusted to the state as a 
whole, is, in theory, not amenable to division between the various state organs. The 
implication is that any state unit, be it a government department or a state 
enterprise, does not have a clear-cut boundary of ownership and responsibility for 
the property under its control. It is entrusted with a duty for its own segment of 
public property. However, as part of the state and in a sense being the state itselfit 
can claim the right to deploy resources entrusted to other units, on the argument 
that this will be beneficial to the common interests of all. Conversely, therefore, the 
unit is also vulnerable to "intrusion" by other units.28 The implications of such 
flexible boundaries of "ownership" are that should one unit suffer loss in an 
investment, the unit is able to diffuse the losses through other units. The 
responsibility for any actor under the public ownership system is thus "softly" 
delineated and subject to all kinds of manipulation.29
This softness of constraints is rooted in the indivisiveness of public 
ownership. It cannot therefore be eliminated by changes to the economic 
management system governing the relationship between the various actors of the 
state. In the end, whether the actor involved in a particular investment decision is a 
government department or a state enterprise, the role performed and the nature of 
the organizations concerned is the same. They all form that part of the division of
2®The situation whereby the administrative units of the state exercise a degree of but incomplete 
ownership rights over the "public properties" under their administrative jurisdiction is described as 
the "proliferation of the public ownership system" in Quan Zhiping and Jiang Zuozhong, Lun 
Difang Jingji Liyi (An Analysis of the Local Economic Interests) (Guangzhou: Guangdong Renmin 
chubanshe, 1992), Chapter one, particularly pp.23-27. Each level of the state hierarchy and each 
administrative unit of the party-state has become the defacto owner of the slice of public properties 
under their administrative custody, although the exercise of their power is subject to control and 
manipulation of the superior levels and ultimately of the Centre.
29Janos Komai identified several conditions, any one of which in his view would be sufficient to 
make the constraints "soft": (1) firms as price-makers instead of price-takers; (2) "soft" tax system, 
meaning that the formulation of tax rules is influenced by die firms; firms may be granted 
exemption or postponement of payment as an individual favour, and the slack collection of taxes; 
(3) free state grants, in form of ad hoc or recurrent state subsidies, and injection of investment 
capital; (4) soft credit system: credit is granted even if there is no full guarantee of repayment. See 
Komai, Economics of Shortage, Volume B, pp.306-7.
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labour concerned with fulfilling the state role of ownership agent. In this sense, 
both the state enterprises and government departments are similarly 
"administrative" organs by nature.
It is thereby obvious that, although discussions since the 1980s on the 
"departmentalization" and "regionalization" of public ownership suggest a 
fragmentation of public ownership within the state,30 such a compartmentalization 
phenomenon does not actually entail full and clear-cut ownership relations 
between the various actors,31 Compartmentalization became a major phenomenon 
primarily as a result of the decentralization reforms of the 1980s. The 
decentralization reforms tended to harden the hold of state units—provinces, 
government departments and state enterprises—on resources and therefore 
encourage investment expansion behaviour. However insofar as the reforms 
strengthen the de facto ownership rights of provincial governments over local 
resources, the reforms do not in themselves lead to insatiable appetite for 
investment. It is the interaction between quasi-ownership rights and flexible 
boundaries of responsibilities on the one hand, and the latent modernization drive 
previously discussed on the other, that leads to the investment expansion 
phenomenon. The fluidity of any demarcation of responsibility means that 
provincial governments are not required to bear squarely the risks of their 
investment decisions. All internal checks on investment expansion is, therefore, 
rendered ineffective.
The above discussion indicates that the difficulty in controlling investment 
and in ensuring an efficient allocation of scarce resources predates the 
decentralization reforms of the 1980s. In the final analysis it is a problem grounded 
in the roots of the socialist system: the public ownership system. The issue is, 
therefore, by its nature, not a political problem of compliance with central policies 
by lower-level units. As, since the 1980s, this problem has become a political issue 
of noncompliance, the fundamental background of the problem, being one 
grounded in the "soft constraints" of the socialist economic system, explains to a 
large extent why the Centre has been so ineffective in achieving its will. In other 
words, the fact that China's investment problem is not solely an issue concerning
30See for instance, David Granick, Chinese State Enterprises (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
1990); and Susan Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reforms in China (Beikeley: University of 
California Press, 1993).
31 David Granick, in Ibid., failed to note the incompleteness of the property-rights of regional 
governments in his analysis of regional property rights. The failure stems from his neglect of the 
indivisiveness of ownership rights under public ownership, and from the fact that the focus of his 
research was solely on the phenomenal symptoms, which show provinces and enterprises acting 
very much like the owner of property under their jurisdiction.
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central-provincial relations accounts in some way for its central-provincial conflicts 
in the investment arena.
Economic Management System: Decentralization in the 1980s
The decentralization reforms of the 1980s changed the economic 
management system from one which was basically top-heavy to one which placed 
more power and responsibility at provincial level. Provincial governments were, 
subsequent to these reforms, given more powers and incentives with which to 
make, and benefit from, investment. Consequently, the problem of investment 
control, previously a basically Centre-led issue, has, since the 1980s reform, 
become increasingly one in which the provincial level had played an important 
part. Since the 1980s investment control has therefore become a largely central- 
provincial issue.
The Fiscal Reform
The fiscal reform instilled in 1980 is central in this process. The fixing of 
revenue shares for five years and the autonomy to arrange local spending 
intensified the local economy orientation of provincial governments and reinforced 
the provincial officials' sense of proprietorship over provincial enterprises.32 As 
this fiscal reform allowed provincial governments to retain all local revenues, after 
remittance of a prearranged sum/percentage to the Centre, and with the added 
security of a five-year arrangement, they consequently became more motivated 
towards developing the local economy, thereby increasing local revenue.
In 1980 the State Council announced that all provincial-levels, with the 
exception of three provincial-level municipalities, should practice a contractual 
fiscal system in which the level of remittance or subsidy would be fixed for five 
years.33 Two crucial features of the 1980 reform set it apart from the previous 
numerous changes made to the fiscal system, and account for the significance of 
the changes in 1980. First, the level of provincial remittance or central subsidy was
32Susan Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform, Chapter Nine presents an account of the 
development of the 1980 fiscal reform and its positive and negative effects. A major negative effect 
was the increase in administrative interference in enterprise management as the new fiscal system 
reinforced the "local ownership system".
33See "State Council Document on Implementing the 'Dividing Revenues and Expenditures, 
Contracting at Various Levels' Fiscal Management System”, February 1, 1980, printed in State 
Planning Commission (ed.), Zhongyao Jingji Fagui Ziliu Xuanbian: 1977-1986 (A Selected 
Collection of the Major Economic Regulations) (Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji chubanshe, 1987), 
pp.629-31.
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to be fixed for a period of five years. This was a feature which appeared briefly in 
the 1958 fiscal reform, but which did not persist long due to the chaos of the Great 
Leap Forward. Second, the sectoral expenditure control figures imposed by the 
central government ministries on provincial governments were abolished, allowing 
the latter unprecedented leeway in allocating resources within the provincial 
budgets. Again, this had been a feature of the aborted 1958 system.
It is true to say that the decentralization of fiscal power and resources from 
the central to the provincial and lower levels did not begin in 1980 but actually 
dates back to the Cultural Revolution. Michel Oksenberg and James Tong rightly 
point out that in this respect the Cultural Revolution was the turning point in the 
history of the People’s Republic since 1949, when the highly centralized system 
established in the 1950s gave way to a highly decentralized and even fragmented 
system.34 Due to the virtual paralysis of the state apparatus between 1966-68 and 
the emphasis on local radicalism thereafter, central control on the collection and 
spending of local revenue in the provinces simply collapsed. There was no annual 
economic plan for 1967 and 1968, and nine central government agencies in 
economic planning and management were merged into one in 1970, when only 
11.6% of their combined total establishment remained in operation.35
The decentralization of fiscal resources during the 1966-76 decade was 
nevertheless a de facto result of radicalism against bureaucratic control and 
management which caused the paralysis of the Centre at that time.36 The design of 
the fiscal system was reduced to a bare minimum whereby the continual running of 
the state, however shattered, was ensured and the despatch of necessary 
expenditures was carried out. The following quote from an official from the 
Ministry of Finance states the nature of the decentralization of the period 
unambiguously:
"The fiscal management system during the Cultural Revolution decade 
could hardly be described as forming any sort of model. The system kept 
changing all the time, almost annually. There was hardly any mechanism as 
such; the purpose was simply to muddle through, and to survive the 
chaos."37 (emphasis added)
34See Michel Oksenberg and James Tong, "The Evolution of Central-Provincial Fiscal Relations in 
China, 1971-1984: the Formal System", China Quarterly, No.125 (March 1990), pp.1-32.
35Ibid., p. 8, Footnotes 12, 13, quoting Gao Shanquan et. al., Dangdai Zhongguo de Jingji Tizhi 
Gaige (Current Reforms in the Economic Structure in China) (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue 
chubanshe, 1984).
36This fact is also briefly noted in Michel Oksenberg and James Tong, Ibid., p.5, where they wrote 
that "the long-term trend since 1949 has been toward an expansion of the fiscal powers of provincial 
governments. To a considerable extent this trend is the result of default rather than design,"
^ S e e  Song Xinzhong (ed.), Zhongguo Caizheng Tizhi Gaige Yanjiiu (A Study on the Fiscal
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Decentralization in the late 1960s and early 1970s was, therefore, a convenient 
expedient and de facto consequence of the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. 
Provincial governments enjoyed substantial autonomy, not because the system 
explicitly allowed them the authority to do so, but because the system of control 
had fallen apart. Provincial governments, as the level of the state apparatus 
responsible for policy implementation and the collection and spending of most 
state revenues, simply filled the vacuum of power.
The decentralization of fiscal authority in the 1980s is both a break and a 
continuation of the "decentralization" of the 1970s. Unlike the de facto dispersion 
of fiscal resources during the Cultural Revolution decade, the 1980 fiscal 
decentralization reform signalled a deliberate decentralization of fiscal 
responsibility, as well as resources, to the provincial level and below. Whilst the 
autonomy of provincial level governments was, in the earlier period, largely the 
result of control failure at a divided Centre, the enlarged provincial fiscal authority 
in the 1980s was part of a larger program of economic reform of a relatively 
unified Centre. Notwithstanding the incremental manner whereby reform programs 
were tested and experimented in the 1980s, the sense of direction was unambiguous 
when contrasted to the "muddling through" mentality of the early 1970s. However, 
on the other hand, there was also obvious continuity of the 1980 decentralization 
decision with developments in the previous decade. As noted in Chapter One, the 
decision of the 1980 fiscal reform, from the Centre's point of view, was basically a 
reaction to the financial difficulties resulted from the extensive diffusion of fiscal 
resources to provinces during the previous decade.38 The status quo as of 1979 was 
perceived by central leaders as leaving them little choice but to further decentralize 
fiscal authority in order to arrest the decline in central fiscal revenue.
As is noted in Chapter Three, the significance of the 1980 fiscal reform for 
provincial investment behaviour is not solely manifest in the fact that provincial 
governments could obtain a larger share of national fiscal revenue, and therefore 
more budgetary revenues to spend on investment. In fact, the share of provincial 
government revenue in the total national revenue was lower in the 1980s than in 
the previous decade. In 1972, the share stood at a high level of 86.2%, but by 1982 
it had dropped to less than 80%, and by 1985 to less than 70%.39 Retained local
System Reform in China) (Beijing: Zhongguo Caizheng Jingji chubanshe, 1992), p.48.
38See Susan Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1993), p. 163.
39See Okensberg and Tong, "The Evolution of Central-Provincial Relations in China, 1971-1984", 
p.31. It should however be noted that the share refers to the amount of fiscal revenue collected
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fiscal revenues, however, generally increased, as provincial governments had in the 
previous decade generally succeeded in ensuring that changes in the system worked 
in their favour.40 The significance of the contractual system instituted since 1980 is 
the fact that fiscal arrangements between the provinces and the Centre became 
more like a "contract". The long time span of the contract and the unprecedented 
autonomy of the provincial government in allocating local resources were 
revolutionary innovations in themselves. What makes such features more 
significant still is that fiscal reform was merely a part and fore-runner of reforms 
regarding the economic relations between the central and provincial governments, 
and between the state and society as a whole. Fiscal reform was launched with the 
deliberate intention of acting as the breakthrough point of change. This larger 
context of fiscal reform has sustained and legitimized the vested interests of the 
provincial governments since the system has been in operation.
The new contractual fiscal system has had repercussions regarding the 
investment control problem in two aspects. First, the security of a five-year 
contract, in which all above-quota revenue could be retained for local discretionary 
use, reinforced the incentive of provincial governments to increase investment and 
thereby increase revenue. Under the soft constraints of the public ownership 
system, as noted in the previous section, the provincial government could easily 
transfer the risks of investment to other entities whilst retaining all the benefits, 
such as the new tax and profit revenue arising from new enterprises, the additional 
job opportunities and the glamour brought about by big investment projects. In 
other words, the contractual fiscal system brought more benefits to provincial 
governments as regards additional investments, but did nothing to change the lack 
of financial accountability and responsibility associated with the public ownership 
system. Consequently, the symptoms of "investment hunger" became intensified, 
and the enthusiasm of provincial governments for new investment became higher 
than ever before.
The other repercussion concerns the supply of a relatively independent 
source of finance. The new fiscal system leads indirectly to the explosion of the 
extrabudgetary part of public finance, which ensures the provincial governments a 
secure and "private" source of revenue for their investment plans. The
locally and not the retained local revenue which was usually a fraction of the former for the 
remitting provinces.
40This is why those provinces who had originally adopted the "Sichuan model" quickly changed 
over in 1980 to the "Jiangsu model" within three years of the inital adoption. Many provinces found 
that their actual retained revenue decreased rather than increased under the original "Sichuan 
model". See Song Xinzhong (ed.), A Study on the Fiscal System Reform in China, p.52.
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extrabudgetary finance (yusuanwai) used to be a marginal and supplementary 
feature of public finance intended to supplement the rigidity of a highly centralized 
system. It originated in as early as 1951, when the State Council issued an 
administrative notice authorizing the imposition of 15% local surcharges over and 
above state taxes by county level governments in order to finance discretionary 
local expenses. City governments were also authorized to levy public utilities 
surcharges in order to raise funds for the construction and maintenance of urban 
infrastructure.41 During the 1970s extrabudgetary finance grew to a substantial 
portion of total public finance, reflecting the dispersion of resources and loosening 
of central control during the Cultural Revolution decade. Yet the most spectacular 
growth was in the 1980s. From 1966 to 1976, total extrabudgetary finance, as a 
proportion of budgetary finance, increased from 15.1% to 35.5%. In 1980 this 
figure stood at 53.5%, rising to 83.3% in 1985 and 94.5% in 1991 42
Behind the spectacular growth of the extrabudgetary finance from that of 
only a minor supplement of budgetary finance are the deliberate tactics employed 
by provincial governments in order to maximize retained local resources under the 
fiscal contractual system. The incentive to maximize local revenue was regarded as 
better served by diverting revenues and resources from the budgetary sector to the 
extrabudgetary. In practice, this diversion slows down the growth of local 
budgetary revenue, and therefore reduces the exposure of provincial coffers to the 
enroachment of the Centre via the adjustment of contracted remittance. The means 
by which provincial governments achieved their purpose is discussed in detail in 
Chapters Five and Six. At this point the relationship between fiscal reform, the 
growth of the extrabudgetary finance, and the phenomenon of weakening central 
control over investment is merely noted. Insofar as fiscal reform has enabled 
provincial governments to get hold of more resources with which to finance 
projects independently, extra revenue has come only indirectly from extrabudgetary 
finance. As noted in Chapters Three and Four, most local investment in the 1980s 
was financed by resources from outside the state budget. The availability of a huge 
pool of extrabudgetary funds has enabled provincial governments to disregard the 
bulk of central directives.
Investment Adminstration
The other major reform is decentralization in the administration and 
planning of fixed asset investment. The main implications of fiscal reform for
41Ibid., p.42.
^2See Ministry of Finance (ed.),China Finance Statistics, 1950-1991, pp.186-87.
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investment expansion, as noted in the previous section, are the strengthening of the 
provinces' incentive to invest and the provision of, indirectly through the 
extrabudgetary finance, the resources with which to invest. On the other hand, the 
decentralization of investment administration authority facilitates investment 
expansion by enabling the reinforced investment incentive and enhanced financial 
strength of the provinces to materialize into investment activity.
The major changes in the investment administration system have taken 
place in two areas. First came the abolition of sectoral control figures previously 
assigned by the central ministries. This enabled the provincial governments to 
arrange their own investment priorities with unprecedented flexibility. The other 
was the decentralization of project approval authority and the simplification of 
approval procedures, to the effect that provincial governments have since had much 
more control over whether or not individual local investment projects might 
proceed.
Sectoral control
Sectoral control figures refer to the detailed mandatory prescriptions of 
investment for each "administrative system" (xitong) which are determined at 
central government level, between the central government ministries and the State 
Planning Commission, and then passed down to the provinces for implementation. 
They symbolize the tight control of the central government over investment and 
were a major feature of the investment administration system prior to the 1980s.
The central government attempted to do away with mandatory fiscal targets 
during the reforms of 1958 and in the 1970s. However, this was not achieved until 
the 1980s. Earlier efforts failed, either because the economic situation changed too 
rapidly, as in the case of the 1958 reform, or because any possible effects were 
swamped by the inertia of central dominance in a politically-charged climate .43
The centralized system was in place early in 1952, when the procedure of 
investment planning was formalized and the rules promulgated. The central 
government, through the various ministries, was responsible for the prescription of 
investment control figures for the lower levels of government. Unlike the central
4^Zhao Xiaomin (ed.), Caimao Jingji Tizhi Gaige Yanjiu (A Study of Financial and Trade System 
Reform) (Beijing: Zhongguo Zhanyun chubanshe, 1985), p.40. It is stated that previous fiscal 
reforms have failed to break through the dominance of central government ministries in issuing 
mandatory fiscal targets. Only in the 1980 reform is this achieved. Provinces since then can and do 
become relatively autonomous and independent in setting their own priorities in fiscal expenditure.
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control figures of the 1980s, which were only lump-sum figures for the total 
investment scale in a province, control figures from the 1950s to the 1970s were 
disaggregated to specific industrial sectors and administration systems. The lower- 
level governments were required to propose specific investment projects within the 
control figures for onward screening and approval, as well as for inclusion in the 
state investment plan. Provinces themselves had very little discretion in the 
allocation of resources across sectors,44 The central government exercised tight 
control over the size of total yearly investment, as well as over which specfic 
investment projects were launched or dropped from the plan. Provinces were 
merely delegated the tasks of detailed planning and implementation.
In 1958 the control figures were nearly axed under the decentralization of 
the Great Leap Forward. According to the reform design, the entire planning 
system was to be shifted to one which would be province-based. Instead of central 
ministries playing the dominant part and assigning specific mandatory targets for 
the provinces, the plans were to be based on suggestions from the provinces. 
Provinces were also allowed much more discretionary power as regards the 
allocation of resources across sectors, provided that the overall spending limit was 
not exceeded.45
The 1958 reform failed, and with recentralizaton setting in, the old control 
figures were resurrected. Then in 1965, when the economy was back to normal, a 
limited degree of decentralization was again launched. The sectoral investment 
control figures for 18 non-industrial sectors were replaced by one single lump-sum 
control figure. The purpose was obvious. It was beyond doubt that the existing 
system was too centralized. The 1958 experience, however, reminded the central 
leadership that steps needed to be cautious. The 18 sectors chosen were the smaller 
and more localized economic sectors which, in any case, could not be efficiently 
planned from so far away as Beijing. Another sector was added in 1966.46
In the 1970s, as still more emphasis was placed on strengthening local 
autonomy, the discretion of provincial governments in investment planning was 
enlarged. The dual system existing after 1965 was replaced by a system whereby
See Dangdai Zhongguo Congshu Bianji Bu (ed.), Dangdai Zhongguo de Guding Zichan Touzi 
Guanli (The Administration of Fixed Asset Investment in Contemporary China) (Beijing: zhongguo 
Shehui Kexue chubanshe, 1989), p.19.
45Ibid„ p.26.
4^Dangdai Zhongguo Congshu Bianji Bu (ed.), Dangdai Zhongguo de Jiben Jianshe. (Capital 
Construction in Contemporary China) (2 volumes) Vol.2, (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue 
chubanshe, 1989), p.472.
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each level of government would be awarded discretionary control for projects 
within their subordination jurisdiction. In other words, instead of central ministries 
issuing investment control figures to all sectors, or to all except the 19 designated 
sectors after 1966, central ministries would issue mandatory control figures for 
central investment projects only. However because of instabilities in the economic 
and political situation, the changes had not fully materialized, and on the eve of 
reform in 1980, central ministries were still issuing mandatory investment figures 
to the provinces.47 In 1980, the sectoral control figures were abolished as the fiscal 
system was changed to that of a contractual system.48 Thereafter provincial 
governments were allowed, in principle, to plan and allocate resources to local 
investment projects in different sectors according to their own priorities. What this 
meant was that provincial governments had become free to allocate their own 
retained local resources, under the fiscal system, to industries of their own choice, 
instead of as previously merely providing the resources with which to implement 
the choices and priorities of the central government ministries. Provincial 
governments thus became more or less independent actors regarding investment 
decisions. They had both the power to plan investment projects and a relatively 
secure and independent access to resources with which to finance their plans.
Decentralization of project approval
The other aspect of decentralization is that of project approval authority. In 
China every investment project has to be screened and approved by the 
government. This applies to all investment projects, irrespective of ownership 
types and finance channels, and includes both projects within and outside of the 
state investment plan. Historically the power to approve projects was highly 
centralized. However, since the 1980s this authority has been decentralized on a 
substantial scale resulting in the bulk of projects having been approved within the 
provincial boundaries.
Fiscal reform and the change in the investment planning system since 1980 
(of which the abolition of the sectoral control figures is a central part) has given 
provinces the freedom to plan, to propose, and to spend. However, in between the 
planning and actual spending, there is still an intermediate step: that of having the 
plans and the specific projects approved. Two issues are involved here. First is the 
approval of yearly investment plans, a power firmly vested in the Centre. The
47Ibid., p.473. See also Zhao Xiaomin, A Study of Financial and Trade System Reform, p.40.
48See "State Council Document on Implementing the 'Dividing Revenues and Expenditures, 
Contracting at Various Levels' Fiscal Management System", February 1,1980.
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other is the approval of individual investment projects on a case-by-case basis. The 
two are interconnected because, as a rule, the yearly plans only list the projects 
requiring the approval of the central government. For projects which can be 
approved within the province, the lump-sum total of investments only are listed.49 
Therefore, if provinces are allowed to approve more projects, they can then invest 
more without reference to the Centre.
This detailed mechanism works in the following manner. Historically, the 
control instruments used by the Centre have always been targeted at yearly 
investment. The annual investment plan submitted to the Centre for approval lists 
the planned value of investments in the coming year. The total investment control 
figure assigned to each province by the central government refers to total 
investment for the year, as do the control figures for bank finance issued to the 
banks. There is basically no measure to ensure that the central government controls 
the total scale of committed investment, as expressed in the total accumulated 
planned investments of all the approved projects.
At times when the central government discovered that yearly investment 
was running out of control, the provinces would be told to examine critically the 
total scale of approved projects, and some projects would have to be dropped in 
order to cut down the commitment. However the recurrent cycle of clamp-down 
and excess investment over the decades has proved such control to be ineffective.
At this point, the decentralization of approval authority enters the process. 
As provinces were authorized to approve more projects, they could easily expand 
the total commitment of investment and use this as a bargaining chip when 
negotiating the yearly control figures with the Centre. By approving more projects 
and allowing construction to commence, the province increased the committed cost 
of the central government as a measure against any possible future retrenchment. 
The province was thus likely to be able to retain more investment projects, despite 
retrenchment, and to expand the yearly investments by starting at a larger base. In 
the event of huge public resources having been used up by projects already in 
construction, the central government would be less likely to abandon these, as 
opposed to projects existing on paper only. After all, under the public ownership 
system most of the resources are "state" resources, and provincial governments can 
always justify investment projects in terms of public interests. This is why "outside 
plan" (jihuawai) investments have been a consistent feature in China. No matter
49Respondent No.5, Guangdong interview, September 1993.
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how often and how strongly the central government issues orders to stamp out 
these "illegitimate" investment projects, provinces nevertheless know that "outside 
plan" projects are their best guarantee for winning a bigger share in the total 
investment scale nationwide. Therefore, as long as the central government cannot 
control the total scale of investment commitment on a regular basis, its battle on 
the yearly investments front is without doubt doomed to failure.50 When the main 
rule of the system is to protect the vested interests, the secret of success is in 
getting one's own feet under the table by whatever means possible, and as early as 
possible. The decentralization of project approval power is thus the ladder which 
has enabled and facilitated provinces to get a strong foothold in the investment 
arena.
Due to its importance, project approval authority has historically been 
centralized. Investment projects were, since the early 1950s, classified into various 
categories in accordance with their design production capacity or investment value. 
Provinces were, generally speaking, allowed to approve only small sized projects. 
For instance, in the early 1950s, provinces could only approve projects with an 
investment of under 0.2 million yuan. Investment projects were then classified into 
two main categories: "above the ceiling" and "below the ceiling", each of which 
were further subdivided into two sub-categories. The largest projects, Category A 
"above the ceiling" projects, which were projects of over 10 million yuan, were to 
be screened and approved by the State Council. Category B "above the ceiling" 
projects, with an investment under 10 million yuan, would have their project design 
documents screened by the relevant central government ministry for onward 
approval by the State Council. Projects of a value between the 10 million yuan 
ceiling and 200,000 yuan were in "Category C", screened and approved by the 
relevant central government ministries or the regional governments.5! Category D 
projects of under 200,000 yuan were approved by provincial governments.52 Later 
the categories were simplified. Categories A and B became the near-equivalents of 
large and medium sized projects, and Categories C and D became the small sized
50Hence some officials of the State Commission on System Reform have suggested mandatory 
controls on the total commited investment scale for projects approved both at the central and 
provincial levels. See Xie Minggan and Lou Yuanming (eds.), Forty Years of Economic 
Development, p. 194.
51 In-between the central government and the provinces, there were six regional-level governments 
in China in the early years of the People's Republic. In November 1952, the status of the six 
regional governments was converted from that of government level to that of the representative or 
agent of the central government at the sub-national level, and were renamed regional comissions. 
The regions were eventually abolished in 1954. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minzhengbu 
(ed.), Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Quhua Shouce (A Handbook of the Administrative 
Districts in the PRC) (Beijing: Guangming chubanshe, 1986), p.105.
52See Dangdai Zhongguo Congshu Bianji Bu (ed.), The Administration of Fixed Asset Investment in 
Contemporary China, pp. 14-15.
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projects.
The power conferred on the provinces at that time was, therefore, very 
limited. Category D projects amounted to only 13.5% of total investment within 
the First-Five-Year-Plan period of 1953-58. The central government, through the 
State Council and the various ministries, controlled the planning as well as the 
detailed scrutiny of the vast majority (86.5%) of investment projects.
Decentralization then occurred during the 1958 reforms. Provinces' power 
to approve projects was extended to cover all Category C projects and, under two 
circumstances, to Categories A and B as well. First, provinces were made 
responsible for screening the design and budgetary documents prior to the Category 
A and B projects being submitted to the Centre for approval. Second, if the 
Category A and B projects did not require co-ordination from the Centre either 
during construction or after production, the provinces themselves would be allowed 
to approve them, reporting to the Centre for their records thereafter.53
The 1958 reform was extensive but it failed to take root as a result of the 
chaos in investment and production between 1958-60. Powers which had been 
decentralized were again recentralized after 1960. In 1962, the approval authority 
for all medium-large sized investment projects was placed with the State Planning 
Commission. Provinces and central government ministries were left to approve 
small sized projects, in accordance with the subordination relations of the projects. 
In 1963, a regulation was issued stating clearly that ministries and provinces should 
be responsible for approving investment projects of less than 0.5 million yuan 
only.54
Approval authority of provinces saw several up-and-down adjustments 
during the 1970s. The provinces' power was enlarged in 1972, when it was 
announced that provinces could approve those medium-large sized projects which 
had been included in the state's long-term investment plan,55 In 1978, the situation 
again reverted to centralized control. In 1978 a regulation jointly issued by the 
State Planning Commission, the Ministry of Finance, the State Planning 
Commission and the Construction Commission reaffirmed the rule that all 
medium-large sized projects, irrespective of subordination relations, should be
53Ibid., p.26.
54See State Planning Commission (ed.), Jingben Jianshe Fagui Dadian (A Comprehensive 
Collection of Rules and Regulations on Capital Construction) (2 volumes), Vol.2, (Beijing: 
Hongqii chubanshe, 1987), pp.61-63.
55Regulation issued by the State Council in May 31,1972. See Ibid., p.63.
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approved by the State Planning C om m ission .5^ However, centralized control did 
not apparently last long because evidence available indicates that, on the eve of the 
1984 decentralization, provincial governments had already the authority to approve 
projects below 10 million yuan.
In 1984, the investment ceiling for projects nationwide requiring the State 
Planning Commission's approval was raised by 300% from 10 million yuan to 30 
million yuan. The value of projects requiring the approval of the State Council was 
also raised from 100 million yuan to 200 million yuan,57 Moreover, the screening 
and approval procedures for medium-large sized projects were simplified. The time 
required by the central government in which to approve projects, proposed and 
screened by the provinces was shortened. After the projects were approved, the 
provinces would also be entrusted with the formulation of their implementation 
plans.58
In a move to encourage local investment in "bottleneck" sectors, the central 
government authorized provincial-level governments, via a notice in March 1987, 
to approve investment projects in the energy, transportation and raw materials 
sectors having a total value of up to 50 million yuan. The jurisdiction for other 
investments remained unchanged at the 30 million yuan limit.59
In August 1979 at a time when the central government sought to encourage 
more export and foreign investment, authority to approve foreign-related 
investments was first delegated to provincial-level governments nationwide. As 
long as provinces could find their own supplies of raw materials and balance their 
foreign exchange exclusive of assistance from the Centre, they could approve 
export-oriented projects and other forms of foreign investment up to US$1
According to "Regulation on Procedures of Capital Construction" issued by the State Planning 
Commission, State Construction Commission and Ministry of Finance on April 22,1978, printed in 
State Planning Commission (ed.), A Collection of Documents on the Capital Construction System 
Reform, pp. 121-28, all medium-large sized projects would be approved by the State Planning 
Commission, and small sized projects would be approved in accordance with their subordination 
relations.
57State Council Notice No.138 (1984), October 4,1984, "Temporary Regulations on Improving the 
Planning System", printed in Ibid., pp. 1-12.
58State Planning Commission, "Notice on Simplifying the Approval Procedures of Capital 
Construction Projects", August 18,1984, printed in Ibid., pp.21-25.
5^State Council Notice No. 23, 1987 (March 30, 1987), "On the extension of project approval 
authority of fixed assets investment and the simplification of approval procedures", printed in State 
Statistical Bureau (ed.), Guding Zichan Touzi he Jianzhuye Wenjian Huibian (A Compendium of 
Documents on Fixed Assets Investment and the Construction Industry) (Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji 
chubanshe, 1992), pp. 111-17.
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million.60 In 1982 this ceiling was again raised to US$3 million for provincial-level 
governments, other than the three provincial-level municipalities, Shanghai, 
Beijing and Tianjian, and apart from Guangdong and Fujian, who enjoyed still 
greater power under the "Special Policy". These five provinces could approve 
foreign investment of up to US$5 million.61 In 1984, the jurisdiction of 
Guangzhou, together with that of Dalian, was increased by 100% to US$10 
million.62 Guangdong's power was further raised to US$30 million in 1987.63
More details are incorporated in the discussions on Guangdong and 
Shanghai in Chapters Three and Four. Suffice it here to note that one important 
effect of the decentralization of power to approve projects is that provincial 
governments have been able to control the bulk of investment activities within the 
boundaries of their provinces. This development explains to a large extent how the 
provincial governments have been able to withstand pressure from the Centre as 
regards their investment enthusiasm. This new-found provincial discretionary 
behaviour is one of the main findings of this dissertation.
Economic Liberalization Reforms
The decentralization of fiscal authority and investment administration 
authority as outlined above relates to the category of adm inistrative  
decentralization, whereby power and resources shifted downwards from the upper 
level of the state apparatus to the lower levels. Reform accentuated the desire for 
self-sufficiency and the more inward-looking orientations of provinces which had, 
to a lesser extent, existed under the central planning system.64 Decentralization has
^ S ee  State Council Notice No, 202 (1979), August 13,1979, "On approving the Regulations on 
Promoting Foreign Trade and Increasing Foreign Exchange Revenue", in State Commission for 
Economic System Reform (ed.), Jingji Tizhi Gaige Wenjian Hidbian (A Collection of the 
Documents on Economic System Reform) (Beijing: Zhongguo Caizheng Jingji chubanshe, 1983), 
pp. 481-87.
61 See Central Committee Notice No.6 (1982) January 15, 1982, "On Approving the Notes of 
Meeting on the Foreign Trade-Related Work in the Nine Coastal Provinces and Municipalities" in 
Ibid., p.577.
62State Council Notice No.138 (1984), October 4, 1984, "On Approving State Planning 
Commission's Temporary Regulations on Improving the Planning System". See also Guangdong 
Jungji Xuehui (ed.),Guangdong Jingji Tiji Gaige Yanjiu (A Study of the Economic System Reform 
in Guangdong) (Guangdong: Zhongshan University Press, 1986), p. 121. Shanghai was ahead of 
Guangzhou in the power to approve foreign investment, and was allowed the jurisdiction up to 
US$30 million. See also Chapter Four.
63This was the decision of the Central Finance and Economy Leading Group on October 27,1987. 
See Guangdong Provincial Party Committee (ed.), Zhongyang Dui Guangdong Gongzuo Zhishi 
Huibian (A Collection of Central Government’s Instructions to the Work of the Guangdong 
Provincial Government) (Hereinafter as Centre's Instructions to Guangdong) (Four volumes), 1986- 
1987 (Part 2), (Neibu: 1988),p.388.
^ S ee  Thomas Lyons, Economic Integration and Planning in Maoist China (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1987). A central theme of Lyons' is that the failure of the central planning system
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had a marked effect on the relationship between the Centre and the provinces 
because provincial governments have since had more resources and power with 
which to exert their own agenda in defiance of central government directives.
In the 1980s there was another type of reform which had an important effect 
on the central-provincial relationship. These reforms were targeted at the state- 
society interface. They included changes in the relationships between the state 
enterprises and their superordinate government departments, changes of policy 
regarding the non-state sector and a gradual "retuning" of the role and functions of 
the state in general. They fall into the general category of economic 
decentralization and may be described generally as economic liberalization 
reforms. A discussion of the contents of these reforms would be beyond the scope 
of this study. Nevertheless, these reforms have so far had the effect of weakening 
the strength of the Centre and of enhancing the power and influence of provincial 
governments. Specifically, they have enhanced the provinces' capability of 
outmanoeuvring the Centre’s control measures.
The relevance of economic decentralization reforms to central-provincial 
relations is apparent in the difficulty, and, as yet, the failure to turn state enterprises 
into autonomous productive entities.65 This failure has enabled provincial 
governments to make use of the enterprises as a "second battlefield" on which to 
achieve their investment plans, irrespective of the supervision of the Centre. 
Budgetary revenue can, for instance, be diverted, through tax alleviation, to 
extrabudgetary funds in the form of funds retained in state enteiprises. Investment 
is then made by enterprises using their own retained funds, with the provincial 
government acting as the approving authority. Provincial governments can thus
forced each of the constituent units, enterprises, localities, departments, etc., to work for the highest 
possible degree of self-sufficiency for survival and organizational interests. The result was therefore 
a fragmentation of the supposedly tightly knitted social fabric.
65 The State Enterprise Law promulgated in 1988 and the "Regulation to Change the Operation 
Mechanism of State Enterpries” promulgated in 1992 are two major attempts to this end. The 1988 
Enterprise Law was a landmark move in that it was the first time that the state enterprises were, via 
a formal and authoritative legal document, accorded independent status as economic entities 
exercising a prescribed level of autonomy at a distance from their superordinate government 
departments. The 1992 Regulation sought to substantiate and improve the general provisions of the 
1988 Law, and include six long articles prescribing in further detail the relations between state 
enterprises and the government. The intention was to continue the unfinished task of the 1988 Law 
of delineating the respective duties and powers, as well as responsibilities of the enterprises and the 
government departments. State enterprises were to enjoy powers in fourteen different areas, ranging 
from the power to manage its production, the power to invest, the power to dispose of and handle 
the enterprise properties, to personnel power and the power to refuse unlawful fees. See "An 
explanatory note by the State Commission for Economic System Reform on the ‘Regulations'", 
printed in Xie Zhijiang, and Jia Huajiang, eds., Regulation to Change the Operation Mechanism of 
State Enterprises: 100 Questions and Answers (Beijing: Zhongguo Dabaike Quanshu chubanshe, 
1992). pp.227-39.
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divest themselves of direct responsibility for excess investment, whilst, in reality, 
continuing to pull the strings behind the scenes through their influence on the 
enterprises.
Moreover, the scope of influence of provincial governments often goes 
beyond state enterprises to include the local branches of state banks and enterprises 
in the non-state sector. Provincial leverage over local banks ensures that an ample 
supply of bank finance is available for their investment plans, whilst collective and 
private enterprises allow provincial governments to fulfill their plans in an arena 
which is still more remote from the oversight of the central bureaucracy.
How can provincial governments continue to exercise such leverage over 
enterprises, despite the attempts of the Centre to make the latter independent? The 
answer is that provincial governments have been instrumental in the survival of 
enterprises. The latter rely on the active assistance and co-operation of provincial 
governments in solving problems of production as well as in the welfare needs of 
their workforce. This assistance is often crucial to the enterprises, given the 
difficulty in obtaining such necessities from an underdeveloped market. This is 
especially the case for state enterprises, which have operated under the planned 
economy system for so long that they often find it difficult, both objectively and 
subjectively, to look beyond their government superior. A market is, without 
doubt, in the process of development since the commencement of economic 
reform. However, as of the 1980s and the early 1990s, it has still been a very 
immature market and as such is not the fair, transparent and easily accessible 
forum whereby one yuan is exchanged for one yuan. In fact the reliance of 
enterprises on the govenment may even have increased since the reform. For 
instance, enterprises could previously rely on annual planning exercises as a means 
to obtaining raw materials and capital. Since the 1980s, however, that simply 
promised in the state plans may not necessarily materialize at all. Enterprises are 
then obliged to begin yet another round of bargaining with provincial, and lower- 
level, governments, depending on their subordination relations, in order to achieve 
their ends. Since commencement of the reform period, enterprises have also been 
under greater financial pressure. Managers of state enterprises find that completing 
their plan assignments and co-operating with their government superiors is no 
longer all that is entailed in being seen to be doing a good job. They are rather 
expected to produce profits, even though they do not have full command over the 
factors which have a direct bearing on the financial status of the enterprises. The 
enactment of the Bankruptcy Law (For Trial Implementation), for instance, which 
took effect in 1988, has forced enterprises in a poor financial situation to depend
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upon the assistance of their govenment superiors for subsidies and loan support. In 
other words, although enterprises have often cried out for more autonomy and 
frequently condemned interference from the state, practical difficulties in the 
transition towards a market economy have, ironically, depended upon the 
participation of provincial governments in order that they may be resolved.66 
Provincial governments have thus continued to enjoy considerable power over 
enterprises.
One important resource over which provincial governments have had great 
leverage is that of bank finance. The ability to influence the supply and allocation 
of bank loans has also enabled provincial governments to influence investment 
which relies on bank loans for finance. Since the management of enterprises' "own 
funds" is expedited through the bank system, the bank, therefore, controls the bulk 
majority of resources used in investment in the 1980s 67 This means that provincial 
governments, as well as lower-level governments, are able to exercise considerable 
influence over the bulk majority of investment decisions within provincial 
boundaries through their manipulation of bank officials. The power of provincial 
governments over investment decisions has not, therefore, been affected by the 
proliferation of investment actors and the growth of the non-state sector.
Why, then, are the provincial governments able to exercise such substantial 
influence, if not control, over the banks? The bank system in China is, in theory, a 
vertical system, whereby the provincial branches of the specialized state banks owe 
their first allegiance to their headquarters in Beijing. In practice the influence of the 
provincial government is unsurmountable. The provincial branches rely on the 
provincial government to provide the social infrastructural support for their staff. 
Moreover, whilst provincial governments count on the banks to provide capital for 
their investment projects, the banks depend on the provincial governments and 
their subordinate enterprises in order to meet their quotas of business turnover. 
Again, this interdependence is largely a product of the reforms of the 1980s, when 
banks were required increasingly to act like commercial entities and to produce 
profits,68 However, as one type of state enterprise operating under "soft
66A nationwide survey covering over 2600 managers of state enterprises conducted in 1994 found 
that nearly 80% of the respondents was so dissatisfied with their situation that they would like to be 
transferred to the non-state sector. The number one problem was the failure to materialize the 
autonomy promised in the 1992 Regulation, and nearly 70% of the managers had to spend over 30% 
of their management time on "handling interferences from outside". See Ming Pao (Hong Kong) 
June 25,1994, p.A13.
67The percentage share of total investment using bank loans and "own funds and other funds", the 
latter often having to be used through the banks, during 1986-90 stood at 84,6%, while the share of 
budgetary investment was only 9.7%. See Statistics on FAI (1990-1991), p.19.
68See Zhong Chengxu (ed.), Difang Zhengfu Touzi Xingwei Yanjiu (A Study of the Investment
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constraints", the banks themselves would not be penalized for bad debts loaned to 
inefficient projects.69 Consequently, the banks would be inclined to co-operate 
with provincial governments in expanding credits to finance local projects, 
especially at times when the "political atmosphere" was relatively relaxed and 
pressure from the Centre to control the finance quotas was relatively mild.70 
Summarily reflecting the close relationship between the provincial government, the 
enterprises and the local banks, a city mayor told a director of a local bank:
"For progressive and advanced enterprises, you have to support (their 
development and growth); for the average enterprises, you have to lend a 
hand (to improve their performance); for backward enterprises running in 
the red, you have to help them to maintain (survival needs)."71
Provincial governments have, therefore, been able to retain, if not increase, 
their influence over investment activities through their leverage over the supply of 
bank finance, and through their authority as government units to "make life easier" 
for enterprises. By giving more resources to the enterprises but not quite enough to 
enable them to stand on their own feet, the program of economic decentralization 
has worked largely in the interests of the provincial and lower-level governments, 
as opposed to those of the Centre. Moreover, the continued participation of the 
provincial government in investment decisions in enterprises, as well as its 
extension into areas outside the traditional domain of the government, not only 
extends the influence of the local state, but also accounts for the provinces' success 
in withstanding central control over their investment agenda (the details of which 
are discussed in Chapters Five and Six). By acting as the "visible hand" behind the 
decisions of enterprises, and by assuming the role of mentor, sponsor and co­
ordinator, the provincial government has come to exercise a degree of power far 
exceeding that suggested by the proportion of investment financed by the
Behaviour of Local Governments) (Beijing: Zhongguo Caizheng Jingji chubanshe, 1993), p. 170.
69For an analysis of the problem of efficiency of the state banks in the reform period, see Wang 
Haibo (ed.), A Study of the Economic Efficiency, p,400.
7^Since the late 1980s the Centre has repeatedly warned against improper interference by provincial 
governments in the local bank branches. In the comprehensive reform package by the State 
Commission for Economic System Reform in 1988, it was explicitly stated that "leaders of various 
levels and various government departments have to support the banks in the exercise of their 
autonomy, and should stop any credits above those of the state set quotas." See "The 1988 
Comprehensive package on deepening the economic system reform, State Commission for 
Economic System Reform", approved by the State Council on February 27,1988, printed in Since 
the Thirteenth Party Congress, p.87. Again, during the macro-adjustment of 1993, Vice-premier 
Zhu Rongji in a national finance conference explicitly warned that banks should follow the rules of 
the Centre. He pledged that if in the future any bank officials in local branches were dismissed by 
the local governments as a result of their refusal to co-operate in unreasonable loan requests, they 
should complain to him directly and that he would back them up. See Ming Pao (Hong Kong) July 
7, 1993. Zhu's statement reveals the substantial power and leverage of provincial and lower-level 
governments over the local branches of the banks, and the severity of the problem.
71See Zhong Chengxun (ed.), A Study of the Investment Behaviour of Local Governments, p. 14.
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provincial budget. Through this indirect route, provinces have, since the 1980s, 
become the predominant actor in investment vis-a-vis the Centre, thereby altering 
the central/provincial balance of power in this arena.
Implications of the Investment Problem: A Central and Local Issue
The above discussion suggests that the problem of investment control in 
China is both a central and a local problem. It is a central problem because the 
quest for more investment is ultimately grounded in a nationalistic desire to regain 
national glory and to raise the international status of the nation. Given the historical 
context of the formation of the People's Republic, the success or failure of the 
modernization program could affect the entire political legitimacy of the regime. 
Investment and economic development have, therefore, always been a major 
concern of leaders at the Centre.72 Moreover, the institutional context which has 
facilitated excess investment over and above prescribed quotas over the years is 
also part and parcel of the socialist system of public ownership. Consequently, the 
issue of investment control is endemic to the socialist system, and, given the bias 
for centralization within such a system, the local factor of implementation bias was, 
until the 1980s, only secondary.
The decentralization reforms of the 1980s gave enough power and resources 
to provincial and lower levels to change the scene. The fiscal reform in 1980 in 
particular resulted in a situation whereby the provincial government had a built-in 
incentive to increase investment. In the political language of the central leadership, 
fiscal reform successfully built up a second source of "enthusiasm" in the state 
apparatus at provincial level, as "back up" to the source of enthusiasm at the 
Centre.73 The changes outlined in the above section demonstrate that the provincial
72This is despite the fact that leaders of different periods have had widely different assessments of 
the economic situation of the country, as well as ideas regarding appropriate strategies with which 
to further the might and the strength of the country. Chairman Mao Zedong opted for a mobilization 
approach, whereby the enthusiasm of the masses was used to provide extra inputs of resources at a 
time when the international exclusion of China disabled it from obtaining additional resources from 
outside of its borders. This strategy required a more optimistic assessment of China's strength, so 
that the enthusiasm of the masses could be protected and reinforced. This deliberate radicalism was 
obvious when Mao faced criticisms from the more "conservative" central leaders during the Great 
Leap Forward. In a meeting held in January 1958, Mao reportedly criticised his conservative 
colleagues for committing a political mistake, because "if you were to oppose radicalism, the 
enthusiasm of the masses would be immediately affected." See Fang Weizhong (ed.), The Major 
Economic Events in the People's Republic of China, 1949-1980, p.205. The excesses of optimistic 
radicalism forced the revamped post-Mao leadership under Deng Xiaoping to adopt a more 
conservative and realistic assessment of the situation. The wanning up of Chinese-U.S. relations 
since 1972 also provided a favourable international environment for the change.
73The reference to provinces and localities as being the second source of enthusiasm, the Centre 
being the first and primary source, is made by Mao Zedong in his famous speech, "Lun Shida 
Guanxi" (On the Ten Great Relationships), April 15,1956, printed in Mao Zedong, Selected Works
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government has increasingly become an independent actor in investment decisions, 
and the problems of investment since the 1980s have increasingly merged into the 
one main issue of central control over investment decisions made at provincial and 
subprovincial levels.
What is most important, however, is that since the 1980s the investment 
problem has been, still, both a central and local issue. The reforms of the 1980s 
have added a local implementation dimension to the issue. Yet the original nature 
of the problem remains the same. It is bound up in the nationalistic drive for rapid 
modernization and in the failure of the public ownership system to impose an 
effective self-monitoring efficiency mechanism. The dual nature of the investment 
problem since the 1980s explains its complexity. In particular, it explains the 
recurrent phenomenon whereby after each drive of central control and investment 
contraction, there is a new round of investment expansion, often sanctioned by the 
central leadership itself.
For instance, Zhao Ziyang, former premier and General Secretary of the 
Chinese Communist Party, was reportedly very slack in the enforcement of control 
instruments and policies, and ignored the excessive expansion of bank credits 
which first started in the south and which became serious in the mid-1980s.74 Eager 
to expand the economy, Zhao apparently believed that expansion of credits and 
some degree of inflation was not a serious issue, and did not bother, therefore, to 
revise the original quotas so as to make them approach the actual level of credits.75 
The system simply fell into disuse. This problem finally led to the retrenchment 
which started in late 1988 and lasted until 1991. The southern tour of Deng 
Xiaoping in 1992 however signalled a change of "political wind" from the Centre 
and provincial governments acted immediately in readjusting their plans and 
strategies. As a Guangdong official commented in 1993, "By this year (1993), the 
control over the investment scale, stringent once more since 1989, is no longer 
working. There is, however, no explicit change of policy or rules. The climate is 
simply different, and any attempts at control in this situation would have been 
futile."76
of Mao Zedong (5 volumes), Vol. 5, (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1977), p.275.
74Respondent No.39, Beijing interview, June 1994. Respondent No.l revealed that during 1987 and 
1988, the banks themselves relaxed the control over money and credit supply, and many bank 
officials at that time had to knock the doors of local government departments and enterprises asking 
for loan applications. (Guangzhou interview, May 1993).
75Respondent No.39, Beijing interview, June 1994.
76Respondent No.4, Guangzhou interview, May 1993.
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The recurrent cycles of expansion and contraction suggest that central 
control, or effective central control, is at best an intermittent phenomenon. 
Although there are regulations, rules and policies prescribing the proper investment 
scale and the proper procedures for project approval, provincial government 
officials know that they are safe to ignore, or pay only lip service to, the rules 
"when the climate is right". The fact that central leaders themselves are eager to 
increase viable investment and to launch good investment projects has enabled 
provincial leaders to argue for exceptions in the various central control measures by 
appealing directly to the desires and inclinations of the central leaders.77 In fact, 
because of such inclination on the part of the central leadership, a "more relaxed" 
environment, meaning that rules and regulations may be ignored or bypassed with 
relative safety, has become the "normal" state from the perspective of the 
provincial government. The "stringent" climate whereby the Centre demands strict 
enforcement of existing rules is regarded either as "extraordinary" or as being a 
"crisis" situation.
The fact that central leaders are equally as eager to expand investment and 
develop the economy as provincial leaders, if not more, explains why the control of 
the Centre has been so ineffective. It is ineffective because since the very beginning 
this has not been a control versus being controlled situation. Provincial government 
officials have always argued, and justifiably so, that their investment plans are of 
help to the Centre in its task of developing the national economy. Here it is worth 
recalling that the investment scale per se has not actually been the issue, as noted 
in the first section of this Chapter. Investment scale has become the issue only 
when the direction and efficiency of the projects involved has been considered 
problematic. But the propriety of investment direction and efficiency is no simple, 
hard-and-fast issue. As a result, as will be discussed further in Chapter Five, a 
motivated provincial government official can frequently convince an equally 
motivated central government official that certain local investment projects are 
good and well worth the resources, even though the original centrally prescribed 
investment quotas are necessarily exceeded as a result
770ne tactic used by the Guangdong provincial government to bargain for a higher investment 
quotas from the Centre, and to legitimize excess performance, is to convince the central leadership 
of the desirability of particularly individual investment projects. Respondent No. 9, Guangzhou 
interview, December 1993. See discussion in Chapter Five.
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Chapter Three
Institutional Context of Investment Administration in Guangdong
The objective of this chapter is to provide the context for answering the 
question: what does fixed asset investment in Guangdong tell us about provincial- 
central relations in Guangdong? Two sets of questions are involved here. First, 
what characterizes Guangdong's investment after 1980? What are the major changes 
in investment so far as central-provincial relations are concerned? Is there an 
"implementation gap" in fixed asset investment policy in the Centre-Guangdong 
interface, and what are its characteristics? Second, how do the changes in 
Guangdong's investment come about? What institutional changes have taken place 
behind the phenomenal changes in the investment scene, and in particular, the 
phenomenon of an investment "implementation gap"? A full understanding of the 
institutional context is prerequisite to understanding the politics of the process, 
which is explicitly discussed in Chapters Five and Seven. This chapter will focus on 
an examination of the institutional context which is pertinent to the behaviour of the 
provincial government in fixed asset investment.
Investment in Guangdong
The fixed asset investment scene in Guangdong after 1980 is characterized 
by two phenomena. One is the proliferation of investment funding channels and 
investment actors. The other is the rapid growth of the total size of investment from 
a relatively low base. The two are clearly related. On the one hand, the rapid growth 
in total investment is the result of the proliferation of investment funding channels 
and investment actors. On the other hand, such a plurality of actors and funding 
sources has evolved due to a strong demand for more investment. The dynamics and 
processes through which Guangdong’s investment has developed into a "great leap 
forward" are the subject of the next section, where the institutional changes of the 
1980s will be discusssed. This section begins with an analysis of the investment 
expansion phenomenon.
Rapid Growth from a Low Base
Low Base
Historically Guangdong has not been a preferred recipient of state 
investment. The proportion of national income utilized in the province for
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accumulation purposes prior to 1979 was low compared to the national average and 
that of industrial centres such as Shanghai. At that time there were few large and 
medium sized investment projects in the province, most of the investment 
undertaken having been in the light and processing industries. The tables below 
show the low level of investment in Guangdong before the reform decade 
commenced in 1979.
Table 3.1
Accumulation Ratio (%)*
Year National Average Guangdong Shanghai
1952 21.4 13.9 25.6
1957 24.9 17.2 34.6
1962 10.4 6.6 n/a
1965 27.1 17.1 12.4
1970 32.9 21.9 28.3
1975 33.9 26.1 41.0
1978 36.5 28.4 41.0
Accumulation Ratio*
3  20
■  National Average □  Guangdong H Shanghai
Notes: Accumulation ratio is the ratio of utilized national income used for working 
capital, stock, and fixed assets investment.
Source: Guangdong National Economic and Social Development Statistics and 
Information 1949-88. Part on Fixed Assets Investment, (hereinafter Guangdong
1949-88. FAI) (Neibu, 1989), pp. 197-99.
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Table 3.2
Ranking of Accumulation Ratio
Year Guangdong Shanghai Total No. of Rank*
1952 16 4 24
1957 26 5 27
1962 12 n/a 22
1965 24 26 26
1970 24 17 25
1971 21 6 25
1978 23 4 24
Ranking of Accumulation Ratio
30 -i-
o
1952 1957 1962 1965 1970 1971 1978
Year
■  Guangdong □  Shanghai H Total No. of Rank*
Notes: The total number fluctuates each year and is not necessarily equal to the total 
number of provinces as some provinces may have identical accumulation ratios.
Source: Computed from Guangdong National Economic and Social Development 
Statistics and Information 1949-88. Part on General Statistics, (hereinafter 
Guangdong 1949-88 (General)) (Neibu, 1989), pp.197-98.
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show that Guangdong's accumulation ratios prior to 
1979 were, for most of the years shown, at least 7% lower than the national 
average. Compared with the 28 other provincial-level administrations, its ranking 
was always at the bottom end of the scale.1 Its ranking was particularly poor when 
compared to Shanghai, which was, with the exception of 1965 and 1970, amongst 
the upper ranks.
1 Prior to 1988 there were only 29 provinces (including provincial-level municipalities and 
autonomous regions) in China. In 1988 Hainan was separated from Guangdong and made a province 
on its own.
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This low accumulation was probably due to the small number of medium- 
large sized investment projects carried out in Guangdong before 1980. The coastal 
and peripheral geographical location of Guangdong made the province vulnemable 
to foreign attack. At a time when strategic and warfare considerations loomed larged 
within the central leadership, Guangdong was not a preferred base for investment 
and economic development in the eyes of the central government As medium-large 
sized investments were at that time mostly approved and financed by the central 
government, the number of sizable investment in Guangdong during the pre-1980 
period remained small and the rate of accumulation was, therefore, low.
Table 3.3
Completed Medium-large sized 
capital construction projects (Number)
Year National Guanadong (%)
1953-57 595 17 (2.85)
1958-62 581 25 (4.30)
1963-65 355 26 (7.32)
1966-70 743 15 (2.02)
1971-75 742 8 (3.10)
1976-80 515 26 (5.05)
Total 3531 117 (3.31)
Sources: Xie Minggan, and Lou Yuanming (eds.), Zhongguo Jingji Faz>
As a result of its below average accumulation ratio, Guangdong's yearly 
investment correspondingly fell below the national average. From 1950 to 1978, 
Guangdong's fixed asset investment in the state sector amounted to a total of 21.3 
billion yuan. The average investment per annum figure of 734 million yuan was 
one-third short of the national average yearly investment, assuming investment has 
been distributed evenly across the 29 provinces/municipalities.
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Table 3.4
1950-78 State Sector Investment (Yuan billion!
NationalOT) Guangdong(G) G % of N Average*
Total 768.8 21.3 (2.8)
Annual Average 26.5 0.7 - 0.9
*Notes: "Average" refers to the hypothetical share of investment for each province if 
total investment is evenly distributed amongst all provinces.
Sources: Guangdong 1949-88. FAI, pp. 158-61; State Statistical Bureau (ed.), 
Statistics on Investment in Fixed Assets of China (1950-1985) (hereinafter Statistics 
on FAI) (Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji chubanshe, 1986), p.9.
Rapid Growth
The small share of Guangdong's investment in the national total before 1979 
indicates how much has changed since then. In 1992 Guangdong’s total societal 
investment amounted to 11.8% of the national total.2 In both 1991 and 1992, 
Guangdong ranked first among the 30 provincial-level administrations in terms of 
the value of total societal investment, with Shanghai ranking sixth and seventh.3 
Guangdong's yearly average investment during the 1979-92 period amounted to 
25.4 billion yuan, more than 32 times the average during the 1950-78 period, as 
shown in Table 3, 5 below.
Table 3.5
Guangdong's Total Societal Investment 
fY uan billion)
Period Total Annual Average
1950-78 22.6 0.8
1979-92 355.6 25.4
1950-92 378.3 11.5
Source: Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 1993, p.236.
This high rate of growth has made possible the "great leap forward" in 
Guangdong’s investment ranking. The annual investment growth rates of 
Guangdong as compared with growth rates nationwide are shown in Table 3.6 
below.
2See Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 1993, p.94.
3See Slate Statistical Bureau (ed.), Quanguo ZJuiyao Shehui Jingji Zhibiao Paixu Nianjian-1992. 
(The 1992 Yearbook of the Ranking of Provinces in Major Social and Economic Indicators) 
(Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji chubanshe, 1992), p. 19.
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Table 3.6
Growth Rate of Total Societal Investment (%)
Year Guanedons National Average
1979 3.9 n/a
1980 35.4 n/a
1981 57.7 n/a
1982 40.3 28.0
1983 4.7 16.2
1984 47.0 28.2
1985 41.6 38.7
1986 17.3 18.7
1987 16.0 20.6
1988 40.9 23.5
1989 -1.8 -8.0
1990 7.3 7.5
1991 28.3 23.8
1992 92.8 n/a
1979-1992 30.8 *19.7
Note: The cumulative average for the national figure is for the period 1982 to 1991 
only.
Sources: Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 1992,1993, respectively, p.145, p.236; 
Guangdong 1949-88. FAI, p.176; Statistics on FAI (1950-1985),(1988-1989), 
respectively, p.8, p. 13.
Table 3.6 shows that for most of the years since 1979, total societal 
investment has more often than not grown more rapidly in Guangdong than 
nationwide. The average yearly growth rate for the 1979-92 period was 30.8%, 
whilst nationally during the 1982-91 period the growth rate stood at 19.7%. This 
continuous growth throughout the 14-year period was interrupted in 1989, when 
investment throughout the country was hampered by severe retrenchment measures 
and the national growth figure dived to -8%. However, investment in Guangdong's 
collective sector nevertheless rose by 1.7% in 1989, indicating that the 1989 
austerity programme failed to suppress entirely the investment drive in Guangdong.
The high growth rate of Guangdong's investment is reflected in its higher 
than average accumulative ratio. Table 3.7 below shows Guangdong's accumulation 
ratios during the 1980s as being, in general, slightly higher than the national 
average. These ratios were also on average over ten percentage points higher than 
those prior to 1980 as shown in Table 3.1. Consequently Guangdong's ranking at 
the bottom end of the provinces in 1980 elevated significantly towards a more 
central position by 1985.
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Table 3.7
Accumulation Ratio: GuangdongfGl 
Year National Average G (%) G Ranking: Total No.of ranks
1980 31.5 22.4 27 28
1985 35.0 35.4 12 26
1986 34.7 34.3 14 29
1987 34.2 34.6 13 28
1988 34.1 35.8 14 29
1989 34.4 35.6 12 29
Source: Guangdong 1949-88 (General Statistics), pp.197-99.
Guangdong's investments during the 1980s were on a much larger scale 
than those prior to 1980 when it was assigned only a small number of medium-large 
sized investment projects. In 1990 and 1991, Guangdong completed the largest 
number of medium-large sized projects nationally. A total of 19 and 22 projects 
were completed respectively, as compared with nine and four projects in Shanghai.4 
Table 3.8 demonstrates the substantial increase which has occurred in Guangdong's 
share in medium-large sized investments since the mid-1980s.
Table 3.8
Share of Guangdong's medium-large sized 
investments in national total
Year Share (%)
1953-57 2.3
1958-62 3.5
1963-65 2.1
1966-70 2.9
1971-75 2.5
1976-80 3.1
1981-85 3.9
1985 4.8
1986 8.9
1987 5.6
1988 6.4
1989 6.5
1990 10.3
1991 10.5
Sources: Guangdong 1949-88. FAI, p. 197; Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 1991, 
1992, respectively, p.151, p.153; Statistics on FAI (1950-1985), (1988-1989), 
respectively, p.70, p.60.
As a result of its high rates of growth, Guangdong's total societal investment has
4Ibid„ p.27.
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consistently surpassed the control figures agreed with the Centre, and by very large 
margins. Table 3.9 supplies the details.
Table 3.9
Differentials between Plans and Performance 
(Y uan Billion')
Year Control Figures* Actual Societal 
Investment
Excess Investment 
(%)**
1980 5.1 3.8 -25.5
1985 5.5 18.5 236.4
1988 12.8 35.4 176.6
1989 14.0 34.7 147.9
1990 20.7 37.3 80.2
1991 23.6 47.8 102.5
1992 34.5 92.2 167.2
Notes: * Figures for 1980, 1985, and 1988 are control figures calculated at the 
beginning of the year. Adjusted figures calculated at the years' end, which are 
usually larger, are not available. Figures for the other years are year-end adjusted 
figures.
Because of the discrepancy in the coverage of the planning control figures and 
statistics on actual investment, the two are not entirely comparable.
Source: Information obtained from Guangdong Planning Commission, Investment 
Bureau.
The above table shows that during the 1980s control figures passed down by 
the central government were consistently and substantially surpassed. The 
retrenchment years of 1989, 1990 and 1991 were no exception. The planned 
investment level for 1989 in the provincial plans made according to central directives 
prescribed a decrease of 20.5% from the planned level in 1988.5 But as seen in 
Table 3.9, the actual societal investment for the year 1989 surpassed the control limit 
by 150%.
It should be noted that the control figures and investment statistics are not, 
strictly speaking, entirely comparable. The statistics purportedly measure all 
investments undertaken in the province which have been reported to the authorities 
concerned.6 Such statistics include investment in the state and the non-state sectors
^See extracts from The Report of Guangdong's 1989 Economic and Social Development Plan by 
the director of Guangdong's Provincial Planning Commission, published in Jihua Yu Fazhan No.l 
(1989), pp.6-12, p.7.
^Some investments, usually at local levels, were not reported to superiors and therefore were not 
included in the statistics. A former State Planning Commission official told the author that in his 
visits to the localities, he had discovered some "unreported" investment projects which had never
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and of all funding channels, including those of both central and local investment 
projects. The control figures, on the other hand, have a narrower scope due to 
multiple exclusion categories as detailed below. Coverage has also varied over the 
years. For instance, in 1980 control figures cover capital construction investment in 
the state sector only, but as from 1988 capital construction in the non-state sector 
was also included. Since 1990, investment in commodity housing projects has 
always been included due to its increasing share in the total investment. However, 
central investment projects in either sector have always been excluded, as have 
foreign direct investments. And in 1992, the central government assigned specific 
control figures to Shenzhen and Guangzhou, whose investments have since also 
been excluded from the Guangdong provincial control figures.7
If investment in central projects is deducted from the total investment figure 
thereby eliminating a major source of coverage incompatibility, the excess 
investment ratios fell but are nevertheless significantly high.
gone through the formal planning and approval procedures and were supposedly "nonexistent" in the 
state investment plans and in the investment statistics. See Chapter Four on Shanghai for more on 
the coverage of statistical data and underreporting of investment activities in statistics.
Respondent No.9, telephone interview, September 1993. In a sense the different coverage is due 
to differences in the nature of the two. Investment statistics are meant to be a factual reflection of 
the total amount of investment activity taking place in the province, irrespective of whether the 
investments are authorized or "illegal", or whether the investments have a subordination 
relationship within or without the province, or whether the funding comes from inside or outside 
the state coffers, or from inside or outside of China. On the other hand, the planning control 
figures are a tool of the central government to control investments undertaken by Guangdong. As a 
result, investments undertaken in Guangdong but not by the enterprises and authorities of 
Guangdong, for instance, those by the central ministries and other provinces, are excluded from the 
planning figures. See "Supplementary Regulations on Domestic Joint Investments" by the State 
Planning Commission, the State Economic Commission, and Finance Ministry, et al. 19 
December 1984, printed in State Statistical Bureau (ed.), Gudtng Zichan Touzi he Jianzfutye 
Wenjian Huibian (A Compendium of Documents on Fixed Asset Investment and the Construction 
Industry) (Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji chubanshe, 1992), p.326. Certain categories of investment 
may also be excluded from the planning figure as a result of central policy. Foreign direct 
investments, for example, are excluded so as to encourage the Guangdong province to attract more 
foreign investments. In 1982 and 1985, respectively eleven and five categories of investment such 
as the repair of existing equipment, the building of roads, schools, hospitals and museums, and 
staff hostels using extrabudgetary or "own funds" were excluded so as to avoid these socially 
desirable projects from being crowded out by more profit-oriented projects. See Dangdai Zhongguo 
Congshu Bianji Bu. (ed.), Dangdai Zhongguo de Jingji Guanli (The Economic Management of 
Contemporary China) (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue chubanshe, 1985), p.237.
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Table 3.10
Differentials between Plans and Performance (Adjusted)
CYuan Billionl
Year Control Figures Societal Investment* Excess Investment %
1980 5.1 3.0 -42.0
1985 5.5 15.6 184.4
1988 12.8 35.4 139.8
1989 14.0 30.0 113.7
1990 20.7 31.5 52.0
1991 23.6 41.3 75.4
1992 34.5 82.5 139.2
*Note: The adjusted figures are arrived at by deducting central projects (state sector) 
investments from the total societal investment figures. (For sources see Table 3.11 
below). Because investments in the non-state sector are normally of local 
subordination relations, the difference should be locally-subordinated investments.
Their different coverages notwithstanding, the substantial differentials between the 
control figures and actual investment give some idea as to the extent of investment 
activity taking place beyond the scope of planning control. This is indicative of the 
waning control of central government over the province via the traditional planning 
system, and of the increasing irrelevance of the state plan as an indication of the 
actual investment activities at provincial and lower levels.
In 1993, Guangdong Provincial Planning Commission in a quite defiant 
move ceased its practice of assigning investment control figures to the subprovincial 
levels of government after it was assigned a lump sum control figure by the central 
government. The quota instruction was simply filed away. In the words of a 
provincial official, the task had become little more than a ritual surviving from the 
old system of central planning, and which as such had no place in the current drive 
towards a market economy.^
Proliferation of Actors
The proliferation of actors in the field of fixed asset investment occurs on 
two fronts. First, there has been a diversification of investment funding channels, 
which has had the effect of bringing in more actors as lenders and investors in the 
undertaking of investment activities than ever before. Therefore the state, and in 
particular the central government, can no longer dominate the investment scene by
^Respondent No.9, Guangzhou interview, September 1993.
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controlling the supply of funds. Second, investment has become more diffused 
within society and is no longer the sole privilege of the state sector. The non-state 
sector, comprising the collectives and the private sector, has also been growing at a 
much faster rate than the traditionally mighty state sector. Within the state sector 
itself decentralization of investment authority has made subprovincial governments 
at city, county and township level active investors in themselves. Consequently the 
authority of the central government has become appreciably marginalized.
Declining Central Investment
The most significant phenomenon resulting from the proliferation of funding 
channels in Guangdong has been the marginalization of central investment in 
Guangdong's fixed asset investment.
As shown in Table 3.11 below, during the early 1950s fixed asset 
investment by the central government accounted for over 70% of the total. This 
share declined drastically during the 1960s and 1970s when a large number of 
central enterprises became decentralized to provincial and lower levels at that time. 
The share of central investment again rose to 66% in 1978 when many large 
enterprises resumed their former subordination relationship. But after 
decentralization once more during the 1980s the share of central investment fell and 
was under 20% by 1992,
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Table 3.11
Central and Local Investments
in Guangdong's State Sector (%)
Year Central Investment Local Investment
1952 72.0 27.9
1957 64.0 36.0
1962 31.6 68.4
1965 37.6 62.4
1970 12.2 87.8
1975 17.4 82.6
1978 66.4 33.6
1980 32,6 67.4
1981 27.8 74.2
1984 25.8 74.2
1987 29.7 71.3
1988 16.4 83.6
1989 23.9 76.1
1990 23.4 76.6
1991 21.3 76.7
1992 19.5 80.5
Sources: For 1952-78: Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 1Q84, p 9.17 F^r 1Q7Q
83: Guangdong 1949-88 FAI, p.172. For 1984-92: Guangdong's Fixed Assets 
Investment Statistical Information, (hereinafter Guangdong FAI Statistics) Yearly 
volumes 1984-1992. (Guangdong Statistical Bureau, Not openly published)
It should be noted that the percentage shares in Table 3.11 are calculated 
according to the subordination relations of each investment project. The entire value 
of a centrally subordinated investment project is calculated as a central investment. 
The same applies conversely to locally subordinated projects. However it appears 
from data made available during the 1980s that there have been substantial cross­
overs of funds from a government level to a project subordinated to another 
government level.9 It is thus possible to know more precisely the share of 
central/local investment in terms of actual monetary contribution. The movement of 
funds also indicates the underlying central-provincial dynamics. Details are shown 
in the following two tables.
It should be noted that before 1980 it was customary to have substantial inflows of central funds 
to locally subordinated investment projects. This was because under the traditional fiscal and 
planning system, revenues were highly centralized and the central government was responsible for 
the planning, approval as well as the funding of the larger investment projects. However this has 
changed since 1980, especially in Guangdong which, with the new dabaogan system, has become 
responsible, in principle, for the planning and funding of most investment activities within the 
provincial borders. This must be taken into account when looking at statistics on central and local 
investment calculated according to subordination relations before and after 1980. (See Chapter Four 
for more discussion on this point.) In accordance with the new principle of division of 
responsibilities between Centre and provinces, the amount of local investment by subordination is 
purportedly the same as the amount by source funding. This sets the scene for the following 
discussion on the cross-over of funds.
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Table 3.12
Local Investment Share (%)
Year Bv Subordination Relations Bv Funding Source
1984 74.2 68.2
1985 79.1 77.6
1986 80.7 80.7
1987 71.4 74.2
1988 83.6 n/a
1989 76.2 75.5
1990 76.6 76.3
1991 78.7 78.4
1992 80.5 81.1
1984)
1992) 78.2 78.1
Source: Guangdong FAI Statistics.
Table 3.13
Fund Cross-Overs (Yuan Mn)
Year Central Funds Local Funds to Crossover
to Local Projects Central Projects % of Total
1984 379.9 26,4 (5.1)
1985 81.9 54.7 (1.1)
1986 0.0 n/a n/a
1987 47.7 113.5 (0.9)
1988 n/a n.a n/a
1989 151.5 169.3 (1.6)
1990 185.0 117.2 (1.2)
1991 333.6 260.5 (2.0)
1992 150.2 554.4 (1.4)
1984)
1992) 1329.8 1296.0 (2.2)
Source: Guangdong FAI Statistics.
Table 3.13 shows that in Guangdong between 1984 and 1992 the total 
crossover of funds amounted to some 2.2% of the total value of investments. Table 
3.12 shows that, after accounting for the cross-over of funds as detailed in Table 
3.13, the share of local investment during the 1984-92 period dropped slighdy, but 
still remained at more or less the same level as the subordination figure. It is 
interesting to note that in Table 3.13, the crossover of local funds to central projects 
is not much less than vice versa. And in 1987 and 1992, Guangdong's injection into 
central projects was between two and three times the value of the inflow of funds 
from the Centre.
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The information shown in Table 3.13 represents only part of the scale of 
fund movement which actually took place. To disaggregate entirely the source of 
funding, a detailed breakdown of every channel of funds is necessary. In other 
words, the general category of "budgetary funds" needs to be broken down into 
central budgetary funds and local budgetary funds. The "own funds" should be 
differentiated in accordance with the source, namely, whose own funds. As a 
portion of bank loans are financed directly from the central coffers, this part should 
be differentiated from the balance of loans which are financed by bank deposits. 
Thus each category of detailed funding source and its allocation of funds to 
central/local investment projects is clearly identified.10
Due to data limitation, Table 3.13 is primarily based on the cross-over of 
"own funds". A breakdown of budgetary funds is available for the technical 
renovation investment of 1984 only. This piece of information, however, indicates 
that the budgetary channel is a major channel of inflow of central funds to local 
projects.11 Hence the extent of the central inflow of funds over the years may well 
be substantially under-reported due to the lack of avaibable data in this area. 
However, the outflow of local funds to centrally subordinated projects in 
Guangdong should not be interpreted as skill on the part of the Centre in extracting 
local resources from Guangdong. The phenomenon is more likely the result of 
Guangdong's successful "fishing" of central investment in the province. By 
agreeing to contribute capital to central projects located in the province, the 
Guangdong government can increase the total value of investment projects in the 
province, particularly when central investment projects are not taken into account in 
the centrally prescribed quotas of total local investment As a planning official put it, 
"since these projects are all located in Guangdong, they contribute towards the 
multiplier effect of the economic development in the province regardless of their 
subordination relations and to where the direct taxes and profit of the project go."12
10The necessity of such disaggregation was confirmed by Respondent No.4, Guangzhou interview, 
September 1993. Respondent No. 36 clarified that foreign loans which are centrally co-ordinated are 
not the means to a central injection of funds. Whether the foreign loans are centrally or locally co­
ordinated depends on the method of arranging the loans. Centrally co-ordinated loans may have a 
lower interest rate because of the type of loans normally dealt with by the Centre and its superior 
bargaining power with the lending parties. Nevertheless the loans are still repaid by the user-units, 
albeit via the Centre, to the lending parties. (Beijing interview, May 1994)
11 This pattern of capital inflow from the Centre was also confirmed by Respondent No.4, 
Guangzhou interview, September 1993.
12Respondent No.9, Guangzhou interview, December 1993. It should be noted that before the 1994 
tax reform, indirect taxes, for instance turnover taxes, of all enterprises, central and local, went to 
the local coffers where the enterprises were situated. After the reform 75% of the turnover taxes of 
all enterprises went to the central coffers, and 25% to the local coffers. See State Council Notice 
No.85, 1993, "State Council’s Decision on Implementing the Tax-sharing Fiscal Management 
System", printed in Caizheng, No.2 (1994), pp.18-20.
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It must be remembered that Tables 3.11 to 3.13 refer to investment in the 
state sector only. As most investment in the collective sector, and virtually all in the 
private sector, is local investment, the share of local investment in total societal 
investment is larger than the percentage shares indicated in these tables. This is 
especially so for the 1980s when the non-state sector investment grew to a 
substantial share.
The decline of central investment's share in Guangdong is due to two 
independent developments. First is the reform in the budgetary fiscal system with 
the subsequent decentralization of budgetary resources. Second is the proliferation 
of funding channels of investment. As a result of fiscal reform Guangdong can 
deploy more budgetary funds for local investment. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that Guangdong's growth of investment is fueled by the increased 
inflow of budgetary funds. In fact, more of the additional budgetary revenues 
Guangdong retains as a result of fiscal reform is assigned to social expenditure such 
as education and health than to fixed asset investment, both in percentage and 
absolute terms.13 Therefore the influence of fiscal reform on investment growth is 
far more subtle than the straight forward supply of funds.
The decline of central investment in Guangdong is therefore more directly 
due to the second development, that of proliferation of funding channels other than 
the state budget. As these "extrabudgetary" sources are less subject to central 
government control, Guangdong has been able to circumvent a substantial part of 
central scrutiny by resorting to these financing resources for its investments.
Decline in Budgetary Investment
The shrinking share of central investment in Guangdong was underlined by 
greater shrinkage still of the share of investments using budgetary revenues. The 
state budget, whether at the central or provincial level, used to be the major source 
of funding for fixed asset investment. Before 1978 over 80% of state sector 
investment in Guangdong was funded by the state budget. This share declined to 
only 13% between 1979 and 1988.14 This rapid and continuous decline of the state-
13Guangdong’s fiscal expenditure on education and health from 1987 to 1991 was 2.29 (billion 
yuan, same as follows), 2.60, 3.32, 3.53, and 3.98 respectively; while fiscal expenditure on 
investment for the same period was 2.05, 2.62, 2.64, 2,96, and 3.62 billion yuan. See China 
Finance Statistics, 1950-1991 (Beijing, Science Press, 1992), p.157. For figures in percentage 
terms, see Table 3.23 in text.
14See Guangdong 1949-88. FA1, pp. 11-12.
125
budget-financed share of investment is detailed in Table 3.14 below.
Table 3.14
Share of Investment Financed bv the State Budget in Guangdong (%)
Year Total Societal Investment State Investn
1978 46.3 62.9
1979 49.0 69.0
1980 30.0 44.6
1981 15.1 26.4
1985 7.2 10.2
1988 3.1 4.3
1989 n/a 4.4
1990 3.2 4.4
1991 2.5 3.7
1992 1.3 1.9
Source: Guangdong 1949-88. FAI, pp,88-89; Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 
1992, 1993, respectively, pp.231, 233; p.237.
From 1979 to 1992, the share of budgetary investment declined from nearly 70% 
for the state sector and just under 50% for total societal investment to a negligible 
1.9% and 1.3% respectively. The gap has been filled by investments financed by 
bank loans, by "own funds" of enterprises and departments, by foreign investment 
and, since the early 1990s, by societal capital gathered through the issue of shares 
via the developing securities market
Table 3.15
Funding Channels of State Sector Investment 
1979-1988 (%)
State Budget Bank Loans Foreign Capital Own Funds 
13.3 25.2 13.7 34.2
Source: Guangdong 1949-88. FAI, p. 12.
Table 3.15 shows that during the 1979-88 decade, the state budget became 
the least important channel of investment funding for state sector investment in 
Guangdong. More investment in the state sector was financed by money from 
abroad than by money from the state. In fact it was not only the relative share of 
investment financed by the state budget which dropped drastically, the absolute 
value also decreased. Table 3.16 shows that while total investment in the state sector 
increased by 66,045 million yuan, or 3292%, from 1979 to 1992, the absolute value 
of budgetary investment dropped by 110 million, or 8%.
Others
13.6
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Table 3.16
1979-92 Differentials: State Sector Investment 
(Tuan Million!
Year Total Budgetary Investment
1979 2006 1385
1992 68051 1275
1979-92 Difference (%) 3292% -7.9%
Sources: Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 1993, p.237; Guangdong 1949-88. FAI, 
p .89.
Before proceeding further it may be useful to consider the significance of 
this budgetary investment statistic and its relevance to this study. In order to do so 
it is necessary to know precisely what this statistic comprises. Prima facie, it is a 
measure of the total value of fixed asset investment financed by the state budget, 
central or local, in a given year. (This is the definition given in the explanatory 
notes of official statistical publications and other reference materials on investment 
statistics.) However,when looking at the breakdowns of local fiscal expenditures 
and comparing the figures covering expenditure on fixed asset investment with 
those calculated within the state plan covering "budgetary investment", it is plain 
that the two have very different coverages. Table 3.17 below gives the details:
Table 3.17
Budgetary Investment and Local Fiscal Investment Expenditures*
(Yuan Billionl
Year Budgetary Investment Fiscal Exp. Discrepancy %
1987 1.26 2.05 0.85 70.2
1988 1.09 2.62 1.53 141.1
1989 1.10 2.64 1.54 140.2
1990 1.20 2.96 1.76 146.8
1991 1.26 3.62 2.36 186.8
Total 5.91 13.89 8.04 137.3
*Note: Discrepancy refers to the amount of local fiscal, that is, budgetary 
investment expenditures over the value of budgetary investments as appeared in the 
statistics of investment by types of funding. The % refers to the absolute 
discrepancy value as a percentage of the budgetary investments. The figures of 
budgetary investment covers the state sector only.
Source: Ministry of Finance (ed.),China Finance Statistics 1950-1991 (Beijing: 
Science Press, 1992), p. 157; Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 1988-1992.
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The table above shows a cumulative discrepancy between the two statistics 
whereby fiscal expenditure exceeds the budgetary investment figure for the five 
years between 1987 and 1992 by nearly 140%. According to interviews in 
Guangdong, this was more than a mere discrepancy in statistics. The value of 
budgetary investments within investment statistics covers the amount of investment 
included in the state plans, having been approved by the Centre and which, in 
accordance with the plan, is to be financed from the state budget. However, the 
figures for fiscal expenditure on investment, as they appear within government 
finance statistics, refer to the actual amount of local budgetary funds spent on fixed 
asset investment. In theory any outlay from local coffers should be strictly in 
accordance with state investment plans, and as such local fiscal expenditure would 
be expected to be smaller or at most equivalent to the value of investment financed 
by the state budget This is because budgetary investment may be financed by state 
budget resources from the central budget as well as from the provincial budget. The 
existence of such a disproportionate discrepancy in favour of local fiscal 
expenditure suggests, therefore, that "outside plan" investments are conducted by 
the provincial government financed from provincial fiscal resources. How close the 
discrepancy is actually equivalent to that portion of outside plan investment depends 
on the amount of budgetary investments that has the origin of funding coming from 
the central rather than provincial budget15
The budgetary investment statistic is not, therefore, a measure of the total 
value of investments financed with budgetary funds, as it was originally intended 
and is formally defined in official publications. From the way the statistic is 
compiled, it can be seen to be rather a measure of the portion of total investment 
which is included in the centrally endorsed investment plans and financed with 
budgetary funds.16 Those "outside plan" investments financed with local budgetary 
funds are excluded from the budgetary investment statistic. They are largely 
included in the "own funds" category.17
^Respondents Nos. 4 and 6, Guangdong interviews, September 1993. Guangdong officials did not 
seem too worried about the fact that the discrepancy of the two statistics revealed that the provincial 
government had been launching and financing "outside plan" investments with money from the 
state coffers. Moreover, as the amount of inflow of central budgetary funds to Guangdong was very 
small, the discrepancy could be regarded as a fairly accurate indication of the portion of outside plan 
investment directly conducted by the provincial government with budgetary money.
^^The statistic is calculated from data provided by the Provincial Planning Commission. The data 
basically covers the yearly investment plans endorsed by the Centre. Hence it does not include 
"budgetary investment" in projects which are not listed in the plans. Respondent No.4, Guangzhou 
interview, September 1993.
1 Respondent No. 4 confirmed that the discrepancy of investments was being included in the 
category "investments with own funds" in the compilation of investment statistics. This 
classification makes sense, since fiscal revenues have been used and regarded as the "own funds" of 
the provincial government from the planning perspective of the provincial government, given the
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The implications of this disclosure of the vagaries of the budgetary 
investment statistic is threefold. First, there is now not only hard evidence of the 
existence, but also a partial indication of the extent, of "outside plan" (jihuawai) 
investments in the provinces other than records of the Centre's complaints on the 
issue. Second, it demonstrates that the Guangdong provincial government has been 
very actively involved in such supposedly "illegal" activities. Findings detailed 
above show that more than half the provincial fiscal outlay for investments of 
Guangdong during 1987-91 has been assigned to projects not endorsed by the 
Centre. One can only imagine the Guangdong government's attitude towards 
similar "illegal" activities by enterprises using their own funds. Third, the relevance 
of the budgetary investment statistic to the present study is now clear. Since the 
statistic is actually a reflection of the state investment plan, its utility in a study of 
central-provincial relations is greater than that of a comprehensive statistic of 
investments financed with budgetary funds.
In other words, the significance of the discrepancy between the two 
statistical measures is that it exposes the discretionary behaviour of provincial 
governments regarding financing "outside plan" investment with fiscal resources. If 
the central government has traditionally used both the plan and the supply of money 
as a means of keeping its grip on provinces and society in general, then the 
budgetary investment statistic is exactly a measure of how much hard core control 
the Centre actually retains. Therefore, as more funding channels develop and state 
ethos becomes less omnipotent, so the significance of the receding dependence on 
budgetary funds becomes more profound. Table 3.18 illustrates the position in the 
early 1990s.
dabaogan fiscal system in practice in Guangdong. A research report conducted by the State 
Planning Commission in Beijing also stated that the "own funds" in the source of investment funds 
mainly included two types of funding: (a) fiscal investment expenditure coming from the budgets of 
the local governments, and (b) funds raised from the society by various means. See Li Fan and 
Zheng Xiao-he, Zhongguo Touzi Zhuti Ji Qi Touzi Xingwei Yanjiu (A Study of the Investment 
Actors and Their Investment Behaviour in China) (State Planning Commission, not openly 
published, 1991), p.83.
129
Table 3.18
Funding Channels of Total Investment (%)
Year Budget Bank Loans Foreign Capital Own Funds Others
1990 3.2 18.1 14.9 32.1 32.2
1991 2.5 21.1 13.0 32.0 31.0
1992 1.3 20.4 12.0 31.7 34.3
Sources: Guangdong Statistical Yearbooks 1991,1992,1993, respectively, p. 193; 
p.231; p.237.
Note: The percentages do not add up to 100 as one minor channel of funding, the 
"coal for oil fund", is not listed here.
If bank loans and "own funds" are to an extent transferred resources from 
the state,18 foreign capital, on the other hand, represents a source of funding which 
is external to the state and is therefore only indirectly under the influence of 
government policies. It is thus worth noting that between 1979 and 1991 the share 
of foreign capital in Guangdong's total investment funding rose to a substantial 25% 
share.^ Moreover, as noted in Table 3.18 above, by 1992 the "others" category has 
become the largest single category of funding channel. The fact that an ostensibly 
miscellaneous category has acquired such prominence demonstrates the extent of 
funding proliferation. The fact that the content of "others" had not been 
disaggregated and the categories not broken down and renamed reflects the diversity 
of content.20
The institutional changes leading to this drastic decline in the importance of 
budgetary investment and the proliferation of funding channels is discussed later. 
First is an examination of the proliferation of investment actors from another 
perspective: that of ownership relations.
^This statement is made on the basis that state banks were closely associated with state finance 
and were not therefore independent of the state. "Own funds" of enterprises were boosted in the first 
place because the state cut taxes, the amount being arbitrarily decided by the government. Also, as 
noted above, some of the "own funds" actually were budgetary funds of provincial and lower-level 
governments.
^The vice-director of Guangdong Foreign Trade Commission, in Zhang Hanqing (od.),Gaige 
Kaifeng Zai Guangdong (Reform and Opening in Guangdong: Implementation and Thoughts on the 
One Step Ahead Policy) (Guangzhou: Guangdong Higher Education Press, 1992), p. 120.
20Respondent No.4, Guangzhou interview, May 1993, revealed that there remained many 
irregularities and "diversities" in the collection of data for the "others" category. This aggregated 
category is often used as a dumping ground for "illegal" and unorthodox funding so as to evade 
supervision and queries from superior levels. The sudden increase in societal capital used in 
investment via the securities market was included in the "others" category in some places, and in 
the "own funds" in others.
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Rise of the Non-State Sector
Prior to 1980s investment in Guangdong and in China overall was largely 
confined to investment in the state sector. Investment in Guangdong's non-state 
sector, that is, in urban collective enterprises, rural communes and communal 
workshops, small private businesses, and in the building of houses in the 
countryside, amounted to only 6% of the total societal investment for the 29 years 
from 1950 to 1978. Between 1979 and 1992 the share rose to a significant 30%. 
Table 3.19 below details the escalation:
Table 3.19
Year
Guangdong's Non-State Sector Investment 
(Tuan Million "t
Collective Private 
£Q £P)
% Share of Total Investment 
C P C + P
1950-52 - _
1953-57 - -
1958-62 348 4 8.2 0.1 8.3
1963-65 254 - 1.3 - 1.3
1966-70 - -
1971-75 - -
1976-80 346 2452 2.7 19.1 21.8
1981-85 7219 12255 13.2 22.3 35.5
1986-90 21838 20902 14.2 13.6 27.8
1991 7121 6398 14.9 13.4 28.3
1992 20932 10914 22.7 18.1 40.8
Total:
1950-78 686 639 3.0 2.8 5.8
1979-92 57373 52285 16.1 14.7 30.8
1950-92 58059 52925 24.6 14.0 38.6
Sources: Guangdong 1949-88 FAI, pp. 158-61 (for 1950-85 figures); Guangdong 
Statistical Yearbook 1993, p.236 (for 1986-92 figures).
Table 3.19 shows that by 1992, just over 40% of total investment in 
Guangdong had taken place in the non-state sector. This leap in the relative share 
within little more than a decade is indicative of the high rate of growth. Tables 3.19 
and 3.20 below illustrate that, for most of the years since 1979, investment in the 
non-state sector has grown at a far more rapid cumulative rate than in the state 
sector.
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Table 3.20
Guangdong's Investments (Tuan Million')
Year State Sector Non-state Sector Total
1979 2006 823 2829
1992 60329 31846 92175
% Increase 2907% 3770% 3158%
Source: Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 1993, p.236.
Table 3.21
Yearly Growth Rate (%)
Year Total State Sector Non-State Sector IP)
1979 3.9 0.1 14.5 13.1 14.9
1980 35.4 28.2 52.7 76.8 49.6
1981 57.7 34.6 105.2 281.6 78.0
1982 40.3 49.6 27.8 79.4 10.7
1983 4.7 8.0 -0.005 3.6 -2.7
1984 47.0 44.2 51.7 52.8 51.0
1985 41.6 62.6 7.6 32.9 -7.0
1986 17.3 21.0 8.3 7.0 9.4
1987 15.9 12.9 24.4 31.4 18.8
1988 40.9 42.1 37.9 52.9 25.6
1989 -1.8 -1.8 -1.7 1.7 -5.5
1990 7.3 9.0 2.8 1.9 3.9
1991 28.3 26.0 34.6 32.3 37.3
1992 92.8 75.9 135.6 194.0 53.3
average
1979-92 30.9 29.5 35.8 61.5 24.1
Source: Computed from Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 1993, p.236.
From Table 3.21, it can be seen that during the fourteen years from 1979 to 
1992 the growth rates of investment in the non-state sector exceeded those of the 
state sector during eight years. The other six years during which growth rates in the 
non-state sector slowed down were those when the Centre demanded retrenchment 
action from the provinces. This suggests that the non-state sector is not altogether 
impervious to interference from the state, a point upon which I shall elaborate in a 
later chapter. Nonetheless, investment in the non-state sector quickly rebounded 
once political pressure had died down. And at 35.8% the average growth rates of 
investments in the non-state sector was well above that of the state sector at 29.5%. 
These illustrate beyond doubt that the non-state sector is, on balance, more prone to 
investment growth than the state sector.
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The increasing importance of investment in the non-state sector marks an 
important development in China since commencement of the economic reform 
programme in 1979. This ostensibly socialist country is obviously no longer solely 
dominated solely by "socialistic" modes of production. For instance, in 1980 the 
state sector in Guangdong produced over 60% of the total production output value 
of the industrial sector. But in 1992 the percentage dropped by almost half to 
33%,21 whilst the collective and private sectors together accounted for over 50% of 
total industrial product output. Moreover, that which previously constituted the 
collective sector has also changed considerably. What was a "para-state" sector has 
gradually taken on some characteristics of an autonomous private sector. In fact a 
substantial number of private enterprises became registered as collective enterprises 
in order to qualify for lower tax rates and easier access to bank finance. 
Nevertheless, the relationship between the non-state sector and the state remains 
"close", with the state, especially at local levels, exercising a pervasive influence, a 
point to be discussed in greater detail in later chapters.
This growth in the non-state sector is material to comprehending the decline 
of central/budgetary investment in Guangdong. The previous dominance of the state 
budget and therefore of the central government in fixed asset investment existed in a 
social context in which the state sector was supreme and central planning was the 
main mode of economic management. Even though there has always been a 
collective sector in the cities, and state ownership was never the major mode of 
production in the countryside, the ideological orthodoxy at that time nevertheless 
specified that the collectives were no more than second brothers to the state sector. 
Methods of management and administration in the collective sector were based on 
those operational within the state sector. As and when a collective enterprise had 
notable results, the enterprise would subsequently be "upgraded" and become state- 
owned, Investment in the collective sector was therefore definitively on a small 
scale. This concentration of budgetary investment in the state sector has, in fact, 
continued into the 1990s, as shown in Table 3.22 below.
21See Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 1993, p.183.
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Table 3.22
Distribution of Budgetary Investments 
Across Sectors (Yuan Mn)
Year Total State Sector Non-State Sectormm
1990
1991
1992
1292
1282
1298
1256 97.7
1245 97.1
1275 98.2
36
37 
23
2.3
2.9
1.8
Source: Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 1991, 1992, 1993, respectively, p.193; 
p.231; p.237.
The design of the budget and the entire system of investment administration 
was therefore based on an economy dominated by the state sector, within which the 
central government was predominant The economic reforms in the 1980s loosened 
central control on the lower levels of government, thus giving rise to more 
"unorthodox" and "liberalizing" behaviour among the provinces, as well as enabling 
the growth of a relatively autonomous non-state sector outside the scope of control 
of the traditional system of administration. The consequence of this is a relative 
decline in terms of central investment due to the altered roles of central and 
provincial governments within the investment scene.
Institutional Backdrops
Fiscal Reforms
Fiscal reforms between central government and Guangdong represent the 
most important single change in central-Guangdong relations for their effect of 
enhanced provincial control over investment in Guangdong, and the subsequent 
rapid pace of economic development in the province generally. Fiscal reform also 
represents the point at which developments which would affect future investment 
activitiy began. The fiscal reforms' effect of provincial financial autonomy further 
consolidated the local economy orientation of the Guangdong Government.
Reform Content and Developments
The dabaogan fiscal system approved by the State Council in 1979 allowed 
Guangdong to retain all fiscal revenues collected from provincial revenue sources 
after remitting a sum of 1.2 billion yuan annually fixed for 5 years.22 However, this
22State Commission for Economic System Reform (ed.), Jingji Tiji Gaige Wenjian Huaibien, 
1978-1983 (A Collection of the Documents on Economic System Reforms, 1978-1983) (Beijing:
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sum was cut to 1 billion in 1980 and the system remained in force beyond the five 
year expiry date. Moreover, since a number of Guangdong enterprises hitherto 
under the jurisdiction of the provincial government were converted to centrally 
’’owned" enterprises, thereby shrinking the revenue base of the provincial coffers, 
the remittance sum was adjusted to 778 million yuan annually from the period 1985 
to 1987.23
In 1988, the system was again adjusted in order that the central government 
might extract still more revenue from Guangdong. Instead of fixing a lump sum 
payment for a number of years, the central government fixed a base figure with a 
percentage increase each subsequent year. The base figure was fixed at 1.413 
billion for 1988, and the percentage increase for 1989 and 1990 set at 9%.24
A direct effect of fiscal reform is the increase in the pool of fiscal revenue 
retained by the provincial government for its discretionary use. From 1980 to 1987, 
the total net remittance from Guangdong to the Centre, amounting to 12.2 billion, 
accounted for 26.5% of Guangdong's total fiscal revenue. This amount includes the 
amount of fiscal remittance as defined by the fiscal system as well as the part of 
fiscal revenue extracted by the Centre in addition to the agreed sum, for instance, in 
the form of intergovernmental "loans", Treasury bonds and new taxes. When 
comparing this figure with Guangdong's net fiscal remittance for the entire 1950-87 
period, which amounted to a full 37% of Guangdong's total fiscal revenue,25 it is 
obvious that Guangdong has successively lowered the revenue extraction rate by the 
Centre since implementation of the new fiscal system.
This has not been a stable contract, however. During the retrenchment years 
of 1989, 1990 and 1991, Guangdong was obliged to raise substantially its 
remittance in order to supplement the national coffers. In 1991, for instance, when 
the fiscal scheme was renewed by another three years, the base figure was 
reportedly increased by 360 million yuan, though the annual increment percentage 
remained unchanged at 9%.26 According to recent articles authored by senior 
Guangdong leaders, the net remittance in the retrenchment years of 1990 and 1991
Zhongguo Caizheng Jingji chubanshe, 1983), p.471.
2^Dangdai Zhongguo Congshu Bianji Bu (ed.), Dangdai Zhongguo de Guangdong (Guangdong in 
Contemporary China) (two volumes) Vol.l, (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1991), p.687,
24Ibid.
25Ibid.,p 673. Total Guangdong fiscal revenue means the total amount of fiscal revenue collected 
from Guangdong. This includes revenue collected by the provincial as well as those collected 
directly by the central government, e.g. from central enterprises in Guangdong and revenue from 
tariffs and customs.
^Figures reported in Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong) March 9,1991.
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was respectively 5.2 billion and 6.985 billion yuan, amounting to about 40% of the 
annual provincial budgetary revenue. Total fiscal remittance to the Centre from 
1980 to 1991 amounted to 31.5 billion yuan.27 From 1979 to 1991, the amount of 
net provincial remittance has increased by 7.5 times and from 850 milliion yuan to 7 
billion yuan, representing an annual average growth rate of nearly 17.6%.2  ^It can 
thus be seen that the central government exacted heavy "fees" from Guangdong in 
return for its new financial freedom.
Nonetheless, in 1992, Guangdong succeeded in its negotiations with the 
Centre to retain its system until the year 2000. The terms of the deal was that, from 
1994 to 1997, the yearly remittance would be based on the existing base figure plus 
an annual increment figure, which would remain at 9%, whilst the increment 
percentage from 1998 to 2000 would be subject to change.29 This agreement was, 
however, curtailed when towards the end of 1993 the Centre announced its decision 
to replace nationwide the fiscal contractual system with a tax-sharing system starting 
as from 1994. However, officials I met in Guangdong expressed in no uncertain 
terms their wish to retain the dabaogan sy stem .30 Failing that, their objective was to 
tailor the new system in such a way that Guangdong's existing financial autonomy 
would not be jeopardized.
The strategies by which Guangdong's officials undertook to "protect" their 
preferred fiscal system will be described in detail in Chapter Five. The foregoing 
information confirms that although Guangdong has repeatedly been obliged to remit 
more than the agreed sum, the remittance in 1991 for example accounting for a 
substantial 40% of its budgetary revenue, the province was nevertheless very keen 
to retain the dabaogan system for Guangdong. The significance of the lump-sum 
payment arrangement, therefore, goes beyond the increased amount of fiscal 
revenue retained in the province.
"Eating in Separate Kitchens" and Investment Drive
The main theme of the fiscal system instituted in the majority of provinces 
since 1980 until its replacement by the new "tax-sharing system" in 1994 was
27Zhang Hanqing (ed.), Reform and Opening in Guangdong, p.7; Guangdong Provincial Party 
Committee Secretariat (ed.), Guangdong Gaige Kaifang Qishi Lu (A Record of Insights of Opening 
and Reforms in Guangdong) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1993), pp.43, 59.
2®Ibid.t p.59.
29Speech given by the Director of Guangdong's Finance Bureau on 16 January 1993 during a 
provincial financial conference, reported in Guangdong Catzheng, No.l (1993), p. 7.
39Respondent No.6, Guangzhou interview, September 1993.
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defined in the expression, "eating in separate kitchens". Under this system, the 
common central/provincial bowl from which to draw revenue was broken for the 
first time. Circumstances varied in different provinces, as there were a variety of 
contractual arrangements in operation. Guangdong's dabaogan system, however, 
was always the most aggressive type, in the sense that Guangdong's system had 
until 1988 fixed the absolute sum of annual remittance, while other remitting 
provinces had fixed only the percentage share of remittance.31 For Guangdong, the 
certainty that fixed lump-sum remittances would not change for five years, or three 
years after 1985, not only gave the province an unprecedented sense of security and 
independence. The fixed absolute sum also enabled the province to keep an 
increasingly large share of its total fiscal revenue, as the total revenue increased each 
year but the amount of remittance remaining unchanged. Although a similar five- 
year fixed arrangement was instituted in 1958, it failed to survive the second year 
and the lump-sum transfers in 1971-73 were single-year arrangements only, 
meaning that provinces had to renegotiate the lump-sum payments or subsidies 
every year. Provinces whose financial situations improved one year, therefore, 
would often be obliged to increase their remittances the following year. There was 
prior to 1980, therefore, little financial security for the provinces, and consequently 
little incentive to generate more revenue or to cut expenses.32 Since 1980, 
irregularities still existed and the central government frequently demanded additional 
financial contributions over and above the prearranged fiscal remissions.33 The 
change in the formal fiscal system nevertheless provided increased protection for the 
provinces. There was at least a contract on which provinces could base their position 
in negotiations with the Centre.34
31 See Michel Oksenberg and James Tong, "The Evolution of Central-Provincial Fiscal Relations
in China, 1971-1984: The Formal System", China Quarterly, No.125 (March 1991), pp.1-32. 
3^For more discussion about the inadequacies and characteristics of fiscal regimes in the Maoist 
period, see James Tong, "Fiscal Reform, Elite Turnover and Central-Provincial Relations in Post- 
Mao China", Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs No.22 (July 1989), pp.5-6; Michel Oksenberg 
and James Tong, "The Evolution of Fiscal relations in China, 1971-1984"; Michel Oksenberg and 
James Tong, "The Evolution of Central-Provincial Fiscal Relations in China, 1950-1983: The 
Formal System", unpublished paper, 1987.
33For instance the Centre borrowed 1.6 billion yuan from Guangdong in 1981 and again a 
considerable sum in 1982, immediately after the "contract" of fiscal remittance was implemented. 
The "loans" were never returned and written off formally in 1983. See James Tong, "Fiscal Reform, 
Elites Turnover and Central-Provincial Relations", p. 19. For a discussion of the situation 
nationwide, see Susan Shirk, The Politcal Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1993), p. 173.
34Ibid., p. 170, for a similar observation of the utility of the existence of a "contract" for the 
bargaining position of provinces vis-a-vis the Centre. The fact that Guangdong officials were 
worried about the loss of financial security and the need to depend upon the Centre for remittances 
of revenue under the 1994 tax-sharing system reform exemplifies this point about the security of a 
contract See Guangdong Caizheng, No.l (1994) for a collection of very informative essays on 
Guangdong's responses and attitudes to the ending of the dabaogan system and the new system 
being formed.
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The sense of security derived from the dabaogan fiscal system is directly 
connected to the investment phenomenon in Guangdong. In fact, the institution of 
the contractual fiscal system in 1980 marked the onset of a chain of developments 
which led to accelerated investment. This acceleration was not spurred on due to 
Guangdong being authorized to retain a greater amount of budgetary revenue, but by 
the relative financial stability which the new system provided, thereby affording the 
confidence for further investment. Whilst taking into account the fact that the 
investment-hunger syndrome has much deeper roots in the public ownership 
system, as we have seen in Chapter Two, and the drive for investment had existed 
before the reforms were launched in the 1980s, the post-1980 fiscal system has 
nevertheless accentuated the "hunger" for more investment and at a much higher 
level.
In other words, while soft constraints under the public ownership system 
relieved the efficiency checks on investments, the post-1980 fiscal system made 
additional investments further more attractive in the eyes of the provinces. Since the 
dabaogan system allowed Guangdong to retain all provincial revenue over and 
above its lump-sum remittance, Guangdong could obtain conspicuous benefit from 
an expansion of the provincial revenue base. Positive inducements have therefore 
increased for further investment, whilst negative sanctions remain minimal and 
ineffective. Investment expansion has been, therefore, a logical course of action in 
the province's rational pursuit for more revenue.
The Extrabudgetary Finance
It has previously been mentioned that the additional fiscal revenue retained in 
Guangdong under the dabaogan system has not necessarily been spent on fixed 
asset investment. In fact, a much smaller portion of budgetary expenditure went to 
investment in the 1980s than previously. During the 1970s, 30% of Guangdong's 
total budgetary expenditure was spent on investment During 1980-91 this figure fell 
to only 18%.35 Table 3.23 gives a detailed breakdown of budgetary expenditure for 
the period 1987-91.
35see Dangdai Zhongguo de Guangdong, Vol.l, p. 673.
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Table 3.23
Share of Maior Expenditure Categories in 
Guangdong's Budgetary Expenditure (%)
Exnenditure 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Investment 21.3 22.7 18.7 19.7 19.8
Education &
Health 23.7 22.6 23.5 23.4 21.8
Price Subsidy 14.0 12.3 12.4 11.8 6.6
Agriculture 7.8 7.5 7.8 7.3 7.1
Law 8c Order n/a 3.2 3.9 4.1 3.9
Source; China Finance Statistics 1950-91, p. 157.
As a result of the decreasing inflow of budgetary fiscal funds for investment 
purposes, and the increasing prominence of other non-fiscal channels of investment 
funding as outlined earlier in this chapter, the share of budgetary investment 
dropped to a negligible level by the late 1980s. However, this did not mean that the 
state, and in particular the state at provincial and lower levels, no longer had a role to 
play in investment financing. The role had merely been shifted outside of the 
budgetary avenue. The existence of a parallel fiscal system external to the budget at 
all levels of government provides a second coffer from which to finance investments 
other than those specified within the state budget
Table 3.24 below compares the total value and the yearly growth rates of 
Guangdong's budgetary/extrabudgetary fiscal revenue in the 1980s.
Table 3.24
Guangdong's Fiscal Revenue
Year Budgetary Extrabudgetary
Yuan Bn Growth % Yuan Bn Growth %
1982 4.2 - 2.9 -
1983 4.4 5.0 3.2 9.2
1984 4.9 11.4 3.7 16.7
1985 6.5 32.7 4.6 8.6
1986 8.2 26.2 5.2 14.2
1987 9.6 17.2 6.7 29.2
1988 10.8 12.2 8.4 25.2
1989 13.7 27.2 9.1 7.9
1990 13.1 -4.3 9.8 8.4
Source: China Finance Statistics 1950-85, p.144; 1950-91, pp.78, 204. Guangdong 
Statistical Yearbook 1984,1986, 1987, respectively, p. 295; p.291; p.367.
Table 3.24 shows that in 1990, Guangdong's extrabudgetary fiscal revenue 
amounted to just under 10 billion yuan, ten times that of the original budgetary
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remittance value agreed with the central government in 1980, and equivalent to over 
75% of the budgetary revenue for the same year. In 1990, 47% of total 
extrabudgetary expenditure was spent on investment. In absolute value this is 
nearly 20% more than the amount drawn from the budget As shown in Table 3.25 
below, the cumulative value of investment funded from extrabudgetary fiscal 
revenue for the period 1986-90 was almost one quarter more than that financed from 
the official budget.
Table 3.25
Investment: Budgetary & Extrabudgetary Fiscal Funds 
(Y uan million!
Year Budeetarv fB! Extrabud setarv fE! E over B
1986 2053 2536 23.5
1987 2616 3097 18.4
1988 2644 3573 35.1
1989 2964 3774 27.3
1990 3617 4293 18.7
Total 13894 17273 24.3
Note: The budgetary investment figures amalgamate the following categories as 
listed in the original source: (1) capital construction; (2) enterprise funds for 
technical renovation; (3) 3 funds for scientific development. The extrabudgetary 
figures amalgamate (1) fixed assets investment; (2) Repair Fund; (3) miscellaneous 
construction; (4) Road Maintenance Fee Fund expenditures; (5) 3 funds of scientific 
development
Source: China Finance Statistics 1950-91, pp. 157, 232.
So what are these extrabudgetary fiscal funds and their sources? How does 
the "extrabudget" relate to the "budget proper" within the fiscal system? What role 
does this second coffer of the provincial government have in Guangdong's 
investment behaviour? These questions will be discussed in Chapter Five, which 
will focus on investment and fiscal behaviour and strategies of the Guangdong 
government. Suffice it here to emphasize that extrabudgetary finance is a legal and 
long-existing fiscal device. As a supplementary fiscal channel its existence dates 
back to 1951, as noted in Chapter Two.36 However the growth to such prominence 
of this portion of fiscal revenue represents a major development during the reform 
decade.With such growth in extrabudgetary finance, provincial and lower-level 
governments in Guangdong and elsewhere have been able to finance their 
investment projects with a source of revenue which is less noticeable and therefore 
less subject to scrutiny and control from the Centre.
^ S ee  discussion in Chapter Two: Fiscal Reform.
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Decentralization in Investment Administration
Along with the 1980 fiscal reform came the decentralization of planning 
authority in various areas, including investment administration, to the Guangdong 
provincial government. However it is worth emphasizing that the decentralization of 
investment administration, and in particular the abolition of sectoral investment 
figures, was more than simply a corollary of fiscal reform. Fiscal and planning 
reforms went hand in hand. The dabaogan system requires Guangdong to be 
responsible, in theory, for all provincial expenditures, including investment 
expenditure, by means of retained fiscal revenue. Guangdong therefore acquires the 
authority to prioritize its various expenditure items, for instance to decide whether 
more should be spent on education or on fixed asset investment, as well as the 
subsequent internal allocation of resources within each category of expenditure, for 
instance, whether to invest more in processing industries or more in infrastructure. 
Therefore from 1980, with the institution of the new fiscal system, the entire 
planning system between Guangdong and the Centre has become a "province- 
based" system. The central government ceased issuing detailed and mandatory 
orders instructing Guangdong to invest how much at what time and in what area. 
However, overall control figures prescribing the upper limit of total investment in 
any one year are still in force, and Guangdong's investment plans must still be 
submitted to the Centre for approval. One new rule of the game is, however, that 
the Centre is expected to accept the investment plans proposed from below. In other 
words, the province has become the major player and the formal power of the 
central government has receded to that of almost nominal status.
The abolition of detailed investment control figures was, therefore, the basis 
of the 1980 reform programme. From the central government's point of view, the 
slackening of sectoral control represented an adjustment in the relative power of the 
ministries (tiao-tiao) and the provinces (kuai-kuai). Fiscal reform has undoubtedly 
enhanced the financial strength and autonomy of the kuai-kuai, while weakening the 
power of the tiao-tiao. However, the central government does not intend to abandon 
overall control and the State Planning Commission continues to prescribe overall 
quotas of yearly investments within provinces. In addition, the central government 
also controls the total amount of bank finance via mandatory control figures issued 
every year.
However, as we have seen earlier in this and previous chapters, the central 
government did not succeed in controlling the overall size of investment. Table 3.9
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shows that since 1980 the overall investment control figures issued by the Centre 
have been consistently and substantially surpassed. The mandatory control figures 
were therefore tigers without teeth. In Guangdong, as will be discussed in Chapter 
Five, these figures were rarely seen outside the four walls of a small number of 
government planning bureaux.37 However, the problems with the "controlling 
tools" aside, another major development in the investment administration system in 
the 1980s was the substantial decentralization of project approval authority.
As noted in Chapter Two, it was this aspect of decentralization that enabled 
the provincial governments to circumvent central control on total investment scale. 
As provincial governments was authorized to approve more and ever larger-scale 
investment projects, the Centre was confronted with ever more fait accompli 
situations whereby it was forced to recognize the legitimacy of projects which were 
approved by provincial and lower-level governments but which fell outside the state 
plan and central quotas on the investment scale. The scale of decentralization was 
indeed massive. In the early 1950s provincial governments could only approve 
projects of under 0.2 million yuan, and in 1963, the authority granted was still for 
projects requiring less than 0.5 million yuan. However, by the early 1980s, the 
upper ceiling of investment value for a single project which provincial governments 
were authorized to approve stood at 10 million yuan. And in 1984, the ceiling 
further increased to 30 million yuan.38 Thus the Centre approved less than 40% of 
all investment projects in the early 1980s, and less than one-third in the late 
1980s.39
Prior to the nationwide decentralization of approval authority in 1984, 
Guangdong's authority had already been enlarged under the auspices of the central 
government's preferential policy to Guangdong. In 1981, to complement the 
enhanced authority conferred on Guangdong and Fujian under the 1979 Special 
Policy,40 the two provincial governments were authorized to approve medium-large 
sized projects, which had previously required the approval of the State Planning 
Commission (as was still the case in other provinces), other than projects which
37The officials in Guangdong have come to regard the central quotas on the investment scale as 
increasingly irrelevant to their work. Consequently only lip service was given to the control figures 
and very often they were simply passed on to the various planning departments without further 
allocation to the various departments and enterprises. In 1993 the provincial government did not 
even allocate the figure from the Centre to the subprovincial levels. Respondent No.9, Guangzhou 
interview, September 1993. See also Chapter Five: Bargaining for more favourable central policies: 
investment administration.
3^See discussion in Chapter Two: Investment administration.
^9See Table 2.3 in Chapter Two.
40The Special Policy is discussed in more detail in Chapter Five: Bargaining for more favourable 
central policies.
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requiring State Council's approval. The only precondition of this authority was that 
the two provinces be solely responsible for all aspects of the investment, from 
funding to construction materials, exclusive of assistance from the Centre.41 In 
November 1982, Guangdong and Fujian were further authorized to approve 
investment projects of under 30 million yuan. This was a full two years ahead of the 
nationwide decentralization move in 1984 42
As already noted in Chapter Two, in October 1984, the jurisdiction of other 
provincial-level governments was raised from 10 million yuan to 30 million yuan. 
Shortly after Guangdong, and Fujian, again received preferential treatment when in 
March 1985, at which point the Centre was apparently quite satisfied with the 
development in Guangdong and Fujian, the Special Policy for the two provinces 
was extended for another five years. The power of Guangdong and Fujian 
provincial government to approve investment projects was then raised from 30 
million yuan to 200 million.43 This means that the entire jurisdiction of the State 
Planning Commission was delegated to the two provincial governments, a privilege 
which was only conferred on Shanghai in 1992 for projects in Pudong, and which 
no other provincial-level governments had ever been granted44 Apart from 
investments in "bottleneck" sectors, namely, the energy, transportation and raw 
materials sectors, for which the authority of all provincial governments was raised to 
50 million yuan in March 1987,45 the jurisdiction for other types of investments in 
provincial governments other than Guangdong and Fujian has remained unchanged
41 Central Committee Document No.27 (1981), July 19, 1981, "Approving the Notes of Work 
Conference of Guangdong, Fujian and the Special Economic Zones", printed in A Collection of the 
Documents on Economic System Reforms, 1978-1983, pp.558-566. See also Dangdai Zhongguo 
Congshu Bianji Bu (ed.), Dangdai Zhongguo de Jiben Jianshe (two volumes), Vol.2, (Beijing: 
Zhongguo Shehui Kexue chubanshe, 1989), p.481.
42Central Committee Report, "On the Implementation of the 'Special Policy' in Guangdong and 
Fujian, and the Operation of Special Economic Zones", November 15, 1982, in Guangdong 
Provincial Party Committee Secretariat (ed.), Zhongyang Dui Guangdong Gongzuo Zhishi Huibian 
(A Collection of Central Government's Instructions to the work of the Guangdong Provincial 
Government), (hereinafter Centre's Instructions to Guangdong), (four volumes: 1979-1982; 1983- 
1985; 1986-1987, Part I and II), 1979-1982, (Guangdong, Neibu, 1986), p.406.
43State Council Notice No.46 (1985), March 28, 1985, "On Approving the Notes of Meeting on 
Extending the Special Policy of Guangdong and Fujian", printed in Centre's Insturctions to 
Guangdong, 1983-1985, pp.377-385.
44The question here is whether or not the central government has ever conferred form al 
authorization. The "contraction" of delegated powers during the retrenchment years is not the issue. 
It was revealed during field interviews that most provincial-level governments, if not all, had 
excercised de facto approving power of up to 200 million yuan since the second half of 1992, 
without formal endorsement and authorization from the Centre. Also see Footnote 42 in Chapter 
Four.
4^State Council Notice No. 23,1987 (March 30,1987), "On the Extension of Project Approval 
Authority of Fixed Asset Investment and the Simplification of Approval Procedures", printed in 
State Statistical Bureau (ed.), A Compendium of Documents on Fixed Assets and the Construction 
Industry, pp.111-17. See also discussion in Chapter Two.
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at the 30 million yuan limit46
The extent of the delegation of project approval authority is figuratively 
reflected in the volume of planning documents submitted annually by Guangdong to 
the central government. As an informed source described the situation, previously 
whole cartons of materials were sent to Beijing for scrutiny and approval each year. 
These were gradually reduced to only a few volumes by the late 1980s.47 This 
suggests that as the planning and approval of more projects in Guangdong was 
completed and the work expedited within the province, there was consequently far 
less to report back to the Centre.45
It should be noted that notwithstanding the decentralization of project 
approval authority, the classification criteria of projects into small, medium and large 
sizes has not changed since 1979.49 As a result, an increasing proportion of 
medium-large sized projects undertaken in Guangdong have in fact been local 
investment projects planned and approved locally. In the absence of more 
comprehensive data reflecting the actual share of medium-large sized projects 
approved by the province as compared to those approved by the central government, 
the following table gives a rough indication via the value of investment formed.
Table 3.26
Medium-Large Sized Projects Started Since 1984 
Cumulative Investments as at 1989 (Yuan Mnl
Projects Above 30Mn (O Projects Below 30 Mn (Pi
7839.6 8092.3
(49.2%) (50.8%)
Source: Computed from Guangdong 1949-88 FAI, pp. 215-33.
Table 3.26 compares the total investment formed for post-1984 projects 
whose cumulative investment value exceeded 30 million yuan with those whose 
value was under 30 million yuan, and shows that the latter accounted for over half
46rhis has been the case until 1994, but Shanghai was excluded here, as Shanghai's authority was 
formally raised to 200 million yuan in 1992. See discussion in Chapter Four.
47RespondentNo.l, Guangzhou interview, May 1993.
4®The detailed mechanics involved is discussed in Chapter Two.
4^The first classification rule was passed in 1952. It was subsequently amended in 1962,1978 and 
1979. The 1979 amendment was partial and affected only a number of specific sectors. Therefore 
the 1978 classification rule is still largely in force as at 1993. (Respondent No.4, Guangzhou 
interview, September 1993). For documents, see State Planning Commission (ed.), Jiben Jianshe 
Fagui Dadin (A Comprehensive Collection of Rules and Regulations on Capital Construction), 
(two volumes), Vol.l, (Beijing: Hongqi chubanshe, 1985), pp.581-611.
C+P
15931.9
(100%)
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the total medium-large sized investments. This table is not however a conclusive 
indication as it relates to investment formed for ongoing projects only and project 
approval authority is assigned with reference to the total planned investment value of 
a project. It is quite feasible that projects in the (P) column include those which have 
a planned investment value of over 30 million yuan. Nonetheless, an informed 
source disclosed that most projects in the medium-large sized category were 
approved within the province.50 And as Table 2.3 in Chapter 2 has indicated, a 
report from the Centre estimated that only 35% of medium-large sized projects 
nationwide between 1980-1984 were approved by the central government, the rest 
approved by provinces. The figure fell to 25% during 1985 and 1990.51 Therefore 
the 1978/79 classification rule, whilst still in force in 1993, is nevertheless obsolete 
and no longer reflects the locus of project approval authority. The actual share of 
total investment which was approved within Guangdong was therefore likely to be 
much higher than the just over 50% indicated by Table 3.26, which only shows 
statistics of investments already formed. Nationally, as noted earlier above, the 
Centre is estimated to approve around 40% of total investment in the early 1980s, 
falling to less than one-third since the mid-1980s.52
Decentralization of the power to approve projects, therefore, has enabled 
Guangdong to control the bulk of its own investment activities. This fact, coupled 
with the extensive subdelegation of such authority to the subprovincial levels, has 
allowed the Guangdong government to sidestep interference from the Centre 
regarding its investment plans.
50Respondent No.4, Guangzhou interview, September 1993. The respondent told the author that 
because the ceiling for medium-large sized projects as prescribed by the 1979/79 classification 
regulation was so low, (amounting to only several million yuan for many industries) the provincial 
statistical bureau would sometimes exercise its discretion to exclude some projects when calculating 
the statistic. Those excluded would be projects whose original estimates had been below the 
ceiling, but due to subsequent amendments had exceeded it, and projects which the provincial 
government regarded as "desirable", but whose "elevation" to the medium-large size category might 
raise the attention of the central government and affect the chance of the projects proceeding.
51The estimate comes from a report by the State Planning Commission. See table and details in 
Chapter 2.
52See Table 2.3. It should be noted that the percentage of "centrally decided" investment is 
constructed to contrast with "provincially decided" investment. "Centrally decided" investment 
therefore include those approved by the State Council, the State Planning Commission, as well as 
those approved by central ministries which have a largely similar jurisdiction of project approval 
authority.
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Extensive Sub-delegation of Authority
An important feature of Guangdong's fiscal reforms in the 1980s and in the 
administration of investment, and indeed in most of other policy areas, has been the 
extent of delegation to the sub-provincial levels. Extensive sub-delegation to lower 
levels has the effect of magnifying the impact of the original decentralization at the 
central-provincial nexus. Although delegating authority to cities and counties might 
appear to be a measure which would deplete the power of the provincial 
government, in the final analysis it cannot but work to strengthen further the 
position of the provincial government vis-a-vis the central government. The 
dynamics of subdelegation strongly suggests that power between governments at 
different levels is not of a zero-sum nature.
Fiscal System
As Guangdong entered into a "contract" with the Centre, so the provincial 
government contracted with its own cities and counties. By the late 1980s, the 
majority of governments at grassroots administrative level, in townships and xiangs, 
had entered into some kind of fiscal contractual arrangement with their county 
superiors, who, in turn, had similar arrangements with the cities.53
Such extensive sub-delegation of fiscal autonomy is not, however, the 
product of some preconceived grand plan of the provincial government After 1980, 
the fiscal system at subprovincial levels was still operating along traditional lines 
whereby the provincial government would negotiate a certain percentage share of the 
fiscal revenue collected at the lower levels. Although more discretionary money was 
granted to counties and cities, the fiscal system between the provincial government 
and the cities, and between the cities and the counties, was still that of the "common 
bowl". There was no financial security at sub-provincial levels, and therefore no 
incentive to increase the revenue. Between 1980 to 1984 total provincial fiscal 
revenue grew at only half the rate of national income. The provincial government 
subsequently delegated autonomy and in 1985 five new fiscal arrangements were 
introduced at subprovincial levels, tailored-made to suit different situations in 
different cities and counties. The counties and cities were, in turn, authorized and
530ver 70% of rural townships in Guangdong entered into some kind of fiscal contractual 
arrangements with the counties in 1988, indicating the thoroughness of the extension of the 
dabaogan fiscal system throughout the province. See Wu Yixin, Guangdong Shinian Jingji Tizhi 
Gatge Yanjiu (Analysing the Ten Years of Economic System Reform in Guangdong) (Guangzhou: 
Zhongshan Daxue chubanshe,1990), p. 127.
146
encouraged to subdelegate authority to the townships.54
As a result of the sub-delegation, local governments' remittances to the 
provincial coffers dropped from a 33% share of the total provincial fiscal revenue in 
1980 to only 20% in 1988.55 In other words, while Guangdong's dabaogan 
contract with the central government effectively retained more fiscal revenue at 
provincial level, a large portion of that retained fiscal revenue was in fact retained at 
city, county, township and xiang level. The extension of the fiscal contractual 
scheme to the subprovincial levels has thus accentuated the diffusion of financial 
resources. As fiscal reform at the central-provincial level has strengthened the 
autonomy of the provincial government, the replication of such reform at sub­
provincial levels means that, as regards Centre-Guangdong relations, the central 
government must deal not only with the provincial government, but also with a 
multitude of local actors, each claiming their own interests and jealously guarding 
their autonomy and jurisdiction.
Investment Administration
In March 1992, the Guangdong government decided to delegate the entire 
authority of the provincial level government to approve foreign investment projects 
to city governments and departments directly subordinated to it. The counties 
would, in turn, be delegated the authority originally assigned at city level. This 
latest wave of subprovincial decentralization has enabled the cities and provincial 
bureaux to approve foreign investment projects of up to US$30 million, and county 
governments to approve foreign investment projects of up to US$15 million.56 The 
fact that the provincial government did not reserve any exclusive jurisdiction for 
itself demonstrated Guangdong's enthusiasm for subprovincial delegation of power.
54Wang Yarning, "Guanyu Wanshan Caizheng Baoganzhi de Ruogan Kanfa", (Some Views on 
How to Improve the Fiscal Dabaogan System), Jihua Yu Fazhan 1989: 14. See also Wu Yixin, 
Analysing the Ten Years of Economic System Reform in Guangdong, p.127, for a description of 
the five types of fiscal regimes which the provincial government entered into five groups of 
cities/districts in 1985. These five types are: (1) for Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Swatow Special 
Economic Zones: retaining all fiscal revenue for local use; (2) for Guangzhou, the provincial 
capital: the city sharing 60% of the surplus revenue after remitting a fixed lump-sum; (3) for 
Foshan and four other cities with a surplus local revenue: a base figure and a percentage increase for 
subsequent years, ranging from 4% to 7%, for remittance as negotiated; (4) for the "deficit" areas: 
fixed lump-sum as subsidy; (5) minority areas: fixed lump-sum as subsidy, to be increased by 10% 
per annum.
55Wang Yarning, "Some Views on How to Improve the Fiscal Dabaogan System", p.15.
56Nanfang Ribao May 5, 1992, p.l. The extract of the formal government notice, Guangdong 
Provincial Government Secretariat Notice No.36, is published in Guangdong Zhengbao, No.5 
(1992), p .ll.
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Decentralization of investment approval authority to cities and counties dates 
back to 1980. In 1980 Guangdong Provincial Government announced that as long 
as local governments complied with foreign investment policy, and as long as the 
various production and marketing requirements of the projects did not affect the 
provincial overall balance, then cities, districts, and counties would be authorized to 
approve foreign investment and outward pocessing projects. The allocation of 
jurisdiction was: Guangzhou, US$5 million or below; Hainan, US$3 million; all 
other districts, cities and bureaux-level units, US$1.5 million; counties, US$0.5 
million.57
Power to approve domestic investment was also delegated. Before 1979, 
all investment projects of over 0.3 million yuan had to be approved by the provincial 
government.58 After 1979, when the provincial government was authorised to 
approve medium-large sized projects as long as the province arranged the investment 
funds and materials for construction and subsequent production, the power of the 
subprovincials was also enhanced: Guangzhou could approve projects of 10 million 
yuan or below; Foshan, Jiangmen, Shantou, Zhuhai and Zhanjiang could approve 
projects of up to 5 million yuan; while other district-level cities, the figure stood at 3 
million yuan; for county-level cities, it was 1.5 million yuan; and for counties, 1 
million yuan.59
By September 1992, the extent of delegation had reached the uppermost 
limit. The entire jurisdiction of the provincial government had been delegated to city- 
level. City-level governments were thus authorized to approve projects of up to 30 
million yuan, so long as no direct capital injection was required from the superior 
government.60
As a result, a large portion of investment activity was taking place further 
away from the scope of scrutiny of the central government. Successive delegation 
of approval authority for investment projects meant that most of the investment 
projects could be (and have been) designed and approved at city, county and even
57Guangdong Jingji Xuehui (ed.), Guangdong Jingji Tizhi Gaige Yanjiu (A Study of the Economic
System Reform in Guangdong) (Guangdong: Zhongshan University Press, 1986), p.121. 
^Economic Institute, Guangdong Planning Commission, "Guangdong Touzi Lingyu de Jihua yu 
Shichang" (Plan and Market in the investment arena of Guangdong), in State Planning 
Commission Research Centre (ed.), Zhongguo: Jingji Tiaojie de Lilun he Shijian (The Theory and 
Practice of Economic Adjustment in China) (Beijing: People's University of China Press, 1992), 
p.69.
59See Guangdong Jingji Xuihui (ed.), A Study of the Economic System Reform in Guangdong,
p. 122.
^ S ee  Guangdong Provincial Government Notice No. 131(1992), in Guangdong Zhengbao, No 9 
(1992), p.46.
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township level. Table 3.27 below shows that for the period 1985-92, the share of 
subprovincial investment in Guangdong's state sector investment amounted to 62%. 
Moreover this share exclusive of central investment amounts to a staggering 80%.
Table 3.27
Share of Subprovincial Investment1
in Guangdong's State Sector Investment (%)2
Year Of Local Investment^ Of Total Investment4
1985 86.00 66.87
19865 64.85 48.01
1987 75.52 55.75
1988 81.60 65.36
1989 77.00 58.65
1990 77,61 59.42
1991 79.87 62.84
1992 82.16 66.10
1985)
1992) 82.16 61.94
Notes:
1.This calculation is in accordance with the subordination relationship of the 
investment project, and does not take into account injection of provincial/central 
funds or the outflow of subprovincial funds to central/provincial projects.
2.These figures cover capital construction investment and technical renovation, and 
do not include other miscellaneous investments such as single-item purchases.
3.Local investment refers to provincial and sub-provincial investment.
4.Total investment refers local investment plus central investment.
5.1986 figures include capital construction investment only.
■Source: Guangdong FAI Statistics. Yearly volumes on 1985-1992,
It should be noted that such extensive subdelegation of approval authority is 
not in line with directives from the Centre, i.e. with explicit regulations issued by 
the central government from time to time. In a regulation issued by the State 
Planning Commission in 1978, it was announced that subsequent to the delineation 
of project approval authority between central and provincial governments, such 
authority should not be subdelegated to lower levels.^1 This was tersely reiterated in 
1981 and 1983. The 1981 directive specified that approval authority was to be rested 
at central government and provincial level only. Sub-provincials did not therefore in
"Notice by the State Planning Commission, State Construction Commission and Ministry of 
Finance on Regulations (Trial) on the Procedures of Capital Construction", April 22,1978, printed 
in State Planning Commission (ed.), Jiben Jianshe Guanli Tizhi Gaige Wenjian Huibian (A 
Coolection of Documents on die Capital Construction System Reform) (Beijing: Hongqi 
chubanshe, 1985), pp.121-29.
149
theory have the power to approve investment plans and projects.62 The 1983 
statement expressed the cause of the official disapproval explicitly: subdelegation 
was contributory to runaway investment. As and when approval powers are 
delegated to levels below the province, and where the extent of delegation is the 
more extensive, it is much more difficult to control the level and direction of 
investment.63 This, of course, is exactly why subdelegation of authority was so 
keenly expedited, and consequently why subdelegation is so relevant to this study of 
central-provincial relations in investment administration.
Given the imposition of control figures by the Centre and the administration 
of investment via a stratified system, it is surprising the Centre is to estimate how 
much investment is in fact being planned by the various strata of administration, or 
how much is actually under way. In theory, the planning authority of capital 
investment resides at only two levels: first, the central government, i.e. the level of 
the State Planning Commission and State Council, and second, the provincial-level 
government, and the central ministries.64 In practice, each level of administration 
adds its own projects to the plan already approved at the higher levels. The 
widespread existence of "outside plan" projects makes the plan, and the original 
control figures, increasingly irrelevant. Not only are the control figures issued by 
the Centre substantially exceeded, as Table 3.9 in this chapter shows, but 
investment plans drawn up by the provincial government is actively utilized as the 
base upon which the subprovincial levels plan their own additional projects, rather 
than being an authoritative plan of the type of investment and its amount to be made 
within the entire province.65
f\0
"State Council, Regulations on Strengthening the System of Capital Construction 
Administration and Controlling the Level of Investment", March 3, 1981, printed in State Planning 
Commission (ed.), Zhongyao Jingji Fagui Ziliao Xuanbian (A Selected Collection of the Major 
Economic Regulations) (Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji chubanshe, 1987), pp. 556-58.
63State Planning Commission, "Report on Controlling the Investment Level and Reducing the 
Number of Investment Projects Under Construction", October 22,1983, pp.584-86.
64The provincial-level and the sectoral central ministries are of the same administrative ranking and 
their jurisdiction in investment project approval is therefore the same in most cases.
65See "State Planning Commission, Report on Controlling the Investment Level and Reducing the 
Number of Investment Projects Under Construction", October 22,1983. It was stated in the report 
that the 1983 capital investment plans of central ministries and of provincial governments exceeded 
the Centre's control figures by 1 billion yuan and 3.3 billion yuan respectively. For the latter part, 
the special economic zones of Guangdong and Fujian accounted for 1 billion yuan. However, due 
to the fact that subprovincial levels all had investment projects in addition to the official provincial 
plans, the total amount of investment exceeding the Centre's control figures was well in excess of 
4.3 billion yuan. A respondent closely associated with some of Guangdong's subprovincial 
governments told the author that the provincial governments themselves did not know how much 
investment was in reality taking place within the provinces. For instance 100 million yuan of 
investment was included for Shunde city in Guangdong's 1992 provincial investment plan. The 
total amount of investment in Shunde that year was actually more than 1 billion yuan, ten times of 
the provincial planned value. (Respondent No.2, Guangzhou Interviews, May 1993).
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According to the rules, "outside plan" investments are undoubtedly "illegal", 
and their existence, albeit extensive, is the result of a slackening of administrative 
rules and passive tolerance of the Centre. The sub-delegation of investment approval 
authority, however, represents explicit recognition of the authority of subprovincial 
levels as regards project approval. Although such delegation is, strictly speaking, 
also "illegal", given the existence of formal regulations which forbid delegation of 
project approval powers to cities and counties, the formal and open way in which 
subdelegation occurs provides a strong protection for investments made by 
subdelegated powers. The Guangdong Government would find it easy to ward off 
central pressure to cut investments by claiming that a substantial portion of 
provincial investment is in fact approved by the cities and counties.66 Whilst 
"outside plan" investments represent a "tool" with which to bargain for a higher 
control figure, subdelegation of approval authority is a means to a defence for 
excess investment, as well as providing a venue for investment 67
In one report on Guangdong's industrial structure, the writer grouped the planned investments by 
the Centre and those of the provincial government together as one category, as opposed to the 
"local investments" by the subprovincial governments. In this way the provincial government put 
itself in the same camp of the Centre thus being able to put the blame for problematic local 
investment on the lower level governments. See The Project Group, "The Adjustment of 
Guangdong's Industrial Structure and Deepening of Economic System Reform", in Xiao Ruchuan 
(ed.), A Study of Guangdong's Industrial Structure (Guangzhou: Guangdong Renmin chubanshe, 
1991), p.267.
^Guangdong and some other provinces argued for a higher control figure at a time when the central 
government pushed for austerity. The argument put forward was that "outside plan" investments 
which had been completed earlier in the year had already used up a substantial portion of the central 
control figures to the provinces. Such being fait accompli, it would lead to great hardship if 
projects within the state plan and considered essential were to be discontinued. Therefore it was 
necessary to adjust the central control figures upwards. State Planning Commission, "Report on 
Controlling the Investment Level and Reducing the Number of Investment Projects Under 
Construction", October 22,1983.
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Chapter Four
Institutional Context of Investment Administration in Shanghai
As one Shanghai official put it, historically both Shanghai and Guangdong 
have had a commercialized regional culture. In his view, the strong tradition of 
Shanghai's commercialized culture enabled it to change, if not revolutionalize, 
itself rapidly once the central government changed its policy towards the city in the 
early 1990s, a full decade after the reform process took off in Guangdong.1
Shanghai is one of the three largest metropolitian areas in China, the other 
two being Beijing, the capital, and Tianjin, both of which are also granted 
provincial-level administrative status.2 Shanghai has also been the largest 
economic centre of China this century, when the city flourished under the peculiar 
conditions of the treaty powers.3 Until the 1990s Shanghai was the highest 
contributor of national revenue amongst the provincial-level administration. From 
1953 to 1980, Shanghai generated over 280 billion yuan, or 14% of the total 
national fiscal revenue, while Guangdong generated only 43 billion yuan, 2.7% of 
the national total and less than one-sixth that of Shanghai.4
The industrialization and commercialization of the Shanghai economy 
earlier in the century as opposed to the rest of the country where the economy had 
remained predominantly agrarian has led to descriptions of Shanghai as being the 
"other China".5 At the time when the city flourished under the protection of the 
foreign treaty powers, the resultant wealth of the city caused hostility and suspicion 
within both the bureaucratic and revolutionary forces of China, whose agrarian and 
inward-looking orientation always carried on in an uneasy coexistence with the 
modem and cosmopolitan orientation of the city.6 However, after the city was 
severed from its foreign connections in 1949, and its economic strength, albeit 
affected, nevertheless remained the most formidable within the country, the "one-
respondent No. 22, Shanghai interview, January 1994.
2With the resumption of sovereignty of China over Hong Kong and Macau in 1997 and 1999, there 
will be two other such areas, although they will be under a special administrative category called the 
"Special Administrative Region1'.
3For a study of Shanghai between 1919 to 1949, see Marie-Claire Bergere, "'The Other China:’ 
Shanghai from 1919 to 1949", in Christopher Howe (ed.), Shanghai: Revolution and Development 
in an Asian Metropolis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 1-34.
^Calculated from Shanghai Statistical Bureau (ed.), Xin Shanghai Sishi Nian (Forty Years of New 
Shanghai) (Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji chubanshe, 1989), p.78; Shanghai Statistical Yearbook 1993, 
p.14; Guangdong 1949-88 (General), p.74, and Statictical Yearbook of China 1993, p.229.
5See Marie-Claire Bergere, "The Other China1: Shanghai from 1919 to 1949".
6Ibid.
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step ahead" economic development of the city gave Shanghai a peculiarly 
important place in the socialist economy and in the maintenance of the regime. 
Ironically Shanghai has since 1949, or, more accurately, since 1956 when the 
"socialist transformation process" of private enterprises was announced complete, 
become the most important base of the socialist economy and of the socialist 
planning system.7 This previously most developed hub of capitalism and the 
centre of private enterprises suddenly became the centre of gravity of the central 
planning system, as a result of the nationalization of Shanghai's industry between 
1955-1956.8
Since then Shanghai has played a critical role in the history of the People's 
Republic. The city has generated one-sixth of the total national fiscal revenue. The 
total profit and tax submitted by its enterprises during the first 40 years of the 
Republic was, cumulatively, six times that of the total value of their fixed assets at 
their original prices. Its export trade also accounted for one-quarter of the national 
total during the same period.^ Politically, its leaders have always been part of the 
national politics. Shanghai's leaders in the early years, for instance Chen Yi and Ke 
Qingshi,10 were all central government figures posted in Shanghai. Later Zhang 
Chunqiao, Yao Wenyun and Wang Hongwen became central leaders during the 
Cultural Revolution. And in the 1990s Shanghai's leaders, Jiang Zemin, Zhu 
Rongji, Wu Bangguo and Huang Ju all capitulated to national power. It has been 
argued that, given Shanghai's importance in the national economy, its leaders were
Respondent No. 14, Shanghai interview, January 1994. Other respondents have expressed similar 
commets on the changing "face" of the city before and after 1949. Lucian Pye noted that the 
Chinese Communist Party realized after gaining power that the economic strength of Shanghai, 
which they previously tended to blacken as a model of foreign and capitalistic exploitation, could be 
usefully "exploited" for the development of the rest of China. As a result Shanghai became more 
important strategically. See Pye, "Foreword", in Howe (ed.), Shanghai: Revolution and 
Development, p.xii.
8The Politburo discussed the "Draft Resolution of Transforming Capitalist Industries and 
Commerce" on December 16, 1955. Within one month Beijing announced the completion of the 
transformation of all capitalist industries and commerce in the city. By the end of March 1956, it 
was announced that all capitalist industrial and commercial enterprises in the country had been 
"transformed" into public-private jointly operated enterprises. See Fang Weizhong (ed.), Zhonghua 
Renntin Gongheguo Jingji Dashiji, 1949-1980 (The Major Economic Events in the People's 
Republic of China, 1949-1980)(Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue chubanshe, 1984), pp.158,163.
See Shanghai Statistical Bureau (ed,), Forty Years of New Shanghai, p.77.
10Chen Yi was the second First Party Secretary (1950-1954) and Ke Qingshi the third (1954-1965) 
of Shanghai, Both were prominent figures of the Party and joined the revolution in its early years. 
Chen was regarded one of the ten greatest generals of the Army and Ke had served as the general 
secretary of the Party before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, and became member of the 
Party Politburo in 1956. See Ma Qibing et al., Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhizheng Sishi Nian (The 
Chinese Communist Party: Forty Years in Power) (Beijign: Zhonggong Dangshi Ziliu chubanshe, 
1989), p.574; and Xiao Chaoran et al. ed. A Concise Dictionary of the Chinese Communist Party's 
History (Beijing: The People's Liberation Army Press, 1987), p. 819.
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more subject to the pull of central politics than leaders of other provinces were. * 
Does the historical importance of Shanghai affect its relations with the Centre in 
this new era of decentralization and reform since 1979? How does the new 
environment of the post-Mao reform era affect Shanghai's relationship with the 
Centre? How does Shanghai compare with Guangdong as regards central- 
provincial relations? These are the general questions which I intend to address in 
the case study of Shanghai, while contrasting Shanghai's fixed asset investment 
implementation with Guangdong.
As in the case of Guangdong, this chapter discusses contextual information 
regarding the administration of fixed asset investment in Shanghai in the post-Mao 
period. It describes the changes to fixed asset investment in Shanghai after 1979, 
and outlines the institutional backdrop to these changes. The purpose is to map out 
the institutional context of central-Shanghai political processes to pave the way for 
a discussion of Shanghai's discretionary behaviour in Chapter Six.
Investment in Shanghai
On the eve of reform in the late 1970s Shanghai's investment was at a 
higher base than that of Guangdong, but thereafter grew at a sluggish rate. Funding 
for investment had become more diversified, in line with the nationwide trend, but 
throughout the 1980s Shanghai was remarkably more reliant on central investments 
than was Guangdong, and the share of investment financed by the state budget in 
Shanghai was also significantly larger.
Trailing Performance
At the beginning of the 1980s, Shanghai's investment was at a much higher 
base than Guangdong, having invested 30% more during the previous 30 years than 
had Guangdong. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 have already shown that Shanghai’s 
accumulation ratios before 1980 were much higher than those of Guangdong. As a 
result, the total cumulative investment was conspicuously larger in Shanghai, as the 
table below shows:
This is the argument of David S. G. Goodman's and in a more complicated way that of Lynn T. 
White Hi's. See David S. G. Goodman, "The Shanghai Connection: Shanghai’s Role in National 
Politics During the 1970s", in Howe (ed.), Shanghai: Revolution and Development, pp.125-52; 
Lynn T. White III, "Local Autonomy in China During the Cultural Revolution: The Theoretical 
Uses of an Atypical Case", American Political Science Review, Vol.70 (1976), pp.479-91. For an 
alternative view, see Parris H. Chang, "Shanghai and Chinese Politics: Before and After the Cultural 
Revolution", in Howe (ed.), Shanghai: Revolution andDevelopmet, pp.66-90.
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Table 4.1
Total Societal Investment: 1950-1980 
(Billion Yuan)
Year Shanghai Guangdong
1950-52
1953-57
1958-62
1963-65
1966-70
1971-75
1976-80
0.29
1.93
5.56
2.03
3.48
9.58
15.14
0.16
1.28
4.26
1.99
2.60
6.12
12.87
Total:
1950-80 38.01 29.28
Source: Shanghai Statictical Yearbook 1980, p.271; Guangdong 1949- 88. 
FAI, pp. 158-61.
Table 4.1 shows that between 1950 and 1980 Shanghai had a consistent 
edge over Guangdong and that by 1980 the cumulative difference in investments 
made amounted to 30% of Guangdong's total investment. Despite the central 
govenment's preference for the interior regarding new investments, given the 
perceived threat of foreign attack in the 1960s and 1970s, and despite the relocation 
of many factories inland during the 1950s,12 Shanghai nevertheless benefited from 
being the largest economic centre in pre-1949 China. In order to better tap its 
industrial infrastructure and highly educated workforce, relatively substantial 
investment was pumped into Shanghai's industrial sector.13
12See Christopher Howe, Employment and Economic Growth in Urban China 1949-1957 (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1971), p.37; and Fang Weizhong (ed.), The Major Economic Events in 
the People's Republic of China,1949-1980, p. 144. The latter source states that resiting was part of 
the exercise to remedy the problem of surplus within the industrial infrastructure, such as the 
oversupply of workers and equipment in the old and established industrial centres, the inadequate 
supply of raw materials and new demand for finished products, a problem which was acute in 1955.
13The policy of the central government towards the developed areas in the coastal region in the 
1950s and the 1960s can be described as one of "exploitation and utilization to the full". In 
accordance with the central policy, the Party Commitee of Shanghai formulated an investment 
policy which "fully utilizes the existing capacities while reasonsably develops new facilities". See 
Shanghai Jingji Nianjian 1982 (Internal Version), p.844. As a result of this policy, although 
Shanghai had more investment than other coastal provinces, almost all investments were aimed at a 
quick and direct return of revenue whilst industrial infrastructure and social needs such as roads and 
domestic housing were seriously neglected. Moreover, as we shall see later in this chapter, Shanghai 
has had the highest extraction rate in the country, in terms of the share of local fiscal remittances to 
the Centre, and the amount of resources ploughed back to the municipality in the form of central 
and state investments was only a tiny fraction of the fiscal transfers.
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However, at the start of the 1980s when the central government's 
experimental reforms gathered momentum in the southern provinces, the edge 
which Shanghai had previously enjoyed gradually dulled.
Table 4.2
Growth Rates of Shanghai's Total Societal Investment
m
Year Shanghai National
1980 28.8 n/a
1981 20.2 n/a
1983 30.7 28.0
1984 6.6 16.2
1985 28.5 38.7
1986 23.9 18.7
1987 26.8 20.6
1988 31.7 23.5
1989 (12.4) (8.0)
1990 5.7 7.5
1991 13.7 23.8
1992 38.4 42.6
Average 8.0 19.7
SourcoiShanghai Statistical Yearbook 1989, 1990,1991,1992,1993, 
respectively, p.271, p.238, p.260, p.280, p.244.
Table 4.2 shows that in six out of the ten years between 1983 and 1992, 
Shanghai's total investment grew at a substantially slower rate than nationally. 
Investment in Shanghai grew at an annual average rate of 8%, as compared to 20% 
nationwide. More notably, despite having in 1988 obtained a more favourable 
fiscal arrangement with the Centre, and, bearing in mind that after 1990, when the 
Centre announced the Pudong policies and investment accelerated, the rate of 
growth in Shanghai was still far short of the national average. When comparing 
Table 4.2 with Table 3.6 on Guangdong, the relatively lacklustre growth of 
Shanghai's investment during the 1980s is obvious. The average annual growth rate 
in Guangdong for the same period stood at 30.8%, nearly four times that of 
Shanghai, at 8%. Also, the rate of growth in Guangdong in 1991 and 1992 was 
substantially higher than that of Shanghai, and this occurred at a time when the 
announcement of the Pudong preferential policies should have made Shanghai the 
new magnet of investment Guangdong's investment performance in 1992, the year 
of Deng Xiaoping's southern tour, was particularly spectacular. That year total 
societal investment almost doubled at 93%, more than double the rate in Shanghai 
and nationally. Moreover, investment in Shanghai had contracted on a larger scale 
during the 1989 national retrenchment drive than was the case nationally and when
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compared with Guangdong's modest dive, at -1.8%. This suggests that Shanghai’s 
investment during the 1980s was, contrary to what happened in Guangdong, more 
prone to contract than expand, even when the stimuli for both growth and 
contraction came from the same origin: the Centre.
As a result of much slower growth rates, Shanghai's cumulative investment 
during the period 1981-92 was less than 60% that of Guangdong's. Table 4.3 below 
shows that in 1992, Guangdong's total annual investment amounted to 2.5 times 
that of Shanghai.
Table 4.3
Total Societal Investment 1981-1992 
(Billion Yuan")
Year Shanghai Guangdong
1981-85 41.28 54.88
1986-90 102.04 154.10
1991 25.83 47.82
1992 35.74 92.18
Total 204.89 348.98
Source: Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 1993, p. 236; Shanghai Statistical 
Yearbook 1989,1990,1992,1993, respectively, p.271,p.260, p.281, p.244.
From 1980 to 1992, Shanghai's total investment grew by 687%, whilst 
during the same period that of Guangdong grew by 2307%. Table 4.4 below shows 
that the edge Shanghai had enjoyed over Guangdong prior to 1980 was thereafter 
reversed to meagre significance in the overall context.
Table 4.4
Relative Edge between Shanghai and Guangdong:
Total Investments ('Billion Yuan')
Year Shanghai (SI Guangdong (Cri Edge
1950-80 38.0 29.28 SoverG 8.73
1981-92 204.89 348.98 G overS 144.09
1950-92 242.90 378.26 G overS 135.36
Guangdong has topped the list of provincial-level jurisdictions as regards the value 
of its total investment since 1988, whilst Shanghai has trailed far behind between 
fourth and seventh positions. From 1988, Shanghai moved down in the ranking
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one position annually, having been overtaken by Shandong, Zhejiang and 
Sichuan.14
Lingering State Dominance amidst Proliferation of Actors
The proliferation of actors in the field of investment was a nationwide 
phenomenon. Nonetheless Shanghai's investment was characterized in three ways. 
First, the state sector continued its predominance with the non-state sector growing 
more slowly than in Guangdong and nationally. Second, the central government 
played a far more active part in Shanghai's investment than in Guangdong. Thirdly, 
whilst funding for investment had diversified substantially, money from the state 
budget still accounted for a higher proportion of total funding than was the case in 
Guangdong, and the eventual drop was not until much later. All these factors point 
to the premise that the grip of the central state via the traditional planning 
mechanism on investment and other economic activities has been much stronger 
and more persistent in Shanghai vis-a-vis Guangdong.
Lingering Central Dominance
If the marginalization of central investment best characterizes the 
proliferation of investment funding and actors in Guangdong since the 1980s, the 
lingering dominance of central investment in post-1980 Shanghai as regards its 
investment behaviour constitutes its opposite extreme. Table 4.5 below depicts the 
different proportion shares between central and local investment in the state sector 
since 1950.
14See State Statistical Bureau (ed.), Quangguo Zhuyao Shehui Jingji Zhibiao Paixu Nianjian, 1992 
(The 1992 Yearbook of the Ranking of Provinces in Major Social and Economic Indicators) 
(Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji chubanshe, 1992), p. 19; Statistics on FAI, 1988-89, p.24.
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Table 4.5
Central and Local Investment In Shanghai*
(% Share")
Year Central Investment Local Investment
1950-52 52.1 47.9
1953-57 70.0 30.0
1958-62 15.8 84.2
1963-65 29.2 70.8
1966-70 27.1 72.9
1971-75 24.0 76.0
1976-80 30.4 69.6
1981-85 49.8 50.2
1986-90 29.3 70.7
1991 36.1 63.9
1992 27.3 72.7
Total:
1950-80 31.3 68.7
1981-92 40.2 59.8
*Note: Statistics for 1950-1977 include capital construction only, as capital 
construction accounted for the bulk of state sector investments (from more than 
80% in the 1950s to more than 60% in the 1970s) and no data of this kind is 
available for technical renovation.
Source: Shanghai Statistics Yearbook 1993, pp. 248, 259.
Table 4.5 shows that from 1981 to 1985 the share of central investment 
surged nearly 20 percentage points to account for half of the state sector investment 
before subsiding in later years. During the 1981-92 period central investment 
accounted for 40% of total investment in the state sector, as compared with the 
31% share during 1950-80. It is interesting that central investment should have 
become more important to Shanghai during the 1980s when the national trend 
elsewhere was towards decentralization of power and resources to the provinces. 
When looking more closely at the capital construction portion of investment, it 
becomes clear that the part being played by the central government had increased, 
and that the upward trend of central participation in Shanghai's capital construction 
investment lingered and persisted through to the end of 1980s.
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Table 4.6
Central Investment in Capital Construction 
(% Share*)
Year % Share
1981-85 66.0
1986-90 58.6
1986 49.6
1987 55.3
1988 62.8
1989 60.5
1990 61.0
1991 50.5
1992 34.7
Source: Shanghai Statistics Yearbook 1993, 1991, respectively, p.248, p.264.
When I raised the issue of the heavy share of central investment during 
interviews with Shanghai officials, they invariably cautioned against too simplified 
an interpretation of the statistics. First, they stressed that the calculation of 
proportion shares according to the subordination relations of the projects might be 
misleading as regards the extent of central influence over Shanghai's investment 
activities. This is because other factors, such as the planning system and the 
funding arrangement of investment, would have a significant effect on the 
pendulum of power between the Centre and the municipality, given that there is a 
certain division of subordination relations. Second, it was suggested by officials 
that a substantial part of local investment had not been included in the official 
statistics and that the share of central investments was artifically inflated. 15
As regards the first point, it is well known that the shares of central and 
local investment calculated according to the subordination relations of projects 
undertaken are a rough indication only of the balance of central/provincial 
influence over investment in a province. Subordination relations assign the 
detailed administration of projects to different levels of the government. The extent 
of power the government department-in-charge actually has over projects is 
dependent on a host of factors. As discussed in Chapter Three, it would be naive to 
interpret the heavy share of local investment in Guangdong after 1958 in the same 
way as one would the similar situation in the 1980s and 1990s. The centralized
^Respondents Nos. 15, 22, and 17, Shanghai interviews, January 1994. The interviews were 
separately conducted. Although the precise wordings of the different respondents may differ, they 
all pointed to the same message concerning what should be read from the statistics on central 
investment.
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planning and fiscal systems before 1980 ensured that though projects and 
enterprises were delegated to local administration, the Centre still retained a high 
degree of control over planning and approval of investment, as well as over the 
allocation of resources which made investment possible in the first place.
Similar caution is therefore necessary when interpreting the heavy share of 
central investment according to subordination relations in the 1980s in Shanghai. 
As one respondent explained to the author, due to changes in funding channels, the 
extent of central control over central investment projects had changed considerably 
since early/mid-1980s . The proliferation of funding channels towards the end of 
thel980s decade reduced the Centre's grip even when the project concerned is a 
central project, as the local economy and the Shanghai government played a more 
active role in "supporting" central investment projects.^
Caution and prudence notwithstanding, it is important not to underestimate 
the significance of these statistics. First, given the national policy of 
decentralization in the 1980s and the nationwide trend of proliferation of 
investment actors, it is noteworthy that such a high percentage of Shanghai's 
investment has been under the administration jurisdiction of the central 
government. The high percentage of central funds in Shanghai's investment is an 
indication of the high degree of central involvement in Shanghai's investment 
affairs. Second, evidence exists that most central investment projects in the 1981- 
85 period were directly financed by the central government budget, whether in the 
form of central budgetary funds or planned loans under the quotas of the central 
ministries. This means that for the first half of 1980s at least, the high percentage 
shares of central investment are a fairly accurate reflection of the extent of central 
control over investment in Shanghai. I shall discuss this point in more detail in the 
next section on funding channels.
Underreporting is probably a common practice nationwide and its extent is, 
therefore, difficult to gauge. Undeueporting actually encompasses three types of 
situation. First, and perhaps the most interesting type for our purposes is the 
conscious decision of the provincial government deliberately to conceal 
information from the Centre. In such cases data for projects is actually available in 
the provincial government files, but they are not included in yearly investment 
plans and reports submitted to the Centre, or in official statistics. The second type 
is a corresponding development of the first type at subprovincial levels vis-a-vis
^Respondent No. 15, Shanghai interview, January 1994.
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the provincial-level. Similarly subprovincial governments do to the provincial 
governments as they do to the Centre so as not to appear to be disobeying orders 
and flouting planning limits assigned from above. Such practice may well exist at 
every level of the hierarchy right from the very grassroots level of enterprise. The 
third type of underreporting is due to the methods of collection of statistics and 
data on investment activities. In other words, owing to a lack of personnel or 
inadequacy in management, some investment activities, usually those small in scale 
or occurring in remote places where management standards are the weakest, never 
enter the statistical books or files at any level of g o v e m m e n t . 1 7
It is obvious that the largest area of underreporting within provincial 
statistics is that of local investments. One respondent explicitly stated that official 
statistics were compiled in accordance with the planning control figure of total 
investment handed down from the Centre every year. The total value of investment 
as shown in the statistics would be made to appear roughly equivalent to the value 
endorsed by the Centre, allowing a reasonable, though not too wide, margin to 
account for the narrower coverage of the planning control figures.18
The extent to which underreporting has underestimated the share of local 
investment is difficult to ascertain, since no such data will be made available whilst 
the provinces and lower-levels still feel the need to engage in such practice. 
Nonetheless, by looking at the absolute amount of central investment and 
comparing Shanghai and Guangdong, it is beyond doubt that Shanghai has had far 
more central investment in absolute terms, as the table below well shows:
Ibid. That local governments have indeed been manipulating statistical data was confirmed by the 
Centre's move to ban such behaviour openly in May 1994, when in a national telephone conference 
with provincial governments Vice-Premier Zhou Jiahua announced that a comprehensive inspection 
exercise was to be carried out regarding the accuracy of statistical information reported to the 
Centre. See People's Daily May 27,1994, p.3. The problematic behaviour Zhou pointed out in the 
conference includes delays in reporting data, refusing to report, and hiding data and inflating data. 
^Respondent No. 15, Shanghai interview, January 1994. It was revealed in a study on local 
(provincial) government investment behaviour conducted by Mainland Chinese scholars that in 
some provinces the provincial government has been keeping two separate sets of investment 
statistics. One set is the raw data recording the total amount of investment undertaken and known to 
the provincial government. The other set is a "processed" version of the first for forwarding to the 
central government. According to the study, this is why there are often huge discrepancies between 
investment data released by the banks and the final official investment statistics released by the 
provincial government. (The latter is often much less.) See Zhong Chengxun (ed.), Difang 
Zhengfu Touzi Xingwei Yanjiu (A Study of the Investment Behaviour of Local Governments) 
(Beijing: Zhongguo Caizheng Jingji chubanshe, 1993), p.448. From the interviews conducted in 
Shanghai, it is clear that Shanghai is one of those provinces. See also Footnote 20 below. On the 
different coverages of the planning control figures passed down from the Centre and the statistics on 
investment, see Footnote 7 of Chapter Three.
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Table 4.7
Central Investment in State Sector: 
Shanghai and Guangdong 
(Billion Yuan)
Year Shanghai Guangdong
1981 ) 0.94
1982 ) 1.33
1983 ) 16.10 1.42
1984 ) 1.99
1985 ) 8.32
1986 4.22 3.25
1987 6.06 4.02
1988 8.29 4.40
1989 7.79 4.78
1990 7.54 5.84
1991 7.37 6.49
1992 7.01 9.86
Total 64.38 46.96
Source: Guangdong 1949-1988 FAI, p. 172; Guangdong FAI Statistics, Yearly 
Volumes (1989-92); Shanghai Statistical Yearbooks 1991,1993, respectively, 
p.264; pp.248, 259.
Bearing in mind that underreporting is a nationwide phenomenon, and the 
fact that Shanghai is more reliant than other provinces/municipalities on central 
investment, it is obviously in the interests of the Shanghai government to desist 
from reporting an investment total which far exceeds the central control figure. In 
the event that the central government judges the total investment as excessive, 
central investments could in theory be more easily controlled and projects curtailed 
than could local investment. *9 The Shanghai government is therefore more wary of 
arousing unwelcome attention of the Centre. The effect is that in Shanghai, the 
appearance of complying with central planning control is of greater importance in 
the minds of local officials than is the case in Guangdong.20
Respondent No.15, Shanghai interview, January 1994. It should be noted that, in reality, central 
investment is not necessarily more subject to retrenchment moves than is local investment. Since 
"strategic" projects are not usually the targets of retrenchment, more often receiving additional 
resources released from other projects, and since central projects were more likely to be regarded as 
"strategic", central investment projects would thus be less affected than local investment during 
retrenchment. In fact this has been the case in Shanghai, where central investment in 1989 shrunk 
by less than 6% from the level of 1988, as against a 12.4% decrease for local investments. (See 
Shanghai Statistical Yearbooks 1991,1993). However since central investment is directly under the 
control of the central government, the feeling in the locality is that this is a slice of investment 
subject to the mercy of the Centre.
29ft is noted that during discussions with Guangdong and Shanghai officials on the underreporting 
of local investments in official statistics, (Guangzhou interviews, May and September 1993; 
Shanghai interviews, January 1994) Guangdong officials confirmed that the third type of 
underreporting is most common, and to a less extent the second type, i.e. subprovincial 
underreporting. On the other hand, Shanghai officials laid the emphasis on the first. In the 
judgement of the author, it would not be right to attribute this difference to idiosyncratic and other
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Funding Channels
Funding of investment in Shanghai is characterized by a relatively high 
proportion share of budgetary funds, foreign capital and bank loans and, in contrast 
to Guangdong, a lower share for "own funds" and other miscellaneous headings. 
Table 4.8 below shows the cumulative position from 1983 to 1992:
Table 4.8
Funding Channels of State Sector Investment 
1983-1992
Channels Billion Yuan % Share
Shanghai Guangdong Shanghai Guangdong
Budget 14.74 12.72 8.50 5.48
Bank Loans 58.56 57.46 27.29 24.76
Foreign Capital 30.54 35.15 19.02 15.15
Own Funds & Others 71.50 126.72 44.52 54.61
Total 175.34 232.05 100.00 100.00
Source: Shanghai Statistical Yearbooks 1983-1993 ; Guangdong 1949-1988 FAI, 
p. 89; Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 1991,1992,1993, respectively, p.195, 
p.231, p.237.
Table 4.8 shows that although the cumulative value of Shanghai's state 
sector investment was only three-fourths those of Guangdong, the absolute value of 
investment using budgetary funds and domestic bank loans was 3 billion yuan 
more than that of Guangdong. The proportional share of foreign capital is also 
almost four percentage points higher, despite the fact that Guangdong has taken the 
lead in the Open Door Policy and has been successful in attracting direct foreign 
investments. A more detailed look at the figures suggests that the higher share of 
investment using budgetary funds, foreign capital, and bank loans, is related to the 
high proportion of central investment.
random factors, such as the possibly different levels of candidness of the respondents. Responses 
were consistently along the same lines for different respondents in either Guangdong or Shanghai 
when this question was raised.
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Table 4.9
Budgetary Investments in State Sector 
% Share
Year National Shanghai Guangdong
1983 34.9 13.6 22.6
1984 34.2 15.2 17.0
1985 23.9 12.9 10.6
1986 22.1 15.0 11.7
1987 20.5 17.8 7.6
1988 14.8 13.0 4.8
1989 13.3 5.5 5.5
1990 13.1 5.6 4.4
1991 10.1 4.5 3.3
1992 6.2 4.0 1.9
Source: Guangdong 1949-1988 FAI, p. 89; Guangdong Statistical Yearbooks 1991- 
1993; Shanghai Statistical Yearbooks 1983-1993; Statistical Yearbook of 
China 1993, pp. 146,149; Statistics on FAI (1950-1985); (1986-87); (1988- 
89); (1990-91),
Table 4.9 shows that Guangdong started off with the higher share of 
budgetary investment in 1983, but that this share rapidly and consistendy declined 
over the years. Five years later in 1987, the share of budgetary investment in 
Guangdong was only about one third that of 1983. On the other hand, budgetary 
investment in Shanghai was resilient. Between 1983 and 1987, the share of 
budgetary investments was generally on an upward trend, climbing from 13.6% in 
1983 to 17.8% in 1987—more than ten percentage points higher than of 
Guangdong's 7.6% share the same year. It was only in 1989 that the budgetary 
investment share declined, abrupdy, falling 7.5 percentage points to equal 
Guangdong at 5.5%.
Table 4.5 and Table 4.9 together show that the period during which 
Shanghai's budgetary investments increased was precisely the time when central 
investment surged in Shanghai. One element of data which strongly suggests the 
extent of the contribution from the central government to Shanghai's budgetary 
investments is the discrepancy between the amount of budgetary investments 
made and the amount of local budgetary funds spent on investment, as Table 4.10 
below shows:
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Table 4.10
Discrepancy of Budgetary Investment and Local Fiscal Investment Expenditures*
(Tuan Million")
Budeetarv Investment Fiscal Exp. Discrepancy %
141 91 (50) (35.5)
330 132 (198) (60.0)
169 145 (24) (14.2)
283 336 53 18.7
521 731 210 40.3
1139 1601 462 40.6
1222 890 (332) (27.2)
1008 887 (121) (12.0)
733 914 181 24.7
821 1030 209 25.5
1063 1620 557 52.4
1194 2364 1170 98.0
1777 2773 996 56.0
2930 1747 (1183) (40.3)
2712 2397 (315) (11.6)
945 2291 1346 142.4
1106 2123 1017 92.0
1044 2107 1063 101.8
1147 2247 1100 50.0
16480 22500 6020 36.5
8787 10665 1928 21.9
Year
1952 
1957 
1962 
1965 
1970 
1978
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992 
Total:
1981-92 
1987-91
*Note: Discrepancy refers to the amount of local fiscal, that is, budgetary 
investment expenditures over the value of budgetary investments as shown in the 
statistics of investment by types of funding. The % refers to the absolute 
discrepancy value as a percentage of the budgetary investment. Figures for 
budgetary investments cover the state sector only, and prior to 1983, cover capital 
construction only.
Source: Fiscal expenditures: Shanghai Statistical Yearbook 1993, p. 56; budgetary 
investments: (before 1983) Shanghai Statistical Yearbook 1986, p.243; (in and 
after 1983) Shanghai Statistical Yearbook 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 
1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, respectively, p.219, p.133, p.242, p.232, p.244, p.274, 
p.239, p. 261, p.281 and p. 245.
It is interesting to compare the table above with Table 3.17 in Chapter 
Three. A comparison of the two makes it clear that the overall discrepancy ratio in 
Guangdong during 1987-91, at 137%, is much higher than the 22% in Shanghai. 
Table 4.10 thus conveys two important indications. First, it shows that, in 
Shanghai as in Guangdong, the amount of budgetary funds spent on investment 
from the provincial state coffers is, both on average and cumulatively, larger than 
the value of investment recorded in the official investment statistics as having 
been financed with budgetary funds, although the difference in Shanghai's figures 
is much more modest than that of Guangdong. As discussed in the previous
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chapter on Guangdong, this indicates that the government of Shanghai has also 
been actively involved in "outside plan" investment.
Second, the relative modesty of the difference in Shanghai's figures is 
largely a result of two years' negative discrepancy in 1987 and 1988, which served 
to cancel out a substantial portion of the positive discrepancy in other years. 
When looking at the years 1990 and 1991, the discrepancy percentage in Shanghai 
was not much less than that of Guangdong, and in 1989 it even marginally 
surpassed Guangdong.
In Chapter Three it has been noted that, in theory, a negative discrepancy is 
the norm. This is because if local fiscal resources are spent stricdy in accordance 
with the state investment plan, and there is normally at least some inflow of 
central budgetary funds, the amount of local fiscal spending on investment would 
be only a portion of the investment financed with budgetary funds, the balance of 
the portion depending on the amount of central inflow. However, in practice the 
opposite has been the case. Table 4.10 shows that for the entire decade of 1980s, 
negative discrepancy occurred in only three years. Data available in the 1960s and 
1970s also recorded the frequent occurrence of positive discrepancies of some 
magnitude. This demonstrates that the Shanghai government has for a long period 
of time actively engaged in outside plan investments, the extent of which 
increased still further in the 1980s.
Given this historical trend, that a negative discrepancy recurred in 1987 and 
1988 indicates a very substantial inflow of central budgetary funds. Taking into 
account the underlying trend of a positive discrepancy, and the fact that local fiscal 
expenditure on investment in these two years was sustained at a more or less 
stable level, it is likely that the actual amount of central budgetary inflow was in 
excess of the discrepancy value.2!
A dominant "central factor" is also indicated in data available on the 
composition and allocation of foreign capital. Such data reveals that there are three 
major ways in which foreign loans are raised and arranged, in terms of the 
different degree of involvement of the central government. First, the central 
government arranges both the raising and repayment of the loan. Second, the 
Centre arranges for the raising of the capital, and the user repays the loan directly.
21This interpretation of the negative discrepancies as signalling large inflows of central fiscal funds 
was confirmed with informed sources in the Shanghai municipal government (Respondents Nos. 20 
and 21, Shanghai interviews, January 1994)
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Thirdly, the user both raises and repays the loan directly exclusive of direct 
involvement with the central government. The Centre has the highest level of 
involvement in the first type of foreign loan, which would be described as 
centrally-coordinated foreign capital in the following discussion. It should be 
noted that in all three cases the users are responsible for repaying loans. In the 
case of centrally co-ordinated loans, repayment would be via the central 
government ministry concerned. Therefore, from the viewpoint of maximizing 
local autonomy and flexibility, the second type was probably the most beneficial 
of the three, since it makes use of the superior bargaining power of the central 
government when securing loans for the use of localities.22 There is however no 
statistical breakdown available for the second and third type of arrangement. The 
two are thus lumped together in the following discussion as symbolizing a high 
extent of provincial involvement.
Table 4.11
Centrally Co-ordinated Foreign Loans in Foreign Capital 
Shanghai’s State Sector Investment 
(Billion Yuan'*
Year Foreign Capital Centrallv Co-ordinated % Share
1987 3.60 2.20 61.11
1988 4.62 2.04 44.16
1989 3.74 1.60 42.78
1990 3.54 1.01 28.53
1991 3.74 0.99 26.47
1992 3.01 0.001 0.03
Total 22.25 7.84 35.24
Source: Shanghai Statistical Yearbook 1988-1993.
Table 4.11 shows that over one-third of foreign capital used in state sector 
investment between 1987 and 1992 was centrally coordinated. It can be seen that 
the percentage shares stood at a very high level, at over 60% in 1987 and over 
40% in 1989, before dropping substantially in the 1990s. Although data for earlier 
years is not available, the trend of the available data strongly suggests a high 
percentage for the pre-1987 years.
A contrast with Guangdong better illustrates the picture, as Table 4.12 
below shows:
22This is the opinion of Respondent No.36, Beijing interview, April 1994. Provincial governments 
could then retain the autonomy in managing the details of the loans while securing more favourable 
terms or larger scale of loan finance through the central government.
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Table 4.12
Centrally Co-ordinated Foreign Loans in Foreign Capital 
Guangdong's State Sector Investment 
(Billion Yuanl
Year Foreign Capital Centrallv Coordinated % Shi
1984 0.90 0.06 6.67
1985 1.74 0.18 10.34
1986 2.46 0.32 13.01
1987 2.69 0.26 9.67
1988 n/a n/a n/a
1989 3.90 0.24 6.15
1990 4.89 0.18 3.68
1991 n/a n/a n/a
1992 7.66 0.14 1.83
Total
1984-92 24.24 1.37 5.65
1987-92 19.14 0.82 4.28
Source: Guangdong FAI Statistics, Yearly volumes 1984-92.
A comparison of Tables 4.11 and 4.12 shows that the amount of centrally 
coordinated foreign loans in Shanghai between 1987 and 1992 was nearly ten 
times that in Guangdong. Shanghai was consequently more dependent on the 
central government for the supply of foreign investment funding, whilst in 
Guangdong the portion in this area was less than 5%. This indicates that 
Guangdong, due to its success in attracting direct foreign investment, has been 
more capable than Shanghai of raising foreign capital independently. More 
importantly, Shanghai has been much less successful in gaining control over 
resources provided by the Centre. As the table below reveals, Guangdong was 
able to deploy the bulk of its 5% of centrally coordinated loans to local investment 
projects, whilst the majority of such loans to Shanghai was used for central 
projects in Shanghai.
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Table 4.13
Distribution of Centrally Coordinated Foreign Loans 
in Local and Central Investment Projects 
fMillion Yuan'!
Guangdong
Year Total Central Projects Local Projects
Mn Yuan (%1 Mn Yuan m
1984 59.7 59,7 (100,0) 0.0 (0.0)
1985 175.2 87.5 (49.9) 87.7 (50.1)
1986 315.4 164.5 (52.2) 150.9 (47.8)
1987 n/a n/a
1988 n/a n/a
1989 236.6 158.6 (67.0) 78.0 (33.0)
1990 179.9 36.3 (20.2) 143.5 (79.8)
1991 n/a n/a
1992 142.5 3.5 (2.5) 139.0 (97.5)
Total:
1984-92 1069.1 510.2 (31.5) 1109.3 (68.5)
1989-92 559.0 198.4 (18.6) 870.7 (81.4)
Source: Guangdong FAI Statistics , Yearly volumes.
Shanghai
Year Total Central Projects Local Projects
Mn Yuan m Mn Yuan m
1989 1603 1540 (96.1) 63 (3.9)
1990 1013 958 (94.6) 55 (5.4)
1991 992 978 (98.6) 14 (1.4)
1992 1 0 (0.0) 1 (100.0)
Total 2006 1936 (96.5) 70 (3.5)
Source: Shanghai Statistical Yearbooks, 1990-1993.
Table 4.13 shows that between 1984 and 1992, nearly 70% of centrally 
coordinated loans in Guangdong was used for local investment projects. This 
share rose to over 80% between 1989 and 1992, as compared to less than 4% in 
Shanghai. It is, therefore, clear that although Shanghai has had more than three 
times the amount of Guangdong's centrally coordinated loans, the amount that was 
used for local projects was only 15% of the amount spent on local projects in 
Guangdong in absolute terms. The message is loud and clear: whilst the Shanghai
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government succeeded in the "pulling in" of resources to the municipality,23 such 
resources came with strings attached. The Centre retained control over the 
resources by assigning them largely to centrally subordinated projects. When 
considering Guangdong's success in allocating centrally coordinated loans to local 
projects, it appears that Shanghai may have paid a disproportionate price in terms 
of leverage vis-a-vis the Centre for its reliance on central-originated funding.
Slow Growing Non-State Sector
Concomitant with the lingering dominance of central investment and the 
resilience of budgetary funds as a source of funding is the predominance of the 
state sector in investment and the economy of Shanghai generally. As detailed in 
Table 4.14 below, as late as 1992, investment in the non-state sector accounted for 
just over 20% of the total, with the state sector accounting for 80%. For the entire 
1981-92 period, the share of non-state sector investment cumulatively was only 
about 18%, less than eight percentage points higher than the share during the 
1950-80 period.
Table 4.14
Shanghai's. Non-State Sector Investment 
(Million Yuanl
Year Collective (O Private (PI % Share of Total Investment
1950-52 2 48
IQ
0.7
sn
16.4
IQ+fP)
17.1
1953-57 15 315 0.8 16.3 17.11958-62 167 133 3.0 2.4 5.4
1963-65 149 97 7.3 4.8 12.1
1966-70 262 213 7.5 6.1 13.7
1971-75 615 305 6.4 3.2 9.6
1976-80 1297 485 8.6 3.2 11.8
1981-85 3616 3323 8.8 8.1 16.8
1986-90 10096 7296 9.9 7,2 17.0
1991 2782 1487 10.8 5.8 16.51992 6416 1755 18.0 4.9 22.9
Total:
1950-80 2507 1596 6.6 4.2 10.8
1981-92 22910 13861 11.8 6.8 18.0
1950-92 25417 15457 10.5 6.4 16.8
Source: Shanghai Statistical Yearbook 1993, p.244.
Centrally coordinated loans could amount to some kind of central support as the provinces may 
not be able to solicit and organize foreign loans independently, and the interest rate or repayment 
terms negotiated by the Centre may be more favourable than otherwise.
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When comparing Table 4.14 with Table 3.19 of Chapter Three, the sluggish 
growth of investment in Shanghai's non state sector relative to Guangdong's is 
clear. In line with its high base of total investment before 1980, and in particular 
due to the concentration of the country's private capital there in the early 1950s, 
both the absolute value and percentage share of non-state sector investment was 
larger in Shanghai than in Guangdong in the 1950-1980 period. The absolute 
cumulative value was nearly three times more, and the percentage share was 
almost double. During the 1981-92 period, however, investment in Shanghai’s 
non-state sector was only 40% that of Guangdong's, and the proportion share of 
the total lower by, again, 40%. The non-state sector became a relatively light 
weight in Shanghai’s economy, as compared in Guangdong and nationally, as 
shown in the table below:
Table 4.15
Proportion Share of Non-State Sector Investment 
in Total Investment (%)
£19921
Sector National Guangdong Shanghai
State 67.1 59.2 77.1
Non-state 32.9 40.8 22.9
of which:
Collective 17.3 22.7 18.0
Private 15.6 18.1 4.9
Source: Table 4.14, Table 3.19, Statistical Yearbook of China 1993, p.145.
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Table 4.16
Yearly Growth Rate of Investment (%)
Year Total State Sector Non-State Sector
C P C+P
1981 20.2 11.8 51.9 163.1 86.1
1982 30.7 36.9 (5.9) 10.4 11.7
1983 6.5 5.5 21.3 2.8 12.5
1984 21.5 16.6 44.8 58.6 50.9
1985 28.5 26.6 16.2 62.2 37.2
1986 23.9 27.7 34.0 (14.1) 8.1
1987 26.8 26.1 33.4 25.9 30.6
1988 31.7 28.6 55.6 33.1 45.8
1989 (12.4) (10.0) (27.7) (14.8) (22.8)
1990 5.7 7.5 (12.9) 10.7 (3.1)
1991 13.7 8.2 52.1 (10.2) 22.5
1992 38.4 26,4 130.6 18.0 91.4
Average 19.6 17.7 32.8 30.0 30.9
SourcetiShanghai Statistical Yearbook 1989,1990,1991,1992,1993, respectively, 
p.271, p. 238, p. 260, p.280 andp.244.
Table 4.16 above details the annual growth rates of investment in the state 
and non-state sectors in Shanghai. When looking at Table 4.16 in tandem with 
Table 3.21 of Chapter 3 on Guangdong, the following observations may be made:
First, in both Guangdong and Shanghai investment in the non-state sector 
grew at a faster rate than it did in the state sector. The average annual growth rate 
of the non-state sector is higher, and when looking at the trend year by year, the 
non-state sector grew faster in more years in Shanghai than in Guangdong. In 
Shanghai, for instance, investments in the non-state sector accelerated during 
eight out of the twelve years between 1981 and 1992. In Guangdong it was the 
case during only six out of the same twelve years. This suggests that while the 
non-state sector in both areas was more prone to growth and increased investment, 
this trend was more consistent in Shanghai, even though the state sector has been a 
more dominant player there. It could be that precisely because the non-state sector 
was a lesser player in investment in Shanghai, it became in a sense less vulnerable 
to the changes in economic and political "climate" which had a larger impact on 
investment in the non-state sector in Guangdong.
Second, in both places it was the collectives within the non-state sector that 
took the lead, and, despite the stronger presence of the state and the plan in 
Shanghai, the greater gap of growth between the collective and the 
private/individual was in Guangdong. Here, the gap was more a result of the high
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growth rates of the collective than of a low base in private investment. Table 4.17 
below gives a clear illustration of the loci of growth in Guangdong and Shanghai:
Table 4.17
Average Annual Growth Rates of Investment: A Comparison
1981-1992 (%)
Sectors Shanghai Guanedone Gap*
Total Societal 19.6 31.5 11.9
State Sector 17.7 32.0 14.3
Non-State 30.9 36.2 5.3
of which:
Collective 32.8 64.3 31.5
Private/Individual 30.0 22.7 (7.3)
*Note: "Gap" here refers to the difference between Guangdong's growth rates over 
Shanghai's. The "gap" mentioned in the text above refers to the differences in 
growth rates between the collective and private investments in a locality.
Between 1981 and 1992, Guangdong's investment in the collective sector 
grew at an average annual rate of 64%, as against a rate of only 23% in private 
investment. In Shanghai the respective rates were 33% vis-a-vis 30%, a much 
smaller difference. In fact the average growth rate of Guangdong's private 
investment was lower than that of Shanghai, as indicated by the negative gap in 
Table 4.17 above. The largest gap in growth rates between Shanghai and 
Guangdong is in the collective sector, amounting to 32 percentage points.
This recalls the early stage of development of the non-state sector in China, 
and the heavy involvement of the government in the economy and in investment 
decisions in particular. The non-state sector in China has never been simply the 
opposite of the state sector. During the 1980s to present day to the foreseeable 
future, the non-state sector has not been and will not be an autonomous actor in 
society as it has in the West. Within the non-state sector the collective has always 
been favoured as a magnet for economic activities. Here is a large grey area 
outside the strict control of the state system yet still endowed with the label of 
public ownership making it much more attractive and convenient politically than 
the capitalistic private sector. The collective has therefore become the hub of 
investment in places with a rapidly expanding economy.
The role of the state in investment decisions and the close relationship 
between the government and the collective sector explains the otherwise peculiar 
phenomenon noted in Table 4.17 above. The private/individual sector was not the
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fastest growth point in the 1980s, not even in Guangdong where decentralization 
reforms first took off in the country and where private investment has accumulated 
to a noticeable proportion of the total (18% in 1992). Therefore it is no surprise 
that the average annual growth rates of private sector investments in Shanghai 
should outstrip those of Guangdong. The crucial gap in performance lies in the 
collective sector. Given the active role of provincial governments in many 
investments in the collective sector, and the fact that the collective sector was 
never the central government's baby, the more a provincial government operates 
under the control of the Centre, the less opportunity it has to invest in the 
collective sector. Under the traditionally tight scrutiny of the Centre and the strong 
presence of the state plan in its economy, the Shanghai Government has therefore 
used to focus its attention on the state sector up until the 1990s. In other words, 
the relatively slow growth of the non-state sector, and of the collective in 
particular, in Shanghai in the 1980s was the result of the traditionally strong hold 
of central government over the municipal government. The development of the 
non-state sector in China, in the 1980s and probably for the near future, is more a 
matter of an adjustment of power between the central and lower levels of the state, 
than between state and society. Consequently, the non-state sector has an integral 
part to play in the discussion on central-provincial relations.
Institutional Backdrop
Why had the central government retained such a level of dominance in 
Shanghai's investment, when the national slogan for the 1980s was 
"decentralization" and "reform"? The answer requires a closer examination of the 
institutional environment in Shanghai in more detail. What are the rules of the 
game which Shanghai has played, and probably does still, with the Centre since 
1979?
Fiscal System: Tight Jacket
The most important and decisive institutional constraint of Shanghai's 
development and investment behaviour is arguably its tight financial situation 
resulting from a centralized fiscal system which operated almost through the 1980s. 
Burdened with a high extraction rate and left with little money to spare,24 the
24Shanghai has the highest extraction rate of all provincial-level jurisdictions in post-1949 China. 
In 1980, the extraction rate of local fiscal revenue to the central fiscal coffers is 91.4%, followed by 
Shandong's 90%, and Zhejiang's 87%. See Tian Yinong, Zhu Fulin, and Xiang Huaicheng, Lun 
Zhongguo Caizheng Guanli Tizhi de Gaige (On China's Fiscal System Reform) (Beijing: Economics 
and Sciences Press, 1986), pp.88-89.
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Shanghai government was particularly keen to fight for central investment as well 
as for all kinds of other central support. In the eyes of Shanghai officials, and 
probably of the city residents as well, the inflow of central resources has been but a 
partial refund of the huge contributions which Shanghai has made to the central 
coffers and to the nation generally over the decades.
Developments
From 1980 to the eve of 1994 when the new tax-sharing fiscal system was 
adopted nationwide, the fiscal system in Shanghai has come through three stages. 
Whilst in 1980 nearly all provinces adopted some kind of contractual fiscal system 
which conferred more autonomy and resources to provincial governments, it was 
not until 1988 that Shanghai won its own kind of fiscal reform. Moreover, this 
belated reform only came after two rounds of unusual "slides" in Shanghai's fiscal 
revenue between 1981-83 and 1986-87, which convinced the Centre that changes 
could be delayed no longer.
1980-1984
The most striking and, from the viewpoint of Shanghai, unfortunate 
development in the 1980s was the central government's announcement of the 
adoption of a new contractual fiscal system nationwide in February 1980, from 
which Shanghai, along with the other two provincial-level municipalities, Beijing 
and Tianjin, was to be excluded.25 Consequently, as Guangdong entered what has 
subsequently proved to be an unprecedented period of local autonomy and 
development via the dabaogan system, Shanghai was stuck with the old-style 
centralized system which had been in operation since 1976.
The essence of the 1976 system was to enable central government to take 
the bulk of local fiscal revenue, after leaving behind an agreed sum to cover local 
budgetary expenditures and another small fixed amount for the flexible deployment 
of the Shanghai government. Under this system the central government prescribed 
a revenue target for Shanghai, which in 1976 was set as 13.84 billion yuan. The 
Centre also set the fiscal expenditure target of funds to be provided from the 
retained local revenue, as well as detailed prescriptions on expenditure for each
25State Council Notice, February 1, 1980, on approving the "Temporary Regulation on 
Implementing the 'Dividing Revenues and Expenditures, Contracting at Each Levels' Fiscal 
System", printed in State Planning Commission (ed.), Zhongyao Jingji Fagui Ziliu Xuanbian, 1977- 
1986 (A Selected Collection of the Major Economic Regulations) (Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji 
chubanshe, 1987), pp. 629-31.
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policy sector which had been passed down from the relevant central ministries. In 
1976 this expenditure target was set at 1.6 billion yuan. There was also a fixed sum 
of 0.15 billion yuan assigned to Shanghai as additional "retention funds" over and 
above the planned expenditure which could be spent at the discretion of the 
Shanghai Government. The balance of local fiscal revenue went to the central 
coffers. If at the end of the year total budgetary revenue exceeded the prescribed 
revenue target, Shanghai would have additional retention funds amounting to 30% 
of the surplus revenue. If however the prescribed revenue target was not met, 
planned expenditure would be reduced proportionately.26
At face value the system was not entirely unjust to the municipal 
government. Shanghai could in theory retain more with more fiscal revenue 
collected: a full 30% of the portion of revenue exceeding the prescribed target 
would go to the coffers of Shanghai. In practice the target was so high that it was 
very difficult to overachieve. The fact that the revenue target was set every year 
also eliminated the possibility of a substantial surplus. Meanwhile if the target was 
not met, as it has not in 1976, the Centre would accordingly reduce the amount 
alloted for local spending, and thus ensuring that remittances to the Centre would 
not be too much affected. This system put a pressure on the municipal government 
to achieve the target as, in the event of a shortfall, municipal expenditure would be 
cut. The value of central remittance was thus guaranteed. In contrast with the 
contractual system in place in other provinces, which had the effect of fattening the 
local coffers at the expense of the Centre, the system in place in Shanghai until 
1984 was one that ensured that the Centre got the best end of deal.
As a result of this arrangement, only 12% of the total local budgetary 
revenue was retained in Shanghai to cover municipal expenditure during the 1980- 
1984 period. The retention rate in Guangdong was 82%, as the table below shows:
26See Shanghai Jingji Nianjian 1949-1982 (Internal Version), p.892. Shanghai failed to meet the 
revenue target in 1976 by 5.3%, and planned expenditure was decreased by 85 million yuan. The 
fixed retention remained constant at 0.15 billion throughout 1976-1981, and Shanghai got a 
cumulative additional retention of 0.93 billion yuan during 1977-1981 by overachieving the revenue 
targets.
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Table 4.18
Remittance Rates of Fiscal Revenues 
1980-1984
Shanghai Guanedone
Fiscal Revenue 82.3 21.3
Fiscal Expenditure 9.9 17.5
(Billion Yuan)
Remission (%) 88.0 17.8
Source: Shanghai Statistical Yearbook 1993, p.55; Guangdong 1949-1988 
(General), p.74; China Finance Statistics 1950-1985, pp.54,92.
Table 4.18 shows that although the absolute value of Shanghai's fiscal revenue was 
more than four times that of Guangdong, given the much higher central extraction 
rate in Shanghai, the value of revenue spent in the municipality was only just over 
half of that of Guangdong.
1985-1987
From 1981 to 1983, Shanghai's municipal fiscal revenue experienced the 
first ever "slide" since 1949. Municipal budgetary revenue decreased from 17.21 
billion yuan in 1980 to 17.15 billion in 1981, then to 16.51 billion in 1982, and still 
lower to 15,37 billion yuan in 1983, a consecutive slide of -0.3%, -3.76% and 
-6.9% respectively.27 When the slide finally halted in 1984, the value of revenue at 
16.1 billion yuan was still much lower than the level achieved in 1980. The causes 
of the slide are many: rises in industrial production costs not keeping up with rises 
in product prices, the reduction of taxes on enterprises, and also mismanagement in 
both industry and the government which resulted in losses of opportunity and 
increase of wastes and costs.2  ^Whatever the causes are, the unprecedented slide in 
revenue in a place long renowned for its economic efficiency and ability to turn 
over revenue constituted a clear signal to the Centre: that some kind of change was 
necessary. As Shanghai had been complaining about the insufficiency of 
discretionary funds provided in the 1976 fiscal system, the central government
27See Shanghai Statistical Yearbook 1993, p. 55.
2^See Tu Jimo, "An analysis of the fiscal 'slides' in Shanghai" in Shanghai Jihua Jingji Tansuo. 
No.l (1988), pp.47-52 and Shanghai Gongye Nianjian 1989, p.38 for discussion of the two slides in 
1981-1983 and 1986-87 and the causes. A multitude of causes notwithstanding, the ultimate one 
was actually the failure of Shanghai's system, still entrenched in the traditional planning system, to 
adjust to the changed national circumstances. Thus state enterprises were still required to produce 
at a ratewhich was in accordance with mandatory production plans under set, and usually low, 
prices while raw materials increasingly had to be sourced from the market at much higher prices. 
The sustained utilization of the 1976 system until 1984 was a reflection of how Shanghai was stuck 
with the old system while for others the rules of the game had already changed.
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finally agreed to increase Shanghai's local financial resources by means of a new 
system implemented in 1985 29
The 1985 system abolished the previous practice of dividing local retained 
fiscal revenue into various portions for "planned expenditure", "fixed retentions", 
and "additional retentions". Instead Shanghai would get a fixed percentage of the 
total local fiscal revenue which would be used to cover all local expenditure. The 
percentage was fixed at 23.2% in 1985 and would supposedly remain unchanged 
for six years. Shanghai could, therefore, retain a greater amount for local use and 
avoid the lack of security of the previous system, whereby the sum retained locally 
was subject to annual adjustment. Moreover, in order to improve Shanghai's 
financial situation, some 1.5 billion yuan was added to the actual expenditure of 
2.2 billion of 1983, bringing the retention ratio up to 23.2%. As a result the 
amount of fiscal revenue spent in Shanghai increased from 3 billion yuan in 1984 
to 4.6 billion in 1985, a leap of over 50%.30
More importantly, with the new system the central prescriptions on 
spending in each policy sector ceased. Thereafter the Shanghai government could 
control the deployment of the entire amount of local fiscal revenue retained 
locally, rather than only a tiny portion of "flexible money" as before.31 This 
amounted to a substantial enhancement of the autonomy of the municipal 
government, although this autonomy had already been in place in Guangdong and 
other provinces since 1980.32
Therefore by 1985, half a decade after the contractual fiscal system was 
adopted nationally, Shanghai was finally awarded a new fiscal system 
encompassing two important features which promised an enhanced local financial 
autonomy. The first was the sense of security gained from the fixation of the 
remittance percentage for six years. This provided the Shanghai government the 
means whereby it could plan forward something which had not previously been 
possible due to uncertainty regarding available resources the following year. The 
second feature was the enhanced responsibility and autonomy of the municipal 
government as regards decisions on municipal expenditure. With the sectoral
29For a discussion on the process please see Chapter Six: Bargaining for more favourable central 
policies.
3®See Jiang Zemin (ed.), The Ten Years of Economic Reforms in Shanghai (Shanghai: Shanghai 
Renmin chubanshe, 1989), p.114.
^Shanghai Economy Yearbook 1983-1985, p.830.
32Mandatory sectoral control figures on fiscal expenditures were abolished formally in the State 
Council's Notice on the 1980 fiscal system, February 1,1980, See Footnote 25 above.
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control targets gone, the Shanghai government was free to act more like a 
municipal government, and take responsibility for crucial decisions on municipal 
policies and expenses, rather than behaving as the messenger and agent of the 
central government ministries. Moreover the immediate effect of the 1985 fiscal 
regime was the lowering of the remittance rate to 76.8%, down eleven percentage 
points from the 1980-84 figure of 88%.
However, it was later found that the challenge to Shanghai's economy 
required more than a mere adjustment in the fiscal system. In 1986 and 1987 came 
the second "slide" in local budgetary revenue. In 1986 Shanghai's budgetary 
revenue decreased by 3% in absolute value from the level in 1985, and in 1987 
further dropped by another 6.2%.33 State enterprises which had long since been 
adapted to operate under the traditional planning system, whereby low-priced raw 
materials supplied through the allocation system and products were eventually 
purchased by the state, performed badly as state supplies of raw materials dried up 
and new markets for products had to be found. As the absolute amount of revenue 
fell, the original fixed retention percentage arrangement which had been intended 
to allow Shanghai to retain more revenue each year, went seriously awry. 
According to the agreed sharing percentage, local retention in 1986 and 1987 
would be respectively 4.09 billion yuan and 3.51 billion yuan, which was 
respectively 0.52 billion and 1.1 billion less than the amount retained and used 
locally in 1985. Eventually the sharing percentage was not strictly applied in order 
to enable Shanghai to meet necessary local expenditures. But this "funding fiasco", 
however, clearly demonstrated the need for further and more radical change in the 
system.
1988-1993
If the 1985 system was designed to enhance the sense of security within the 
Shanghai government regarding its local retention as well as to raise, albeit 
modestly, the retention share for Shanghai, the basic tenet of the design was 
nevertheless to ensure that remittances to central coffers would increase in line with 
local revenue increases. Since the percentage share was heavily in favour of the 
Centre, it ensured that only a minor portion of new increments of revenue raised 
would go to the municipal government. There would be, in other words, security 
for Shanghai, but the fortune, in the best situation of a rising total revenue, would 
be modest.
33See Shanghai Statistical Yearbook 1993, p.55.
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The 1988 fiscal system negotiated between the Shanghai government and 
the Centre in the midst of the fiscal slide of 1987 effectively reversed the Centre's 
method of exacting fiscal remittance.34 Instead of fixing the portion to be left for 
local use, be it the absolute amount or a percentage share, the 1988 contractual 
system fixed for five years the absolute amount that Shanghai would have to remit 
to the Centre. In other words, as similar to the dabaogan system of Guangdong, 
Shanghai would be able to retain all its revenues upon fulfillment of its obligation 
to the central government.
Under this system Shanghai would remit to the Centre 10.5 billion yuan of 
its local budgetary revenue and retain the rest. The 10.5 billion figure was based 
on the actual performance in 1987, when local budgetary revenue amounted to 16.5 
billion yuan. This sum was taken as the base figure. As actual budgetary 
expenditure in 1987 had been 5.3 billion yuan, so six billion yuan of local 
expenditure was allowed for, thus giving the 10.5 billion remittance figure. The 
system also provided that from 1988 to 1990, Shanghai was to retain all revenue 
surplus to the 10.5 billion remittance. However, as from 1991 Shanghai was to 
share the portion of revenue in excess of 16.5 billion yuan with the Centre on a 
50:50 basis.
The 1988 system was obviously designed as a means to conferring more 
financial resources on Shanghai. From the point of view of Shanghai's officials, the 
new system would make Shanghai's budgetary coffers better off by 1.4 billion yuan 
in 1988 a l o n e . 3 ^  10.5 billion was also substantially less than the amount of 
remittance in the early 1980s.3  ^Its benefits however were on a far smaller scale 
than those of Guangdong's dabaogan system. First, Shanghai's required remittance 
was by far the higher of the two. As seen in Chapter Three, the total cumulative 
remittance from 1980 to 1987 in Guangdong's case amounted to 12.2 billion, an 
amount Shanghai was obliged to remit annually. Although Guangdong was 
required to remit more in later years, for instance with the introduction of a new 
incremental increase factor in 1989 as well as all kinds of irregular arrangements 
such as "loans" to the Centre, its remittance in 1991 at 7 billion yuan was
34For a discussion on the process and considerations at that time, see Chapter Six: Bargaining for 
more favourable central policies.
3^Shanghai Economy Yearbook 1989, p.73.
3^Taking the average remittance rate of 88% as shown in Table 4.18, the average annual remittance 
between 1980 to 1984 would amount to 14.5 billion yuan. In the eyes of central government 
officials, the 1988 system had, therefore, already brought about a fairly significant improvement for 
Shanghai. (Respondent No.29, Beijing interview, April 1994).
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nevertheless only 70% that of Shanghai's. Second, the 50:50 sharing ratio for 
revenue over and above 16.5 billion yuan effective from 1991 was much less 
favourable than the 9% incremental growth of remittance in operation in 
Guangdong. Table 4.19 below shows the remittance rates in Shanghai since 1980:
Table 4.19
Remittance Rates of Local Budgetary Revenues
Year Local Revenue Local Expenditure Remittance Rate
(Billion Yuan) (Billion Yuan) (%)
1980-84 82.3 9.9 88.0
1985-87 52.2 14.8 71.6
1988-92 83.6 37.3 55.4
1980-92 218.1 62.0 71.6
Source: Shanghai Statistical Yearbook 1993, p.55.
Consequences
The above section notes that Shanghai, as the most developed economic 
city prior to 1980, was a relatively late comer to the fiscal decentralization reforms 
of the 1980s. What specific implications did this fact have for Shanghai's 
investment, and in particular, for the behaviour of the Shanghai government 
regarding investment decisions and Shanghai's relationship with the central 
government?
Given the circumstances surrounding the birth of the 1985 and 1988 fiscal 
systems, it might be surmised that Shanghai's late entry into the fiscal reforms and 
the consequently depleted state of its local coffers, would limit the amount the 
Shanghai government could afford to spend on investments. However the 
breakdowns in Table 4.20 below of fiscal expenditures between 1987-1991 shows 
that this is not strictly the case.
Table 4.20
Local Fiscal Investment Expenditures: Share of Total Local Fiscal Expenditure 
Shanghai Guangdong
Year Yuan Mn % Share Yuan Mn % Share
1987 1617 32.2 2053 21.3
1988 2247 34.8 2616 22.7
1989 2291 31.3 2644 18.7
1990 2123 28.1 2964 19.7
1991 2107 20.8 3617 19.8
Total 10385 35.0 13894 20.3
(Total fiscal expenditures: 1987-91: Shanghai, 29.7 billion yuan, Guangdong, 68.6 
billion yuan)
Source: China Finance Statistics, 1950-1991, pp.138,147, 157.
Table 4.20 shows that Shanghai has spent almost as much budgetary 
resources on investment as has Guangdong, despite the fact that Guangdong's total 
local budgetary revenue for the period was more than double that of Shanghai. 
Whilst Shanghai may have experienced financial difficulties, such difficulties did 
not apparently inhibit the municipal government from launching investment 
projects financed from budgetary resources.
It has been noted in Chapter Three that the major significance of the 
dabaogan fiscal system as regards investment in Guangdong does not lie in the 
increased amount of fiscal revenue Guangdong is permitted to retain under the new 
system. The opening up of the domestic economy to the international community 
and ever expanding liberalization policies have made it impossible for the state 
budget, central or local, to foot all the bills of investment. In fact, as Guangdong's 
local revenue grew, the proportion that on investment fell, rather than rose.
It would be helpful here to reiterate the Guangdong case, and to note that 
the impact of the fiscal system on local investment behaviour, as seen in the case of 
Guangdong, is diffused. Bringing about an enhanced sense of security as well as 
autonomy to the provincial government, the fiscal system forms the core of the new 
environment in which the Guangdong government has operated successfully. The 
key features of the new environment are: (1) the provincial government has had a 
clear and focused target and agenda, namely economic development and pioneering 
in reforms; (2) repeated and high-level assurances from the Centre during the 
1980s has reinforced the sense of security and direction first conferred by formal
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arrangements and policies; and (3) there has been a rapid and directed (especially 
during the earlier period) diffusion of such clarity of direction and purpose from the 
provincial government to subprovincial levels and to the community, and that a 
growing self-generating momentum of change and development has developed in 
the society at large. This societal force, in turn, has served to provide the pressure 
and impetus needed for further initiatives within the provincial government. 
Therefore, the dabaogan fiscal system was not the direct cause for the investment 
phenomenon in Guangdong; it was instead the core of the new environment in 
which such growth and changes were possible. That the system allowed the 
province to retain more revenue undoubtedly had effects on investment, but the 
effect was neither direct nor linear. More investment was made possible not 
because the Guangdong government was allowed to retain more fiscal revenue 
locally, thus having more funds to finance investment projects. Investments grew 
immensely in Guangdong because the provincial government felt reasonably 
secure, due to the dabaogan system and other central policy concerns, that most of 
the additional revenue generated from the new projects would remain in the 
province.
The implication of the sluggishness of fiscal reforms in Shanghai is 
likewise not directly related to fear of a tight financial situation resulting from the 
high remittance rate and the resultant tight financial situation. Table 4.20 above 
shows that it would even be wrong to deduce that potential financial difficulty was 
the inhibiting factor in local government investment activity.
The reason is rather that Shanghai leaders have focused more on the day-to- 
day balancing of the local budget than on forward-looking long-term plans for the 
economy. As the extraction rate was high and Shanghai's previous supplies of low- 
priced raw materials and consumer goods from the planning channels dried up, the 
muncipal government was caught up in the double-edged trap of heading to reduce 
the burden of tax on enterprises to enable them to survive on the one hand, and 
having to hand out increasingly large sums of subsidy on the other. The two fiscal 
"slides" of 1981-83 and 1986-88 indicate fully how difficult the financial situation 
really was. The local financial situation was often described as "catering finance", 
meaning that it was so tight that the budget could normally provide for the most 
basic needs only. The most important task for senior officials became therefore the 
routine balancing of the budget books. Attention focused on lobbying the central 
government to increase the local retention rate every year, and on closely confining 
expenses to those of most immediate need. When survival was regarded as the
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paramount issue, there could be no place for long term planning and development 
strategies.37
Therefore the most important consequence of the fiscal system on 
Shanghai's investment was that the fiscal system created an environment which, 
rightly, in practice led the municipal government to care more about the petty 
administration of the account books than about planning the expansion of the 
economy. The horizon of concern was largely restricted to the traditional 
boundaries of the state sector, and the working methods accordingly followed the 
traditional style. Investment remained a high priority of the municipal government. 
Indeed, as Table 4.20 above has shown, the percentage of local fiscal expenditure 
spent on investment was substantially higher in Shanghai than in Guangdong. 
However the municipal budget was too small to satisfy investment requirements. 
Shanghai consequently took the traditional route and turned its attention towards 
the Centre as a means to further investment resources. This explains why the 
percentage share of central investment in Shanghai in the 1980s was so high and, 
given the difficulty in the local finance at that time, Shanghai's reliance on central 
investment was higher in 1980s than during the previous full decade.
Investment Administration
In its capacity as being the largest port of China and until 1986 its top 
ex p o rte r ,3 8 Shanghai has been able to obtain more autonomy in the area of 
investment administration relative to the situation in the area of fiscal finance. The
37Shanghai officials during interviews often stressed the heavy burden of Shanghai and the lack of 
favourable central policy in explaining the lacklustre economic development in the 1980s. When 
asked to mention some examples to illustrate what the municipal government leaders had previously 
done to advance the welfare and interests of Shanghai, the lowering of central extraction resulting 
from several adjustments in the fiscal system was amongst the popular answers. Moreover it is 
revealed that because Shanghai traditionally has been the top contributor to the central coffers, the 
city has been the Centre's top choice to turn to for "additional contributions" in case of difficulties 
within central coffers. Such borrowing became almost a yearly routine in the later years of 1980s. 
An academic summarized the situation in this way: "The most important job of the senior local 
officials has been to try to increase the amount of local retention. Their work would thus comprise 
the following aspects. First, to negotiate the best possible deal at the beginning of a financial year. 
This includes, for the pre-1988 years, trying to raise the expenditure control targets as high as 
possible, whilst keeping the revenue target as low as possible. The former would enable Shanghai 
to have more money retained for local use, and the latter would make it easier to achieve or 
overachieve the target Then during the year and especially towards the end of the year, the job 
mainly involved warding off central "borrowing", or failing that trying to confine it. Finally, local 
officials would try their best to fight for central resources which would serve to compensate for the 
drain on local resources. Therefore if in a year the officials succeed in reducing Shanghai’s burden 
by a few hundred million yuan, or managed to attract central investment projects, they were 
regarded having done service to the best interests of Shanghai." (Respondent No. 16, Shanghai 
interview, January 1994).
3^See Jiefang Ribao February 22,1994, p. 9.
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central government has in fact adopted a more even-handed approach to the 
decentralization of investment administration than it has to the reform in fiscal 
system. In the 1984 decentralization move, a ll  provincial-level governments were 
awarded the power to approve investment projects up to a value of 30 million yuan.
Shanghai was later than Guangdong in having the central ministries' 
mandatory sectoral control figures abolished. It was not until 1983, three years 
after central sectoral control figures of all kinds were abolished in Guangdong, that 
Shanghai was awarded the autonomy to decide on its own fiscal investment 
expenditure.39
As regards project approval authority in November 1985, Shanghai was 
awarded the power to approve domestic investments forming part of a foreign 
investment project of under 30 million yuan. This came later than similar privileges 
came to Guangdong whose power had been enhanced in 1981 and again in 1982 40 
There was then the lift in 1984 when the central government raised the ceiling for 
provincial-level jurisdiction of all domestic investments across the board and in 
March 1987, as noted in Chapter Three, the Centre raised the provincial-level 
jurisdiction nationwide on approving projects in the "bottleneck" sectors to 50 
million yuan. However, Shanghai’s authority had apparently been raised to 50 
million yuan ahead of the national move.41 In 1992, Shanghai was authorized to 
approve Pudong projects under 200 million yuan as a boost to the Pudong area. 
Thereby Shanghai became the third provincial-level government after Guangdong 
and Fujian, to whom such authority had been granted in 1985, to wield such 
power 42
39The Shanghai government specifically asked for such autonomy in a report submitted to the 
central government in March 1983. The State Council approved the report a month later. Shanghai 
could thereafter decide the allocation of local fiscal investment expenditure, subject to the approval 
of specific projects by the relevant levels in accordance with the approval jurisdiction system. 
Shanghai's autonomy in some other areas such as the use of foreign investment and foreign trade 
was also enhanced via that report. See State Council Notice No.55, 1983, "On Approving the 
Proposals on Developing Shanghai's Foreign Economic and Trade' by the Shanghai Government" 
(April 4,1983), printed in State Commission for Economic System Reform (ed.), Jingji Tizhi Gaige 
Wenjian Huibian, 1978-1983 (A Collection of the Documents on Economic System Reform, 1978- 
1983) (Beijing: Zhongguo Caizheng Jingji chubanshe, 1983),pp.605-10.
4^See Chapter Three, Footnotes 41 and 42.
41In a report from the Shanghai Planning Commission released in early 1983, it was stated that the 
municipal Planning Commission would handle the investment application of between 30 million to 
50 million yuan. There was no mention of the designation of industrial sectors; therefore the 50 
million yuan jurisdiction was probably applicable to all projects in all sectors. See Shanghai Jihrn 
Jingji Tansuo, No.2 (1987), p.28.
42See People's Daily March 11,1992, p.l. During interviews in Beijing, January/February 1994, 
Respondent No.31 told the author that all provincial-level governments have in fact been approving 
investment projects under the 200 million yuan ceiling since the second half of 1992 as a result of 
the heightened "atmosphere" for quicker economic development since the southern tour of Deng 
Xiaoping in Janurary-February 1992. Such approval has, however, been without formal
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As the largest economic centre and the historical hub of foreign commercial 
activity, Shanghai has been more successful still in obtaining power for foreign 
investment. In 1983 Shanghai was authorized to approve foreign investment 
projects of up to US$10 million, which was twice the ceiling in Guangzhou 43 in 
October 1984, the Centre enlarged the power of the fourteen open coastal cities as 
regards foreign investment, and Shanghai's power, together with Tianjin's, was 
raised to US$30 million, three times more than the jurisdiction of Guangzhou.44 If 
there was still some lag in investment administration between Shanghai and 
Guangdong, therefore, it was nevertheless minor as compared with the greater 
disparities of the fiscal system.
Having an enlarged power to approve investment projects may be necessary 
but it is not solely sufficient for a take-off in investment activities. For instance, the 
decentralization of investment administration from the Centre is fairly uniform 
nationally, but the performance of different provinces in investment and economic 
development is conspicuously uneven. In the words of an authoritative source in
endorsement from the Centre. Some provincial-levels, including the Beijing Municipality, had 
delegated the authority to approve projects under the 200 million yuan ceiling to the county/district 
level. United Daily (Hong Kong) March 9,1993, reported the similar delegation of such authority 
by the Xiamen city government, Fujian, to some of its counties and districts. The respondent 
revealed that the State Planning Commission had drafted a document with a view to recognizing the 
de facto enlarged power of the provinces in early 1993, but the document was held up in the 
Secretariat of the State Council, and has not since been approved. This indicates that the Centre 
chose an ambivalent and flexible approach towards provinces' self initiative, whilst maintained the 
power to call stop to their activities should situations change. So in the end in this period it was 
only Shanghai that got the formal power to approve projects under the 200 milllion yuan ceiling, 
although all provincial-level governments had in fact been doing likewise. (Guangdong and Fujian 
were awarded the power when the Centre extended the "special policy" for die two provinces in 
1985. See also Chapter Three, Footnote 43.) This suggests two possibilities: first, the central 
government has been uncertain about the proper approval jurisdiction of the provinces, and insecure 
about its ability to recentralize power formally awarded to the provinces. Second is the relatively 
favourite position of Shanghai as opposed to other provinces in 1992 in the considerations of the 
Centre. The fact that formal endorsement was given only to Shanghai reflects the priority 
development status of Shanghai in the strategy of Centre in the 1990s. For documentary evidence 
of the original proposal by the State Planning Commission, see Shanghai Guanli Kexue, 
No.2(1993), p.10. It was reported that during the national economic conference of early 1993, 
proposals were made to extend further the project approval authorities of the provinces. It was 
proposed that the investment ceiling of projects requiring the approval of the State Council be raised 
from 200 million yuan to 1 billion yuan, and provinces' authority to approve foreign investments 
raised to the ceiling of US$50 million.
4^This was the result of a "petition" from Shanghai. See State Council Notice (Circular) No.55 
(1983) April 4, 1983, "On Approving Shanghai's Petition on Developing Shanghai's External 
Business and Trade", printed in State Commission for Economic System Reform (ed.), A Collection 
of the Documents on Economic System Reform, 1978-1983, pp.605-10.
^ S ee  State Council Notice (Circular) No. 138 (1984), October 4,1984, "Temporary Regulations on 
Improving the Planning System", in State Planning Commission (ed.), Jiben Jianshe Guanli Tizhi 
Gaige Wenjian Huibian (A Collection of the Documents on the Capital Construction System 
Reform) (Beijing: Hongqi cbubanshe, 1985), pp. 1-12. It is stated that Guangzhou and Dailan could 
approve foreign investment projects of under US$10 million, while the remaining ten open coastal 
cities could approve up to US$5 million.
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Beijing, "the decentralization of investment authority to the provinces has had 
different effects in different provinces. The inland provinces complain that in any 
event they have little money to spend on investment and development, so enlarged 
powers for investment mean little to them. They were simply too constrained by 
survival matters to utilize fully the powers."45 It is necessary, therefore, to look at 
the substratum on which new policy initiatives were made in order to have a clear 
idea of their effects.
As regards Shanghai, the earlier discussion of the wider environment in 
which the Shanghai government has been operating is relevant. It all originates 
from Shanghai's conferred role as the "eldest son" of the Centre. Officials in 
Shanghai have repeatedly stated that since the economy of Shanghai is much more 
developed than in other parts of the country, its better performance had brought 
about more responsibilities.46 This has resulted in the high extraction rate of local 
revenue by the central government, which, as seen in the previous section, has 
consequently obliged the Shanghai government to focus its attention on survival 
needs rather than on long-term economic development.
In addition to the detrimental effect of the fiscal situation, local scholars and 
officials have condemned the system of administration in Shanghai, and its process 
of approval of investment projects as bureaucratic and inefficient.47 Although 
Shanghai had been awarded increased powers in 1984, along with other open 
coastal cities, the system within the municipality remained highly centralized for 
some years after. For instance it was only in 1987 that the power to approve 
projects was decentralized horizontally to other muncipal departments from the 
municipal Planning Commission. Vertical decentralization to bureaux and counties 
had also been slow, finally gathering momentum as late as in 1988.48
45Respondent No. 31, Beijing interview, February 1994.
46This was mentioned by many respondents in the Shanghai government the author interviewed in 
Shanghai in 1994.
47See for instance Wang Zhang, "The 'Shanghai Phenomenon1 in China's Economic Growth" (Part 
2), Shanghai Gaige, No.5 (1991), pp.14-15, 41. Wang was then a professor at Shanghai's Fuden 
University and later appointed the director of the Shanghai Economic Research Centre—a think 
tank of the municipal government Despite complaints and some subsequent improvement, there 
was indication that as late as 1994, foreign investors were still dissatisfied with the low efficiency 
and uncoordinated policies among different departments of the Shanghai government regarding 
foreign investment See Jiefang Daily February 21,1994, p. 1.
48See Jiang Zemin (ed.), The Ten Years of Economic Reform in Shanghai, p.94; Shanghai 
Economic Yearbook 1989, p.85. Previously there had been modest measures towards 
decentralization, and bureau-level units were awarded the power to approve pojects under 3 million 
yuan in 1984. See the Shanghai Government Notice No. 99, 1984, "Notice on Approving the 
Proposals of the Municipal Planning Commission on Improving the Planning System in Shanghai", 
printed in Shanghaishi Jingji Tizhi Gaige Lingdao Xiaozhu (Shanghai Economic System Reform 
Leading Group) (ed.), Shanghaishi Jingji Tizhi Gaige Wenjian Huibian, Part 2 (A Compendium of
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Consequently Shanghai has been excluded from the 1980s "multiplier 
effects" conferred by the extensive subdelegation of powers to subprovincials in 
Guangdong. The cumulative effect of always having been under close scrutiny of 
the Centre, and the thus internalized expectation of having to set an example for the 
"younger brothers" to follow, has resulted in relatively rule-abiding behaviour 
amongst officials in Shanghai. When compareing the behaviour of officials of 
other provinces, and Guangdong in particular, with that of the latter, Shanghai 
officials are more conservative and cautious. Shanghai officials follow more 
closely the rules and regulations laid down by the Centre and are less inclined than 
counterparts in other provinces to venture into the unspoken grey areas, a practice 
for which Guangdong is famous.49 Consequently, although Shanghai and 
Guangdong have been granted a similar range of power regarding investment 
administration, Shanghai has nevertheless continued to seek the detailed approval, 
screening and, in particular, financing directives of central regulations. It has also 
been disinclined to decentralize the power of the Municipal Planning Commission- 
-simply because there has never been a central document specifically sanctioning 
the authority of provincial-levels to delegate downwards!50
The Shanghai leadership has learned its lesson, albeit slowly. As from 
1988 bureaux, districts and counties were authorized to approve domestic 
investments of a "productive" nature of up to 10 million yuan, and up to 5 million 
yuan for non-productive projects such as hotels and real estate.51 As from 1992 
they could also approve foreign investments of up to US$5 million,52 and in 1993 
this was extended to US$10 million.53 Since 1992 district governments have also
Economic System Reform Documents of Shanghai. Part 2) (Shanghai: Qiye Guanli Xuehui, 1985), 
pp.91-99.
49For more discussion of these characteristics, see Chapter Seven.
50It should be noted that the central government has never issued positive statements concerning 
the subdelegation of authority by the provincial-level to the subprovincials. Normally there would 
be a brief statement at the end of policy documents or regulations when the authority of the 
provincial-level was adjusted vis-a-vis the Centre, saying that the system at subprovincial levels was 
to be designed and decided by the provincial-level governments accordingly. Occasionally when 
the Centre felt that subdelegation had become too extensive it would issue directives voicing its 
disapproval. These were, however, vague and unspecific. At other times the Centre would simply 
say nothing and acquiesce in whatever the provinces were doing. This reflects the "stratified 
administration" approach of the Chinese government, whereby the central government sets its eye 
mainly at the provincial level, which consequently has quite a free hand in management at 
subprovincial level. As long as things do not go wrong, and, as regards investment matters, as long 
as the local economy is running smoothly and does not create problems for other provinces, the 
Centre does not impose itself at subprovincial level. Under such a system the power of the 
subprovincial levels of government varies substantially according to the choices and initiatives 
taken by the provincial leadership in different provinces.
5^Shanghai Economy Yearbook 1989, p.85.
52Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong) October 2,1992, p.l.
53Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong) March 3,1993, p.l.
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also been authorized to raise loans, foreign and domestic, for urban renewal 
projects, as well as the authority to lease out public land sites to investors.
The rapid growth in investment activity since 1992 made obvious the need 
for extensive delegation to subprovincials, particularly during the early period of 
economic take-off. This was obviously acknowledged by the Shanghai government 
in 1993 when it further enhanced the powers of the districts.54 However, the deep- 
seated and pervasive influence of central monitoring is strong on officials' 
behaviour and attitudes. As an official in Shanghai described the "rule abiding" 
behaviour of Shanghai officials:
" Unlike their counterparts in Guangdong, the bank and auditing personnel 
in Shanghai were, and are, very "conscientious" about their job. That is, 
they are much stricter in applying the rules. Officers in the banks are more 
concerned with the "propriety" of the projects applying for loans, for 
instance: whether the projects are included in the state plans of investment 
and bank finance, and whether the projects' finance are strictly in order. 
Audit officials are most assiduous in their task of locating misdeeds in 
financial management within the units in question. The background of such 
behaviour traces back to the tight financial situation in Shanghai, and to the 
heavy extraction of revenue by the Centre, so that traditionally the banks 
were more vigilant in their lending procedures for fear of missing the 
central remittance target, and auditing personnel were under pressure from 
the municipal leadership to ensure that every cent was duly collected to the 
local fiscal coffers. The resultant situation is in direct contrast to the 
"hands-off approach in the auditing and banking sectors of Guangdong. 
However, such behaviour and attitude cannot be changed within a short 
time."55
If China can be said to be administered by the cross-secting systems of 
"tiao-tiao" and "kuai-kuai", then Shanghai may be characterized as a place wherein 
the "tiao-tiao" has had historically the upper hand within the administration. This 
does not mean, however, that local interests are not important in Shanghai, but that 
the influence of the "tiao-tiao" became so strong that following central regulations 
was regarded as the best and safest policy when safeguarding local interests given 
Shanghai's circumstances. Since, in any event, there could be little room for 
manoeuvre under the high extraction rate and close scrutiny of the Centre, it 
seemed better for Shanghai to exceed the expectations of the Centre and earn the 
reputation of being a "good boy". In local official and nonofficial publications, 
therefore, the high percentage of remittance was traditionally hailed not as a
54The Shanghai Government included in their 1993 Government work report a section on the 
subprovincial level. Because of the increased economic activities in the counties and districts in 
1992 subsequent to the decentralization in 1992, it was proposed that more powers should be 
delegated downwards to keep up the momentum. See Shanghai Economy Yearbook 1993, pp.34, 
41.
55Respondent No.14, Shanghai interview, January 1994.
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burden, but as a positive contribution and thereby fulfilling Shanghai's obligation 
to the country as the "elder brother" 56 Shanghai thus strove for overachievement 
of remittances to the Centre, and was, ostensibly, happier with a higher, rather than 
lower, extraction rate. Rather than attempting to manoeuvre within the tight control 
of the Centre, it had adopted a pragmatic attitude. Following the central rules 
appeared to be the safest course to take, because in the event of any failure to 
accomplish targets assigned from the Centre, the municipal government could 
point out the fact that every prescription and directive had been followed and thus 
enabling it to disclaim responsibility.
Such behavioural pattern has given rise to the conservative manner in which 
the Shanghai government has utilized the new powers conferred by the Centre 
during the 1980s. It took the Shanghai leadership almost a decade to recognise the 
fact that the circumstances within which they had been operating had, in fact, 
changed radically, and, consequently, that their strategy of survival within the 
system also had to change. The state plan was no longer operating as before. 
Shanghai's obedience and responsiveness could, therefore, no longer be rewarded 
by supplies through the administrative system. As the Centre did not have its 
previous leverage over other provinces, Shanghai could no longer rely on the sway 
of the Centre in its dealings with other provinces. In fact being the "good boy" of 
the Centre has made Shanghai a mockery amongst the other provinces, since the 
Centre could no longer "deliver the goodies" as effectively as in the past, yet 
Shanghai was still nevertheless stuck with its own obligations to the Centre. Since 
1988 Shanghai has sought to reduce these obligations, but the city started from a 
high base, and the change of people's behaviour and attitudes is often slow and 
gradual. The effect of past central control, therefore, is an historic legacy for 
Shanghai, which will continue to influence its leadership and personnel, for some 
time to come.
56A standard entry in statistical publications, as well as in articles and books on the economic 
situation of Shanghai, is a list of contributions made by Shanghai to the Centre and nationally. 
Examples are: Shanghai's GNP as a portion of the national GNP, the high remittance of local 
revenue to the national coffers, the percentage of Shanghai’s internal and external trade in the 
national total, etc.
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Chapter Five
Provincial Discretionary Behaviour: Guangdong
In this and the next chapter, the discretionary behaviour of the Guangdong 
and Shanghai governments in the investment arena will be discussed. The purpose 
of this discussion is to show, by explicating the details of provincial discretions, 
how provincial governments interact with the Centre and what strategies they 
undertake to advance their interests to gain more investment and faster economic 
development within the context of central policies.
Defining Provincial Discretionary Behaviour
Before proceeding further it is necessary to define and clarify what is meant 
by "provincial discretionary behaviour". This concept refers to actions and 
inactions taken by the provincial government without the formal endorsement of 
the Centre. The term "formal endorsement" defines written affirmation by the 
Centre of any particular course of action taken by the provincial government 
through the issue of formal Central or State Council documents. But as the 
concluding chapter notes, such "endorsements" are often not clearly defined. Very 
often the behaviour of the Centre has been first to acquiesce, only to criticize or 
give explicit endorsements to the contrary at a later stage. It is arguable that 
acquiescence itself constitutes some kind of de facto endorsement, especially when 
seen from the provincial perspective. However as such "approval" is of an unstable 
and transient nature, it is not in this discussion considered as formal endorsement.
One further clarification is that of the concept of "behaviour" which, as 
used here, refers to behavioural phenomenon only. The institutional causes of 
excessive investment have been discussed in Chapter Two. However, the level of 
motivation and consciousness of provincial leaders in terms of their actions and 
inactions may vary. And since it is difficult if not impossible to study motivation 
scientifically, the approach taken here is to focus on the behaviour itself rather than 
the motives behind it.1 "Discretionary behaviour", therefore, covers behaviour 
which is purposefully taken, as well as that is of a more spontaneous and customary 
nature.
*On the complications of motivations, see Peter Ferdinand, “Interest Groups and Chinese Politics", 
in David S. G. Goodman (ed.), Groups and Politics in the People's Republic of China (Armonk, 
New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1984), pp.18-9. For a brief discussion on this point, see Chapter One, 
footnote 41.
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Studies of Chinese politics in the reform period have noted the prevalence 
of bargaining behaviour amongst the various government actors and, in particular, 
between the central government units and the subnational units of government.2 
Guangdong, in particular, has been famous for its flexible implementation of 
central policies. The so-called "red-light theory" defines the ways in which 
Guangdong has made the best possible use of the ambiguities of many central 
policies as well as the existence of a policy "vaccum" in terms of the 
implementation of policies.3 Bargaining and implementation deviations are, 
therefore, two forms of discretionary behaviour employed by the provincial 
leadership at the appropriate stages of policy formulation.
Bargaining occurs normally during the deliberation stage of a yet-to-be 
formulated policy. Provincial governments aim at gaining an advantage through 
early participation in the formulation of any particular policy. There are two types 
of bargaining in terms of the aspirations of the provincial governments. One type 
may be described as "macro", as its aim is to influence major central policies 
which, in the eyes of the provincial leadership, may affect provincial interests. A 
typical example of "macro" bargaining is that of the bargaining and articulation of 
interests which occurred in April 1979 at the Central Work Conference. The 
bargaining between the central and the Guangdong/Fujian leaders there led 
eventually to the Centre's agreement that Guangdong and Fujian should receive 
preferential treatment, thus significantly enhancing their fiscal and economic 
planning autonomy. Macro bargaining is particularly important for the provinces 
as, if they win, an altogether more favourable policy environment results wherein 
there is more room for manoeuvre. In other words, if it is the Centre who takes the 
lead in being the one to "set the scene," it is the province which, through its
See for instance David M. Lampton, "Chinese Politics: The Bargaining Treadmill”, Issues and 
Studies, Vol.23, No.3 (1987), pp.11-41; Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making 
in China: Leaders, Structure and Processes (New Jersey, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1988). Bargaining is also intense within the central government, especially between the 
commissions endowed with more comprehensive and macro-management functions, such as the 
State Planning Commission and Finance Ministry on the one hand, and various departmental 
ministries on the other. But because the focus of the dissertation is on the interface of the Centre as 
a whole and the provinces, and because such conflicts are on the rise as more power has been taken 
from the ministries and given to the provinces, emphasis is placed on the bargaining between these 
two groups of actors rather than amongst members of each group.
3The "red-light theory" is the summary abstraction of Guangdong's flexible implementation of 
central policies during the reform period. The exact source of such a saying has become obscure 
but it is probably the product of study trips by other provincial governments to Guangdong. The 
theory includes three statements which describe Guangdong's strategy in different circumstances: 
"When you see the green light, go ahead at a running pace; when you see the red light, go around it; 
when there is no light at all, find your own way." See Zhongguo Jinbao, January 13,1989, p. 2.
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successful bargaining activities, '’collaborate*' in this scene-setting in such a way as 
to ensure that it is set to their advantage.
The other type of bargaining, whilst on the surface more mundane, is no 
less important than the first. Provinces normally spend a great deal of effort in this 
type of day-to-day bargaining with the central ministries. This is because, first, 
central policies are generally laid down in vague and flexible terms, so that central 
ministries have a great deal of power of interpretation. Second, central ministries 
control a substantial amount of resources on which provinces depend. Accordingly, 
the bargaining revolves around these two aspects. First, provinces seek to bargain 
for the best deal as regards the routine planning and allocation of resources by the 
various central ministries. Bargaining for a higher control figure of investment and 
for more central investment projects can be classified in this category. Second, 
provinces bargain for a greater say in the design of detailed implementation 
prescriptions of existing central policies. Be it "mundane" or "macro", the purpose 
of bargaining is to get a better deal on existing practices and to obtain more 
concessions from the central government, whether in terms of more resources or 
greater autonomy.
The term "implementation deviations" refers to discretionary behaviour 
during the implementation phase of policies. In other words, after bargaining with 
the Centre for a better policy, and whether or not the bargaining has succeeded, the 
provincial government may still seek to affect the ultimate outcome of the central 
policy through its behaviour during implementation.
Provincial governments may adopt different strategies of implementation 
deviations for different situations. Yang Xiaofei in his study of the Guangdong 
Government describes five types of implementation deviations.4 First is passive 
implementation—a form of feigned compliance. The orders and policies of the 
Centre are superficially followed on the surface. However, through slack follow- 
ups and a laxity of supervision in their implementation, an unequivocal message is 
communicated to the grass-roots enforcers that such policies are not to be taken too 
seriously. Second is locally invented policies, or so-called "native" policies. Where 
there is a policy vaccum in new areas of activity, or where the existing central 
policies have become so outdated and obsolete due to changes in circumstances,
4Yang Xiaofei, Shengji Zhengfu de Zizhu Xingwei; Kaifang Gaige Shiqi de Guangdong Zhengfu 
(Discretionary Behaviour of Provincial-level Governments— the Guangdong Provincial 
Government in the Reform Period) M.Phil Thesis, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1990, pp.61- 
65.
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provincial governments will implement policies of their own making. Third is the 
evasion of central policies. Where provincial governments find certain central 
policies "inconvenient", they may take measures which circumvent such policies 
without explicitly flouting them. This is also expressed in the saying,"going round 
the red light" as part of the "red-light theory". Fourth, provinces may take action 
without asking for prior central approval. Some central government directives 
have included the general, and hence vague, requirement that the Guangdong 
provincial government obtain central approval prior to taking any major initiative 
beyond the parameters of existing central policies. However, the Guangdong 
government has, on many occasions, opted to go ahead without such approval, thus 
avoiding the eventuality of a negative response. Finally, the fifth type of 
implementation deviations is explicit contravention of specific central directives. 
For instance, the Guangdong provincial government has sometimes carried on 
certain investment projects despite specific central orders to stop.
The foregoing definitions of "bargaining" and "implementation deviations" 
clarify the variety of provincial discretionary behaviour. They highlight the fact 
that the provinces have certain means through which to influence both the 
formulation and implemention of central policies. Nevertheless, it should be 
reminded that policy formulation and implementation are different and distinct 
stages in the analytical sense only. In practice, formulation and implementation are 
part of a continuous process through which policies are initially formulated, 
implemented and tried out, before being adjusted and reformulated. Bargaining and 
implementation deviations, being types of discretionary behaviour employed at 
stages of this process, are not, therefore, clear-cut, separate activities on the part of 
the provincial governments. Rather bargaining and implementation deviations 
interact. The provincial government first bargains with the Centre as it "sets the 
scene", within which it makes its own decisions on exactly which directives to 
implement and in what manner. The conditions resulting from such implementation 
deviations subsequently constitute an altered environment in which the provincial 
leadership may again bargain with the Centre on new policies as they arise, or on 
revisions of existing policies. There is therefore no hard-and-fast line between 
policy bargaining and implementation deviations in practice. Consequently, it is 
necessary to bear in mind the dynamic and continuous nature of the whole process 
in the subsequent discussion.
A more viable criterion of classification of provincial discretionary 
behaviour is with regard to their differential degree of dependence from the Centre. 
Provincial discretionary behaviour as discussed in this and the next chapters is
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consequently grouped into the following five general categories. The first is 
bargaining with the Centre for more favourable policies in order that the provincial 
government may obtain more authority and a larger room for manoeuvre regarding 
investment. The second is bargaining with the Centre for more direct central 
support, in the form of injection of central resources, such as budgetary or 
extrabudgetary fiscal resources, bank finance, and larger investment scale quotas. 
The third is flexible implementation of central policies—provinces using feigned 
compliance as the "cover" whilst engaging in various "creative" interpretations of 
central policies in order to attain provincial objectives. The fourth is developing the 
"new horizon" of investment expansion—provincial governments moving beyond 
the state budget and the conventional state sector towards the burgeoning market 
(the non-state sector as well as the "extrabudgetary state enterprises") in their 
pursuit of investment expansion. Finally, the fifth type of discretionary behaviour 
may be described as internationalization—in terms of the provincial effort in 
attracting external resources from beyond the national borders, and in terms of its 
being a new pretext used by the provincial government to demand greater 
autonomy from the Centre.
Of these five categories of discretionary behaviour, there is a general 
progression away from dependence on the Centre from the first to the fifth types. 
The rationale of such a classification is apparent. Some discretionary behaviour is 
conducted with the Centre as the focus of attention, and provincial discretions in 
this respect reflect as much reliance of the provincial government on the Centre as 
its ability to manoeuvre. On the other hand, some other discretionary behaviour by 
the provinces has a more obvious "independence" orientation. An increasing 
occurrence of this latter type of discretionary behaviour indicates that a provincial 
government is getting more "independent" and less dependent on the Centre as 
regards its investment activity.
Figure 5.1 below places these categories of provincial discretions along two 
dimensions. The first is the degree of provincial "independence", or autarchy, vis-a- 
vis dependence on the Centre, as two ideal-type situations along the top axis of the 
figure. Provincial autarchy indicates that discretionary behaviour is done with little 
reference and interactions with the Centre. On the other hand, central dependency 
suggests a situation whereby provincial discretions are largely directed towards the 
lobbying of, and bargaining with central leaders for more favourable policies and 
more central resources. The second dimension is the degree of involvement of the 
local plans and the "market" in the discretionary behaviour, as vis-a-vis central
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plans and policies. Some provincial discretions are directed towards central policies 
and plans, while others are concerned with local plans and the market situation.
Figure 5.1
Provincial Discretions: A Typology
Provincial Autarchy Central Dependency
Central Plans/ 
Policies
-Flexible implementation 
of central policies 
(A)
-Bargaining for more 
favourable central policies 
-Bargaining for direct 
central support (e.g., 
budgetary resources, 
investment scale)
(B)
Provincial Plans/ -Develop "new horizon" -Bargaining for direct
Markets beyond the budget: central support (e.g.,
expansion into the extrabudgetary resources
"market" of central ministries)
-Internationalization (D)
(C)
As Figure 5.1 depicts, the types of discretionary behaviour which have the 
highest degree of provincial "independence" as vis-a-vis dependence on the Centre 
are those in quadrant (C), namely, the behaviour of "developing the new horizon" 
and "internationalization". In quadrant (C) the two dimensions interset to denote 
discretions which are neither engaged with the central government nor concerned 
with central policies and central plans. Both the expansionary behaviour into the 
"market" and the effort towards internationalization are activities largely done by 
provincial governments independently. Moreover, their targets of activity are, 
respectively, the enterprises in the market and the international community. The 
Centre, and its polices, are not the primary focus of these behaviour. Situated at 
the opposite end is discretionary behaviour in quadrant (B), namely, bargaining 
with the Centre for more favourable policies and for more central resources. The 
dependence on the Centre is obvious here. The success of these provincial 
discretionary behaviour relies upon decisions by the Centre regarding, for instance, 
the approval of a favourable policy or the delegation of more generous resources to
197
the province. In between these extremes is behaviour at quadrants (A) and (D). 
Flexible implementation of central policies denotes a kind of provincial 
discretionary behaviour which, albeit concerned with central policies, reflects a 
high degree of provincial independence orientation in terms of feigned compliance 
and "creative" local interpretation of central polices. As an activity it is largely an 
"autarchic" behaviour conducted by provincial governments on their own. 
Meanwhile, in quadrant (D) there are discretions which have the Centre as their 
major focus of concern, but are nevertheless occurring beyond the traditional realm 
of central plans. An example is the attraction of extrabudgetary central investment 
by a provincial government. While such investment constitutes a kind of direct 
central support, these central resources did not come from the central plan. For 
these central resources, the injection of resources took more of the nature of 
commercial investment projects, and central ministries were commensurate with 
"investors" looking for viable investment projects within the country in order to 
obtain profits. To a large extent, provincial governments in these cases acted as if 
they were attracting foreign investors.
Guangdong's Discretionary Behaviour
The Guangdong government since 1978 has engaged in both "centrally 
dependent" and "independence-oriented" discretionary behaviour when seeking to 
increase investment within the province. However, as compared to Shanghai, the 
Guangdong government have undertook more independence-oriented discretions. 
A comparative discussion of the discretionary behaviour of the Guangdong and 
Shanghai governments is undertaken in Chapter Seven. Figure 5.2 below 
summarizes the development of Guangdong's discretionary behaviour since 1978, 
each of the lines representing one of the four quadrants of discretionary behaviour 
in Figure 5.1, and denoting a different level of central dependence.
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Figure 5.2
Trends of Guangdong's Discretionary Behaviour. 1978-1993
Occurrence
Lo
Year1978 1985 1993
The hierarchy of central dependency of the four quadrants of discretionary 
behaviour in Figure 5.1 is, as noted above, from the highest to the lowest, B, D, A, 
C. Figure 5.2 shows that in the reform period 1978-93, Guangdong's discretionary 
behaviour shows an obvious trend of increasing provincial independence and 
decreasing central dependence. This is most markedly indicated by the crossing 
lines of B and C, each representing the more extreme cases of central dependence 
and provincial independence respectively. Meanwhile, the intermediate cases of A 
and D started at a fairly high level in 1978, and show a gradual increase over the 
reform period. The rest of this chapter discusses each category of Guangdong's 
discretionary behaviour in these respective quadrants in detail.
Bargaining For More Favourable Central Policies
The first category of Guangdong's discretionary behaviour is that whose 
aim is to obtain the most favourable policies from the Centre. Although the focus 
of this type of discretionary behaviour reflects the heavy reliance of provincial 
governments on the goodwill of the Centre, it also confirms that provincial 
governments do, in fact, have a substantial amount of influence on central policy­
making. As the focus of this behaviour is on the formulation of central policies, its 
method consists largely of bargaining behaviour.
This section outlines Guangdong's efforts in three major areas, namely, the 
Centre's "Special Policy" on Guangdong, the fiscal system, and the investment
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administration system. Bargaining for the most favourable central policies that 
circumstances allow has always been the major focus of the Guangdong 
government. It has been a very important, if not the most important, type of 
discretionary behaviour, particularly in terms of the earlier years of the reform 
decade. The basic policy framework regarding the economic development of the 
whole southern province and, in particular, the development of investment, was 
formulated in direct relation to these three areas of central policies. The success of 
such bargaining has produced a progressively more favourable environment in 
which to deploy other categories of discretionary behaviour.
Special Policy
The opening up and implementation of reform in Guangdong took off with 
the announcement of the "Special Policy" for Guangdong and Fujian in April 1979. 
The policy, embodied in a State Council Document No.50 in July 1979,5 gave 
Guangdong and Fujian "pioneer" status within the opening up and reform process, 
as well as enlarged provincial autonomy in planning and fiscal aspects, and more 
power to attract foreign investment. The Guangdong and Fujian officials lobbied 
intensively for a preferential policy. At a time following the Third Plenum of 1978 
when the Centre was eager and receptive to new ideas on how to develop the 
economy, they succeeded. The Special Policy is important to Guangdong because it 
formally endorses, as a matter of principle, the legitimacy of future deviations on 
the part of the province from national practice. The only two preconditions are for 
Guangdong, firstly, to justify the merits of such actions in terms of performance in 
economic development and, secondly, to guarantee that the interests of the rest of 
the nation would not be too adversely affected. The wide umbrella of the Special 
Policy also facilitated Guangdong's fight for specific central support and more 
favourable treatment in more specific items.
The Centre was "receptive" to Guangdong's bargaining as the opening and 
development of both Guangdong and Fujian would fulfill an important political 
goal, as well as certain strategic concerns and tactical requirements.6 Guangdong 
and Fujian are, respectively, the neighbouring territories of Hong Kong/Macau, and
The document is printed in full in Guangdong Provincial Party Committee, the Secretariat (ed.), 
Zhongyang Dui Guangdong Gongzuo Zhishi Huibian, 1979-1982 (A Collection of Central 
Government's Instructions to the Work of the Guangdong Provincial Government) (Neibu) (Four 
Volumes, 1979-82, 1983-85, 1986-87, Parts I and II) (hereinafter as Centre's Instructions to 
Guangdong), (1986), pp. 18-40.
^Ezra F. Vogel briefly discussed these political and strategic concerns in Vogel, One Step Ahead in 
China: Guangdong Under Reform (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp.82-83.
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Taiwan. The successful development of the economy of these two provinces could 
have a "demonstration effect" on the residents of these neighbouring areas and this 
encourages national unification in the long run. The many kinship ties between the 
residents of Guangdong and Fujian with residents of Hong Kong/Macau and 
Taiwan could also be integral in the endeavour of these two southern provinces to 
attract the capital and management support of their richer neighbours, as well as to 
utilize their overseas market connection bringing products to the international 
market. This tactical consideration was particularly relevant in 1979 when the 
financial situation of the country was put under strain by negligent production 
during the Cultural Revolution decade 1966-76 and by the "Westem-style Leap 
Forward" in 1977-79. Moreover, in revenue terms, Guangdong and Fujian are 
situated near the southern border of the country and had in past times been 
relatively insignificant contributors to total national revenue. Fujian had always 
been a deficit province requiring net inflow of central fiscal subsidy, and 
Guangdong's remittance to the Centre in 1978 was 1.2 billion yuan, amounting to 
only 2.3% of the total central fiscal expenditure of the year.7 As seen in Chapter 
Three, historically the central government had not invested much in Guangdong. 
The low revenue baseline and marginal contribution of the border provinces to the 
national economy meant that economically little could be lost in the event of any 
failure in this experiment with reform and opening up.
It would appear to be the early awareness and initiative of Guangdong 
provincial officials that has enabled Guangdong to seize the opportunity presented 
by the change in policy at central level in the late 1970s and secure favourable 
treatment. The various strategic considerations of the Centre notwithstanding, it 
was officials from the Guangdong provincial government, not the Centre, who first 
raised the idea of a preferential policy as a means which could enable the province 
to open up to the international market at a faster rate.8 As neighbours of Hong 
Kong and Macau, Guangdong officials were able to move more quickly than their 
counterparts in other provinces in redirecting attention towards economic
7The contracted remittance sum of Guangdong originally agreed in Central Document No.50 (1979) 
at 1.2 billion yuan was based on the actual performance of 1978. Fujian had the Centre agree to 
give it annual subsidy of 100 million yuan by the same document.
^Respondent No.9, Guangzhou Interview, December 1993. This is also supported by documentary 
evidence. The idea of setting up special economic zones first appeared in a Guangdong Party 
Committee meeting in January 1979. See Liu Zhongxiu, Thoughts on Shenzhen by 100 Scholars, 
(Shenzhen: Haitian chubanshe, 1991), p. 162. Ezra F. Vogel stated that Guangdong's leaders and 
those in the central government concerned with Guangdong had been given forewarning of the new 
policy of economic opening and development prior to the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party 
Congress in late 1978 and as a result Guangdong's leaders had had more time to contemplate how 
the new turn in the Centre's attitude might be applied. In the end they came up with the idea of the 
Special Policy for Guangdong. See Vogel, One Step Ahead in China, p.84.
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development after the downfall of the Gang of Four. The Third Plenum of the 
Eleventh Congress of the Party Central Committee gave Guangdong officials a 
clear go-ahead. Serious consideration was promptly given within the provincial 
government to identify specific measures through which an economic take-off 
could take place. A report on Ye Jianying's meeting with Guangdong officials 
confirms the initiatives taken by the two provinces. In a meeting in June 1979, Ye 
told officials in Guangdong that "during the central work conference held in April, 
there were strong calls for decentralization and reforms of the economic 
management system from the two provinces. As a result the Centre has decided to 
let Guangdong and Fujian spearhead reforms."9
After the April conference, in May Guangdong officials worked together 
with the central working team headed by State Councillor Gu Mu and by early June 
1979 had formulated a proposal on how to begin the reforms and speed up the 
opening of Guangdong. In the report the Guangdong provincial government made 
specific requests for a dabaogan fiscal system and for autonomy as regards the 
planning of local investment projects.10 The report was approved just over one 
month later.
Apart from a few specific decisions such as those covering the new fiscal 
system and the retention of foreign exchange reserves, the Special Policy approved 
in 1979 included only general statements as regards the decentralization of 
authority to Guangdong. There was, therefore, a need for certain refinements in 
order that the latitude provided by such nebulosity might be better utilized.
During 1980 and 1981 in various meetings with central government leaders, 
the Guangdong officials complained about the "uncooperative attitude of many 
central government ministries and the difficulty experienced in putting the Special 
Policy into practice. For instance, during a meeting in March 1980, Guangdong's 
leaders told State Councillor Gu Mu that there was a lack of support and 
understanding among some central government ministries regarding the Special
See "Ye Jianying's Speech in Meeting with Guangdong's Party Secretaries at the District, City, 
and County-Levels, June 1979", Centre’s Instructions to Guangdong, 1986-1987, Part U, p.446. 
Ye, one of the first generation leaders of the Chinese Communist Party and a Guangdong native (of 
Mui County), served as the first First Party Secretary and governor of Guangdong after 1949. His 
son, Ye Xuanping, subsequently became governor of Guangdong from 1985 to 1991.
l^See "Report by the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee on Utilizing Guangdong's Favourable 
Conditions, Expanding External Trade, and Speeding up Economic Development", June 6, 1979, 
This was approved by the Centre via State Council Notice No. 50 (1979), July 15, 1979. See Ibid.,
(1979-1982), pp. 18-40.
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Policy.11 The complaint was lodged again in September when provincial officials 
in the Central Committee Secretariat reported on Guangdong's work before top 
central leaders, including Hu Yaobang, Wan Li and Gu Mu.12 In another meeting 
held in Guangdong in December 1980, when State Councillor Gu Mu urged 
Guangdong to take the initiative and to propose bills for approval rather than 
relying on the central ministries to take action, the then Provincial Party Secretary 
Ren Zhongyi remarked that "the ministries do make some regulations, but they are 
all negative in content and prohibit necessary action."13
In a meeting on the work of Guangdong, Fujian and the Special Economic 
Zones held in Beijing in May 1981, Guangdong, collaborating with Fujian, 
requested specifically that the central government lay down a few major binding 
principles, such as avoiding the "capitalistic road", and strictly following the four 
basic principles, and to leave the rest to them.14 This request was granted. In the 
minutes of the meeting, as approved by the State Council in July, it was written 
unambiguously that,
"Subject to the following major principles, the meeting agreed that the two 
provinces should be allowed the autonomy to go their own way: (1) abiding 
by the four basic principles; (2 ) following the major policy direction of the 
Party and national unity; (3) obeying the guidance of the state plan; (4) 
completing the tasks handed down from above; and (5) maintaining a united 
front in external matters."15
It would appear that the central government effectively granted residual 
power to the two provinces. In addition, the content of the central government's 
Special Policy for the two provinces were laid down in still more specific terms:
"(1) the two provinces should be more open to the outside world than other 
provinces, including the use of foreign investment and foreign technology 
and management, and the expansion of foreign trade; (2 ) the two provinces 
should practice more "liberalized" domestic policies, such as the 
development of other modes of ownership and the expanded use of various 
economic levers; and (3) the two provinces should have enlarged authority,
11 This is inferred from Gu Mu’s speech on the meeting and from the minutes of meeting. 
Guangdong’s officials at the meeting included the First Party Secretary Xi Zhongxun, Vice- 
governors Lau Tianfu and Wu Nansang. See Ibid., pp. 57,60-71.
l^See Ibid., pp.94-108.
13lbid.,p.l22.
i4Ibid., p. 153.
l 5See Central Committee Document No. 27(1981), July 19,1981, "On Approving the Notes of 
Meeting on the Work of Guangdong, Fujian and the Special Economic Zones", printed in State 
Commission for Economic System Reform (ed.), Jingji Tizhi Gaige Wenjian Huibian, 1978-1983 
(A Collection of Documents on Economic System Reforms, 1978-1983) (Beijing: Zhongguo 
Caizheng Jingji chubanshe, 1983), pp. 558-66.
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including the power to legislate on provincial matters, and more autonomy 
as regards economic, personnel, and enterprise management."16
This was therefore a successful bid on the part of the Guangdong 
government to enrich and refine the vaguely worded Special Policy first announced 
in 1979. For the first time the two provinces were heralded explicitly as 
constituting the experimental base of economic reform. The coverage and policy 
dimensions theoretically applicable to the Special Policy were also explicitly laid 
down. The provincial government obtained as well the central government's pledge 
of "non-intervention" within the five major principles, which indicated the granting 
of a kind of residual power within a federal system of government.
However, Guangdong officials had experienced considerable "struggle" 
with officials from central ministries in their efforts to secure the "non­
intervention" pledge. Success had not come easily. Although the attitude of some 
central leaders, and in this case, Gu Mu in particular, was one of support for 
Guangdong's request for more autonomy, central ministrial officials at working 
level who had direct working relations with Guangdong were often less than 
supportive. Such disparities in attitude were a contributing factor to the minutes of 
the meeting needing to be drafted four times before being eventually approved. 
Guangdong officials also had to join the drafting work in the final round to ensure 
that the pledges they requested and that Gu Mu had endorsed were formally laid 
down. 17
It is true that the concept of residual power was one somewhat alien to 
China's political culture, and announcements in an administrative document did not 
necessarily protect Guangdong from future "encroachments" on its delegated 
autonomy. The five major principles are undoubtedly coined in general terms still 
and open therefore to interpretation. This is possibly the reason why the central 
government saw no harm in approving them. However, despite such remaining 
limitations, the significance of the overall success of this attempt should not be 
underestimated. The Guangdong government has made the Centre specify the 
dimensions and coverage of the policy, and make explicit the "taboo" areas. This 
in itself was a significant improvement on the previously nebulous concept of the
16Ibid.
17See Gu Mu speaking in the work conference of Guangdong, Fujian and the special economic 
zones, May 27, and June 12, 1981, in Centre's Instructions to Guangdong, 1979-1982, pp.158-60. 
The officials responsible for the drafting of the notes were from the central Foreign Trade 
Commission. The earlier three drafts included lots of references of concrete examples of 
Guangdong's "problematic" economic profiteering activities.
204
"Special Policy". On this new footing the Guangdong government improved its 
position for future bargaining with the central government on a specific level, as 
well as in enlarging its room for manoeuvre within and beyond existing central 
policies.
Fiscal System
The dabaogan fiscal system, whereby the Guangdong government was 
required to remit 1 billion yuan per year from 1980 for a fixed period of five years, 
was instrumental to the economic development and investment growth in 
Guangdong, as noted in Chapter Three. This was one of the few specific policies 
requested by Guangdong and obtained from the central government in July 1979, 
and which remained thereafter a focus for "protection and enhancement" by the 
Guangdong provincial government.18
The Reduction of Fiscal Remittance
The amount of fiscal remittance was first set at 1.2 billion yuan in July 
1979, and was supposed to be fixed for the two years, 1980 and 1981. This was 
less time than that requested by the provincial government. In the June 1979 report 
Guangdong did not specify the amount of fiscal remittance but rather requested that 
the amount be fixed for a period of five years.19 Therefore, only three months after 
the passage of the report at a meeting with Gu Mu in September 1979, the 
Guangdong officials had begun to "rattle their case". They pointed out the need for 
additional local expenditure as a result of the price adjustment of agricultural 
products and salary rises, and accordingly asked that the remittance amount be 
lowered. The attitude of the Centre was very supportive, as can be seen from the 
following quote:
"It does not really matter how much you remit to the Centre next year, 
whether it is 1.2 billion or 1 billion yuan. ... The calculation of the 
remittpce amount should not be a serious issue. The figure of 1.2 billion 
yuan is a little arbitrary. If it is not correct, simply do the calculation 
again."20
The other specific preferential policy Guangdong obtained was regarding more favourable 
foreign exchange retention. Other preferential policies such as the delegation of planning authority 
and the enhancement of investment approval authority had been coined in loose and general phrases 
in the 1979 report. See Guangdong Party Committee's Report, June 6,1979, approved via Central 
Committee Document No. 50 (1979), in Centre's Instructions to Guangdong, 1979-1982, p.1840.
19Ibid.
20Gu Mu was talking to Guangdong provincial officials in September 22, 1979. See Ibid., pp.42,
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As a result in May 1980 the amount of fiscal remittance was slashed by 
one-sixth to 1 billion yuan,21 and after a further meeting with central leaders in 
September, the amount was fixed for a period of five years, just as Guangdong had 
originally requested.22 At that time the Centre was obviously more concerned with 
getting reforms off the ground in Guangdong than in extracting revenue. After all, 
the difference in remittance of 0.2  billion yuan represented only 0.18% of the 
national total fiscal revenue in 1980. However, this was nevertheless of significant 
advantage to Guangdong, and it is noteworthy that in this case Guangdong 
succeeded in making the Centre revise an earlier decision before it had even come 
into effect.
Defending the Coverage of the Contract
One area of frequent bargaining within revenue matters over the years 
between the Centre and Guangdong has been the effect of the ongoing reform 
measures on the revenue and expenditure of the province. Reforms have brought 
about new sources of revenue as well as expenses. How should such revenue and 
expenditure be allocated? Should they go to the central or the provincial budgets? 
If they are assigned to the provincial budget, should the remittance amount be 
adjusted accordingly ?
Guangdong provincial officials were in the habit of emphasizing the fact 
that Guangdong had shouldered the "burden" of reform during the 1980s, 
Provincial officials from the Provincial Party Committee Secretariat calculated that, 
from 1980 to 1992, reform measures engineered by the Centre had cost the 
provincial government over 13 billion yuan through increase in its expenditure and 
decrease in its revenue.23 From the provincial standpoint the cost of these measures 
should have been shouldered by the central government budget. According to their 
account, the Centre increased de facto the annual remittance from Guangdong by
21See Central Committee Notice No. 41 (1980), May 16, 1980, "On Approving the Notes of the 
Meeting on Guangdong and Fujian", in State Commission for Economic System Reform (ed.), A 
Collection of Documents on Economic System Reforms, 1978-1983, pp.500-4. The meeting was 
held in March 30.
22See "Notes of Dialogue of Central Committee Members when Hearing Briefing by Guangdong 
Officials" September 24, 25, 1980, and "Notes of Meeting of the Central Committee Meeting", 
September 28,1980, in Centre's Instructions to Guangdong, 1979-82, pp.94-112.
23 See Guangdong Provincial Party Committee, the Secretariat (ed.),Guangdong Gaige Kaifang 
Qishi Lu (A Record of Insights of Opening and Reform in Guangdong) (Beijing: Renmin 
chubanshe, 1993), p.59.
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an annual average of 1 billion yuan over the 13 year period since 1980, effectively 
doubling the remittance rate of the earlier years of that period.
Moreover, Guangdong has been made to make additional contributions to 
the Centre exclusive of the arrangements of the "contract". For instance, when the 
central government ran into the red during the late 1980s, as was often the case, the 
"extra-contract" remittances of Guangdong became increasingly hefty, being often 
several times that of the "normal" remittances under the contract. The following 
table sets out the details:
Table 5.1
Guangdong's Fiscal Remittances: "Contract" and "Extra-Contract"
(Billion Yuan)
Year Total Remittances Contract Extra-Contract (% of Totals
Source: Calculated from Dangdai Zhongguo Congshu Bianji Bu (ed.), Dangdai 
Zhongguo de Guangdong (Guangdong in Contemporary China) Vol. 1, (Beijing: 
Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1991), pp.686-87; and Guangdong Provincial Party 
Committee (ed.), A Record of Insights of Opening and Reform in Guangdong, 
p.59.
Available evidence shows that Guangdong has resisted this imposed 
"obligation", and has, at times, won concessions from the Centre. During a 
meeting in the Central Committee Secretariat in 1982, Guangdong officials 
together with Fujian officials complained of the burden imposed by central 
borrowing and the reduction in local revenue levels.24 They made remarks such as 
"the Centre gets the increases in revenue, the province shoulders all increases in 
expenditure; we can hardly continue under this type of contractual system". Some 
even said, "Now we know how good the traditional system is of 'eating from the 
same pot'". As a result, central leaders agreed at the meeting that from then on the 
provinces could retain all extra sources of revenue arising from reform whilst, at
24See "Report for the Central Committee Meeting: The Implementation of Special Policy in
Guangdong and Fujian and the Trial Operation of the Special Economic Zones" November 15, 
1982, in Centre's Instructions to Guangdong, 1979-1982, pp.405-6. In 1980, in Central Committee 
Notice No.41 (1980), it was stated that the remittance amount was to be adjusted according to
changes in the local revenue base and at times when the revenue and expenditure situation of the 
provinces was affected substantially by major economic measures taken by the Centre. The 
grievance of provinces was that while extra revenue went to the Centre, the provinces were often 
left to shoulder additional expenditure alone. The pledge that the two provinces could retain extra 
revenues generated from new revenue sources was therefore an improvement
1980-1987
1987
1988-1991
1991
12.197
2.319
19.308
6.985
7.334
0.778
7.044
1.995
4.863
1.541
12.264
4.990
39.87
66.45
63.52
71.44
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the same time, they would shoulder all extra expenditures. The meeting also 
pledged that the Centre would not borrow from the two provinces again, and that 
revenue from the local sale of state bonds would go to the provincial coffers on the 
understanding that the provinces would also be responsible for their repayment. 
Revenue collected from the provinces in the form of "Energy and Transportation 
Fund" would subsequently be used to support investment projects in the 
provinces.25
It is noteworthy that the last item mentioned, the Energy and Transportation 
Construction Fund, had not yet been formally announced at the time of the 
meeting. Since the tax base figure of the Fund is equal to the amount of the extra- 
budgetary funds of local units, and most of the collected revenue was destined for 
the central coffers, this fund was regarded as a typical example of new measures 
cutting into the retained local revenue which so aggrieved the provinces. By 
obtaining a pledge that funds would be allocated back to the provinces, Guangdong 
officials sought to minimize the effect of the measure and to prepare the ground for 
future bargaining with regard to direct central support in the form of central 
investment projects.
The province again succeeded in reducing remittance in 1985, when the 
dabaogan system was renewed for another five years. Guangdong succeeded in 
lowering its remittance amount from 1 billion yuan to 0.778 billion by arguing that 
a number of local enterprises had been made central enterprises and the revenue 
base of the provincial government was thus adversely affected. This arrangement 
lasted for three years from 1985 to 1987, and was terminated in 1988 when the 
fixed sum contract system was changed to an incremental adjustment contract.26
25The Energy and Transportation Construction Fund was a new tax announced in December 1982. 
The fund is imposed on the extrabudgetary funds of all units and local governments with a tax rate 
of 10%. All revenue collected within the prescribed quota was to go the central coffers. The 
provincial and lower-level governments could keep all revenues collected above the quotas for 
local use, and as from 1985, 70%. See "The Collection Rules of the State Energy and 
Transportation Construction Fund", announced by the State Council on December 15, 1982, printed 
in State Planning Commission (ed.), Zhongyao Jingji Fagui Ziliu Xuanbian, 1977-1986 (A Selected 
Collection of the Major Economic Regulations) (Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji chubanshe, 1987), 
pp.664-66. The pledge of no more borrowings was, of course, not followed through, as 
demonstrated by the increased amount of "extra-contract" remittance as shown in Table 5.1.
26*See Dangdai Zhongguo Congshu Bianji Bu (ed.), Guangdong in Contemporary China, Vol.l, 
p.687.
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Saving the Contract
The most important discretionary behaviour in relation to the fiscal system 
following the establishment of the dabaogan system was that employed in the 
effort to save this system in 1987-88, and again in 1993, when there were growing 
signs that the central government intended replacing it with a "tax-sharing" system. 
In 1988 Guangdong succeeded in its "rescue" attempt. By proposing an annual 
incremental increase of 9% to the original fixed lump-sum remittance, the 
Guangdong government alleviated the Centre's concern that Guangdong might 
have retained too much for itself. When, in 1993, retaining the system was found 
to be impossible, the focus changed to that of safeguarding the local interests 
associated with the system.
The Incremental Dabaogan: 1987-88
Guangdong's lump-sum dabaogan system, first established in 1980, was 
extended for another five years in 1985. In anticipation of its expiry in 1989, the 
Guangdong Provincial Government again started its lobbying early in 1987, In 
recent years there had been increasing pressure from the central government to 
raise Guangdong’s remittances to the Centre over and above the contracted 
remittance amount. Table 5.1 above shows that in 1987, Guangdong remitted a 
total of 2.3 billion yuan, more than triple that of the contracted remittance. 
Difficulties within the central budget and growing disparities in wealth between 
Guangdong and the inland provinces made Guangdong's position increasingly 
vulnerable, given the still very dominant belief in equalization of wealth. The idea 
of a tax-sharing system, whereby different levels of government had as their source 
of revenue different taxes and the discussion of which had first occurred in 1984- 
85, was picked up once again in 1987-88. Guangdong did, therefore, have good 
grounds for concern over the fate of the dabaogan system.
In October 1987, around the time of the convening of the Thirteenth Party 
Congress, the Guangdong provincial leadership submitted a report to the Party 
Centre and the State Council lobbying for more autonomy.27 The tone of the report 
was forward-looking and progressive, rather than defensive and inward-looking. It 
detailed the strong development in foreign investment which had occurred earlier 
that year. The report described the international background to such a warming in
^Guangdong Provincial Party Committee and Provincial Government, "Proposals on Fully 
Utilizing the Current Opportunities to Speed up Economic Development" October 12, 1987, in 
Centre's Instructions to Guangdong, 1986-1987, Part n, pp.370-75.
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investment, arguing that it signalled the beginning of a new era of development 
and represented a golden opportunity for Guangdong and China. Consequently, the 
Centre should delegate further autonomy to Guangdong so that the province might 
better grasp this opportunity, and hence advance further the nation’s quest for 
development and modernization. It was only at the end of the report that the 
demand for an extension of the fiscal contractual system was made. The message 
seemed to be: as more autonomy is needed to enable us better to serve our 
designated role for the nation, how can there be any question of doing away with 
existing autonomy (on the fiscal system)?
The lobbying worked. Fourteen days after the report had been submitted, 
Zhao Ziyang, Li Peng and other central leaders received Guangdong's provincial 
leaders, who were at that time attending the Thirteenth Party Congress in Beijing. 
Zhao talked about making Guangdong an experimental site for comprehensive 
reforms, allowing, in principle, the provincial government to launch reform 
experiments on all fronts.28 As regards the fiscal system, Zhao guaranteed that the 
tax-sharing system would not be implemented in Guangdong.29 This was of 
significant meaning to Guangdong as otherwise its favourable dabaogan system 
would end and more revenue would inevitably go to the central budget. Instead, 
Zhao indicated that the "sharing-the-total" system could be considered for 
application to Guangdong.
At this point Guangdong's purpose had been only half-way achieved. It had 
obtained Zhao's promise regarding the tax-sharing system, but the "sharing-the- 
total" system was not the best alternative, given the experience of the three 
provincial-level municipalities, namely, Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai, which 
operated under such a system until 1988. However, the Guangdong leadership 
finally got its way when the formal response of the central government to its report 
requested that Guangdong and the Finance Ministry work together to produce a 
specific proposal on the fiscal system.30
28 "Zhao Ziyang Discusses Guangdong Becoming the Experimental Zone for Comprehensive 
Reform" October 26,1987, in Ibid., pp. 384-86.
29At that time the Centre had not yet arrived at a mature view of the tax-sharing system. But when 
the system was finally implemented in 1994, the target of the Centre was to centralize 60% of the 
total national fiscal revenue to the central budget, before some portion of the revenue was redirected 
to the provincial-level as transfer payments. See State Council Notice No.85 (1993) December 15, 
1993, "State Council's Decision on Implementing the Tax-sharing Fiscal Management System", 
printed in Caizheng, No.2 (1994), pp. 18-20.
30"CentraI Finance and Economy Leading Group on Guangdong's October 12 Report", October 27, 
1987, in Centre's Instructions to Guangdong, 1986-1987, Part H, pp.387-91.
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A report was promptly submitted by the Guangdong government in January 
1988. As regards the fiscal system, instead of proposing something along the lines 
of the "sharing-the-total" system, the Guangdong government proposed a 
modification of the original contractual system. It, moreover, proposed that the 
expiry date of the original lump-sum system be moved forward for two years from 
the end of 1989 to the end of 1987. From 1988 onwards the annual remittance 
amount would no longer be a fixed lump sum, but rather increase by a fixed 
percentage over the the remittance amount of the previous year. The incremental 
rate for 1988-91 was to be fixed at 9%. The report also proposed to set the base 
line figure for the calculation of the 1988 remittance figure at 1.414 billion yuan, 
which was the total fiscal remittance (including "extra-contract borrowing") for 
1987.31 The incremental rate after 1991 could be subject to change.32
The strategy was to surrender part of the revenue voluntarily in order to 
retain more. The Guangdong government undertook a three-pronged initiative to 
impress the Centre that Guangdong had no intention of jealously hoarding local 
revenue at the expense of central revenue, thus preempting central moves which 
may prove more disadvantegeous to Guangdong. The three proposals are: (1) to cut 
short the existing lump-sum arrangement for two years; (2 ) to voluntarily increase 
its future annual remittance amount by a fixed incremental rate; and (3) to raise the 
level of base-line figure for the first year of the new system to include "extra- 
contract" remittance, effectively increasing the level of its annual contractual 
remittance amount in future. The strategy worked, and in February 1988, 
Guangdong's report was approved by the State Council. As will be noted later in 
this chapter, many of the other areas of enhanced powers granted at this time were 
later recentralized in practice during the 1989-91 retrenchment. The agreement on 
the dabaogan fiscal system however remained intact.33
The contracted.remittance in 1987 was 778 million yuan, and the Centre "borrowed" an extra 
amount of 635 million yuan that year. The two sums together became the 1.414 billion new base­
line figure for the calculation of the new contracted remittance for 1988, which was 1.54 billion 
yuan. See Huang Haichao et al„ The Realization of Dreams. Guangdong Advancing to Market 
Economy. (Guangzhou: South China University of Technology Press, 1993), p.31.
32Guangdong Provincial Government, "Proposals on Deepening Guangdong's Reforms, Expanding 
the Opening to the World, and Speeding up Economic Development" January 7,1988, in Centre’s 
Instructions to Guangdong, 1986-1987, Part n, pp.427-41. According to Respondent No.6, 
Guangzhou Interview, September 1993, eventually the 9% rate was retained for 1992 and 1993 in 
later negotiations. See also Chapter Three.
8See Ibid., p.426, for the State Council Notice, February 2,1988, approving Guangdong's January 
1988 Report in principle. See Yang Xiaofei, "Discretionary Behaviour of the Provincial-Level 
Government", pp. 43-45, for a discussion of the Guangdong Jaunuary report and the subsequent 
lapse of many of the approved powers, in investment, bank finance, pricing, etc.
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Guangdong succeeded in saving and retaining the dabaogan system, albeit 
with some concession, due to developments in the national scene. At that time, the 
tax-sharing system had been little more than a talking point amongst academics and 
researchers rather than a concrete policy with proposals ready for implementation. 
In view of the spectacular developments in Guangdong, it was in the interests of 
most provinces to adopt rather than to scrap the dabaogan system. Even between 
academics and central think tanks, the formulation of the tax-sharing system was 
at that time still at a rudimentary stage. Consequently, in order to encourage the 
provinces to develop the economy, in early 1988 the central government was 
prepared to continue, and in fact, to expand, the application of the dabaogan 
system. In 1987 Shanghai obtained the approval to start the new dabaogan system 
as from 1988. In July 1988, a notice was issued to extend this contractual system 
nationwide, allowing variations in different provinces.34 In an environment such as 
this, it is thus no surprise that the Guangdong government succeeded in its 
lobbying effort.
1993: Guarding and Maximizing Vested Interest
By the second half of 1993, when the Centre's intention to implement the 
tax-sharing system was clear and imminent,35 the preference for the dabaogan 
system amongst Guangdong officials was nevertheless unambiguous. Planning and 
finance officials interviewed in summer and autumn 1993 freely admitted to the 
author that they would like to keep the system which had bom such abundant fruit 
for the past fourteen years.36 Even after the formal announcement of adoption of 
the new tax-sharing system in December 1993, many had not lost the hope that the
34The document on the new regime is found in 1988 Nian Caizheng Zhidu Xuanbian. 1989, pp. 104- 
8. From 1988 the whole nation was therefore practising some kind of dabaogan system. There 
were six major variations of contract For details see Xu Yi and Xiang Jingquan (eds.), 1986-1990: 
Diqige Wunian Jihua Shiqi de Guojia Caizheng (State Finance during the Seventh Five-Year Plan 
Period) (Beijing: Zhongguo Caizheng Jingji chubanshe, 1993), pp.74-77.
3 5 According to an internal report from the Finance Ministry, it was at the conclusion of the 
Fourteenth Party Congress in late 1992 that the tax-sharing system progressed from being only a 
concept and a discussion topic amongst the academics and government think tanks to a formidable 
policy proposal on the government agenda. The Finance Ministry started to work out the specifics 
of a tax-sharing system in May 1993. In July, the new system was presented for discussion at the 
National Finance Work Conference for the first time. After further revisions in August, the reform 
plan was presented to and approved by the State Council and the Politburo of the Party at end 
August/early September. A further meeting with the provincial finance department officials was 
held in late October/early November to solicit further opinions and to check the budgetary figures of 
the provinces for the preliminary calculation of the central transfers in 1994. See "Guanyu 
Fenshuizhi Caizheng Tizhi Ruogan Wenti de Shuoming", by the assistant of the Finance Minister 
compiled from working papers of the national finance work conferences, printed in State Audit 
Commission, Finance Audit Bureau (ed.), Caishui Tizhi Gaige Xueshi Ziliu (Study Materials on 
Taxation and Fiscal Reforms) (Neibu, 1994), pp.99-109.
■^^Respondents Nos. 6 and 9, Guangzhou interviews, May and September 1993.
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old system might be retained in some form. A number of authoritative provincial 
government advisers suggested in local conferences and openly published articles 
that Guangdong should continue the dabaogan system at subprovincial level.37
As it was obvious that the Centre was determined to go ahead, the focus of 
the provincial leadership became that of safeguarding Guangdong's vested interests 
under the new system. A provincial official revealed that the Centre had originally 
intended to use the 1992 figure as the base line, but as a result of intense lobbying 
by Guangdong officials in September 1993, at the time of Vice-Premier Zhu 
Rongji's visit to Guangdong, the Centre agreed to use 1993 as the base line year. 
When formally announcing the new fiscal system in December 1993, the central 
government could therefore assure the provinces that since their accumulated 
vested interests under the old system would be calculated as of 1993, their 
provincial coffers would not therefore be adversely affected under the new 
system.38 Since the economy had grown rapidly during 1993, with government 
revenue swelling accordingly, the change of the base-line year from 1992 to 1993 
would enable the provinces to retain more revenue under the new fiscal system.39
Fixing the base year at 1993 also allowed the provinces to make full use of 
the remaining three months of 1993 in which to boost the base figures. After Zhu's 
visit in September, fiscal revenue collected in Guangdong during the fourth quarter 
of 1993 increased spectacularly, accounting for 37% of the total revenue of that 
year. Table 5.2 shows the rise:
37Opinions of this sort appeared in several articles on the tax-sharing system system in the 
Guangdong Finance, No.l (1994), which is a publication of the Guangdong Finance Bureau. The 
articles include, Zeng Zhiwen, "A collection of views on the tax-sharing system1', pp.8-9, which is a 
summary of views emanating from a seminar in Guangdong; Wang Guanjiu, "An alternative view 
on the tax-sharing system", pp.10-13, which is an explicit defense of the advantages of the 
dabaogan system; and Zeng Xiaohong, "Thinking and woirying about the tax-sharing system", 
pp. 18-19. For suggestions regarding continuing the practice of the old system at subprovincial 
levels, see p.9.
3^See State Council Notice No, 85 (1993) December 15, 1993, "State Council's Decision on 
Implementing the Tax-sharing Fiscal Management System", printed in Caizheng 1994, No. 2:18- 
20. This means that even though, in accordance with the allocation of fiscal revenue under the new 
system, the Centre would get about 60% of total fiscal revenue, a substantial part of that revenue 
would be transfered back to the provincial coffers in a lump-sum. The purpose was to ensure that 
the amount of fiscal revenue that the provinces would retain and use at their discretion in 1994 
would be at least equal to the amount they had retained in 1993 under the contractual fiscal system.
39Respondent No.9, Guangzhou interview, December 1993. The lobbying took place during Zhu 
Rongji's tour to the coastal provinces in September 1993. The purpose of Zhu's tour, which included 
Guangdong, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Jiangsu and Hainan, was to discuss the Centre's plan to implement 
the new system with the provincial leadership and get their support. According to the respondent, 
Guangdong provincial officials told Zhu that given Guangdong's rapid economic development in 
1993, the enthusiasm of the grassroots officials to develop the economy would be seriously
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Table 5.2
Guangdong's Fiscal Revenue 1993 (100 million yuan')
Month Revenue % Increase over Same Month 1992
Jan. 18.7 14.2
Feb. 21.7 39.2
Mar. 24.0 36.8
Apr. 25.4 27.3
May 23.9 34.6
June 24.8 26.6
July 26.2 38.3
Aug. 24.9 46.1
Sep. 27.3 63.3
Oct. 35.6 70.6
Nov. 35.5 105.1
Dec. 58.2 145.7
Source: Information from the State Planning Commission.
Table 5.2 shows a spectacular surge in fiscal revenue collected after 
September 1993. The chase for more revenue in order to boost the base line was, 
in fact, a nationwide phenomenon, but Guangdong was obviously among the more 
"aggressive" provinces. Despite issue of a notice by the central government in 
November 15th criticising and banning such behaviour on the part of provincial 
governments,40 Guangdong's revenue continued nevertheless to surge and by an 
even larger percentage by December 41
Guangdong officials could obviously see that this was their last chance to 
enhance, at a relatively low risk, Guangdong's interests and to reduce its potential 
loss under the impending change of fiscal system. In other words, Guangdong 
would have much to gain and little to lose by engaging in such behaviour. One of 
the motivations for the Centre's determination to implement the new system was 
that of centralizing more fiscal revenues at central level, and of narrowing the
dampened if the lower figure of 1992 was used as the base line to calculate Guangdong's retained 
revenue in 1994.
4^In mid-November the State Council issued a severly worded notice warning against provincial 
government moves to boost the revenue base line via irregular means. Three types of irregular 
moves were identified: (1) collecting "prepayments": revenues not yet realized being taxed in 
advance; advancing the payment dates of taxes accrued, etc; (2) collecting bad debt taxes by 
requiring the enterprises concerned to take out bank loans or borrow fiscal funds from the finance 
department in order to pay the taxes; (The provincial governments allegedly volunteered to lend the 
money and also instructed the local banks to do so) (3) delaying the normal refund of taxes to 
exporting enterprises, or reducing the amount refunded, thereby increasing the total fiscal revenue 
for the year. See "State Council's Notice on Issues relating to the Implementation of the Tax- 
sharing System" November 15,1993, printed in State Audit Commission (ed.), Study Materials on 
Taxation and Fiscal Reform, pp.20-22.
4 ^Respondent N o .ll, Guangzhou interview, December 1993, confirmed that there had been 
revenue-scrambling behaviour in Guangdong in the fourth quarter of 1993.
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widening gap in fiscal strength between different provincial jurisdictions.42 As 
Guangdong had been the largest benefactor under the dabaogan system it therefore 
stood to lose the most. Enlarging the base line was thus its last chance to cash in on 
benefits accrued from the old system and to reduce its loss under the new. This is 
the reason why during Zhu Rongji’s tour of September 1993 the Guangdong 
provincial officials focused their lobbying on the determination of base year.
On the other hand, the risk of being penalized by the Centre was low. First, 
although Guangdong would benefit most from manoeuvring the base line, the other 
provinces would also benefit from such behaviour. The design of the new system is 
to protect the vested interests of all provinces. Consequently poor provinces also 
stood to gain from an inflated base line. Guangdong was not, therefore, alone in 
this rush for a higher base line, and as long as everyone was in the game, the risk of 
central repercussions on any particular individual became much lower.
The risk was also low due to the unclear boundaries between "irregular" 
revenue collection and "effective" collection. It is somewhat ironic that provincial 
governments were criticized for collecting too much revenue in the fourth quarter 
of 1993, when in the past they had been blamed for collecting too little. Since it 
was not easy for the central government categorically to establish their 
"hypothesis" (i.e., that the surge in fiscal revenue in the fourth quarter was due to 
provincial governments' discretionary behaviour as a means to boost the base year 
revenue), provincial governments could justify the surge by putting it down to 
faster economic growth and more effective and efficient tax collection. 43
42In an article explicating the tax-sharing system the Deputy Minister of Finance Ministry made it 
clear that increasing the proportion of fiscal revenue in the central government was one of the four 
major reasons for the new system. The other three purposes were: (1) to stabilize the revenue 
sources of the central and provincial governments, minimize the "haemorrphage" of fiscal revenue; 
(2) to reduce the arbitrariness of the distribution of fiscal revenue amongst different levels of the 
government, and enhance the role of the fiscal system in the allocation of resources across the 
country; (3) to facilitate the conversion of government functions and powers, to contribute to a 
unified national market and to optimize on resource allocation. See Xiang Huaizheng, "Tax-sharing 
System Is a Major Item of the Tax and Fiscal Reform", Qiushi, No.2 (1994), pp.32-36.
43Guangdong officials confirmed that as long as the provincial government acted discreetly, it was 
difficult for the Centre to prove that they had done wrong. Revenue collection was after all the duty 
of the government. (Respondent N o .ll, Guangzhou interview, December 1993). In the official 
report on Guangdong's 1993 budget implementation and the 1994 budget, of February 19,1994, the 
Director of Guangdong's Finance Bureau cited both objective and subjective reasons in accounting 
for the overachievement of fiscal revenue. They included: robust economic performance, policy 
factors (the rise of business tax for retail transactions by two percentage points, inflationary effects, 
etc.), improved implementation of central orders to stop new tax exemption and reduction in the 
second half of the year, and the adherence to central regulations on plugging the "holes" in tax 
collection, etc. For the Report see Guangdong Caizheng, No.4 (1994), pp.4-10.
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In the end, the central government had no option but to call for "self- 
restraint" on the part of provincial governments. In January 1994 another urgent 
notice was issued by the State Council in conjunction with the Finance Ministry, 
the State Taxation Bureau and the People's Bank reiterating earlier warnings and 
restating the severity of the issue. Although some provinces were criticized for not 
abiding by the earlier November notice, the notice asked only that provincial 
governments be conscientious in the propriety of their local budget implementation 
figures, that they refund taxes which had been collected ahead of time, and that 
they deduct any "irregular" revenue from the provisional revenue statistics.44 Given 
the substantial interest which Guangdong had in boosting the base line, and the 
ambiguity of the line of irregularity,45 such a weak call for self-restraint could not 
hope to be effective in forestalling the scramble for more revenue.46
This is a classic example of the interactive use of bargaining and 
implementation deviation over a period of time in order to further provincial 
interests. By first bargaining for a base line which was more susceptible to 
manoeuvre, and then making best use of such manoeuvrability, Guangdong was not 
only able to realize a higher base line of retained local revenue, it has also 
improved its bargaining position for future bargaining of provincial and central 
interests at the next stage of the new tax-sharing system.47
44State Council, Finance Ministry, the State Taxation Bureau, People's Bank of China, “Urgent 
notice on clearing and verifying the expenditure and revenue figures of the 1993 budget", January 
20, 1994, printed in State Audit Commission (ed.), Study Materials on Taxation and Fiscal 
Reforms, pp.34-37.
45The ambiguity of the propriety of the actions was illustrated in the report of the Finance Minister 
on the implementation of the 1993 State Budget, March 1994. In the report to the National People's 
Congress, Minister Liu Zhongli analysed the three causes for the substantial over-achievement of 
fiscal revenue as compared to the original estimates. (Total fiscal revenue including foreign and 
domestic debts in 1993 reached 511.48 billion yuan, 113.1% of the original estimates.) Apart from 
fast economic growth and the effect of the macro-economic adjustment in the second half of 1993, 
the third reason was the increased enthusiasm of provincial governments in tightening up revenue 
collection and preventing a haemorrhage of revenue which had resulted from the Centre's adoption 
of the 1993 revenue figure as the base line year for the calculation of central transfers to the 
provinces under the tax-sharing system. The revenue in the fourth quarter consequently saw a large 
increase. The Economic Daily (Beijing) March 12,1994, p. 2. It should be noted that although the 
Minister referred to what the Centre's knowledge of the real reason behind the surge in enthusiasm, 
the action itself was described in fairly neutral terms. It would have been difficult for the Centre to 
punish the provinces for stemming the outflow of revenue when the Centre had for a long time 
urged them so to do.
4^In fact there was a considerable comer of opinion among central government officials that the 
fixing of the base line year at 1993, instead of at 1992, represented yet another concession on the 
part of the central government in face of provincial pressure. They claimed that this had seriously 
undermined the original intention behind implementing the tax-sharing system as a means of 
increasing the share of national revenue in the central coffers, Beijing interview with Respondent 
No. 31, April 1994.
47The arrangement in 1994, in which the vested interests of the provinces under the preexisting 
dabaogan system would be protected, and the sharing of revenue between the central and provincial 
governments would still be largely in accordance with the preexisting arrangement, was intended 
only as a measure through which to "buy over" the support of provincial governments for the new
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Investment Administration
The substantial power of investment administration enjoyed by Guangdong 
came as a result of bargaining for better policies from the Centre as well as from 
the frequent manipulation of implementation discretion. In this section the focus is 
on the former behaviour: that of obtaining a more favourable central policy 
whereby the province could achieve a greater autonomy within investment 
administration.
The Guangdong government focused primarily on two areas in its 
bargaining with the Centre for more investment power, the first being provincial 
project approval authority. In this respect, the quest for a higher ceiling of 
provincial authority was ongoing and relentless. The second area was the desire for 
a larger investment scale, and the ultimate abolition of annual control figures as set 
by the Centre and thus giving Guangdong the autonomy to plan its own investment 
scale. The following sections discuss these two areas of bargaining within the 
domestic and foreign investment scenes respectively.
Domestic Investment
As noted in Chapter Three, the decentralization of investment 
administration powers was a material factor in the rapid growth of investment 
activity in Guangdong. As more and larger investment projects were approved and 
funded within the ambit of the provincial government, the central government had 
less and less influence on the total scale, the allocation direction and content of 
investments.
The development of Guangdong's investment administration authority, and 
the fact that Guangdong had succeeded throughout each wave of national 
decentralization in gaining greater autonomy than other provinces nationwide have 
been described in Chapter Three. This section describes how the Guangdong 
leadership managed to achieve such an edge, and how they proceeded, step by step,
system. The announced intention of the Centre was that the system would gradually be changed to a 
more uniform system whereby a larger share of the national revenue would go to the central coffers. 
Further rounds of bargaining were, therefore, inevitable. The intention was explicit in the State 
Council Notice No. 85 (1993) "State Counci's Decision on Implementing the Tax-sharing Fiscal 
Management System", which announces the implementation of the tax-sharing system. See the 
Notice as printed in Caizheng, No.2 (1994), pp.18-20.
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in their attempt to circumvent central control on the investment scale in 
Guangdong.
Guangdong obtained the authority to approve projects of under 30 million 
yuan, and for investment in heavy industries under 50 million yuan, in 1982. As 
regards its approval authority of the former figure, this was at least two years ahead 
of other provinces nationwide, and the 50 million yuan authority was five years in 
advance. This resulted from persistent lobbying for more investment support from 
the Centre by the provincial leadership.
In the report of June 1979, and thereafter, Guangdong's officials frequently 
impressed on the Centre the urgent need for more investment in the province if it 
was to fulfill its national role as the forerunner in reforms and economic 
development. The last part of the report contained a checklist of projects, mainly 
raw materials, energy and transport projects, for which central investment was 
deemed necessary.48 Strained as it was by the huge financial commitments 
demanded by "foreign leap" projects the Centre was not too forthcoming in 
providing direct investment. However, this cry for central support brought to 
Guangdong a higher level of autonomy in investment administration which the 
central government awarded to Guangdong as compensation for the low level of 
investment funding.
When Gu Mu inspected the work of Guangdong in December 1980, he 
made clear that it would be more pragmatic to expect the Centre to give leeway on 
policy rather than on the financial side. " We (the Centre) will give neither money 
nor materials to Guangdong, but we will formulate specific policies (to let you 
develop on your own)".49 This attitude was formally adopted in the December 24, 
1980 meeting with central leaders chaired by the Party Secretary General Hu 
Yaobang, and attended by Zhao Ziyang, Yao Yilin, Gu Mu, Yang Shangkun as 
well as senior Guangdong and Fujian officials. The minutes of the meeting 
recorded that in view of the central government being pressed for funds in the 
current economic adjustment period (which lasted from 1980 to 1983), it would be 
unable to give much monetary support to Guangdong and Fujian. The two 
provinces were, in fact, required to contribute still more to the central coffers in 
order to ease financial pressure at the Centre. The meeting agreed that in order to 
enable Guangdong and Fujian to continue to develop without central financial
4®See Centre's Instructions to Guangdong, 1979-1982, p.29.
49See "Gu Mu Speaking When Inspecting Work in Zhuhai", December 10,1980, in Ibid., p.l 14.
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support, the approval procedures of investment should be simplified and more 
approval authority decentralized to the provincial level.50
Following this, and as mentioned in Chapter Three in July 1981, 
Guangdong and Fujian were allowed to approve medium-large sized projects, 
whereas other provinces would still require approval at State Planning Commission 
level.
In August 18, 1981, when reporting the work of the provincial government 
to Zhao Ziyang, Guangdong's senior officials again played on Zhao's concern 
regarding energy and transport sectors as a means to raising the ceiling on 
provincial investment authority. Since energy and transport were traditionally the 
responsibility of the central government, Guangdong sought to bargain for more 
investment authority in exchange for agreeing to fund a number of energy and 
transport projects. Therefore when Zhao asked Guangdong to place priority on 
transport and energy when planning local investment projects, Vice-governor Liu 
Tianfu immediatedly requested that the Centre raise the limit on the investment 
scale. Zhao agreed to this request.51
This is the process leading to the one-step-ahead decentralization in 1982. 
The Guangdong leadership succeeded in exploiting central government's concern 
over "bottlenecks" in the energy and transport sectors. Conversely, the central 
government saw no harm in delegating authority thereby facilitating the province to 
invest in areas wherein the Centre found difficulty in sustaining the financial 
commitment singlehandedly. It is interesting to note that enhanced authority was 
not necessarily restricted to the bottleneck sectors, but that a disparity (50 million 
yuan versus 30 million yuan) was built in which reflected the Centre’s preference 
for investment in the energy and transport sectors. This happened, of course, as a 
result of bargaining and compromise between Guangdong and the Centre.
In March 1985 Guangdong's authority was further raised to 200 million 
yuan, a sum equivalent to the authority of the State Planning Commission, as 
described in Chapter Three. This was ostensibly shortlived, as retrenchment set in 
later the same year. However, in October 1987 Guangdong attempted to reclaim 
this "lost authority", and asked for a jurisdiction of 100 million yuan in a petition to
5®See "Central Party Secretariat Approving the Notes of Meeting of the Guangdong and Fujian 
Seminar", January 21,1981, in Ibid., pp.128-31.
51See "Zhao Ziyang Speaking When Receiving the Briefing of the Guangdong Party Committee" 
August 18,1981, in Ibid., pp. 213-14,
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the Centre.52 When the initial response from the central leadership (and most 
particularly, from Zhao Ziyang) sounded positive, the Guangdong leadership raised 
its demand further. In a later report drafted in accordance with instructions from 
Zhao, the Guangdong leadership reverted its demand back to the 200 million yuan 
it had so briefly enjoyed in 1985.53
More importantly, and probably encouraged by the Centre's favourable 
response to its initial "testing of the waters", Guangdong's 1988 report asked for 
the autonomy to determine independently the total investment scale for the 
province, whilst taking into account national guidelines, the financial strength of 
the province and the requirements of the economy. The entire report was approved 
quickly, in principle, by the Centre. However, many of the provisions of the report 
which had been approved failed to materialize, as the national economic situation 
quickly deteriorated during the second half of 1988 and the Centre was keen to 
reestablish its hold on the run-away economy. The 200 million yuan project 
approval authority finally materialized towards 1992 when the national economic 
atmosphere improved, as noted earlier. However, the power independently to set 
the provincial investment scale was never again formally endorsed or practised.
This request to manage the total local investment scale demonstrates the 
extent of Guangdong’s push for ever more autonomy in its domestic investment 
administration. Towards the late 1980s the ceiling of project approval authority 
became so high that the provincial government could plan and approve most, if not 
all, projects as it saw fit. At times when the value of an investment project 
exceeded the provincial jurisdiction and in theory should have required the 
approval of the State Council, the structure of the project could be manipulated 
whereby a large project would be broken down into several related but separate 
projects the separate funding of which fell well within the jurisdiction of the 
provincial government.54 From the point of view of the Centre, the retention of 
control over the total investment scale was the remaining major control instrument 
at its disposal. If materialised in accordance with the February 1988 Report, the
52See "Zhao Ziyang Approving Guangdong's Two Petition Reports", October 6, 1987, in Ibid., 
(1986-1987), Part II, p.374.
53 See "State Council Approving Guangdong's Petition on Further Opening and Speeding up 
Economic Development", February 10,1988, in Ibid., p.438.
54In the situation where a provincial government could approve projects of under 30 million yuan, 
an industrial project of a total investment scale of, for instance, of 40 million yuan could be broken 
down into two projects each of 20 million yuan, so that the provincial government could approve 
the project(s) independently without submitting the project to the State Planning Commission for 
approval. This has been the most extensively used, and successful, method of provincial 
governments to expand their de facto authority on investments vis-a-vis their superiors. 
Respondents Nos. 31, and 35, Beijing interviews, November 1993 and August 1994 respectively.
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replacement of central control figures by provincial-devised control would 
effectively eliminate this last major tool of central control over local investment in 
Guangdong.
This control instrument had, however, for some time been less than 
effective. As noted in Chapter Three the norm throughout the 1980s was for the 
central control figures to be substantially exceeded. As a control instrument 
therefore it was no more than a "tiger without teeth" and depended heavily on the 
voluntary compliance by provincial governments for its effectiveness. During 
times of "crisis", such as during the 1989-91 retrenchment, when the Centre sought 
to tighten control, provinces were more likely to abide by control figures than 
during "normal" years when economic development was the major theme, and the 
central government itself was not overly concerned with the implementation of 
control figures.55 In general, therefore, the relevance of control figures in terms of 
amounts actually invested had receded significantly. In early 1993, for instance, 
the control figures handed down from the State Planning Commission to 
Guangdong were not passed down to the subprovincial levels for implementation 
as they should have been according to central government regulations. The control 
figures were simply filed away at the provincial level.56
Therefore, although since 1988 Guangdong had not again sought to 
materialize the approved autonomy through which to set the local investment scale, 
this should not be interpreted as a sign of weakness on the part of the province. 
The lack of attention to pursue this authority reflects the recognition by the 
provincial leadership of the obsolescence of the investment scale control as a 
control instrument.57 In fact many planning officials at the central government
55The fact that the problem of investment control is a part central and part provincial issue is 
discussed at length in Chapter Two.
^ R e s p o n d e n t  No.9, Guangzhou Interview, September 1993. Early in 1988 it became clear that 
Guangdong's implementation of the central control figures had been half-hearted. In an article on 
Guangdong's investment in 1989, it was revealed that although the Centre had, since 1988, included 
investments by individuals within the non-state sector in the coverage of the investment scale 
control figure, that part of the plan had not been implemented by authorities in Guangdong. The 
control figures of this part of investment simply stayed in the files of Guangdong's planning 
departments. See Sun Jian,"A Report on Guangdong's Efforts to Contain Its Investment Scale", 
China Investment and Construction, No.8 (1989), pp. 17-18. Therefore that which had occurred in 
1993 merely followed on from the practice which had come to light in 1988.
57A senior research official at the Guangdong Provincial Planning Commission wrote in an article 
published in 1992 that it was futile to attempt to contain the total volume (scale) of investment 
activities by administratively setting an overall control figure. He argued that the root of the two 
waves of investment expansion in Guangdong in 1984/1985 and 1988 was the oversupply of bank 
loans at the national level. Since money supply was the jurisdiction of the central government, he 
implied that ultimately the central government was to blame for "overheated" investment activities. 
See Guangdong Provincial Planning Commission Research Institute, "The Plan and the Market in 
the Investment Scene of Guangdong", in State Planning Commission (ed.), Zhongguo Jingji Tiaojie
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would appear also to have recognized this. When the central government reviewed 
the administration system of fixed asset investment in the early 1990s, the 
continued utility of the control figures was cast into serious doubt. In the reform 
proposals of 1994, it was envisaged that the use of the central control figures on 
investment scale would have to be gradually phased out.58
Foreign Investment
Similar developments occurred regarding foreign investment, when the 
Guangdong government demanded progressively more authority to approve foreign 
investments and, eventually, the autonomy to determine the total scale of foreign 
investment, including loans. Moreover, the Guangdong leadership had, at a very 
early stage, started to push for a wider usage of foreign investment, being cognizant 
of the potential use of such an important source of investment funding. The scope 
of use of foreign capital is discussed in a later section of this chapter.
As seen in Chapter Three, Guangzhou's, (and therefore Guangdong's) 
jurisdiction was raised to US$10 million in October 1984. The authority was 
expanded to US$30 million in October 1987. The rise to US$10 million in 1984 
was the result of lobbying by Guangzhou officials with Gu Mu during a briefing 
session in June 1984. Guangzhou's jurisdiction had originally been set at US$5  
million at the time when the city was made one of the fourteen open coastal cities 
in April 1984. However, as Guangzhou, and the Guangdong provincial 
government, had been operating at that level of authority since 1982, Guangdong's 
officials protested at this lack of improvement to Gu Mu, and obtained his 
support.59
de Lilun he Shijian (The Theory and the Practice of Economic Adjustment in China) (Beijing: 
People's University of China Press, 1992), p.72.
5%or a description of the proposed reform measures, see an article by the vice-director of the State 
Planning Commission, Yao Zhenyan, "Build Up an Investment Finance System Commensurate with 
the Socialist Market Economy", China Investment and Construction, No.l (1994), pp.5-10. In an 
interview with an informed source of the Commission, it was revealed that some central officials 
still favoured the retention, if only for a transitional period, of the old system. One type of lingering 
was more psychological: due to the inertia of past practices. The other type saw the continued 
usefulness of administrative controls during the transitional period. Since enterprises were still less 
than independent investors, and the local governments could still lay their hands on investment 
decisions, the existence of administrative controls such as the investment scale control figures could 
still exert some kind of control. Therefore control figures would only be gradually phased out. 
Respondent No.31, Beijing interview, February 1994.
59A senior official of the Guangzhou city government, Li Jianan, made the point that prior to 
Guangzhou being made one of the open coastal cities its authority on foreign investment already 
stood at US$5 million. The open coastal city status appeared, therefore, to mean little to Guangzhou 
in regard to a higher investment authority. Gu Mu commented that they had reason on their side. 
See "Gu Mu's Response on Hearing the Briefing by Guangzhou and Zhangjiang City Officials", 
June 9,1984, in Centre's Instructions to Guangdong, 1983-1985, p.168.
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Guangdong had just cause to protest. According to the original decision on 
the fourteen open coastal cities, Shanghai and Tianjian would have the authority to 
approve foreign investment under the US$30 million ceiling, and Dalian for those 
of under US$10 million. Guangzhou had since 1982 had the authority to approve 
foreign projects under US$5 million as had Shanghai and Tianjian, whilst other 
provincial governments could approve projects of under US$3 million only. 
Guangzhou was, however, grouped together with the other eleven cities with an 
authority of US$ 5 million.60 In other words, all thirteen open coastal cities other 
than Guangzhou had improved their situation and obtained an expanded authority. 
From the point of view of Guangdong officials, if the intention behind the 
establishment of open coastal cities was to encourage faster economic expansion by 
delegating more foreign investment and related authority, then Guangzhou should 
not be restricted in this way. This was probably this logic which prevailed upon 
Gu Mu to respond positively to Guangzhou's petition.
In October 1987, when the central government was preparing to launch 
another wave of reform with the convening of the thirteenth Party Congress, 
Guangdong submitted a petition for further power and autonomy over, amongst 
other things, foreign investment. Although in the end not all the requests of 
Guangdong were approved, the approval authority of the province was nevertheless 
raised to US$30 million whilst for projects in the energy and transport sectors, 
which did not require assistance from the state for materials or foreign exchange, 
Guangdong had total authority regardless of the value of investment.
It is revealing to look in some detail at the back and forth process through 
which Guangdong's leadership bargained for the best possible deal. There were 
four rounds of events in this process, which lasted from October 12, 1987 to 
February 10, 1988.
First, on October 12, 1987, the Guangdong leadership submitted a petition 
report to the Party Centre and State Council. As already noted in the previous 
discussion on the fiscal policy earlier in this chapter, the report was primarily a 
high-sounding policy statement asking for wider powers and more favourable 
policies for Guangdong. As regards foreign investment, the report asked, rather
^ S ee  "Central Committee and State Council's Notice on Approving the Notes of Meeting of the 
Panel Discussion of Some Coastal Cities, April 30,1984", May 4,1984, printed in State Economic 
Comission (ed.), Zhongguo Jingji Guanli Zhengce Faling Xuanbian, July 1983 - June 1984 (A 
Collection of Policies and Regulations on China's Economic Management, July 1983-June 1984) 
(Beijing: Jingji Kexue chubanshe, 1985), p.61.
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aggressively, for the scrapping of the Centre's control over the absolute amount of 
foreign loans which the province could borrow in any one year, and the autonomy 
to devise its scale of foreign loans independently. The report also requested that 
Guangdong be allowed to approve foreign investment projects regardless of their 
investment value as long as 70% of their output were for export.61
The Guangdong government was actually asking for nearly complete 
autonomy to decide on how much foreign investment, including loans, it should 
use, and which specific projects it should approve. The demand for the abolition of 
central control on the total scale of foreign capital was in line with similar requests 
regarding domestic fixed asset investment, as discussed in the previous section. 
This was, however, deemed too radical by the central leadership. Consequently, 
although the response from the Centre on the report was generally positive, the 
extra powers granted regarding foreign investment were very limited compared to 
Guangdong's original demands.
The second event was the central government's response to Guangdong's 
demands. On October 23,1987, the Central Finance and Economy Leading Group 
rejected Guangdong's request for the abolition of central control over the total scale 
of foreign capital used every year. The province would instead continue the 
practice of submitting annual foreign loan plans to the State Planning Commission 
for approval. But Guangdong did not go empty-handed. The ceiling for 1988, 
1989, and 1990 was raised from the original level of around US$300million per 
year, to US$500 million, US$700 million and US$900 million respectively. In 
other words Guangdong more than doubled its quotas of foreign loans for the next 
three years.
Guangdong's request to approve independently export-oriented foreign 
projects regardless of investment value was also turned down. Instead, 
Guangdong's approval authority on foreign investment across the board was raised 
three-fold from the pre-existing US$10 million ceiling to US$30 million.62 The 
rationale of the central government's decision on Guangdong's request was revealed 
in Zhao Ziyang's meeting with Guangdong's senior leaders on October 26, 1987. 
Zhao commented that as the use of foreign capital in Guangdong would affect the 
national balance of foreign exchange reserves, for which the Centre would be
61 See Guangdong Provincial Party Committee and Provincial Government, "Proposals on Fully 
Utilizing the Current Opportunities to Speed up Economic Development” October 12, 1987, in 
Centre's Instructions to Guangdong, 1986-1987, Partn, p.374.
62See "Central Finance and Economy Leading Group on Guangdong's October 12 Report" October 
27,1987, in Ibid., p.388.
224
ultimately responsible, it could not, therefore, relinquish control. However, with 
regard to central control on a total scale, the jurisdiction of Guangdong on specific 
projects could be enhanced.63
However, in comparison with that which Guangdong had originally 
requested, what the central government, via the Central Finance and Economy 
Leading Group, actually agreed to was much less impressive. The meeting with 
Zhao and other central leaders on October 26 therefore gave the Guangdong 
officials a chance to get back some of their "lost lands", the third event in this 
series of development. Consequently, when the decision of the Central Finance 
and Economy Leading Group, arrived on October 23th, was printed out on October 
27th, it included a post-meeting note recording a new directive from the State 
Council in the aftermath of the October 26 meeting between Zhao and 
Guangdong's leaders.64 The addition was that a further policy document would 
have to be drafted on the development strategy and mission of Guangdong and on 
the necessary measures required. This formed the background for another round of 
lobbying for more favourable policies beyond that which had been decided by the 
Central Finance and Economy Leading Group.65
According to the central directive arising from Zhao's meeting with 
Guangdong's leaders, the drafting of the policy document on Guangdong's 
developmental strategy and mission was supposedly "to be co-ordinated by the 
Special Economic Zone Office, State Council, and the State Commission for 
Economic System Reform, with other relevant departments".66 However, it was 
eventually drafted by the Guangdong provincial government alone. The report 
subsequently submitted to the State Council on January 7, 1988 included requests 
for more favourable policies and enlarged jurisdiction in ten policy areas. The 
report was, therefore, an expanded and elaborate version of the October 12 petition. 
More importantly, while taking heed of the Centre's clear objections, for instance 
concerning the abolition of control figures on foreign capital, many other specific 
policy demands transgressed the boundaries already laid down by the Central 
Finance and Economy Leading Group.
^3See "Zhao Ziyang talking about Guangdong becoming the experimental zone for comprehensive 
reform" October 26,1987, in Ibid., p.385.
^Ibid., p.389.
65The Central Finance and Economy Leading Group meeting was chaired by Zhang Jingfu, State 
Councillor, under the general instruction of Zhao. Zhao himself was not directly involved in the 
detailed decisions of the Group. There was therefore still room for manoeuvre for the Guangdong 
leadership.
footnote 64.
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The attitude of the central government towards overall scale control was 
clear and adamant. Zhao himself had made clear to Guangdong officials at the 
October 26 meeting that the Centre would continue to keep control over the total 
scale of foreign loans. However the Centre was more flexible on the issue of 
Guangdong's approval authority of individual foreign investment projects. It was, 
in fact, Zhao that stated in the same meeting that whilst the Centre controlled the 
total scale, Guangdong could be allowed to decide on the specifics.
As a result in the 1988 report the Guangdong leadership included again a 
request for unlimited approval jurisdiction for export-oriented projects. To make 
the request look different from the earlier one which had been rejected by the 
Central Finance and Economy Leading Group, the energy and transport sectors, as 
well as import substitution projects, were added to the list of eligible projects for 
unlimited jurisdiction. In effect, this expanded the coverage of the original request. 
As regards other projects, Guangdong requested a jurisdiction of under US$30 
million— in line with what the Central Leading Group had prescribed.67
The report was approved in February. Thus by testing the waters and 
quickly identifying both "die-hard" and "flexible" areas, the Guangdong leadership 
was able to obtain the best possible policies and to expand its latitude to the 
outermost boundary despite the constraints and "taboos" of the Centre.
Fight For Central Direct Support
The second category of discretionary behaviour with similar proximity to 
and reliance on the Centre is the struggle for central direct support in Guangdong's 
investment. This category differs from that of bargaining for more favourable 
central policies in that it is concerned with getting a direct central injection of 
capital and resources, often under the auspices of the traditional system of 
investment activity, whilst preferential policies can be described as indirect central 
support. Fighting for direct central support has been the traditional behaviour under 
the central planning system, when most resources for investment have come 
directly from the central government and the Centre has been responsible for the 
planning and approval of most investment projects. Although its significance has 
receded greatly in the 1980s relative to earlier decades, this type of behaviour has 
often recurred, and has, as will be shown, played an important part in interaction
67See Guangdong Provincial Govemment,"Proposals on Deepening Guangdong’s Reforms, 
Expanding the Opening to the World, and Speeding up Economic Development" January 7,1988, in
Centre's Instructions to Guangdong, 1986-1987, Part II, pp.431-32.
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with other categories of discretionary behaviour to produce the greatest benefit for 
the province.
Asking for direct central support has been a frequent occurrence in the 
interactions between Guangdong officials and central leaders, particularly in the 
earlier years of opening and reform. As from the very first petition for more 
favourable policies as included in the June 1979 Report, and in practically all 
subsequent encounters with central leaders, the Guangdong leadership has 
persistently reminded the Centre that its past neglect has resulted in Guangdong 
being seriously short of infrastructure and other investment badly needed for the 
success of the reform experiment. The last part of the June 1979 Report, for 
instance, consisted of a checklist of investment projects requiring central support; 
for instance, electricity stations at Shaojiao and Maoming and the double-tracking 
of railroad between Hengyang in Hunan and Guangzhou, etc.68 From 1979 to 1980 
alone Guangdong succeeded in obtaining central endorsement to provide direct 
support, either in the form of direct investment or through the provision of 
materials or favourable financing policies, on the following projects: power stations 
at Shaojiao and Maoming, the double-tracking of Hengyang-Guangzhou railroad, 
power station equipment from Romania, a nuclear power station and the 
construction of power stations in southwest China for transmission of electricity to 
Guangdong.69
The desire for direct central support in investment amongst Guangdong's 
leadership is reflected in the comments of central leaders who were the targets of 
intensive lobbying activities. In the Central Committee meeting on Guangdong's 
work in September 1980, Zhao Ziyang urged Guangdong's senior officials to take a 
longer term view and to devise a long term plan for economic development. "On 
this point Guangdong has to change its attitude too. Do not come to Beijing on 
every minor issue. The Centre has only a limited amount to offer and cannot help 
much. It is more worthwhile to rely on one’s own efforts."70 Gu Mu at the same
68 S e e  "Report by the Guangdong Provincial Party on Utilizing Guangdong's Favourable
Conditions, Expanding External Trade, and Speeding up Economic Development" June 6,1979, in 
Ibid. (1979-1982), p.29.
6°The Shaojiao and Maoming power stations were endorsed after the June 1979 Report. The 
double-tracking of railroad was proposed in the June 1979 Report, and endorsed after a further 
meeting in March 198o, approved via the Central Committee Notice No,41 (1980), May 16, 1980. 
The Romanian equipment was apparently planned well in advance, and the Guangdong officials 
asked for prompt implementation in a meeting with Central Committee members in September 
1980, when they were assured by Gu Mu that Guangdong would not have to pay a cent for the 
equipment. The nuclear power station (completed in Daya Bay in 1994) would be financed by 
Guangdong itself, but only after the Centre had already negotiated favourable terms from the French 
equipment supplier. See Centre's Instructions to Guangdong, 1979-1982, pp. 60-72,96,100,126. 
7®Ibid., p.99.
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forum commented that in his previous two meetings with Guangzhou officials, 
"They were always talking about the need for more funds from the Centre, or 
complaining about their contradictions with their superiors at the provincial 
government; they scarcely talked at all about how to make use of their own 
favourable conditions."71
It should be noted that due to its tight financial situation the central 
government did not materialize all the projects for which Guangdong had won 
central support.72 However, having a pledge entitled Guangdong to bargain for 
other "goodies" as some sort of "compensation" and many favourable policies were 
subsequently obtained in this manner. For instance, the central endorsement for 
using foreign capital on infrastructural development, collecting tolls to finance the 
construction of highways and bridges, and the rise in rail freight fare to finance 
railway developments, all of which had far-reaching significance for investment 
growth in Guangdong, were among the examples 73 Another example was the 
expansion of Guangdong's project approval authority, which allowed Guangdong 
to invest more freely in energy and transport projects, which had traditionally been 
planned and financed by the Centre, as discussed earlier in this chapter. A popular 
statement often used by central leaders in the early 1980s regarding their response 
to provincial lobbying for support was: "ask for money, no, sorry; ask for policies, 
take a few."74 This vividly reflects the situation whereby favourable policies were 
granted as compensation for aborted promises of direct support. The importance of 
this provincial discretionary behaviour of getting more direct central support, 
therefore, has to be understood as extending far beyond its direct effect on the 
amount of direct resources it actually achieved.
Direct central support can take various forms. The most obvious form is 
central investment projects and central participation in central-provincial "joint 
venture" projects. The amount of central fund injection is difficult to ascertain,
71lbid„ p.105.
72The "softness", or unreliability, of central pledges of support was revealed in this comment of 
Zhao Ziyang made in August 1981, the mid-point of the 1980-82 economic adjustment,"... the 
several power stations already mentioned (in the July 1979 Central Committee Document approving 
Guangdong’s June 1979 Report on the Special Policy) could be undertaken by the Centre, but there 
is always a precondition to this undertaking. Given the current national economic situation, we can 
only talk about to what extent the Centre will be responsible for these projects." See Centre's 
Instructions to Guangdong, 1979-1982, p.214.
73Ibid., pp. 47,51,64,214.
74Gu Mu uttered this phrase frequently in his conversations and meetings with Guangdong 
officials. See for instance Ibid., p.l 14 (December 1980), p.385 (September 1982).
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given the lack of statistical information of central investment by province.75 In an 
article by officials from the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee Secretariat, the 
cumulative central investment in Guangdong’s electricity, roads and bridges, and 
telecommunications sectors amounted to 0.58 billion yuan, only 2.2% of the total 
investment actually carried out in these sectors in Guangdong.76 However, this 
refers only to central investment within the state plan. Alongside this there was 
another group of central investment activity by the various central ministries in 
Guangdong which was not within the investment plan of the State Planning 
Commission, the so-called "outside plan” projects. And as the economy of 
Guangdong developed the province became a still stronger magnet of investment.77 
A gross estimation by a Guangdong source put the share of central investment by 
source of capital in the total societal investment from 1980 to 1991 at 15%.78 How 
this percentage was arrived at, however, was nowhere elaborated and so remained 
unclear 79
Table 3.11 of Chapter Three gives the percentage of central and local 
investment by administration subordination in Guangdong. This could serve as a 
rough estimate of the amount of direct central support Guangdong has succeeded in 
attracting. The percentage of central investment by subordination from 1984 to 
1992 was about 18%, and Table 3,13 of Chapter Three shows that Guangdong has 
invested a not insignificant amount in central projects, probably as a result of 
bargaining with the central government to "fish” for central investment.
"Mutual fishing" was the strategy taken by both the central and provincial 
governments as a means of attracting the capital of the other party to projects in 
one's own interests. For the provinces seeking to attract large-scale central
75There is no readily available information on this aspect as central investment projects or central- 
local joint ventures, normally large-scale projects listed under the State Planning Commission 
annual investment plan, are listed by projects. As these are usually infrastructure projects, more 
than one province is usually covered, either geographically or as benefactors. It would not be easy 
to disaggregate the total central investment by area. Respondent No.36, Beijing interview, April 
1994. It should be noted that "central investment" here refers to the amount of captial the Centre 
invested in investment projects in Guangdong.
76See Guangdong Provincial Party Committee (ed.), A Record of Insights of Opening and Reforms 
in Guangdong, p.57.
77 Both officials in Guangdong and in Beijing commented that Guangdong had been a strong 
magnet attracting investment from central ministries and other provinces, including pots: provinces 
short of capital. This "magnetic power" became stronger each year. Interviews with Guangdong 
Provincial Planning Commission official, December 1993, and with officials from the Finance 
Ministry and State Planning Commission, April 1994.
7^See People's Daily August 8,1992, p.l. Another percentage, 16%, appeared in an article by the 
Guangdong Provincial Planning Commission, "The Plan and the Market in the Investment Scene of 
Guangdong", p.70.
79The coverage of the 15% was unclear even to an informed source in Guangdong. Respondent 
No.9, telephone interview, April 1994.
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investment projects, the willingness to shoulder part of the cost enhanced the 
possibility of success, given the tight financial situation of the central government. 
On the other hand, the central government liked to encourage provincial 
governments to invest more in infrastructure facilities, thereby easing the 
"bottleneck" situation, by itself providing part of the funds or other necessary 
resources for the projects. As the financial strength of the provincial governments 
grew stronger and that of the Centre relatively weaker, there was an increasing 
occurrence of "central-provincial joint ventures", some of which might involve 
several provinces.
The expansion of the Shantou airport was one incidence of central- 
provincial "mutual fishing" in Guangdong. The following quote from Zhao Ziyang 
speaking to Shantou's officials in 1986 reveals the dynamics of this practice:
"I think the (Aviation Bureau) might be unable to allocate that much money 
for die project in a year, because they have made promises to many similar 
projects nationwide. If the costs of all these projects are added together, 
they simply do not have enough funds. Perhaps you should pay the bills 
first, or you can pay on behalf of the Bureau.... You promised to shoulder 
20 million yuan, and now you say you also have difficulty in raising that 
amount all at once. How can you then expect the Bureau to raise the 
promised 40 million yuan all at once? You had better pay your part of the 
bill first, then I shall telephone Beijing to ask the Bureau to consider 
whether they can squeeze out any more ..."80
Another, example of Centre-Guangdong joint venture investment is the 
project to build several hydroelectric power stations in southwest China to supply 
electricity to Guangdong. The project involved the cooperation of four provinces, 
namely, Guangdong, Guangxi, Yunnan, Guizhou, with the central government. 
First formally mentioned in Central Committee Document No.41 (1980) as a 
central-provincial joint-investment project, formal agreement was reached in June 
1988, with construction planned to commence as from April 1991. Total 
investment up to the year 2000 was projected to exceed 20 billion yuan. In some 
major parts of the project Guangdong's contribution in terms of investment capital 
reached a level of 50%-70%, an exceptionally high percentage to be shouldered by 
a province in a central-provincial joint project. 81
Another form of direct central support was the injection of fiscal transfer 
funds to pay for specific social and economic needs, such as anti-poverty funds for
80"Zhao Ziyang Speaking When Hearing the Briefing on Shantou's Work" February 2-5, 1986, in 
Centre's Instructions to Guangdong, 1986-1987, Part I, p.28.
81 This was the first ever joint investment by more than one province for the development of 
electricity in China. See Nanfang Ribao, December 29,1993, p.2.
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poor counties and villages, subsidies for natural disasters and various price 
subsidies. Some of the anti-poverty funds would end up being used for the 
financing of investment projects in the poor areas. While natural disaster funds and 
price subsidies did not have direct bearing on investment, the injection of central 
subsidy made available the equivalent amount of local resources which could then 
be channelled into investment projects. The amount of this kind of central fund 
injection in Guangdong has been reportedly small. When interviewed, Guangdong 
officials frequently stated that the province had shouldered most of the costs of 
reform which should, according to the traditional division of responsibility, have 
been met by the central government, which was still the practice in the case of less 
well-off provinces.82 According to an account quoting source from the Provincial 
Finance Bureau, central fiscal fund injections of this sort amounted to a total of 2 
billion yuan for the period 1980-88, which is equivalent to about 3% of the total 
provincial fiscal revenue for the period.83
Despite the lack of clear and unambiguous data on the exact amount of 
direct central support in terms of capital finance to Guangdong, the general 
impression in Beijing amongst planning and finance officials was that, contrary to 
the picture openly portrayed by Guangdong's officials, Guangdong had in fact fared 
quite well in attracting investment from the central government ministries. The 
remarks of a central planning official are revealing:
"In some cases it is the richer localities who can do better in attracting funds
and investments than the poorer guys, because those who have money to
lend and invest expect a higher and quicker return."84
The rapid progression of reform and a strengthened economic force 
inevitably changed the rules of the game in the scramble for direct central support. 
Under the traditional system, when the concern of the central government 
ministries was focused less on economic benefits and more on social stability and 
resource equalization, a commonly used tactic for attracting central funding was 
"crying wolf’, thus exaggerating crises. Poorer areas may then have had an edge 
over those more well-off. However, whilst the traditional tactics of exaggerating
^O fficials from the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee Secretariat wrote that the reform 
measures such as reductions in revenue and increases in expenditure engineered by the Centre since 
1980 had cost the provincial coffers about 13 billion, an average of 1.3 billion per year. According 
to the traditional fiscal system these should have been borne by the Centre. See Guangdong 
Provincial Party Committee (ed.) A Record of Insights of Opening and Reforms in Guangdong, 
p.59.
^ S ee  Leung Kwaichuen et al., The Track of Rising Economy: A Sample Analysis of Guangdong's 
Economic Development (Guangzhou: Guangdong Renmin chubanshe, 1992), p.42.
^Respondent No.35, Beijing interview, 1994.
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one's difficulties continued to be used, the central government started to shift its 
emphasis from even development and equalization of wealth to speeding up the 
pace of development, and central ministries became more like profit/cost centres 
seeking to maximise returns on investment. Exaggerating one's difficulties, 
therefore, had to be combined with the prospect of high potential return in order to 
be effective in attracting investment. Consequently, as the economy of Guangdong 
blossomed, the province became a strong magnet for investment capital as units 
nationwide were anxious to come to the province to make money.
The mechanics of attracting central investment also altered as the economy 
changed its tack, albeit gradually, from the traditional central planning system to 
the market economy. Under the traditional system resources were distributed via 
administrative channels, and this gave the central government, which by definition 
was at a superior level in the administrative hierarchy, a commanding position in 
the allocation of investment funding. The provinces seeking to attract central 
investment resources were thus situated at a subordinate footing, reduced to asking 
for favours from the relevant central ministries. However, under the emerging 
market economy, economic calculation entered the equation in the allocation of 
investment resources. Fast-growing provinces like Guangdong, therefore, had a 
much more improved position as now the previous "central boss" had become more 
like a co-partner in economic development.
The Guangdong government in the 1980s was in fact very keen to attract 
investment from the central ministries and other provinces.85 Its motive was two­
fold, being political as well as economic. From the economic point of view, 
attracting external investment helped Guangdong to enlarge its investment capital 
and thus expand the size of the economy. This was the economic motive. 
However, since capital supply had improved substantially since the early 1980s, 
this motive became less of a survival significance and was, therefore, much less 
imminent in the minds of Guangdong officials. The political motive, however, had 
gradually bom fruit. Investment from central ministries and other provinces was 
welcome as part of the effort to cultivate nationwide support for Guangdong. In 
attracting central ministries and other provinces to Guangdong to invest in a share 
of its economic growth, the Guangdong government sought to defuse misgivings 
and cultivate support. By sharing the prospect of economic growth with its 
potential "enemies", Guangdong thus sought to turn them into partners and 
supporters.
^Information in this paragraph is the view of Respondent No.9, Guangzhou Interview, December 
1993.
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Guangdong was, of course, in an advantageous position as regards 
attracting investment from the central ministries. On the one hand, there was the 
economic "pull" effect as discussed above. Central ministries came to invest 
because they felt that a good profit could be made in Guangdong. Funding 
channels for these central investment projects would, therefore, include budgetary 
allocation, bank loans (using quotas of the investing ministries), the "own funds" of 
the ministries, usually in form of various specialized funds, and capital from the six 
specialized investment companies set up in 1988.86 Since Guangdong had also 
become much richer over the 1980s than many other provinces, it therefore had 
more resources at its disposal with which to "fish" central investment.
Another edge which Guangdong had was the "liberal" attitude of its 
officials towards the "fishing" of central investment. In the words of a Guangdong 
official, "some provinces, especially the inland provinces, are still endowed with 
the mentality of the central planning system, and regard central investment purely 
as the administrative appropriation of funds. They are therefore not prepared to 
accept that if they want central investment nowadays, they themselves need to offer 
something in return, either in the form of potential profits from the projects, or by 
the provinces sharing the investment capital and the cost of the project, or both. 
Guangdong has long recognized this as working in a similar way to a joint-venture 
business. Both parties (Guangdong and the central ministry) have to bear some of 
the costs, with both sharing the benefits."87 Guangdong's more liberal attitude to 
"fishing" is, however, obviously linked to its relatively superior economic strength. 
The interactive and mutually reinforcing relationship between economic situation 
and subjective attitudes of Guangdong officials has together resulted in 
Guangdong's relative success in gaining central investment.
A further form of direct central support of resources was the provision of 
bank finance. There are no complete statistics on exactly how much financial 
support the Centre has given to Guangdong’s investment via the banking system. 
An account by officials from the Guangdong Planning Commission, Industry 
Division, put support in the form of central bank loans to cover the shortfall of 
deposit-loan balance between 1980-1988 at some 26.6 billion yuan.88 After 
deducting the transfer to the Centre of various bank funds, including deposit
86Ibid.
87Ibid.
88See Yao Dinghai and Zeng Shunming, "An Analysis of the Scale and Structure of Guangdong's 
Bank Loans", Jihua Yu Fazhan, No.6 (1989), pp.52-54.
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liquidity provision, and the "compulsory" purchase of central bonds of about 13.4 
billion yuan, the net injection of central money into the banking system from 1980 
to 1988 amounted to 13.2 billion yuan. Since the interest rate of the central bank 
loans was very low, and much of the bank loans lent out from Guangdong’s banks 
were used for investment purposes, this amounted to a fairly substantial central 
subsidy of Guangdong's investment capital.89
Guangdong officials were therefore keen to obtain central loans via the 
financial system. For instance, when Zhao Ziyang, Hu Qili and Tian Jiyun visited 
Shantou in February 1986, officials from Shantou lobbied the Centre to increase 
the flow of central bank loans to Shantou's banks and to waive the 10% remittance 
from Shantou's total bank deposits to the central bank. In response, Zhao revealed 
that the total value of cash circulation in Guangdong already amounted to one-third 
of the national total, and that money had been diverted by Guangdong from inland 
provinces such as Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Gansu.90 In other words, 
Guangdong had been using part of the deposit resources of the inland provinces, 
via the central bank, to make up the shortfall of its own deposits to satisfy the 
demand for bank finance emanating from investment activities. Despite the fact 
that Guangdong's deposit-loan balance had been "in the black" since 1991, the 
Guangdong government nevertheless continued to bargain with the Centre and to 
succeed in obtaining central bank loans amounting to some 1 billion yuan per year. 
The major reason for this as put forward by Guangdong officials is that so long as 
the Centre requires Guangdong's banks to lend out "policy loans" as prescribed in 
the annual bank finance plan, the Centre should provide some form of 
compensatory subsidy via cheap central loans.91
Sometimes the aim of winning central funds was attained the other way 
round: by remitting less to the Centre. For instance, apart from the annual fiscal 
contractual remittance, part of the profits of those provincial departments which 
had traditionally been managed by the central ministries had to be remitted to the 
central ministries. In 1983, however, Guangdong officials persuaded visiting
S^This interpretation was confirmed with the respondent from the Guangdong Planning 
Commission, Guangzhou Interview, December 1993. He commented that it was difficult to 
ascertain the full extent of central support in this manner as it was supplied in a somewhat obscure 
fashion.
°0See "Zhao Ziyang, Hu Qili and Tian Jiyun Speaking When Receiving Officals of Shantou", 
February 5, 1986, in Centre's Instructions to Guangdong, 1986-1987, Part n, p,44. The Centre 
finally agreed to their requests and exempted banks in Shantou, Zhuhai and Xiamen from remitting 
the 10% deposit contingency allowance to the Centre. This part of resources was instead retained 
by the local branch of the People's Bank of China for local use. See "Notes of Meeting of the 1987 
Work Conference of the Special Economic Zones", February 10,1987, in Ibid., p.297.
9 Respondent No.8, Guangzhou interview, December 1993.
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central leader Gu Mu to do away the annual remittance of 2 million yuan to the 
Telecommunication Ministry so that the province and the special economic zones 
could have more funds for economic construction. They won Gu Mu's support.92
Flexible Implementation of Central Policies
A category of discretionary behaviour which exhibited both central 
dependency and provincial independence, and for which the Guangdong 
government has become famous for during the 1980s, is flexible implementation of 
central policies. The targeted group of policies might be those central policies for 
which the province had bargained hard, or those of the "traditional" policies which 
the province had still to tolerate. Whether it be the former or the latter, flexible 
manoeuvres were necessary in order to mould the policies laid down to suit the 
changing needs of investment in the province.
Shaping a New Reform Policy
One example of the need to modify via implementation discretion central 
policies, the formulation of which the province had played a part, is the 
establishment of Special Economic Zones. The idea of establishing Special 
Economic Zones to speed up foreign investment and economic development was 
first suggested by the Guangdong provincial leadership to the Centre in the Central 
Work Conference of April 1979.93 The establishment of "special export zones" 
initially in Shenzhen and Zhuhai, extended later to Shantou and Xiamen, was 
endorsed by the Centre in July 1979. In the next Central Document (zhongfa) on 
the work of Guangdong and Fujian in May 1980, it was clearly stated that the 
primary and major purpose of the Special Economic Zones, as so renamed, was to 
attract foreign investment. The influx of investment from inland provinces and the 
central ministries was to be strictly controlled. Prior approval also had to be 
obtained for domestic units from outside Shenzhen seeking to set up companies, 
including joint ventures with foreign investors.94
92See "Gu Mu speaking when inspecting the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone" April 7-18,1983, 
in Centre's Instructions to Guangdong, 1986-1987., Part n, p.540.
9^See Liu Zhongxiu (ed.), Thoughts on Shenzhen by 100 Scholars, p. 162.
94See Central Committee Document No. 41 (1980), May 16, 1980, "Approving the Notes of 
Meeting on Guangdong and Fujian, March 30, 1980". In a Central Committee Document (No. 17) 
issued in March 1, 1983, it was ordered that all unauthorized temporary or permanent 
offices/companies set up by central ministries and other provinces in Guangdong and Fujian, 
including those in the special economic zones, had to be moved out. See Centre's Instructions to 
Guangdong, 1979-1982, p.310. The context of the order was ostensibly to curb the smuggling and 
speculative trading activities in Guangdong, but it actually reflected the lack of concern of the 
central leaders of the possible role of domestic investment in the Special Economic Zones,
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As soon as the construction of the zones took off, the tight restriction on the 
influx of domestic companies and capital became a clearly unrealistic and 
detrimental measure. Not only did the construction of the city's infrastructure 
desperately require investment from nationwide units, given the tight supply of 
finance from the state budget, but the attraction of foreign investment would also 
require the presence of a considerable number of domestic investors to act as 
partners in the joint ventures. In any event the initial five years saw domestic 
capital from all over the country playing a dominant part in the largest special 
economic zone, Shenzhen. By 1985, the use of foreign capital had accounted for 
under 20% of the cumulative total fixed asset investment in Shenzhen. On the 
other hand, domestic bank loans, "own funds" of enterprises and their 
superordinate units accounted for over 40%.95
When Gu Mu commented on the declining share of foreign capital in the 
investment activities in Shenzhen in January 1986, he was neither pleased nor 
undisturbed.96 However, the utilization of extra-budgetary capital from all over the 
country and the participation of a multitude of domestic units nationwide was 
eventually acknowledged as a major success factor in Shenzhen's development. 
Domestic investment and participation, in the absence of strong support from the 
state budget, enabled Shenzhen to develop and to overcome problems such as 
shortage of expertise and personnel in developing what had originally been a piece 
of rural land.97
By 1989, 46 central ministries and 29 provinces had earmarked their 
"piece" in Shenzhen, and 6000 contracts were signed. 3900 enterprises were 
established with these central and provincial units, and this did not include the 
foreign joint ventures of which these units were partners. Realized capital injection 
amounted to 3 billion yuan. This "domestic" sector compared not unfavourably 
with the foreign sector, which in 1989 consisted of just under 2600 foreign- 
invested enterprises, with a total realized capital injection of US$ 2.7 billion.98
9^See Pei Guanzhong, Finance and Banking (Beijing: Haiyang chubanshe, 1990), p.3, quoting 
source from the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Daily, December 1985.
9^Gu Mu’s comments came in the context of a nationwide economic retrenchment which started in 
1985, whilst investment in Shenzhen continued to grow by 141% in 1985. The share of foreign 
capital in total investment in the zone decreased from 42% in 1980, to only 13% in 1985. (1981: 
50%, 1982: 32%; 1983: 25%; 1984: 16%), while the share of bank loans increased year by year to 
44% in 1985. See "Gu Mu's speech in the Special Economic Zones Meeting", January 5, 1986, in 
Centre's Instructions to Guangdong, 1986-1987, Part I, p. 16.
97See for instance Liu Zhongxiu (ed.), Thoughts on Shenzhen by 100 Scholars, p.139.
98See Huang Haichao et al., The Realization of Dreams, p. 127.
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What had taken place was a reversal of the original policy of restricting 
domestic investment and participation to one of enthusiastic attraction. This was 
possible because from the very beginning the original policy had been tentatively 
set and both the central and Guangdong governments had no clear idea of how to 
develop the special economic zones effectively. This is substantiated by Gu Mu’s 
comments on the March 1980 meeting with Guangdong and Fujian officials, as 
quoted below:
"As far as the method of developing the special economic zones, and what 
the zones should look like in due course is concerned, we did not specify 
either in detail in (the July 1979 Central Committee Notice No. 50). 
Comrades from Guangdong did write a few outlines, about one to two 
pages long, but we felt they were too abstract. We actually did not know 
how and what to specify. Therefore we just left it unsaid." 99
Neither the central government nor the Guangdong leadership had a firm or 
clear idea of how to practically progress from the general concept of establishing 
several special zones. Bearing this in mind, it is understandable that the ostensibly 
clearly worded policy on restricting domestic investment in the special economic 
zones should be so easily discarded in practice. As the provincial leadership, 
together with the leadership of the zones, were in the frontline of policy 
implementation, they were able to realize at an earlier stage the folly of the earlier 
design to restrict the role of participation and investment of units nationwide, 
whilst central leaders were apparently stuck with the earlier preconception for a 
much longer period.100 Like all reform measures of the 1980s, the experimental 
nature of the policy allowed for, and necessitated, a substantial amount of 
flexibility at the implementation level.101
" S ee  "Gu Mu Speaking in the Meeting on the Work of Guangdong and Fujian", March 24,1980, 
in Centre's Instructions to Guangdong, 1979-1982. ,  p.57.
iOOjn a report to the Centre in October 1982 the Guangdong leadership pointed out that experience 
had proved the importance of soliciting the participation of the whole province and the entire 
country in the construction and development of the special economic zones. Although the overall 
direction of development should be externally oriented, with the attraction of foreign investment 
being the primary immediate objective of the zones, the participation of domestic units nationwide 
was necessary to solve practical difficulties such as the lack of capital, personnel and equipment in 
the zones, as well as to strengthen the ability of the zones in the attraction of foreign investment. 
See "Guangdong Party Committee, and Guangdong People's Government on the Preliminary 
Appraisal of the Experiment of the Special Economic Zones", October 22 ,1982, in Ibid., pp.380, 
382.
10 implementation discretion and the interactive relations between policy formulation and 
implementation is of course a generic phenomenon of the policy process. The extensiveness and 
magnitude of the occurrence of implementation discretion in China is related to two factors. One is 
the experimental approach of China's reforms, which made many policies necessarily general, vague 
and tentative, allowing a lot of room for manoeuvre within the wordings of the policies. The other 
is the slackness of law/policy enforcement in China. The effect on implementation discretion was 
that provincial governments could often openly violate the confines of a stated policy, without
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Discretion in the Traditional System
China's economic reforms took place within the context of the traditional 
central planning system. This meant that at any one time, two systemic "streams" 
were operating simultaneously. The first are the new reform systems which were 
set up on a tentative, and experimental basis. The other are the pre-existing 
systems operating under the central planning system of government and economic 
administration. As has been discussed in the section above, the tentative and 
experimental nature of the reform policies necessitated and, therefore, allowed 
ample room for implementation discretions. Meanwhile, the extensive occurrence 
of discretions and deviations emanating from the traditional policies was immanent 
in the uneasy co-existence between the old system and the requirements of those 
which were new and emerging.
The old system, as compared to that of the emerging reform policies, was 
relatively specific and had a clear purpose and rationale. There was, in other 
words, a more established and formidable existence of vested interests in the old 
policy and system. It was thus less easy simply to "muddle through", and change 
the content of the policy through actual practice than was the case in the new 
reform measures. Therefore, discretionary behaviour could either be applied within 
the confines of the policies, or failing that, more efforts would be required to 
justify the violation of the existing policies. In this section I shall illustrate these 
two varieties of discretionary behaviour through the discussion of the 
implementation of three specific policies.
Expanding the Central Control Figure on the Total Investment Scale
As previously discussed, the central control figure on the total investment 
scale was one of the few major control instruments through which the Centre 
sought to keep control on investment activities in the provinces.102 Guangdong's 
discretionary behaviour towards this central control instrument may be 
differentiated into three types: (1) seeking its abolition; (2) ignoring it; or (3) 
seeking to raise the ceiling. An example of the first case occurred in February 
1988, as discussed earlier in this chapter. This was the boldest and most
feeling compelled first to amend the policy, no matter how general and vague the amended policy 
may still be.
^ T h e  other instruments include control over the total bank Finance and over the project approval 
authority of the provinces.
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aggressive type of action as it required a projected calculation of possible central 
response. It worked in 1988, if only temporarily, and was overturned by 
subsequent changes in the macro-economic situation and, thus, in central policies.
The other two types had been commonly used as a matter of routine. At 
times when the policy emphasis of the Centre was on economic growth and was 
therefore more tolerant towards excesses over the control figures, they would be 
more or less ignored in the investment administration and planning of the 
provincial government. On the other hand, at times of economic retrenchment the 
Centre became more serious about the investment scale of provinces, the 
provincial government had to act with more prudence. It would have to make more 
effort towards enlarging the quotas of total investment scale, instead of simply 
ignoring them.
Table 3.9 of Chapter Three shows clearly that the control figures were, as a 
rule, substantially exceeded in actual practice, normally by at least 100%. In 1985 
actual societal investment reached 18.5 billion yuan, while the central control 
figure supposedly prescribing the total scale of societal investment for the year 
stood at only 5.5 billion yuan, less than one-third of the actual amount of 
investment in practice. This exemplifies the fact that the control figures were, for 
most of the time, not taken seriously.
During retrenchment years the Centre was more stringent in its attempts to 
control the total investment scale, as economic retrenchment was itself the normal 
response of the central leaders to the perceived threat of the economy becoming 
"over-heated" as a result of over-active investment activity during the previous 
period. In these years the provinces were under pressure from the Centre in two 
ways. First, the total scale of investment allowed by the Centre, as expressed in the 
control figure, would often be considerably reduced. Second, the Centre would be 
displeased if the control figure was greatly exceeded than it would be in more 
"normal" years.
The usual response of the provinces during such "crisis" periods was to 
bargain for a higher control figure from the outset, and when actual investment still 
exceeded the approved scale, to come up with various excuses through which to 
escape responsibility. Guangdong, with its active investment scene, was 
particularly sensitive to any tightening of central control as regards its investment 
activity.
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As briefly noted near the end of Chapter Three, the Guangdong government 
in 1983 used the fait accompli argument in resisting pressure from the Centre to 
cut its investment, despite the fact that much of the fait accompli actually consisted 
of "outside plan" projects which, in theory, should not have existed in the first 
place. From late 1980 to 1983 the central government launched an economic 
adjustment campaign to contain the investment drive set off by the "Western-styled 
Great Leap", and to restructure investments in preparation for further economic 
reforms. From the Centre's point of view, "outside-plan" investment in 
Guangdong and Fujian was excessive and some containment was necessary. This 
attitude is clearly revealed by Yao Yilin's comments in the course of a meeting oh 
Guangdong and Fujian in February 1982:
"Many economic activities in the two provinces took place outside the state 
plans,...The economic policy of the two provinces need review... There 
were many "outside plan" investment projects there... The value of "outside 
plan" investment in the two provinces was 44% of the total "outside plan" 
investments nationally."103
The Guangdong government, however, argued that the Centre had failed to 
give adequate consideration to the special circumstances of Guangdong, given its 
assigned role in the economic opening and reform in the country. The total scale 
of local capital construction investment approved by the Centre for Guangdong for 
the Sixth Five-Year Plan period (1981-85), which was announced only in February 
1983, was less than 2.8 billion yuan. In the end a total of 12.5 billion yuan of local 
investment was accomplished in the five years, 4.5 times of the scale allowed for 
by the Centre. The Guangdong government argued that this control figure was 
totally unrealistic. First, the controlled scale announced in February 1983 did not 
even allow for the investment already made in 1981 and 1982, at 3.9 billion yuan. 
Second, a larger investment scale was necessitated by Guangdong’s task of 
pioneering economic reforms. As a result the control figure was adjusted upwards 
in the subsequent annual planning conferences when the control figure for the 
coming year was to be decided. Cumulatively the revised central control figure for 
Guangdong's local investment in the 1981-85 period was 6.3 billion yuan. 
Guangdong was thus able to enlarge the approved scale by more than double via 
annual bargaining at the operational level.104
i03see "Yao Yilin's Speech in a Meeting on Guangdong and Fujian", February 13, 1982, in 
Centre's Instructions to Guangdong, 1979-1982, p.287.
104See Wang Zhongliang, "The Capital Investment and Macro Management of Guangdong in the
Sixth and Seventh Five-Year Plan Periods", in Wang Kunwei (ed.), Gaige, Kaifang, Fazhan.
(Reform, Opening, Development: A Collection of Essays in the Various Annual Meetings of the
Guangdong Planning Society) (Beijing: Zhongguo Jingji chubanshe, 1989), p.82. It should be noted
that the above figures, on the control scale as well as actual investment, covered local capital
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Apart from bargaining in the annual planning conferences, the Guangdong 
government persistently lobbied central leaders for their support. For instance, 
when Gu Mu came to Guangdong to inspect work in December 1983, the 
Guangdong leadership presented Gu Mu with a development plan for the Pearl 
River Delta Region. After winning his admiration and endorsement for their 
achievements and initiatives, they then asked Gu Mu to help to solve a few 
"specific problems". All these "specific problems" were concerned with obtaining 
more favourable treatment and less stringent policies towards Guangdong's 
investment for the coming year, and most necessarily regarding the Centre's 
control quotas for Guangdong's investment.105
It may be noted that the value of local capital construction investment 
finally accomplished for the five years 1981-85 still exceeded the adjusted 
approved control scale by nearly 100%. By voicing protest at the outset, therefore, 
Guangdong had psychologically prepared central leaders for the later proven 
insufficiency of the approved scale. Bargaining activities for a larger investment 
scale, therefore, served a dual purpose. First, the frontier of central control was 
pushed back, thus enlarging the room for legitimate local manoeuvre. Second, the 
bargaining activity prepared the ground for central tolerance of the "illegitimate" 
provincial implementation that might still have to take place.
The second half of 1989 was the most severe retrenchment year in China in 
terms of contraction in investment since the commencement of economic reform. 
Table 3.6 of Chapter Three shows that during that year, the value of total societal 
investment nationwide dropped by 8% as compared to 1988. In Guangdong, where 
investments had been growing at a double-digit rate with a high 40% growth in 
1988, there was a negative growth of -1.8% in 1989. Control on bank finance was 
tightened, and the investment control figure for 1989 was drastically cut back from 
the level of the previous year. In a report in early 1989 by the Director of 
Guangdong Planning Commission on the provincial economic and social 
development plan of 1989, it was revealed that the total investment scale approved
construction investment projects only, and were thus considerably smaller than the investment 
statistics in the statistical yearbooks, which included both central and local investments.
105See Gu Mu, "On the Planning of the Pearl River Delta Region and the Work of the Special 
Economic Zones", December 12, 1983, in Centre's Instructions to Guaagdong, 1983-1985, pp.87- 
90. The list of specific problems seeking the support of the State Council and the State Planning 
Commission includes the Centre's quotas of Guangdong's investment not requiring state financial 
support, the construction of the Shaojiao power station, getting a separate quotas for investments in 
Hainan, foreign investment, and the construction of a sugar factory. Gu Mu, his attitude sounding 
supportive, promised to discuss these with Zhao Ziyang and the State Council.
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by the Centre for 1989 was 20.5% and 57.8% less than the control figure and 
provisional estimates of completed investments for 1988, the extent of reduction 
thus greatly exceeding the original expectation of the provincial government.106
However, data obtained from the Guangdong Planning Commission, as 
detailed in Table 3.9 of Chapter Three, shows that the central control figure for 
1989 was eventually adjusted upwards to 14 billion yuan, a 42.4% increase from 
the original level. An informed source in Guangdong confirmed that the 
Guangdong government had sought to ease the pressure of the tight restrictions by 
bringing the Centre's attention to the practical difficulties these had caused.107 The 
tactic was to focus on specific projects, arguing that the severe reduction in the 
investment scale would cause valuable projects to bog down and good 
opportunities therefore lost. Rather than arguing with the Centre on matters of 
principle, the Guangdong leadership brought up more "mundane" concerns, 
putting forward specific calculations of costs and benefits. They thus managed to 
loosen slightly the tight reins imposed by the Centre, even at a time of "crisis".108 
A quote from an article from the Provincial Planning Commission clearly 
explicates the line adopted by the Guangdong government:
"In finalising Guangdong's total investment scale for the year earlier this 
year, the provincial government stated unambiguously the position of the 
government: The provincial government should plan in accordance with the 
scale assigned from the State Planning Commission. Difficulties should be 
brought to the attention of the Centre for its consideration, but no
Wong Guiying, "Report on the Preparation of the 1989 National Economic and Social 
Development Plans of Guangdong Province" (Summary), Jihua Yu Fazhan, No.l (1989), pp.6-12. 
In the report it was revealed that the Centre had made the central control figure on investment scale 
a mandatory order. Lending more than the planned total of bank loans was strictly prohibited.
1 ^ Respondent No.9, Guangzhou interview, December 1993. Zhongguo Jinbao, October 7, 1989, 
p.l, contains a report which shows precisely the practical and empirical approach through which the 
Guangdong government managed to enlarge the approved investment scale. The report was about a 
glass factory the construction of which was prohibited in February 1989 as a result of the 
investment stamping exercise. It was argued that stopping the construction would do more harm 
than good because a total of US$2 million of imported equipment would stand idle, and 
compensation would have to be made for previously signed sale contracts. As nearly 5 million yuan 
in bank loans had already been used, interest therefore had still to be paid even though the project 
had been halted with no prospect of realized income.
^ T h e  Guangdong leadership openly adopted an understanding and supportive attitude towards the 
retrenchment, but at the same time kept on raising "practical difficulties" with the Centre, In a 
speech in the provincial planning meeting in early 1989 Vice-governor Yu Fei stated that "the 
adjustment and retrenchment policy of the Centre not only suits the needs of our country, the policy 
is also good for the situation in Guangdong,... We should take the initiative to adjust our economy, 
based on Guangdong's local conditions, and should not regard retrenchment as a matter of obeying 
orders (from the Centre), Moreover, we have to start early and be progressive in our specific 
actions." See Yu Fei's speech in the provincial planning and economic meeting, 1989, 
"Restructuring During the Retrenchment; Developing Amidst the Restructuring" (Summary), Jihua 
Yu Fazhan, No.l (1989), p.2.
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(provincial and subprovincial) level should enlarge its investment scale
without first obtaining the Centre's approval."109 (Italics added)
The Guangdong leadership was therefore careful not to oppose the central 
policy of economic retrenchment and adjustment. Its strategy was to emphasize 
those parts of central policy which better served its purposes. For instance, in a 
Provincial Party Work Conference in January 1989, the participating officials 
pointed out two separate requirements of the Centre concerning the policy of 
economic retrenchment and adjustment The first was the determination to stamp 
out runaway investment and to adjust the economy; the second was the 
determination to continue the externally-oriented economic development strategy 
of the coastal region.110 In other words, the main purpose of the retrenchment was 
to clamp down on "unnecessary" and ill-conceived investment projects, saving the 
resources for "worthwhile" and "necessary" projects. In view of this, one argument 
the Guangdong government used to counter the Centre's pressure to cut investment 
was that some investment projects such as those concerned with energy and 
transport did have good returns and were badly needed by the economy. Such 
projects should therefore be protected and advanced rather than restricted. In order 
to promote this argument, Zhao Ziyang's statement that improving the overall 
economic environment started from adjusting the structure of the economy was 
quoted conspicuously in the provincial press.111 In this way Guangdong could 
move towards continuing some of its projects by claiming that they contributed to 
the restructuring of the economy.
Guangdong's leadership was also adamant in asking for "exceptional" and 
preferential treatment during the 1989 retrenchment. They put forward the fact 
that, since the tightening policies of late 1988, there had been a decline in foreign 
trade and investment. Good economic prospects in the province was thus destroyed 
by overrestrictive policies. The argument was that more flexible policies should be
See "Guangdong Province: Implementing the Licensing Management System for Construction 
Projects" in Zhongguo Touzi Yu Jianshe, No.10 (1989), p.7. The author was from the Investment 
Division of Guangdong's Planning Commission.
110See Zhongguo Jinbao, January 27,1989, p. 2, for the report on the conference. This newspaper 
was a Guangdong provincial weeldy paper first published in late 1988, having been approved by the 
Centre in late 1987 and early 1988, and was one of the byproducts of Guangdong becoming the 
experimental region for comprehensive reforms. The mission and purpose of the newspaper was 
therefore to promote and advance the frontiers of reform. Guangdong's Party Secretary from 1980- 
1985, Ren Zhongyi, stated in the opening publication of the paper in January 1989 that the paper 
should for the time being (that is, during the period of retrenchment) focus on publicising the 
"making an exception" policy for the coastal region, and especially Guangdong. See Zhongguo 
Jinbao, January 6,1989, p.l.
^ S e e  Zhongguo Jinbao, January 20,1989, p.l.
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applied to Guangdong in order to forestall the slide and continue the good progress 
made in the province during the previous year.112
The above discussion shows that Guangdong has been able to enlarge its 
room for manoeuvre, even under more difficult circumstances, by "playing around" 
with the confines of the central policies and asking for "minor" and "operational" 
adjustments based on considerations of the "practical" circumstances of the 
province. Although central control figures on total investment scale as a control 
instrument was in practice ineffective for most of the time, it was nevertheless a 
major tool of control upon which the Centre depended during the transitional stage 
of economic reform. Consequently, with the exception of the 1988 attempt, 
Guangdong had avoided openly challenging the central policy of investment scale 
control, choosing instead to bargain for special consideration on a more mundane 
level.113 However, as regards other central policies towards which central 
determination was more ambiguous, Guangdong’s discretionary behaviour was 
more confrontational in nature.
Justifying the Breaking of "Traditional" Rules on Bank Finance Management
In this section I discuss Guangdong's discretionary implementation of two 
central policies concerning the management of bank finance. In both cases 
Guangdong has sought to justify and legitimize its extensive violation of the 
policies by distinguishing the original, that is, "outdated", aims of the policies from 
the present requirements of reform and the externally oriented economic 
development of Guangdong. The two serve as convenient examples for the sake of 
illustration, and are not intended to be exclusive.
First, as from 1979, there was central policy regarding the management of 
bank loans requiring state banks to establish different categories for loans directed 
to the working capital of enterprises and to fixed asset investment. By 
distinguishing loans for working capital from loans for fixed asset investment, and 
the corresponding assignment of separate quotas for each, the central government
senior official in Guangdong's foreign trade and investment work brought attention to the 
negative effect of the change in policies since the onset of retrenchment on foreign trade and the 
inflow of foreign capital into Guangdong. Foreign trade for the first quarter of 1989 dropped by 
20%, as against the national slide of 8%, and many foreign joint ventures could not proceed because 
the capital supply of Chinese partners was affected by the tightening of bank finance. He asked for 
more flexible policies based on the special circumstances of Guangdong. See Zhongguo Jinbao, 
April 21,1989, p. 8.
^ T h e  only time Guangdong's leadership did try to do away with the application of investment 
scale control policy for Guangdong was in early 1988, as discussed earlier this chapter.
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sought to maintain control over the scale of investment. However a substantial 
portion of the bank loans which had been assigned for working capital was actually 
being used to finance investment projects.114 And this was one major area of 
scrutiny in the annual inspection exercise on taxes and finance every year.
It was, however, difficult to gauge the precise extent of the diffusion of 
funds across the quotas. It was only in the past few years that the State Audit 
Commission started auditing the work of banks. In the case of Guangdong, 
because of the limitation of manpower and other resources, only one bank system 
could be inspected each year.115 In an audit inspection of the Construction Bank 
conducted in 1993, it was discovered that in some Guangdong branches up to 3% 
of the loans ostensibly used for financing working capital was actually directed to 
fixed asset investment. On average the ratio was about 1 to 2% in 1992 in 
Guangdong. The value of bank loans directed towards working capital was 141.36 
billion yuan, and the value of fixed asset investment loans was 23.58 billion.116 As 
2% of the value of working capital amounts to 2.83 billion yuan, it may be 
calculated that investment loans were, in effect, increased by more than 10% by 
way of circumventing the quotas control.
What is significant in this discussion of Guangdong's discretionary 
behaviour is not the sheer scale of covert violation of central rules but the near- 
overt advocacy of the abolition of the rules. In an openly published article, an 
official of the Shenzhen Branch of the Construction Bank championed the 
"flexible" approach of the branch in its utilization of the two separate quotas as one 
of the major successful "reform measures" that had helped solve the capital 
problems of Shenzhen.117 This view was echoed by a respondent in the 
provincial government. The following quote was his response to the question on 
why there had been such an extensive occurrence of quota-diffusion behaviour:
For instance during the retrenchment of 1985, State Councillor Chen Muhua as the then head of 
the People's Bank of China criticized when paying a visit to Zhuhai the use of so much bank finance 
originally intended for working capital as on de facto investment projects. See "Chen Muhua 
Speaking When Visiting Zhuhai Special Economic Zone", December 12, 1985, in Centre's 
Instructions to Guangdong, 1983-1985, p.428.
1 ^ Respondent No. 10, Guangzhou Interview, December 1993. The percentage tallied with the 
percentage quoted in an article from the Shaoxing city Audit Bureau in Guangdong Audit, No.2
(1991), pp.14-15. In the article, it was stated that inspection on the use of the two streams of bank 
finance in banks of the city in 1988 found that 2.2% of working capital loans was actually used for 
fixed asset investment
116*See Guangdong Statistics Yearbook 1993, p.385.
117See Li Chaoyung, "The Captial Problem in the Development of Externally-Oriented Economy 
of the Special Economic Zones", Theory and Practice of the Special Economic Zone, No.4 (1990), 
p.59.
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"There have been both positive and negative reasons for this. The negative 
reason has been corruption. It has often been the case that certain members 
of bank staff have been able to obtain "benefits" from enterprises in return 
for lending them funds for investment purpose. This works in such a way 
that when quotas for fixed asset investment had been used up, or projects 
did not meet the criteria for such loans, bank staff might then lend out the 
money in the form of working capital loans... As regards the positive 
reasons, the system of separate quotas for working capital and investment 
loans was in fact a product of the central planning system. When the system 
was first set up, there was the concern that loans for fixed asset investment 
would, in practice, be little more than grants by another name (traditionally 
most investment projects had been financed by state fiscal grants). Control 
on the scale of loans was therefore necessary. However, nowadays as the 
market economy gradually develops in Guangdong, the capacity for self- 
restraint by enterprises in terms of cost and investment control has been 
increasing substantially, or at least, this is the goal of provincial government 
and banks. Under such circumstances the banks in Guangdong feel that 
they should be able to use the capital available to them more flexibly."118
Among officials in Guangdong a feeling was that the system of separate 
quotas for working capital loans and investment loans had become outdated in 
terms of the swing towards a market economy. What is noteworthy here is that, as 
reflected in the above quote, provincial auditing officials appear to take a similar 
view towards the "legitimacy" of what is, strictly speaking, illegitimate behaviour 
from an auditing perspective.
The other policy to be discussed is the central policy precluding the 
provision of bank finance for foreign investors of foreign-funded enterprises, as 
well as the provision of a guarantee to enterprises by government departments of 
bank loans. From the point of view of Guangdong, this policy was not conducive 
to the attraction of foreign investment. The Shenzhen Construction Bank official 
again championed the breaking of these rules as being one of the success factors of 
Shenzhen. He wrote in 1990:
"(One success factor of Shenzhen in attracting foreign investment is) the 
abandonment of the preconception that banks should not lend out 
investment loans to foreign-funded enterprises. In the past there was a rule 
that foreign investors in foreign-funded enterprises had to inject their own 
investment capital from abroad in full. We were not allowed to provide 
loans to cover that part of investment. At the time this was a necessary 
provision. However, due to some occasional unanticipated factors, a 
shortfall in the amount of investment capital injected from abroad would 
occur. If the shortfall was not made up, production would not be able to 
commence. In order to solve practical difficulties of this sort, the Shenzhen 
Construction Bank made loans to these enterprises. Since the enterprises 
had not yet commenced production and thus could not borrow in their own
118Respondent No. 10, Guangzhou interview, December 1993.
246
name, we would take the shares of the enterprise as mortgage, or let the 
department-in-charge of the Chinese partners guarantee the loans.. ."119
It should be noted that it was only in local practice that the rule had been 
changed. From the point of view of the Centre, such provision of finance and 
guarantee was banned. In February 1993, a notice was issued by the State Council 
reiterating its prohibition of government departments acting as guarantors for bank 
loans, a position which had already been clearly stated in 1984, and again, in 
1988.120
In a sense the "flexibility" with which the Guangdong government 
implemented central policies and the discretionary behaviour of the Guangdong 
leadership were quite apparent within the country and to China watchers abroad. It 
has raised eyebrows most because, unlike the first two types of discretionary 
behaviour which are basically concerned with lobbying for more favours from the 
Centre, implementation discretion requires more calculation and strategic analysis 
on the part of provincial officials. For instance, provincial officials must first assess 
the suitability of central policies for local application, and subsequently undertake 
the course of action which would bring the most benefit and incur the least cost. 
Whether in theory or in practice, implementation discretion represents a far higher 
degree of provincial independence than does the scramble for preferential policies 
and direct central support. Relative to the two other categories of discretionary 
behaviour, i.e., the development of the non-state sector and the embrace of 
internationalization, which will be discussed later in this Chapter, implementation 
discretion is also more directly targeted at central policies. The degree of 
provincial independence as indicated by this type of discretionary behaviour makes 
the controversies which have consequently resulted come as no surprise.
During the 1989 retrenchment Guangdong came under great pressure to 
conform to central requirements and, therefore, to cut investments and to control 
prices, amongst other retrenchment measures. The flexibilitiy with which the 
province had implemented central policies in the past came under severe attack. It 
is, therefore, indicative of the degree of independence which had developed within 
the provincial leadership that despite the harsh approach adopted by the Centre
Chaoyung, "The Capital Problem", p.60.
120see "The Notice by the State Council Secretariat on the Strict Prohibition of Administrative 
Departments to Guarantee for Economic Activities", February 23, 1993, in Zhonghua Renmin 
GongheguoXin Fagm Huibian, 1993, Volume 1,1994, pp. 189-90; "Notice by the Finance Ministry 
on the Prohibtion of Finance Departments to Act as Guarantee for Economic Activites", November 
20,1988, in Caizheng Guizhan Zhidu Xuanbian, 1988, Volume 1 , pp. 115-16.
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towards the Guangdong Government at that time, it nevertheless still published in a 
provincial paper an up-front counter-attack of the criticisms which had been 
levelled against it. This article defended Guangdong’s flexible implementation of 
central policies, and argued that, rather than blindly following the vagaries of 
central policies, "unsuitable policies" should be either ignored or, at least, revised. 
The following self-explanatory quotes fully explicate the discussion in this section:
On the inevitability of flexible implementation, in the generic sense:
"the directives and policies of the Party are formulated in accordance with 
the objective and practical situations of a certain time; they themselves are 
not constant and are subject to change.... Some policies and directives no 
longer suit the changed objective situation. We should take the initiative to 
discard these, rather than try to retain the unretainable..."
In the particularistic sense:
"the directives and policies of the Party were formulated to reflect the long­
term interests of the community as a whole. But there are huge differences 
between various sectors and regions.... When these policies do not suit the 
particular circumstances of the local situation, there is no need to apply 
them strictly and without adaptation."
For an example in this case:
"the commodity economy has become quite well developed in the coastal 
region. The price of many commodities in this region has already been 
deregulated. There is thus no need and no sense in going back to the old 
way of administrative control of price and the use of rationing in the effort 
to contain inflation."
And for the case of Guangdong:
"The Party Centre and the State Council previously instructed Guangdong 
and Fujian to go one step ahead of the rest of the country...and allowed the 
two provinces to act according to the Special Policy, and 'flexible measures'. 
This means that the Centre does not require the two provinces to follow in 
strict accordance the policy documents which are meant for the use of the 
rest of the country, but rather to follow the Special Policy documents 
tailored specifically for these regions."
On the need to implement flexibly reform policies:
"as reform is a totally new task and there is no precedent in this area,
mistakes are inevitable. It is therefore inevitable that some policies made on 
reform are later found to be unsuitable when applied to the actual situation. 
With this understanding,... we should then move quickly to adjust and revise 
policies which are found to be inappropriate to the practical situations."
And, on the ultimate criterion of whether or not one has followed the 
(Centre's) policy:
"The four modernizations are the major tasks of the entire party, and 
productivity is the criterion by which to judge whether our work is good or 
not..."
Finally, the counter attack on the critics:
"Now that the Centre has flashed a "special green light" to the two
provinces, and we (in going in the direction of this special green light) are 
merely going around the "ordinary" red light (meant for the rest of the
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country), what is there to be criticized? On the contrary, if somebody does 
not implement or try to put their own limitations on the Special Policy 
formulated by the Centre, then this should amount to the flouting of (party) 
discipline. t h i s  going against economic opening and reform, the 
highest-order policy directive of the Party ?"121 (emphasis added)
Developing the New Horizon: Beyond the Budget
The three categories of discretionary behaviour of the Guangdong 
government which have been discussed so far all have a common characteristic: the 
central government is the primary focus of their attention. In a sense these were the 
responses calculated by the provincial leadership to achieve the most benefit and to 
obtain the best deal possible under a centrally dominated environment. It is the 
relative absence of this characteristic which distinguishes the fourth type of 
discretionary behaviour from the other three.
In this category of discretionary behaviour, the provincial government 
moves beyond the traditional domain of governmental action: the state and, within 
this, the budgetary sector. Such a diversion from the state and budgetary sectors 
includes a vertical as well as a horizontal dimension. Vertically, the provincial 
government no longer fixes its eyes solely on the debits and credits of the fiscal 
budget. Enterprises are no longer simply tax-payers (revenue remitters) and 
spending units of state grants, but also major players in the development of the 
economy and, as such, important investors. Horizontally, the state sector and, 
within this, the budgetary sector, are no longer the primary focus of governmental 
attention. The collective, the individual and the private sector, as well as the 
"extrabudgetary1 enterprises within the state sector assume an increasingly 
important role as they can far better perform as vibrant economic actors and 
investors than can the traditional state enterprises.
Discretionary actions taken can be summarized in three major parts. First, 
more funds were allowed to be retained at the enterprise level in order to facilitate 
investments by enterprises. As long as Guangdong had more than enough fiscal 
revenue to pay the contracted remittance amount to the Centre under the dabaogan 
system, there was no point in raising too much revenue as this would result in too 
large a surplus of provincial budget, which would, in turn, invite "borrowing"
See Wang Hao, "Three 'Sayings'; Three Defences", Zhongguo Jinbao, January 13,1989, p .l  
The author was alerted to the article by Yang Xiaofei, "Discretionary Behaviour of the Provincial- 
Level Government". According to Yang, Wang was the propaganda chief of the Guangdong 
Provincial Party Committee.
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requests from the Centre, or worse still, an upward adjustment of the contracted 
amount.
Second, the government encouraged the development of the collective and 
individual/private sector. Traditionally, these enterprises either fell outside, or 
were at the periphery of, the ambit of the central planning system. The various 
control instruments of the central government did not usually touch these sectors, 
and when they did, they were ineffective. The central control figure on the 
investment scale, for instance, covered until 1988 investment in the state sector 
only, and even after 1988 control on investment scale of the non-state sector was 
more symbolic than real. Some new state enterprises set up in the 1980s were 
placed outside of the state budget, and their taxes and profit remittance was not 
included in the budget.
Both measures—retaining more funds in the enterprises and developing 
non-state and extra-budgetary enterprises—had the effect of keeping the flow of 
resources to the state budget to a minimum. Accordingly the province could better 
ward off the tapping of its resources by the Centre.
The next step was that of recentralizing funds which had been diffused to 
enterprises back to the provincial government. In the 1980s social and economic 
development in Guangdong, and to a greater extent in China as a whole, was still at 
a stage whereby the government had a major and direct role both as investor and 
financier. Therefore while the provincial government was reducing the taxes of 
enterprises in order not to swell its fiscal coffers and thereby attract the unwelcome 
attention of the Centre, the province had to recollect at least part of that revenue by 
the imposition of various fees with which to finance its investment and other 
economic activities. Unlike fiscal revenue, which was collected primarily by the 
finance department which then allocated the funds to various user departments as 
fiscal expenditure, this income was usually collected separately by different user 
departments for their own use. All of such revenue was placed outside of the 
budget as part of the extrabudgetary revenue of the collecting departments.
As a result of these manoeuvres, the size of extrabudgetary revenue grew 
rapidly during the 1980s. The table below shows the spectacular growth:
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Table 5.3
Budgetary and Extrabudgetary Revenues of Guangdong 
(Y uan Billion')
Year Budaetarv Growth (%) Extrabud eetarv Growth
1982 3.83 .. 2.90
1983 3.63 -5.2 3.17 9.3
1984 4.96 36.6 3.70 16.71985 6.97 40.5 4.56 23.2
1986 n/a n/a 5.20 14.0
1987 9.59 n/a 6.72 29.2
1988 10.76 12.2 8.41 25.2
1989 13.69 27.2 9.08 8.0
1990 13.10 -4.3 9.84 8.4
Source: China Finance Statistics 1950-1985, pp.54,144; 1950-1991, pp.59,204.
Cutting Back the Budgetary Sector
The provincial governments could achieve its aim of retaining more funds 
outside the budget in three major ways. These were (1) extensively and generously 
applying the policy of tax exemption and reduction; (2) on the operational level of 
tax collection, by reducing the actual amount of taxes collected by manoeuvring the 
method and base of calculation, etc., and by tolerating the tax-evasion behaviour of 
the enterprises; and (3) by finance departments at various levels of provincial 
government diverting part of their fiscal revenue to the extrabudgetary sector 
through, for instance, setting up "private accounts".
Exempting and Reducing Tax Payments
Reducing the tax burden of enterprises via various tax exemption and 
reduction policies was a major governmental tactic in the 1980s. It was in fact an 
approach adopted and endorsed by the central government in order to develop the 
economy and attract foreign investment. In 1977, the State Council approved a 
notice drafted by the Finance Ministry on the tax administration system. This 
notice recognized the necessity sometimes to reduce and exempt taxes to help 
enterprises faced with difficulty in paying them. Different jurisdictions were also 
assigned to approve or initiate such actions at different levels of the government.122
122Information from an informed source, Respondent No.34, Beijing interview, March 1994. For 
the 1977 notice, "The Regulation by the Ministry of Finance on the Tax Management System", 
November 13,1977, see State Planning Commission, A Selected Collection of the Major Economic 
Regulations, pp.877-78. In sum, the notice reserves the formal power of promulgating new taxes 
and the changes of official tax rates to the State Council, but assigns a wide range of discretions to 
provincial governments in implementing the tax policies to the effect that the effective tax rates 
were in fact set by the provincial governments.
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This principle of tax alleviation was followed by subsequently promulgated tax 
regulations. Therefore, offering favourable tax treatment with preferential tax rates 
and generous reductions and exemptions was from the beginning the Centre's 
approach in order to attract foreign investment. The trend of offering ever more 
favourable tax policies to foreign investors by provincial governments nationwide 
was, therefore, only an extended version of the original central policy.
The 1977 State Council Notice prescribes the jurisdiction of tax 
management at various government levels which includes the imposition of new 
taxes, the designation of tax rates, the specific taxable categories as well as the 
exemption and reduction of taxes.123 It states that for decisions covering the 
country as a whole, the State Council would be the authority, and for decisions 
affecting a province or a particular sector, the Finance Ministry and State Taxation 
Bureau would be the authority. Decisions on individual enterprises within a 
province would be the authority of the provincial government. The notice states 
that the provincial jurisdiction regarding discretionary implementation of tax 
policies should, in general cases, not be subdelegated further to subprovincial 
levels. Presumably, therefore, the subprovincial levels do not have authority as 
regards tax exemption and reduction.124
However, in practice extensive authority was, in fact, delegated and 
exercised by the subprovincial levels of government in Guangdong. Moreover, 
since the regulations and central government notices on tax administration often 
included only a very general provision regarding tax exemption and reduction, the 
provinces had ample latitude regarding the specifics. The subdelegation of 
authority to subprovincials was a widespread and accepted practice throughout the 
provincial-level areas. In a book on tax exemption/reduction policies and 
management authored by officials from the Finance Ministry, the State Taxation 
Bureau and the State Audit Commission in 1993, the division of jurisdiction 
amongst the provincial, district and county levels, in accordance with the amount 
of tax exemption and reduction involved, was described as part of the country's tax 
exemption/reduction policy.125 The tax department at the county level, it was 
written, would in general have the jurisdiction to exempt or reduce taxes of under
30.000 yuan in a single application. The district level had a jurisdiction of under
100.000 yuan, above which the provincial tax bureau would be responsible. All of
123 Ibid.
124This was the interpretation of Respondent No.34, Beijing interview, March 1994.
125See Han Shaochu, Shuishou Jiannuan "Zhengce Yu Guanli (The Policy and Administration of 
Tax Reduction and Exemption) (Beijing: Zhongguo Wuzi chubanshe, 1993), p.293.
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this in fact amounted to provincial discretionary behaviour, or "native" policies 
beyond the general provision of central regulations.126 However, the fact that such 
discretionary behaviour was described in a suitably neutral manner as the "policy" 
on tax exemption and reduction by officials from the central departments of 
finance, tax and audit, albeit sixteen years after the issue of the 1977 State Council 
Notice, reflects the ambiguity of "unlawfulness" from this aspect.
In fact the above description of subdelegation is still very much an 
understatement of the actual practice in Guangdong. In a notice by the Guangdong 
Provincial Government in 1992, a county level city, Shunde, was given the 
authority to approve the application of tax exemption and reduction of amounts 
under 600,000 yuan, in a move to extend Shunde's authority to the district-level.127 
This amount was six times that of the 100,000 yuan jurisdiction of the district level 
governments in the country in general, and indicates the success of the Guangdong 
government in keeping one step ahead of other provinces in tax exemption and 
reduction.
In an account from the research institute of the Guangdong Provincial 
Planning Commission, it was estimated that the total value of tax exemption and 
reduction from 1979 to 1987 amounted to 3.54 billion yuan, which is equivalent to 
over 8% of the total revenue from industrial and commercial taxes, the most major 
source of fiscal income for Guangdong and for the whole country. If the revenue 
foregone via the arrangement of tax for loan payments is included, the 
haemorrhage of tax revenue during the period approaches 12% of total industrial 
and commercial tax revenue.128 Due to the sensitivity of the issue and the 
consequent difficulty in calculating the total amount of tax revenue foregone as a 
result of tax exemption and reduction, the above estimates are nevertheless likely to 
be a gross understatement of the total picture.129
126According to Respondent No.34, such local policies were tolerated by the central government 
before 1990. However, in 1990 the State Council issued a notice which explicitly prohibited the 
delegation of tax exemption and reduction authority to the subprovincial levels. (Beijing Interview. 
March 1994).
127The notice, reference no. 337,1992, was published in Guangdong Zhengbao, No.9 (1992), p.50.
128See Yang Ming,"An Analysis of the Haemorhage of Tax Revenue in Guangdong", Jihua Yu 
Fazhan, No.2 (1989), p.29. Revenue from the industrial and commercial taxes can be nearly 
equivalent to, and has ometimes been larger than, the total fiscal revenue, because revenue from 
state enterprises (in the terms of profit/ profit tax) is either very small or negative due to huge losses 
on the part of many enterprises.
129Respondent No.12, Guangzhou interview, December 1993, admitted that the issue of tax 
exemption and reduction was a sensitive one in the context of central-provincial relations, and 
declined to provide specific details of how the system worked in Guangdong in terms of the value of 
tax exempted and reduced. In the course of this and other interviews the author sensed that secrecy 
was directed more from the domestic audience, in particular the central authorities, than from the 
outside world. In a press report by an official from the People's Bank of China, the total revenue
253
The sensitivity surrounding this issue substantiates the argument that even 
though tax alleviation started as a centrally directed and endorsed policy, it 
eventually developed into a practice by the provincial governments with which to 
shield local resources from the Centre. Guangdong's officials were obviously very 
conscious of the strategic role of tax exemption and reduction as regards a more 
autonomous economic development of the province.130
The "Unenthusiastic Collectors"
Apart from generously reducing the tax burden of enterprises, the provincial 
and lower-level governments could a priori reduce revenue inflow into the state 
budget by manipulating the calculations of the exact amount of taxes to be levied at 
an operational level, and by being lax in the supervision of tax assessment and 
payments. This tactic was more commonly used in the case of those new taxes 
which were imposed by the central government during the 1980s as part of its 
effort to control the scale and direction of investment in the provinces.
The Energy and Transport Strategic Construction Fund, first imposed by the 
Centre in December 1982 as a means to tap the growing extra-budgetary funds in 
the provinces, required as 10%, and rising to 15% from August 1983, of the 
extrabudgetary funds in various units to be collected to the state budget. A large 
proportion of this fund goes to the central coffers in order to finance badly needed 
energy and transport investment. In theory, payments into the Fund would increase 
in line with the extrabudgetary funds of a unit. As regards the public roads 
department in Guangdong, however, this was not the case. In order to retain more 
funds within the department with which to finance the province's road construction 
programme, the Guangdong Government froze the payments of the department into
lost nationally as a result of abusive tax exemption and reduction was estimated to reach 50 billion 
yuan a year. See Economic Information Daily (Beijing) March 9,1993, p.4.
130This is the impression given to the author by Respondent No. 12, Guangzhou interview, 
December 1993. When comparing the relative importance of the expanding investment 
administration authority, in particular project approval authority, with the effect of tax alleviation 
for the growth of investment in Guangdong, the respondent stated unambiguously that the former 
was more important than the latter. Therefore, even though Guangdong’s power to reduce and 
exempt taxes would be greatly restricted by the tax reforms in 1994, in his opinion the effect on 
Guangdong’s investment would not be too severe. This respondent's judgement is not the issue 
here. What is important is that his articulations reflect how strategically minded he is as a member 
of the Guangdong government and his consequent consciousness of the role of tax alleviation in 
Guangdong's central-provincial relations.
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the Fund at the base line level of 1984. As a result the department was able to 
retain several hundred thousand yuan in the 1980s.131
There was similar resistance to paying taxes on the part of the electricity 
department in Guangdong. Guangdong's electricity department was unwilling to 
pay into the Energy and Transport Strategic Construction Fund and the Budgetary 
Adjustment Fund, as altogether this would amount to 25% of the total electricity 
fund of the department.132 The two funds were central measures through which to 
recentralize extrabudgetary funds in the provinces; and as the electricity fund 
belonged to the extrabudgetary category, paying the taxes should therefore have 
been a matter of course. However, the Guangdong department argued that since 
the electricity fund was set up with the approval of the Centre to facilitate local 
financing of Guangdong's energy projects, the diminution of the fund as a result of 
paying the two central taxes would amount to a violation of the original intention 
of the Centre in establishing the electricity fund. As a result of this bargaining, 
Guangdong's electricity department was in the end required to pay only a fraction 
of the original liable tax.133
Construction Tax was another measure imposed by the Centre from 1983 to 
1989 to control investments. 10% of the value of investment using funds outside of 
the state budget, and including local budgetary funds used in "outside plan" 
projects, was required to be paid in this tax. However the implementation of the 
tax was far from effective. Investments in Guangdong continued to grow 
spectacularly, but the amount of Construction Tax collected remained more or less 
static, and at an extraordinarily low level. Total investment in 1985, 1986 and 1987 
was 18.46 billion yuan, 21.65 billion yuan, and 25.1 billion yuan respectively,134 
whereas Construction Tax collected in these three years amounted to only 90 
million yuan, 107 million yuan, and 115 million yuan, accounting for 0.5%, 0,49% 
and 0.48% of total societal investment.133 In some periods the tax revenue dropped
131See Lou Jingfen and Guo Shuqing, Jichu Chanye Jianshe Zijin Chouji. (Capital Mobilization for 
Infrastructural Constructio) (Beijing: Jingji Guanli chubanshe, 1993), p.234. This is a book 
organized and written by officials from the State Planning Commission.
132This was mentioned by Respondent No.34, Beijing interview, March 1994.
133ibid. An informed source in Guangdong provincial government (Respondent No.7, Guangzhou 
interview, December 1993) also revealed that because the two funds, the Energy and Transport 
Strategic Construction Fund, and the Extrabudgetary Adjustment Fund, were measures arising from 
administrative notices, rather than formal taxes promulgated by law, they were of lower status and 
authority, and had long been the targets of severe lobbying and even blanket violation by various 
unwilling tax-payers.
134See Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 1993, p.236.
133See Yang Ming, "An Analysis of the Haemorhage of Tax Revenue in Guangdong", Jihua Yu
Fazhan, No.2 (1989), p. 29. Total societal investment is used hoe as the comparison base. Because
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in relation to a rising investment total. According to the Guangdong Provincial Tax 
Bureau estimate, a maximum of 40% to 50% of the tax was actually collected m 
1987 and 1988.136
A major and systematic method through which to retain more revenue 
outside the state budget is that of manoeuvring the base-line of the tax-profit 
remittance contracts with enterprises. It should be noted that the contracting 
system was formally endorsed and its application extended to nearly all state 
enterprises by the Centre in 1987. Fixing the amount of remittance from the 
enterprises to their superordinate departments was intended to cultivate a greater 
potential for development among the traditionally weak state enterprises. As the 
calculation of the base line was normally based on the average tax level of 
enterprises over the previous few years, this method of tax assessment resulted in 
more revenue being retained by the enterprises, an advantage similar to that gained 
by the provincial government vis-a-vis its fiscal contracts with the Centre. 
Moreover, in the event of straitened times and of profits falling below average, 
enterprises would still be able to apply for temporary tax reduction or 
exemption.137
The contracting system relied on the superordinate departments and the 
provincial governments negotiating an adequate "contract" through which to find a 
balance between both the competing needs to encourage the incentives of 
enterprises and to ensure an adequate level of fiscal income. However, since a 
larger fiscal revenue on the part of the provincial government would be likely to 
affect central-provincial negotiations over the province's fiscal remittance, the 
provincial government was careful not to let the local coffers swell too much, and 
as a result opted for retaining more within the enterprises. Pushing down the base­
line of contracts with enterprises was therefore commonplace amongst local 
finance departments in Guangdong.138 Moreover, when first conceived the
the proportion of investment using budgetary funds was getting increasingly smaller in the 1980s, as 
shown in Chapter Three, this does not greatly affect the accuracy of the whole picture.
^bjbid. During the first nine months of 1988, the value of investment in the state sector increased 
by 37.4% over same period last year. Meanwhile the amount of construction tax revenue for the 
period dropped by 13.3%.
^ 7For discussion of the practice of collecting tax via "tax contracts", and criticisms of the practice 
by some local tax officials in Guangdong, see Zhu Jiangchou, "The Ten Drawbacks of the Tax 
Contracting Practice", Guangdong Taxation, No.9 (1992), pp. 8-9.
*3®In ^  article from the Audit Bureau, Jiangmen city, Guangdong, it was stated that some local 
finance departments, with the purpose of retaining more discretionary revenue in the locality in 
mind, would undertake various tactics through which to reduce the recorded fiscal revenue for the 
year, whilst exaggerating the level of fiscal expenses. These tactics included transferring part of the 
revenue for the current year to the following year, and of the following year to the next, and on to 
the following; and treating the unspent cash in hand as spent expenditure. See Ngan Shaoping,"A
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contracting system was supposed to cover the remittance of profit and profit tax 
only. However, in the course of implementation the provincial and lower-level 
governments often also included industrial and commercial taxes. Since these were 
the major fiscal revenue items, the central government was adamant that the 
industrial and commercial taxes should be levied strictly in accordance with the tax 
regulations, but obviously with little success.139
It is difficult to know exactly how much revenue has been kept from the 
state budget in this way. Annual financial and taxation inspection exercises have, 
however, recovered increasingly large sums of lost revenue. For instance, in 1988 
it was 0.4 billion yuan and in 1993 over 0.7 billion yuan was recovered.140 
Although these were not huge sums when compared to Guangdong's total fiscal 
revenue of over 22 billion yuan in 1992, the coverage of haemorrhage behaviour 
was nevertheless extensive. The 1989 inspection found that nearly 60% of the 
inspected enterprises in the state and collective sectors, and 80% of the inspected 
central enterprises in Guangdong, had experienced such problems.141
However, whatever was unearthed during inspections, it was almost 
certainly only the tip of the iceberg. There is immense difficulty in digging out 
such figures, given the current state of auditing work within the Chinese 
government and the protectionist attitude of provincial governments towards this 
issue. Moreover, it is not easy to define clearly or identify the boundaries of 
revenue haemorhage. For instance, the lowering of the remittance contracts of 
enterprises is not, as long as the rules of accounting have been duly observed, 
easily disclosed by ordinary audit scrutiny, and there are also many more grey 
areas than outsiders would expect to find, even in the seemingly straight-forward 
matter of the observance of auditing and financial rules. As an informed source 
described it, practical situations in the country had changed so much and so rapidly 
that many accounting and financial rules had become inapplicable and obsolete. 
When inspecting the accounts of the various units, the audit personnel, therefore, 
could not follow the straight-forward approach and focus on just the books and 
rules, but needed to look at the actual situations in order to arrive at a sensible 
judgement of whether or not a certain act was "against the rule". There is,
preliminary discussion of the auditing work of local fiscal budgets under the dabaogan fiscal 
system", Guangdong Audit, No.4 (1990), p. 16.
139The Director of the State Taxation Bureau, Jin Xin, stressed that the industrial and commercial 
taxes should not be "contracted" and stated four reasons for it. See Guangdong Taxation 1W ■
(1992), p.24.
140See Zhongguo Jinbao June 16,1989, p.l; NanfangRibao January 8,1994, p.l.
141See Zhongguo Jinbao June 16,1989, p.l.
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therefore, an inevitable element of subjectivity, thus adding to the difficulty in 
ascertaining the extent of revenue haemorrhage in an objective sense.142
Diverting Budgetary Revenue to the Extrabudgetary and "Private Accounts"
After initially reducing the flow of local resources into the state budget 
through the exemption and reduction of taxes, then manipulating the calculation of 
tax payments and tolerating underpayment on the operational level, local 
departments, including the finance department, could ultimately reduce the size of 
fiscal revenue by "illegally" appropriating part of the collected fiscal revenue to the 
extrabudgetary funds of the departments. Alternatively, they may divert part of the 
collected budgetary revenue to "hidden" or "private" accounts beyond the coverage 
of both the budgetary and extrabudgetary fiscal finance.
Budgetary revenue of an ad hoc nature was more susceptible to such 
diversion efforts. Income arising from various administrative penalty fees, for 
instance, was a major target. In an inspection report in 1986, it was discovered that 
less than 30% of the penalty income entered the budget, as compared to 70% 
prescribed by central finance regulations.143 The report found that at least 13% of 
the total revenue arising from such fees and retained outside of the state budget had 
been used for capital construction. Moreover, many such investment projects had 
not obtained the necessary approvals and were thus "hidden" projects.
Diverting funds to "private accounts" is a much more serious type of 
discretionary behaviour and edges more towards illegality than does the shifting of 
funds from the budget to the extrabudgetary. Unlike problems with the 
extrabudgetary funds which were basically a matter of abusing and stretching the 
preexisting system of extrabudgetary management of fiscal resources, private 
accounts were blatantly "illegal" and should not have been in existence. There 
could still be some kind of control over extrabudgetary funds, (in theory the central
142Respondent No. 10, Guangzhou Interview, December 1993. The respondent regarded the 
inevitability of a subjective element in auditing work as one of the peculiar difficulties of audit work 
in China. Because of the experimental nature of China’s reforms in the 1980s and the fact that laws 
and regulations had lagged substantially behind the actual situation, audit officials in their work 
often had to "cross the river by touching the stones". Having been placed in a role whereby they 
were required to judge what was wrong or right while some of the laws themselves had become 
seriously obsolete, the audit staff usually had to rely on the highest principle of promoting 
productivity as well as abstract principles such as fairness in their day-to-day judgements.
143See "The Guangdong People's Government Notice No. 125 (1986) approving the Provincial 
Audit Bureau's report on the auditing of the penalty income of Guangdong" July 26,1986, in Jingji 
Tizhi Gaige Wenjian Huibian , 1986-1988, 1988, pp. 450-51. The remaining 30% could be 
retained by the units to cover the administration and related expenses.
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government knew exactly how much funds in the extrabudgetary sector amounted 
to, as reflected in the statistics of extrabudgetary funds), making them potentially 
susceptible to central control.144 The "private accounts", on the other hand, were 
supposedly non-existent and there was, therefore, no control mechanism in force 
over them at all. As a result provincial and lower-level governments were able to 
have an even larger degree of autonomy over this part of revenue.
This absence of control has made private accounts a widespread 
phenomenon, existing as they do in state enterprises, local and central 
administrative units, and also government departments at various levels. Even the 
finance bureaux at provincial and subprovincial levels, which should act as 
managers, guardians of the local budget, have had their own private accounts. For 
instance, in an account from the Guangdong Provincial Audit Bureau, it was 
revealed that the finance departments in some Guangdong cities had opened 
separate bank accounts in which to keep the "private money". Revenues diverted 
to these private accounts included taxes paid by the extrabudgetary state enterprises 
and income from anti-smuggling activities.145
In order to wipe out the private accounts, a severely worded notice was 
issued by the State Council in 1989.146 In about a month 1 billion yuan of funds 
was recovered from the "private accounts". However because of the huge interests 
involved, many units implemented the State Council notice only half-heartedly.147 
Given the vested interests of the units, the commonality of the practice nationwide, 
and the inevitable reliance of the inspection exercise on the self-discipline of the 
units themselves, it is doubtful whether the private accounts could be successfully 
banned merely by administrative orders.148
144The Energy and Transport Strategic Construction Fund started in 1983, and the Budgetary 
Adjustment Fund started in 1989 were two such examples. Both had the extra-budgetary funds as 
the tax base. The two together could take away 25% of total extrabudgetary funds to the budget.
145See Lin Zhengbo,"A Preliminary analysis of the rule-abating behaviour of local finance 
departments and some possible solutions", Guangdong Audit, No.5 (1990), pp.9-10.
i^State Council Notice No. 77 (1989), State Council, "Notice on the inspection and wiping out of 
'private treasuries'", November 14,1989, in State Council Gazette, No.24 (1989), pp.867-68.
147In another notice issued in February 1990, the Centre complained about the unethusiastic 
attitude of many enterprises, departments and units in the inspection and wiping out of private 
accounts and urged that more cooperation and effort to be applied to the task. See State Council 
Notice No. 6 (1990), the State Council Secretariat, "Notice on the further inspection and wiping out 
of the 'private treasuries'", February 22,1990, in State Council Gazette, No.3 (1990), pp.91-92.
14^One difficulty in wiping out the practice is the vagueness in boundaries between legitimate own 
funds and illegitimate private accounts or treasuries. The State Council Notice No. 77 (1989) made 
a distinction, stating that party fees, union fees, mutual aid funds of staff, and retention funds from 
literary writing revenue did not belong to the category of "private treasuries". This meant that there 
would then be a fourth segment of revenue, apart from budgetary, extrabudgetary and the 
illegitimate private accounts. Although this fourth segment of funds was legitimate, it was 
seemingly not included in the statistics and accounts of budgetary and extrabudgetary funds.
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Developing the Extra-Budgetarv and Non-State Sector
The state sector was traditionally the focus of concern within the central 
planning system. As state enterprises obtained more support through the planning 
system, they were consequently under tighter scrutiny than the non-state sector. 
With the gradual liberalization of the economy, state enterprises had obtained fewer 
and fewer benefits from the state, but the traditional management system, albeit 
also under change and increasingly ineffective, was still comparatively harder on 
state enterprises than on the collective and individual sector. As Guangdong 
progressed still further in its economic development, so the constraints on the state 
sector of the economy emanating from the traditional system were increasingly felt. 
Therefore, moving beyond the traditional model of state enterprises became 
increasingly the consensus of the Guangdong leadership as regards the direction of 
Guangdong's economic development.
An article published in 1992 written by Lin Ruo, Guangdong's Party 
Secretary from 1986 to 1990, and subsequently the chairman of the Provincial 
People's Congress Standing Committee, includes an explicit reference to this 
strategy and approach by the Guangdong leadership:
"As state enterprises would not be able to get rid of the centralized control 
of the state for some time to come, Guangdong has taken the approach of 
going round this obstacle by focusing on the development of collective 
enterprises of various types. We have not placed these enterprises under 
the control of the budget. This has worked well and these enterprises have 
succeeded. That is why the proportion of our state enterprises within the 
budget has been ever on the decline whilst the proportion of collective 
enterprises of various types is ever increasing.
In encouraging the development of the collective and private sectors, the 
Guangdong government not only granted generous tax reduction policies and 
reduced the taboo areas of private sector activities, it also provided the 
organizational cover for the new and emerging private sector.
In 1989 there were an estimated 800,000 to 900,000 private enterprises in 
Guangdong. However, the number of private enterprises in the formal register of
Respondent No.34, Beijing interview, March 1994, confirmed the existence of such fourth segment 
funds in every unit This fourth segment of funds was, according to the respondent, normally quite 
small in amount and was usually some kind of petty cash for staff welfare. The problem was that the 
line of demarcation between legitimacy and illegitimacy was far from clear. 
l^ S e e  Lin Ruo, "Looking Back and Rethink: The Track of Reform and Opening of Guangdong", 
in Zhang Hanqing (ed.), Reform and Opening in Guangdong, p.18.
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the Industry and Commerce Bureau was under 6000, the registration rate standing 
at only 6%. The vast majority of these private enterprises had been registered as 
collectives under the auspices of "shell collective enterprises".150
This apparently ridiculous phenomenon was the result of progressive 
discretions carried out by the Guangdong government in order to facilitate the 
development of the private sector within a still restrictive macro-environment. 
Having been all too aware of "exploitation" within private enterprises, the central 
government was slow to recognize the legitimacy of private enterprises. It was 
only in 1987 that the Centre first endorsed the existence of private enterprises, and 
only in 1988 that the constitution was amended to give legitimacy to the private 
sector. The rights of private enterprises started to get some form of legal protection 
with the passage of the first administrative regulation on the private sector in 
1988.151
Prior to 1988, therefore, private enterprises were deprived of a legal 
existence. Many had existed as individual businesses, although the number of 
employees had far exceeded the permitted ceiling of eight persons. Many more had 
operated as collectives due to the convenience resulting from the legitimacy 
accorded to collective enterprises in an economic management system which was 
still seriously biased towards the public sector. One major advantage of collective 
enterprises was their ability to obtain bank finance. Under the constraints of central 
rules, banks in Guangdong could offer very limited services to private enterprises. 
In Foshan, loan policies in the late 1980s prescribed that private individuals and 
enterprises could normally borrow only 3000 to 5000 yuan at one time, and could 
under no circumstances borrow more than 10,000 yuan. There was, however, no 
ceiling for collectives. The interest rate for private enterprise loans was also 
substantially higher than that of loans for collectives.152
Local governments, usually at the township levels, obtained benefits in the 
form of management fees and licence fees from these enterprises. In a sense it was 
the vested interest of the "shell enterprises" which had encouraged and sustained 
such a practice. However given its extensiveness, the connivance of the upper
150See an article by Guangdong's Industry and Commerce Bureau, "The present status and future 
development strategies of private enterprises in Guangdong" in Lok Chaopei and Zheng Yanchao 
(ed.)A Study of Guangdong's Private Sector Economy, pp.257-58.
151Ibid.
152See Fong Jishun (from the Industry and Commerce Bureau of Foshan) "A Study Into the 
"Pseudo" Collectives in Foshan", in Lok Chaopei and Zheng Yanchao (ed.) A Study of Guangdong's 
Private Sector Economy, pp. 164-69.
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levels of government within the province was nevertheless still required. In this 
respect the Guangdong provincial leadership would not have been so tolerant or 
supportive if not for their strategy to promote the development of the previously 
peripheral non-state sectors.
Apart from the collective and private enterprises, there was another 
category of enterprise which was promoted by the Guangdong government in a 
move to circumvent the traditional state sector. In terms of modes of ownership 
these were still owned by the state, and were similar to state enterprises. The main 
difference between these and the traditional sector was, however, that they were not 
placed within the state budget, and could thus be described as "extrabudgetary state 
enterprises".
The existence of extrabudgetary state enterprises was not new, but as a 
major phenomenon it occurred only in the 1980s with the proliferation of 
investment actors and funding channels. Traditionally state enterprises were 
established by budgetary grants of the state but at the same time there were still a 
small number of enterprises which had been set up by various departments using 
their own extrabudgetary funds. These enterprises were usually small in scale and 
performed a subsidiary role in the economy and as their source of capital was 
extrabudgetary funds via the state, they were still, in theory, state enterprises. They 
were consequently placed outside of the budget and, after paying indirect taxes (the 
industrial and commercial taxes, for instance) to the state, the distribution of profits 
was entirely a matter between the enterprises and their "mother units".153 In other 
words the relationship between the state budget and such enterprises is similar to 
that of state-enterprise relations in a private-ownership system. The state collects 
taxes, and the sharing of profits (and losses) is entirely a matter between the 
shareholders of the enterprise and the enterprise itself. The only difference is that in 
a private ownership system, the taxes paid by enterprises to the state treasury 
include a direct tax on their profits, which is not paid by extrabudgetary enterprises 
in China.
In a sense the concept of extrabudgetary enterprises has always been 
marginal and transient. As an economic phenomenon, enterprises such as these 
before the 1980s had been relatively few in number, small in scale, and therefore
153por a succint discussion of the state of extrabudgetary state enterprises, their distinguishing 
characteristics, state of development and existing problems, see Wang Weijian, "Thoughts on Some 
Issues Concerning the Extrabudgetary Enterprises", Jihua Jingji Yanjiu, No.7 (1990), pp.59-62. 
Wang was from the General Planning Department of the Finance Ministry.
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largely neglected by the central government. Some regarded the concept as a 
contradiction in terms, since state enterprises should, by definition, be governed by 
the state budget, 154 As their numbers grew phenomenally during the 1980s, it has 
been argued that the concept, which had from the beginning been a product of the 
central planning economy, would become increasingly irrelevant in the age of 
market economy.155 Nevertheless the concept is material as regards a better 
understanding of the economic and investment behaviour of provincial and lower- 
level governments at a time when the transition from a planned economy to a 
market system is as yet incomplete. Due to the fact that after-tax profit could be 
retained entirely between the enterprises and their "mother units", and that taxes 
could easily be reduced by the local government under various pretexts, the 
growing number of extrabudgetary enterprises had, therefore, become a major 
avenue for the haemorrhage of state revenue. Some "mother units" would use 
budgetary resources to support the enterprises during their inception, whilst 
retaining all revenues outside the budget
There are no formal and official statistics on the total number of 
extrabudgetary enterprises. An account from the State Planning Commission in 
1990 estimated the total number nationwide as of the end of the 1980s decade as 
over 10 ,0 0 0 , and the production value of these enterprises as tens of billion 
yuan.156 Neither estimates or statistics were available for Guangdong, but officials 
in Guangdong admitted to an increased number of extrabudgetary enterprises in 
the province since 1980. The number of extrabudgetary enterprises in a single city, 
for instance, nearly tripled from 51 to 138 enterprises between 1985 and 1991, so 
that by the end of 1991 the turnover revenue of extrabudgetary enterprises 
amounted to 60% of the total of the budgetary sector.157 It is therefore 
unsurprising that many new state enterprises established in the 1980s were said to 
have been placed outside the budget.158
Three reasons were cited for placing enterprises in the extrabudgetary 
sector in Guangdong.159 The first was as a means to helping enterprises to repay
154Ibid., p.59. Experience of the author during the field trip in Beijing pointed to the same 
impression that the concept of extrabudgetary enterprises was not commonly known. Several 
respondents from the economic and planning stream appeared never to have heard of the concept
155 See Lou Shangxi et al., "An Appraisal of the History of Creativity of Fiscal Theories", Caizheng 
Yanjiu, NO.7 (1993), p.13.
156Wang Weijian, "Thoughts on Some Issues Concerning the Extrabudgetary Enterprises", p.59.
157See Zeng Xiangyou, "A Study of the Financial Management of Extrabudgetary Enterprises in 
Maoming", Guangdong Caizheng, No.l (1993), p.46.
^ R e s p o n d e n t  No,7, Guangzhou interview, December 1993.
159Ibid. For an explicit advocacy of the establishment of extrabudgetary enterprises by the local 
financial department, see Zhong Qijun, "A Preliminary Study of the Approach Whereby the
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bank loans with which most extrabudgetary enterprises were established. Placing 
enterprises outside of the budgetary system made tax-reduction and exemption 
easier. The enterprises could then have more retained resources with which to 
repay the loans. Second, enterprises in the extrabudgetary sector helped to contain 
the budgetary revenue base line of the province, thus reducing the exposure of the 
province to extraction pressure from the Centre. Thirdly, the province was very 
often left to shoulder new expenditure items or additional expenditure as a result of 
the progress of reform or new central initiatives. Under the dabaogan system, 
however, it was not easy for the province to bargain for a reduced value of 
contracted remittance due to its increased expenditure obligation. Under such 
circumstances, the availability of a second source of fiscal revenue to make up the 
losses could help the provincial coffers to stay afloat
Moreover, all revenues derived from extrabudgetary enterprises in 
Guangdong were also placed outside the budget. A provincial government notice 
in 1985 openly prescribed that profit tax revenues from extrabudgetary enterprises 
be managed outside the budget even though central policy was that extrabudgetary 
enterprises should pay both profit and indirect taxes to the state coffers.160 This 
open violation of central policy was only rectified in 1992, after pressure from the 
central government following an audit inspection from Beijing, when another 
provincial government notice proclaimed the cease of effect of the 1985 rule, and 
that taxes paid by the extrabudgetary enterprises would thereafter be included in the 
budget.161
The Guangdong Development Bank, established in 1988, is an example of 
one such extrabudgetary enterprise. Its shareholders included Guangdong's 
Finance Department, various specialised state banks, several major provincial 
enterprises and the China Bank Group based in Hong Kong. It was stated that the 
establishment of the bank did not involve state grants, being wholly supported by 
the "own funds" of the shareholders.162 The Finance Department, as one of the
Finance Department Invests Directly in Extrabudgetary Enterprises", Guangdong Caizheng, No.l 
(1993), pp.55-56. The author is an official from the local finance department of Maoming city, 
Guangdong.
160This is revealed in Guangdong Provincial Government Notice N o .3 ,1992, "On the Inclusion in 
Budgetary Management of Profit Taxes and Adjustment Taxes Paid by Extrabudgetary Enterprises" 
printed in Guangdong Zhengbao, No.l (1992), p.34, which states that the 1985 notice would 
hereafter be superseded.
161 That the change was a result of central pressure after audit inspection was revealed by 
Respondent No.7, Guangzhou interview, December 1993. For the 1992 Notice, see Footnote 160 
above.
1 ^ Respondent No.7, Guangzhou interview, December 1993, admitted that the bank was within the 
extrabudgetary enterprise category. See also a report in Nanfang Ribao, February 6,1990.
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shareholders, did however provide at least several hundred million yuan from the 
provincial budget as the initial capital of the bank.163 First established in 1988, the 
bank was still exempted from profit taxes in 1993.164
Through developing the non-state sector and placing new state enterprises 
beyond the budget, the Guangdong leadership sought to speed up economic 
development by ignoring the relatively stagnant traditional state sector and 
focusing on the new and more flexible non-state and extrabudgetary sectors. Not 
only was the mode of operation of these enterprises often more flexible, and with 
less red tape, they were also more susceptible to manoeuvring by the provincial and 
lower-level governments. As local enterprises they were under the sole 
management of the Guangdong government. This enabled easier manoeuvring of 
the tax payments of the enterprises, and, as and when the need arose, easier 
extraction also.
Recentralization of Societal Resources
Additional resources retained at enterprises and grass-roots units through 
tax reduction and exemption could be recentralized by the imposition of various 
fees. These revenues were usually placed outside of the budget in order to reserve 
the revenue exclusively for local use. Through first reducing taxes and then levying 
local charges, the provincial and lower-level governments were able to retain more 
resources within Guangdong and to minimize the possibility of extraction by the 
Centre, whilst still being able to gain access to local resources for their own 
disposal and allocation.
The Electricity Fund established in 1987 in Guangdong is an example of 
one of those larger extrabudgetary funds whose major revenue source derived from 
that which had previously been budgetary revenue. In March 1987, the Guangdong 
provincial government approved a proposal from the provincial electricity bureau 
that taxes formerly paid by the bureau be exempted. Meanwhile an equivalent 
amount of funds would be paid into a newly formed electricity fund. This fund 
would be placed outside the budget for the autonomous use of the bureau. In return 
the bureau would take up the responsibility, including the provision of capital, for 
the construction of an agreed list of electricity supply projects. In addition, the 
electricity bureau was allowed to charge an electricity construction fee to the users,
1 ^ Respondent No.6, Guangzhou interview, September 1993. 
^Respondent No.7, Guangzhou interview, December 1993.
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with the revenue ostensibly paid into the Fund. 165 A total of more than 8 billion 
yuan was raised by this extrabudgetary fund by the end of 1990.166
A substantial proportion of investment in the "bottleneck" sectors, of 
energy, transport and telecommunications, in Guangdong was also financed from 
extrabudgetary resources. The flexibility and higher degree of autonomy 
associated with this type of financing and investment management enabled 
Guangdong to overcome, to an extent, traditional bias against investment allocation 
to these sectors. For this reason the experience of Guangdong was made the 
subject of intensive examination and was evaluated fairly positively by the central 
government in a high-level study in the early 1990s.167
Apart from the electricity fund as described above, it was found that 
Guangdong had also collected more than 20 billion yuan in the extrabudgetary 
sector via road tolls, additional or adjusted charges on freight transport, installation 
fees for new telephones since 1980. These funds had been used to finance the 
construction of roads, bridges and ports, and the development of the 
telecommunication service within the province.168 Part of this sum came from new 
charges, for example adjusted freight prices and telephone installation fees. Part 
was also derived from what had originally been the revenue of the budget. Fo  ^
instance, the port authorities were exempted from paying into the Energy and 
Transport Strategic Construction Fund and the Budget Adjustment Fund by the 
provincial government in order that the resources could be used to develop the port 
facilities locally. 169 This, in effect, amounted to a transfer of budgetary resources 
to the extrabudgetary.
165§ee Guangdong Provincial Government Notice No. 20 (1987), "Guangdong People's 
Government’s Notice of Approving the Proposal by the Provincial Electricity Bureau on 
Contracting the Electricity Development Targets of the Seventh Five-Year Plan Period", March 20, 
1987, in Guangdong People's Government, and Provincial Commission for the Restructuring and 
Reform of Economic Systems (ed.), Jingji Tizhi Gaige Wenjian Huibian, 1986-1988 (A 
Compendium of Economic System Reform Documents, 1986-1988) (Guangdong: Neibu), pp.225- 
29.
166see Guangdong Planning Commission Research Institute, "The Plan and the Market in the 
Investment Scene of Guangdong", in State Planning Commission (ed.), Zhongguo Jingji Tiaojie de 
Lilun he Shijian (The Theory and Practice of Economic Adjustment in China) (Beijing: People's 
University of China Press, 1992), p.72.
167The experience of Guangdong figured conspicuously and were evaluated in a positive light in a 
study by the State Planning Commission, the State Council, the Construction Bank and the Ministry 
of Finance in 1991/1992. The findings of the study were published in Luo Jingfen and Guo 
Shuqing (ed.), Jichu Chanye Jianshe Zijin Chouji (Capital Mobilization for Infrastructural 
Construction) (Beijing: Jingji Guanli chubanshe, 1993). For more discussion on this point, see 
Chapter Seven,
^ S e e  Footnote 166, p.73.
!69See Luo Jingfen and Guo Shuqing (ed.), Jichu Chanye Jianshe Zijin Chouji, p.235.
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In a report on the use of extrabudgetary funds in fixed asset investment 
nationally, it was stated that in some provinces there were more than 100 different 
channels whereby extrabudgetary funds were obtained and used by various units 
for investment purpose. 170 In general 80% of funds was kept in state enterprises 
and their superordinate departments-in-charge. Government departments and 
various administrative ("shiye") units kept about 18%, with the remaining 2 % 
being kept in the local finance departments. In Guangdong, the share was 64%, 
32% and 4% respectively for the period 1986 to 1990.171 The share kept in the 
government departments, "shiye" units and local finance departments was 
considerably larger in Guangdong as compared with the national average. As there 
was a larger number of state enterprises than government and administrative units, 
this suggests a higher degree than average of centralization of extrabudgetary funds 
in Guangdong, probably due to a more aggressive involvement of governmental 
units in investment, through, for instance, the establishment of the various utility 
funds as outlined above.
There were two major ways in which the provincial government could 
recentralize societal resources. One was through various types of capitalization 
exercise, including the sale of local public bonds, the near-administrative 
assignment of capitalization quotas, and through high-interest loans. In one report, 
for instance, it was stated that Dongguan city, a hub of export-processng activity in 
the Pearl River Delta Region, planned to raise 0.6 billion yuan of capital between 
1989 and 1991 with which to finance infrastructure investments, despite the fact 
that the national economy was at that time in the throes of an austerity 
programme.172 The other was via the more traditional method of levying various 
administrative or service fees and charges, or by adjusting the prices of 
commodities.
There are no comprehensive statistics on the total number of extrabudgetary 
fees and charges levied by various government and administrative units, either 
nationwide or in Guangdong. An insight into the possible scale of such a practice 
has been made possible via information made available through campaigns to 
stamp out the excessive proliferation of such levies in the early 1990s. In late 1991 
it was reported that, in total, 70378 categories of fees and charges involving a total 
sum of 3.3 billion yuan were being inspected and screened during the 1990-91
17^See Gui Shiyong (ed.), Xianshi Yu Jueze: Lai Zi Guojia Jiwei Jingji Yanjiu Zhongxin de Baogao 
(The Reality and the Choice: A Report from the State Planning Commission) (Shanghai: Shanghai 
Renmin chubanshe, 1991), p.79.
17 Calculated from Ministry of Finance (ed 1),China Finance Statistics 1950-1991, p.294,
172SeeNanfangRibao, February 27,1989, p.l.
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inspection campaign regarding excessive fees in Guangdong. In the end about 
7200 categories were either abolished or revised, thus lowering the level of fees by 
about 0.8  billion yuan.173
The central government, concerned with the haemorrhage effect of such 
extrabudgetary charges, launched campaigns to stamp out their proliferation from 
time to time. An administrative regulation issued by the State Council in 1988, for 
instance, unambiguously banned the levying of fees and charges beyond the 
provision of laws and administrative regulations.174 In October 1993, in the midst 
of the effort to rein in the runaway financial activities which had occurred earlier in 
the year, the central government announced that all administrative charges and 
fees, including penalty levies which had been previously placed outside the budget, 
should thereafter be gradually subsumed into the budget, and remitted to the state 
treasury.175 In November and December 1993, a total of 143 administrative charges 
by various departments were abolished in two batches. 176 Nevertheless, given the 
relatively good performance of Guangdong's extrabudgetary funds, in terms of the 
effect on the investment in bottleneck sectors, and the fact that Guangdong had 
sought the approval of the State Council for at least some of its major initiatives, 
the brunt of the ban fell mostly on the other provinces, having relatively little effect 
on the extrabudgetary finance of Guangdong.177
173See Nanfang Ribao, December 11,1991, p.l.
174"The Temporary Regulation on the Banning of Tan-pei Charges to Enterprises" promulgated 
by the State Council in April 28,1988. This regulation provided that all charges to enterprises not 
provided under laws and formal administrative regulations of a legal effect, and all "compulsory" 
sale of bonds and other securities beyond the provision of laws and regulations would be banned. 
Enterprises had the right to refuse any such illegal charges imposed by any government units. The 
Regulation was printed in State Council Gazette, No.12 (1988), pp.387-90.
175 "Central Committee Secretariat and State Council Secretariat Approving Ministry of Finance's 
'Regulation on Implementing the Budgetary Management on Administrative Fees and Penalty 
Revenues’", released in Beijing Daily, October 24,1993, and reprinted in State Audit Commission 
(ed.), Study Materials on Taxation and Fiscal Reforms, pp.75-79.
176two lists of charges banned with immediate effect were released in national newspapers on 
November 9, and December 31,1993. The lists were reprinted in Ibid., pp.84-94.
177The two lists of banned charges included exemptions of those already approved by the- Centre. 
For instance, it was explicitly stated in the announcement that surcharges levied oh freight 
transport, an item banned in the second list, would not include those surcharges already approved by 
previous State Council documents. Since Guangdong had already obtained approval for freight 
transport surcharges in the mid-1980s, its interest would not be affected. Respondent No.9 from 
Guangdong confirmed that Guangdong had obtained the approval of the Centre to raise charges for 
freight transport as early as 1984 or 1985. (Telephone interview, November 1993) A report by 
officials of the State Planning Commission on the financing of infrastructure investment in 
Guangdong also stated that it was the preferential policy of the Centre to allow Guangdong to levy 
higher charges for newly built railroads financed with locally raised funds. See Luo Jingfen 
Guo Shuqing, Capital Mobilization for Infrastructural Construction, p.235.
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Internationalization
The term "internationalization" refers to the increasing use of foreign 
capital in the economy of Guangdong. It is included as one type of discretionary 
behaviour because although the use of foreign capital was the stated policy of the 
Centre, the method in which the Guangdong government has implemented this 
general policy has had a significant effect on its relations with the Centre regarding 
investment.
The use of foreign capital, in Guangdong and nationally, started with the 
initial aim of supplementing the shortage of domestic investment capital and 
bringing in foreign technology and management techniques to order to speed up the 
modernization drive of the country. At that time it was largely a demand driven 
exercise, particularly as the onset of economic adjustment between 1980-83 
tightened the supply of domestic capital when additonal input was badly needed, 
both for the take-off of the economic experiments in Guangdong and the 
construction of the freshly established special economic zones.
However, the use of foreign capital brought with it certain "benefits" other 
than additional resources from abroad, and the Guangdong government soon 
became conscious of the advantage the foreign factor provided vis-a-vis its 
relations with the Centre. As the vice-director of Guangdong's Foreign Economic 
and Trade Commission commented, "the work of the provincial government in 
attracting foreign investment has gone through a developmental process, from one 
of passivity to active, conscious and strategic action."178 He was actually referring 
to the allocation and direction of foreign investment, but this statement could also 
be used to describe the process by which the Guangdong leadership recognized the 
possible use of internationalization, both for Guangdong’s development and for its 
relations with the Centre.
Demand-driven: Expanding Scone of Utilization
From 1979 to 1991, a total of nearly US$15 billion of realized foreign 
capital was used in Guangdong, of which 18%, or US$2.76 billion, was invested in 
infrastructure projects such as roads, ports, electricity stations, and
See Zhang Hanqing (ed.), Gaige Kaifang Zai Guangdong (Reform and Opening in 
Guangdong: Implementation and Thoughts on the One Step Ahead Policy) (Guangdong: 
Guangdong Higher Education Press, 1992), p. 125.
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telecommunication equipment179 The heavy use of foreign capital in infrastructure 
projects, an area traditionally the domain of central planning and administration, 
was initially a practical response on the part of Guangdong's leadership to the 
shortage of central investment input. As central leaders in the early 1980s 
repeatedly had emphasized the impracticablity of Guangdong in expecting 
substantial central capital injection, provincial leaders had no choice but to turn to 
external sources.
In September 1979 Guangdong leaders suggested to central leaders the idea 
of using foreign capital in infrastructure investments for the first time, and received 
a favourable response.180 Gu Mu even elaborated on the idea, suggesting that 
foreign capital be paid back via other industrial projects yielding a higher profit, 
should infrastructure projects fail to provide by themselves the profit return 
required to attract foreign investors.181 Central approval was formally given in 
Central Committee Notice No.41 in May 1980. This notice was issued after a 
meeting on the work of Guangdong and Fujian and included a statement explicitly 
authorizing the two provinces to utilize foreign capital in infrastructure projects 
including the electricification of railroads and the construction of ports and roads, 
in view of the shortage of state funds.182 In 1981, it was further announced that 
infrastructure projects using foreign capital could be exempted from taxes and 
profit remittance for a period in order to facilitate capital/loan repaynv 
Therefore within first two years of the commencement of the Special Policy, the 
door to extensive use of foreign capital in nearly all comers of the economy was 
opened for Guangdong. 184
179Ibid., pp.120-21. Realized foreign capital used in 1992 reached another peak of US$4.9 billion. 
This was the largest amount of foreign capital used in any single previous year. See Nanfang Ribao, 
February 2,1993, p.2.
^ G u a n g d o n g ’s vice-governor, Wu Nansang, raised the idea of using foreign capital in electricity 
and highway projects whilst Gu Mu was visiting Guangdong in September 1979. See Centre's 
Instructions to Guangdong, 1979-1982, p.47. Gu Mu immediately agreed to the suggestion, and 
added that since both the central government and the Guangdong government were short of funds, 
foreign capital should also be used to finance roads and power stations.
181Ibid.
182Central Committee Notice No. 41 (1980), May 16,1980, "On Approving the Notes of Meeting 
on Guangdong and Fujian".
183See Central Committee Notice No.27 (1981), July 19, 1981, "On Approving the Notes of 
Meeting on the Work of Guangdong, Fujian and the Special Economic Zones".
184This is not to say that all obstacles to the use of foreign capital in investment were removed in 
these two central documents. The approval given in 1980 and 1981 focused on roads, ports and 
railroad projects. In 1983, Guangdong approached the centre for using foreign capital on 
telecommunication investments. The response from the relevant ministry initially was not positive. 
But later Guangdong's idea was supported by Hu Yaobang. See "Hu Yaobang speaking when 
inspecting Guangdong", February 6-14, 1983, in Centre's Instructions to Guangodng, 1983-1985, 
p.23. The importance of the developments in 1980/1981 is in that they laid the ground for later 
specific bargaining with the Centre.
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Circumventing Central Control
The extensive use of foreign capital in investment projects in Guangdong 
not only brought in a massive amount of external resources from abroad, with the 
total value of foreign capital used from 1979 to 1991 accounting for more than 
25% of total societal investment in the province, 185 it also enabled the Guangdong 
government to circumvent some of the control measures imposed by the Centre on 
the investment of the province. Foreign investment has been a material factor in 
enabling Guangdong to raise the ceiling of central control figures during times of 
economic retrenchments, for instance, in 1986 and 1989, so that more domestic 
capital could be made available to Guangdong with which to finance joint-venture 
projects. The Guangdong leadership has, therefore, become more strategically 
minded and conscientious in making full use of the "foreign element" in the 
economy as a means to obtaining more favourable treatment from the Centre.
Foreign investment was excluded from the coverage of central control 
figures on the total investment scale as these quotas were designed as a control 
instrument on the use of domestic investment resources only. However, since most 
foreign investment projects were in fact joint venture projects, the use of a certain 
amount of foreign capital would, in turn, involve the use of a more or less 
equivalent amount of domestic capital, which being domestically derived, falls 
under the coverage of the central control figure on the total investment scale.
Because of this linkage of foreign and domestic capital, the contraction of 
the investment scale during retrenchment could seriously affect both the progress 
of foreign investment projects and the use of foreign capital in Guangdong. On the 
grounds that this province absorbs the largest amount of foreign capital in the 
country, the Guangdong government has succeeded in exacting concessions from 
the Centre on the pretext of protecting the country's interest through attracting and 
retaining foreign capital.
In 1986, for instance, in the middle of a retrenchment exercise, a State 
Council notice stated that,
"for those foreign investment projects which were already registered or 
under construction, provincial governments and various ministries should 
ensure the provision of the capital required by the Chinese partners in 
foreign investment projects within the central control figure. I f  that was
^ 5See Zhang Hanqing (ed.), Reform and Opening in Guangdong, p. 120.
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really impossible, this year's control ceiling of investment scale and total 
bank finance could be raised..."
"From 1987 onwards, the investment and bank finance required by the 
Chinese partners in foreign investment projects will be covered in separate 
quotas in the central and provincial plans."186 (Italics added)
It is likely that provincial governments had deliberately held back capital for 
foreign enterprises in order to press for a higher ceiling of total investment scale. 
Many foreign investors complained of the effect of tightening finance on their 
projects, and the Centre, anxious to maintain foreign confidence, finally yielded to 
pressure. In this way, both the investment control and the supply of domestic 
capital was eased.
Having the largest number of foreign enterprises, Guangdong was 
obviously the major player in this game. In October 1986, Guangdong's leaders 
took up the case with Zhao Ziyang during Zhao's visit to Zhuhai and complained 
about the shortfall of bank finance. From Zhao's reply it could reasonably be 
deduced that the context of their discussion was related to foreign investment
In response to a comment by Guangdong's leaders that there was a 
mismatch between investment plans and the supply of capital, and that there was 
often no capital provided for projects within the plan, Zhao replied:
"Nationwide there are now about 6000 foreign joint ventures... with a total 
investment scale of US$20 billion, and requiring "partner capital" from our 
side of over 10 billion yuan... We do not have the capacity to provide that 
much... There is probably not enough money."187
In October 1987, after Guangdong had submitted a report to the Centre 
presenting the good prospects of foreign investment inflow and requesting more 
relaxed policies and greater local autonomy with which to tap this golden 
opportunity, it finally succeeded in obtaining an additional domestic capital supply 
to go with the new foreign investment contracts it had won. The Centre agreed to 
assign an additional 100 million yuan of special circulating loans from the central 
bank to Guangdong to solve the shortage of domestic "partner capital" arising from
^^State Council Notice No.6 (1986), "On Further Improving the Production and Operation 
Conditions of Foreign-Funded Enterprises", July 11,1986, in Centre's Insturctions to Guangdong, 
1986-1987, Part I, pp.136-41, pp. 137-38.
1 7^See "Zhao Ziyang Speaking When Inspecting the Zhuhai Special Economic Zone", October 18, 
1986, in Centre's Instructions to Guangdong, 1986-1987, Part I, p. 195.
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the rise in foreign capital investment since 1986.188 In a sense Guangdong had 
succeeded in "fishing" the Centre's provision of domestic capital through its 
success in attracting foreign investment.
The foreign factor was put to use again in 1989, when the Centre ordered a 
severe cut in the investment scale nationwide. The ceiling for Guangdong was 
substantially less than the provincial government had contemplated, as mentioned 
earlier in this chapter. The strategy of the provincial leadership was, therefore, to 
shift emphasis to the foreign investment sector. More efforts were made to attract 
foreign investment and to link existing domestic enterprises to the foreign sector. 
As a result, more, not less, foreign capital was used in Guangdong in the three 
years of nationwide retrenchment between 1989 and 1991. The total value of 
realized foreign capital from 1989 to 1991 was US$6.8 billion, 13% more than the 
total value realized in the four years preceding 1988.189
Placing the emphasis on the foreign sector served two purposes for the 
Guangdong government. First, the foreign sector enabled the provincial 
government to bargain for preferential treatment for Guangdong, exempting the 
province from some of the harsh control measures imposed by the Centre as a 
result of the retrenchment drive. This included a higher ceiling on the investment 
control figure190, relaxation of control in the supply of bank finance, and the 
possible removal of custom duties imposed on imported raw materials and semi­
finished parts for export processing, etc.191 In other words, the foreign sector was 
being held "hostage" by the Guangdong leadership in its bargaining with the 
Centre for preferential treatment Secondly, the increased use of foreign capital 
enabled Guangdong's economy to continue to develop whilst most other provinces 
were badly affected by the straitened financial situation caused by retrenchment. 
Since the use of foreign capital effectively brought in additional resources to the 
domestic economy, it could not, in theory, worsen, but rather improve, the supply 
and demand situation within the economy. In the event that the use of foreign
^ S e e  "The Central Leading Group on Guangdong's Report", Octber 27, 1987, in Centre's 
Instructions to Guangdong, 1986-1987, Part n, p.389.
^ S e e  People's Daily, January 23,1992, p.2.
l°0 see  Sun Jian, "A Report on Guangdong's Efforts to Contain Its Investment Scale", p.18. It 
should be noted that Sun Jian was a central government official participating in the inspection work 
on Guangdong's retrenchment efforts. In his article on Guangdong's investment scale, however, he 
suggested that consideration be given to the special needs of the foreign-funded enterprises in 
Guangdong. He had apparently been "co-opted" and successfully persuaded by Guangdong's 
presentation of its special circumstances. Respondent No.9 also admitted to the author that 
Guangdong had played the "foreign investment card" in fighting for a more relaxed environment in 
the retrenchment years. (Guangzhou interview, December 1993).
i^ S ee  Zhongguo Jinbao, April 21,1989, p.8, and March 10,1989, p.l.
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capital had an adverse effect in terms of continuing to "heat up" the economy, it 
would nonetheless be difficult for the Centre to dampen Guangdong's enthusiasm 
for attracting foreign investment, due to the possible negative repercussions this 
might cause within the international community and on Guangdong's future 
prospects of attracting foreign investment.
In fact the Guangdong government had early in 1989 moved beyond the 
more traditional approach of attracting new foreign investment projects. More 
emphasis was placed on linking the domestic sector to a foreign element, thereby 
expanding the benefits of the "exemptional policies" awarded to the foreign sector. 
Yu Fei, Guangdong's vice-governor, made this intention explicit in his speech to a 
provincial planning and economic meeting:
"We must make every good use of the favourable conditions given by the 
'exemptional policy1. Those capital construction projects which have a 
linkage with foreign-invested enterprises should be supported by all means. 
We should try to convert some domestic investment projects and find for 
them a foreign linkage so that they can enjoy the 'exemptional policies' ."192
As it turned out, the number of co-operative joint ventures formed between 
existing state enterprises and a foreign partner rose conspicuously in 1989. For 
Guangzhou alone, the number of such contracts from January to April 1989 was 
2.5 times greater than those of the same period the previous year, with the value of 
realized foreign capital leaping by more than 20  times.193
This tactic was repeated in the second half of 1993 when the Centre once 
more tightened its supply of funds and clamped down on investment projects. In 
July 1993, at the onset of the Centre's tightening of bank credit, the mayor of 
Guangzhou, Lai Ziliu, said that his government would implement a more 
favourable policy with which to expand the use of foreign capital in the city, 
thereby enabling local enterprises to withstand the capital shortage problems 
resulting from the Centre's move.194 In a move to attract foreign capital the city 
would offer to foreign investors the prospect of a larger share in the domestic 
market, more profits, and shares in the existing state enterprises.
192See Jihua Yu Fazhan, No.l (1989), pp.4-5.
193See Zhongguo Jinbao, July 21,1989, p.l.
194See Ming Pao (Hong Kong) Daily, July 8,1993.
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International Centre: Justifying a Higher Level of Investment and Provincial
Autonomy
With more foreign capital being absorbed into the economy, and the 
economy becoming increasingly externally oriented,195 there arose the call to build 
Guangzhou and Shenzhen, the two major economic centres of Guangdong, into 
international cities. The purposes of such a call were two-fold. First, it justified 
Guangdong's plans for further and higher quality investment projects in order to 
make the infrastructure and industrial structure of the two cities commensurate 
with the standards of international cities. Second, it strengthened Guangdong's 
position in bargaining for a higher degree of autonomy from the central 
government, as a high degree of autonomy would be necessitated by such building 
of as well as its being the symbol of all such international cities.
The idea of building international centres was first raised in 1987 by Deng 
Xiaoping. When receiving a foreign delegation in May/June 1987, Deng stated 
that a few more "Hong Kong"s would be built in Mainland China, and the idea was 
raised again during Deng's southern tour in February 1992.196 As Hong Kong is 
an international city, the call for the building of several more international cities is 
thus regarded as obvious.197 With the end of the retrenchment policy and the 
change towards a more relaxed and optimistic economic "atmosphere" after the 
southern tour, the call for building international cities was taken quite literally in 
the more developed coastal regions, and particularly in Guangdong and Shanghai.
For the Guangdong leadership, the opening of Pudong in Shanghai posed 
new challenges to the status and prospects of Guangdong, and to its special 
economic zones in particular. There was increasing concern that other open areas 
and cities were enjoying preferential policies similar to, if not more favourable 
than, those once exclusively found in its special economic zones, and that the 
special economic zones were no longer that "special". There was therefore a need 
to move beyond the preoccupation with central preferential policies and to find
195Shenzhen took over Shanghai's long-held position as the No.l city in export trade in 1993. The 
total export value of Shenzhen in 1993 reached US$8,33 billion, 15% of the national total, 
surpassing Shanghai's US$7 billion. Foreign-funded enterprises, together with enterprises engaging 
in export processing, accounted for 87% of the total export trade of Shenzhen. See Shenzhen 
Special Economic Zone Daily, March 8,1994, p.l. It should be noted that Shanghai is a provincial- 
level municipality. If compared on a provincial level, Guangdong has, since 1986, surpassed 
Shanghai as the No.l exporter of the country.
19^See Lin Zhuji (ed.), Shenzhen Guojixing Chengshi Lunwenji (A Collection of Essays on 
Shenzhen Becoming an International City) (Beijing: Zhongguo Jingji chubanshe, 1993), p.4.
197Ibid., p.2.
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new goals and targets in order to keep up the momentum of development, and to 
sustain the image of the province as the pioneer of economic reform. For 
Guangdong as a whole, the new aim was to reach and surpass the economic and 
social development of the "four little dragons" in two decades.198 For Guangzhou 
and Shenzhen, their sights were set on becoming the first two international cities 
in Mainland China.199
International cities require good infrastructure as well as a correspondingly 
high standard of economic development. Thus the quest for investment polarized 
into a legitimate, clear-cut and high-sounding focus. The prospect of being an 
international city provided an objective yardstick against which the investment and 
development plans of Guangdong, and Guangzhou and Shenzhen in particular, 
could be evaluated. Since it was obvious that the standards of the two cities still 
lagged substantially behind most international cities, the city governments would 
have a strong "alibi" through which to justify their ambitious investment plans and, 
in the event of pressure from the Centre to cut investments, a legitimate position 
from which to defend their investment activity and to bargain for exemptional and 
preferential treatment.
To make way for the realization of this goal, the Guangzhou city 
government plans to build a new airport with the capacity to handle 63 million 
passengers per year—three times the capacity of Hong Kong's Kai Tak Airport. 
Ten billion yuan is to be spent on building a mass transit rail system in the city 
area, and a long list of road and railway projects are also in the pipeline.200 In 
Shenzhen, investment projects for the decade of 1990s would require more than
19^This was stated as the goal of Guangdong in Deng's talks during his southern tour in February 
1992. In a speech at a provincial government meeting in July 1992, Guangdong's governor, Zhu 
Senlin, stated that Guangdong had set its aim at reaching the standards of the "four little dragons1' in 
20 years. The provincial government had already completed a preliminary plan for the attainment 
of the goal. See Natfang Ribao, July 25,1992, p.l. The description, "four little dragons", refers to 
four newly industrialized countries/territories in Hast Asia whose rapid economic development since 
the 1960s has startled the international community. The four are: South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan 
and Hong Kong.
l^ T h e vice-mayor of Guangzhou, Dai Zhiguo, stated unambiguously that the target of Guangzhou 
was to develop into an international city. He revealed in a press interview that Guangzhou had 
applied for membership of the Association of International Cities in May 1993, and was accepted in 
September, the first city in China to become a member of the worldwide association. See 
Economic Daily (Hong Kong), February 15,1994, p.2. This demonstrates the determination of the 
Guangzhou government to elevate the status of Guangzhou internationally, and to acquire the 
recognition of international associations ahead of other competitors such Shenzhen and Shanghai. 
Shenzhen's ambition was also explicit and open. The Shenzhen Government spearheaded a seminar 
in February 1993 on the strategies to realise the goal. In a paper by the organizer, it was stated that 
out of all other cities Shenzhen was the best qualified to be turned into an international city. The 
essays of the seminar were published in the book, Lin Zhuji (ed.), A Collection of Essays on 
Shenzhen Becoming an International City. For the above comment, see p.4.
20C>See Economic Daily (Hong Kong), February 15,1994, p.2.
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100 billion yuan of capital.201 To finance development plans on such an immense 
scale, however, more foreign capital would need to be used. Increasing 
internationalization of the economy of the two cities is, therefore, an inevitable 
consequence of the building of an international city. More importantly, making 
internationalization as the goal of the two cities enables the city governments to 
obtain the necessary clearance from the central government for their ambitious 
investment plans.
Another interesting implication of the call for internationalization is the 
legitimization of provincial calls for less central control and more provincial 
autonomy generally. Ever since the conception of the special policy for 
Guangdong and Fujian in 1979, the prospect of more authority and autonomy for 
Guangdong has been discussed, both on the part of the Centre and of the provincial 
leadership, as the necessary expedient whereby the province may act as a 
spearhead in economic development and reform. The goal of economic 
development would therefore be achieved through the means of local autonomy for 
Guangdong. In a sense the delegation of additional authority to Guangdong in the 
1980s was necessitated by the difficulty in bringing changes to the country as a 
whole at one time. With the progress of reform and the subsequent changes in 
many provinces in the country, Guangdong was becoming less exceptional and 
during recent retrenchment drives its economy was more often placed within the 
same jurisdiction of central macro-economic control as other provinces. There is 
concern among the Guangdong leadership that the Special Policy no longer exists 
in practice, and that the autonomy of the Guangdong government to manage its 
own economy will gradually be reduced.202
By setting itself the new goal of building international cities the Guangdong 
government has enabled itself to transcend the crisis arising from the end of the 
poineering role of Guangdong during the initial stage of China's reforms. Not only 
does the idea of international cities represent a new and higher-order goal in the 
development of China's reforms, and thus extend Guangdong's frontier position 
among other provinces, this new goal also poses an inherent requirement to the 
level of autonomy of the provincial government. The Guangdong government
20 1 See Lin Shuji (ed.), A Collection on Essays on Shenzhen Becoming an International Chys p,6, 
202This is, of course, more in a relative sense than in an absolute sense. As a result of the economic 
reforms and the liberalization of the economy, the degree of planning and administration from the 
Centre has already been substantially reduced. In other words the Centre has been issuing fewer 
number of orders and detailed prescriptions to the provincial government. However as 
decentralization of authority was extending nationwide, and Guangdong was increasingly placed 
under the national macro control instruments, the Guangdong government had a feeling that its 
autonomy vis-a vis the Centre relative to other provinces was less than before.
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could refer to the achievements of other international cities when arguing for a 
higher degree of local autonomy for Guangzhou and Shenzhen, and by extension, 
for the provincial government itself. Power and autonomy are no longer merely 
the expedient; they constitute an integral part of the goal: international cities.
The following quotes serve to conclude this section:
"To materialize the strategy, Shenzhen must solve a number of things... how 
to obtain the necessary degree of local autonomy and "self rule" required 
by any international city"203
(As written by a scholar from Shanghai wrote in a paper in a seminar on 
Shenzhen’s strategies to develop into an international city)
"We need to limit the scope and weaken the force of control by the central 
ministries on the special economic zones, and let the zones practice self-rule 
in economic affairs.... Practising self-rule is necessitated by the complexity 
of the national economy and the imbalances in the commodity economy... 
This land of economic self-rule does not ask for the rendering of all 
authority to the localities. It is not a pretext for regional separatism or 
independence. The purpose is to adapt better to the requirements o f an 
internationalized market situation."204
(As written by a researcher in Shenzhen wrote in an article entitled, "Self- 
rule is the direction of future development for the special economic zones" 
published in 1991.)
203see Lin Zhuji (ed.), A Collection of Essays on Shenzhen Becoming an International City, p. 183. 
204<jee zhu Tijin, "Self-Rule Is the Direction of Future Development of Special Economic Zones",
in Liu Zhongxiu (ed.), Thoughts on Shenzhen by 100 Scholars, pp.99-103.
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Chapter Six
Provincial Discretionary Behaviour: Shanghai
As the largest economic centre and the number one contributor to total 
national revenue until 19911, Shanghai was in a policy and economic environment 
very different from that of Guangdong. As officials in Shanghai were very 
conscious of, and, at least initally, quite proud of, their special role within the 
national economy, they themselves also formed part of the context of Shanghai 
government's discretionary behaviour. Notwithstanding the fact that the same five 
categories of discretionary behaviour were apparent in both Guangdong and 
Shanghai, such behaviour had entirely different emphases. The details of such a 
part-extemal/part-internal context are discussed comparatively in terms of 
Guangdong in the next chapter. Figure 6.1 below depicts the pattern visually. When 
compared with Figure 5.1 of Chapter Five, it is clear that discretionary behaviour 
of Shanghai in the 1980s was far more Centre-oriented than that of Guangdong.
Figure 6.1
Trends of Shanghai's Discretionary Behaviour. 1978-93
Occurrence
Lo
Year
1978 1985 1993
* Shanghai's number one position in terms of total fiscal revenue was assumed by Guangdong in 
1991, when Shanghai's fiscal revenue was 19.19 billion yuan, and Guangdong's 19.21 billion yuan. 
It should be noted that the concept of fiscal revenue being compared here was the total value of 
fiscal revenue collected by the local collectors, and not the retained local fiscal revenue after 
remittance to the Centre. For the figures see Ministry of Finance (ed.), China Finance Statistics, 
1950-1991 (Beijing: Science Press, 1992), p.59.
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The four lines in the above figure represent each of the quadrants of 
discretionary behaviour as discussed in Figure 5.1, with the order of provincial 
"independence" increasing from B, D, A, C. Figure 6.2 recaps the discussion as 
follows:
Figure 6.2
Provincial Discretionary Behaviour: Degree of Provincial "Independence"
Central Plans/Policies
Local Plans/Markets
Throughout the entire decade of 1980s the most important single objective 
of the Shanghai government was to bargain for more favourable central policies in 
order to improve the macro economic environment. Since it had taken Shanghai so 
long to attain this end, and in the interim the municipal government’s room for 
manoeuvre has been severely constrained, the Shanghai government was keen and 
persistent to gamer further central resources from within the bounds of the 
prevailing system. Bargaining for more central investment and reducing annual 
local fiscal remittance thus accounted for a very large part of the day-to-day 
dealing between the Shanghai government and the Centre during the 1980s. 
Therefore, as indicated in Figure 6.1 above, the lines (B) and (D) have always been 
of a high level of occurrence throughout the reform period. The room for 
discretions in implementation was limited, thus the relatively low level of the line 
(A) in Figure 6.1. Nonetheless the tight constraints of Shanghai's system did not 
entirely preclude the occurrence of policy deviations, such pressure merely shaping 
their form and content. As will be discussed in this and the next chapters, as the 
economic situation became more stringent for Shanghai during the 1980s, the 
Shanghai government was forced to be more "flexible" in their implementation of 
central rules and policies in order to make their ends meet. When the economic 
situation of Shanghai finally improved towards the beginning of the 1990s, the 
Shanghai government increasingly adopted discretionary behaviour of a kind which 
was less focused on the Centre and more "independence-oriented". This is 
represented in Figure 6.1 by the sharp rise of the line (C) from a fairly low basis
Provincial Autarchy Central Dependence
(A): High (B): Lowest
(C): Highest (D): Low
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during the 1980s. The sights of Shanghai are now set beyond the state and 
budgetary sectors and, having adopted an increasingly outward orientation, it is 
now aiming at the international community beyond the Yangzi estuary.
Bargaining for More Favourable Central Policies
The position of the central government is, in some aspects, particularly 
strong vis-a-vis the lower levels. Consequently, improving the position of the latter 
requires fundamental changes to the system. One of the ways this may be achieved 
is through lower-level governments bargaining for more favourable sets of rules. In 
this respect, Shanghai’s capacity to participate in this kind of behaviour has been 
seriously jeopardized due to its special position amongst other provincial-level 
units. This "stumbling block" has been Shanghai’s conferred role as the "eldest son" 
of the Centre and the "elder brother" of other provinces. As such, Shanghai is 
expected to shoulder more responsibilities for the "father", and act as rear-guard 
whilst the younger brothers are left to make their way through the reform 
experiment. This special responsibility was considered by Shanghai's officials, in 
post facto analysis, as the major factor inhibiting rapid economic development in 
Shanghai in the 1980s.
As a result of this greater responsibility, it took the Shanghai government 
relatively longer to achieve a favourable macro-policy environment comparable to 
that of Guangdong. Whilst Guangdong was awarded the "Special Policy" early in 
1979, and its subsequent bargaining efforts aimed at the implementation and 
refinement of that Special Policy, Shanghai spent the entire 1980s in pursuit of a 
more favourable policy environment.
Early Manoeuvres: 1979-1983
Upon Guangdong and Fujian being granted a preferential investment and 
revenue policy in July 1979, Shanghai and the other two provincial-level 
municipalities also pressed for preferential treatment A meeting between the three 
municipalities and the Centre was held between July and September 1979, in which 
Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin asked for half of the new powers of Guangdong and 
Fujian.2 Due to the pressure from the municipalities and other coastal provinces, in
2This is revealed by Gu Mu when he was visiting Guangdong in September 22, 1979. He urged 
Guangdong1 officials to move faster in implementing the special policy because other provinces 
were very envious of their position. He said,"Since the release of the central documents on these 
two provinces, the three municipalities, Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai, have become very envious of 
you. They demand to enjoy one-half of your new powers. A meeting was later convened between
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November 1981 a work conference was convened with the municipalities and 
coastal provinces other than Guangdong and Fujian. The meeting agreed on the 
general principle of trickle-down economics, that is, that the coastal provinces 
should lead the inland provinces in the modernization of the economy. In order to 
fulfill this role the coastal provinces were urged to strengthen their work regarding 
foreign trade and the economy in general, and, in particular, to utilize more foreign 
capital in the improvement of the technology.3
The concessions these coastal provinces and municipalities eventually 
obtained, however, bore a pale resemblance to those perquisites given to 
Guangdong and Fujian two years previously. The theme of the 1979 meeting was 
restricted to external economics, focusing largely on the issues of allocation of 
foreign exchange income from foreign trade and the attraction of foreign 
investment. The fiscal system, the planning system, price controls—issues of 
major importance to the autonomy of provincial governments—and generous 
powers over which had been delegated to Guangdong, were, simply, not touched 
on. On approving the minutes of the meeting the central government, on the 
contrary, made clear that reform in the foreign trade system and delegation of 
autonomy in this area should be implemented in a cautious and case-by-case 
manner.
The cautious attitude of the central government is expressed in the 
following statements in the Notice:
"Situations vary between the coastal provinces and municipalities. We 
should therefore start from the actual situation of each area, and develop our 
external economic work in a gradual but progressive manner. You should 
not blindly emulate one another,,. In order to adjust to the needs for the 
development of foreign trade, it is necessary to expand the authority and 
autonomy of coastal provinces and municipalities as regards the conduct of 
foreign trade... But we would consider this issue on a case by case basis, 
and approve each case as and when the situation is ripe for change..."4
The Centre was obviously anxious to contain the aspirations of coastal 
provinces and to preempt any further demands for policies as favourable as those
the three. However, once the problem with the three municipalites had been solved, several other 
coastal provinces, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shandong and Liaoning, all expressed their desire to 
participate in the opening drive..." See Centre Instructions to Guangdong, 1979-1982, p.41.
3See "The Central Committee, State Council Notice No.6 (1982), January 15, 1982, on approving 
the Notes of Meeting of the External Economic and Trade Work Conferencec of the Nine Coastal 
Provinces and Municipalities (November 29, 1981)" in State Commission for Economic System 
Reform (ed.), Jingji Tizhi Gaige Wenjian Huibian, 1978-1993 (A Collection of the Documents on 
Economic System Reform, 1983),pp.574-81.
4Ibid„ p.574.
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granted to Guangdong and Fujian. Therefore, whilst recognizing the leading role 
of the better endowed coastal provinces relative to the inland region in economic 
development, the central government emphasized that there were also significant 
differences between the coastal provinces, which necessitated their being dealt 
with on an individual basis. Consequently, Shanghai did not gain much from this 
meeting in terms of fewer restraints. Apart from the general recognition of the 
need to use more foreign capital, the only specific authority of significance won by 
Shanghai from the 1981 meeting was that of having its project approval authority 
on foreign investment raised to US$5 million.5
In response, perhaps, to the central government's case-by-case approach, the 
Shanghai government independently submitted a report to the Centre in March 
1983 putting forward its case. The report, entitled "A Petition on Several Issues 
Concerning External Economic and Trade Work of Shanghai", of March 30, 1983, 
urged the central government to delegate more power to Shanghai in respect of 
foreign investment approval authority, and to confer on them the power to borrow 
foreign loans independently. It also called for more favourable tax policies towards 
enterprises using foreign capital for technical renovation, the abolition of central 
sectoral figures on the allocation of budgetary investment funding, and more direct 
central support in the form of investment funding and foreign exchange supply.6
As a result of this petition, the ceiling of Shanghai's approval authority for 
foreign investment projects was raised 100% from US$5 million to US$10 million. 
Also, and as noted in Chapter Four, central sectoral control over the allocation of 
budgetary investment was cancelled, thereby enabling the Shanghai government to 
distribute budgetary investment funds amongst different sectors and industries as it 
saw fit. Shanghai also gained more autonomy in the management of bank 
investment finance. It was discovered that the Centre would thereafter allocate a 
lump-sum quota of bank loans on fixed asset investment to Shanghai’s People's 
Bank, in a similar way as it did in Guangdong, for its onward distribution to the 
various specialized banks. This replaced the previous system whereby the 
headquarters of specialised banks assigned individual quotas to their local 
branches.
5Ibid., p.577. The authority of Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin to approve foreign investment projects 
was raised to under US$5 million, while the other coastal provinces got the US3 million ceiling.
6See State Council Notice No. 55 (1983), April 4,1983, "State Council Approving Shanghai's ' A 
Petition on Several Issues of the External Economic and Trade Work of Shanghai"' in State 
Commission for Economic System Reform (ed.), A Collection o f the Documents on Economic 
System Reform, pp.605-10.
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Therefore, Shanghai finally obtained its slice of favourable policies, albeit 
four years after the announcement of the Special Policy for Guangdong and Fujian. 
It was, however, a very small slice. The central government was explicit in its 
policy towards Shanghai, as expressed by State Councillor Zhang Jingfu during his 
visit to Guangdong shortly after Shanghai's petition had been approved. At this 
point Zhang specified to Guangdong officials the exact nature of Shanghai's 
favourable policies and recently enhanced local autonomy:
"The Centre has asked me to handle the issues arising from Shanghai's 
petition...But this autonomy (of Shanghai) has a special meaning. The 
Centre has appointed Shanghai the task of developing a group of industrial 
projects to an internationally advanced level by the year 1990 and 2 0 0 0 . 
Under this precondition, the Centre has allowed Shanghai 300 new 
industrial projects, at a total value of US$300 million. This is thus the 
"cage" (scope of manoeuvre) the Centre has allowed Shanghai. Within this 
"cage", we might loosen the "strings" . However this "cage" has its defined 
limits. We are not loosening the "strings" in an abstract (general) way, but 
with and under specific preconditions...As special economic zones you have 
definitely more power than Shanghai..."1
The concessions Shanghai achieved in 1983 were, therefore, limited and 
highly circumscribed. The enlarged autonomy on foreign investment approval was 
not accompanied by any loosening in other areas of central planning. There was no 
general endorsement of the enhanced autonomy of Shanghai to decide on 
municipal affairs, as was the case in Guangdong. The fiscal situation, in particular, 
was left totally untouched. Shanghai was still practising the "sharing-the-total" 
system in place since 1976, as were Beijing and Tianjin, whilst other provinces had 
obtained more local fiscal resources since 1980. In fact, as seen in Chapter Four, 
instead of increasing local revenue as was the case in most other provinces, the 
local fiscal revenue of Shanghai decreased in absolute terms from 1981 to 1983. 
The macro fiscal policy environment in Shanghai had not, therefore, seen any 
improvement since the start of the reform decade, and could even be described as 
having deteriorated from the pre-1980 conditions.
1984: Grand Development Plans
The quest for a better policy environment therefore continued. A year later, 
in August 1984, the Shanghai leadership met Zhao Ziyang and other central leaders 
of the State Council and the (Party) Central Finance and Economy Leading Group. 
During the meeting the Shanghai leaders made suggestions and sounded out their
7See "Zhang Jingfu Speaking When Hearing the Briefing of the Shenzhen City Pary Committee", 
May 26,1983, in Centre's Instructions to Guangdong, 1986-1987, Part II, p.559.
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views on a more aggressive development plan in Shanghai. Subsequent to this 
meeting, the State Council sent a research team to Shanghai for further 
investigation. After rounds of discussions and deliberations, a report on the future 
development strategies of the Shanghai economy was produced on December 1, 
1984.8
The report, approved by the State Council in February 1985, confirmed the 
pioneer status of Shanghai in the modernization and development of the national 
economy, and accordingly called for more delegation of power and resources from 
the Centre to facilitate the realization of this role. The most important change was 
in the adjustment of the fiscal system. As noted in Chapter Four, the fiscal system 
of 1985 fixed the local retention ratio at 23.5% for six years. An additional 1.5 
billion yuan was allowed for local expenditure in the calculation of the retention 
ratio, and in fixing this for six years the intention was to give a degree of certainty 
to the Shanghai government so that it might better plan its expenditure.
Despite the positive tone of the report, not many policy concessions were 
granted, and the macro policy environment of Shanghai remained largely 
unchanged. In the absence of substantial concessions in the form of preferential 
policies, this ostensible affirmation of Shanghai's position as the largest economic 
centre in the country and pioneer of modernization sounded hollow. The changes 
in the fiscal system, which were often hailed as a major achievement in securing 
more resources for local use, were, in fact, only a meagre improvement. They 
were, in any event, too insignificant to offset the negative impact of rising costs of 
production to prevent a second slide of fiscal revenue from 1986 to 1988.
The 1985 fiscal arrangement was probably the result of a compromise made 
by the Shanghai government in its negotiations with the Centre. This hypothesis is 
based on two observations. First, the preference of Shanghai's officials as early as 
1984 had been for some form of tax-sharing system through which the municipal 
and central governments would retain their respective taxes as sources of revenue. 
Secondly, as soon as the deal with the Centre had been struck, there were 
indications from Shanghai officials that the 1985 system was considered 
inadequate for the needs of Shanghai. Some of the more explicit statements
8See the opening paragraphs of the "Report on the Development Strategy of the Shanghai 
Economy", printed in Shanghai Economy 1983-1985, p.25.
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maintained that the 1985 system was suitable only as a transient arrangement 
pending the anticipated full establishment of the tax-sharing system.9
Another shortcoming of the 1984 Report concerns its underlying 
assumptions. The general direction and goal of development proposed by the 
Shanghai government in the report was strongly imbued with Shanghai's traditional 
thoughts about its own role. As the "eldest son" of the Centre, it was unthinkable to 
Shanghai’s leaders that Shanghai should have no major role to play in the new 
drive for reform and development. Despite the central government's well known 
strategy of having the southern "border" provinces test the waters, it was almost the 
reflex response of the Shanghai leadership that Shanghai should in some respect 
play a major role. However, given its greater responsibility to the national 
economy, it was accepted that its development strategy and emphasis was bound to 
differ from that of the southern provinces. The following quotes from the Shanghai 
government's 1984 Report substantiate this irony vividly:
"... Shanghai should become the pioneer of the four modernizations of the 
country. This is preconditioned by the status and position of Shanghai in 
the country and in the whole world. ..."
"...As the largest industrial and economic centre in the country, Shanghai 
should make the largest contribution to the national goal of "quadrupling the 
production output" by the end of this century... As for the production plan 
of Shanghai during the seventh Five-year Plan period (1986-1990), we 
should be pragmatic. We should strive to maximize our production under 
the precondition of fulfilling our development strategy (i.e. restructuring 
Shanghai's industrial structure), and should not blindly pursue projects with 
the sole aim of doubling the production output by 1990... "10
In other words, whilst the Shanghai leadership were eager to jump on the 
economic development bandwagon and sustain the leading position of Shanghai,
9See Xu Riqing et. alM "Wanshan Difangshui Tixi, Shixing Fenji Caizheng Tizhi" (Perfecting the 
Local Tax System, Practising a Stratified System of Government Finance," Shanghai Caizheng 
Yanjiu, No.l (1985), pp.2-5; Xu Riqing e t  al. "Wanshan Shanghaishi Difang Caizheng de Yanjiu" 
(A Study on How to Perfect the Local Fiscal System in Shanghai), in Chen Minzhi (ed.), Shanghai 
Jingji Fazhan Zhanlue Yanjiu (A Study of Shanghai's Economic Development Strategy, 1985), 
pp.247-48; Tu Jimo, "A Preliminary Deliberation to Improve the Allocation of Shanghai's Fiscal 
Resources in the Seventh Five-Year-Plan Period", Shanghai Caizheng Yanjiu, No.2 (1985), p. 11. It 
should be noted that during 1984/1985, the central government had designed a new fiscal system, 
based on the principle of the provinces and the Centre separately obtaining revenue from different 
taxes. This was intended to replace the contractual/sharing system in place nationwide since 1980. 
At that time Shanghai officials therefore expected some form of tax-sharing system to be imminent 
and that the 1985 arrangement, though considered inadequate, would be only temporary. 
Respondents No.23 and 27 from the Shanghai municipal government also confirmed that the 
ultimate goal of the Shanghai government since the 1980s regarding the fiscal system had been the 
tax sharing system which was considered fairer to Shanghai. (Shanghai interviews, May 1994),
10See "Report on the Development Strategy of the Shanghai Economy", printed in Shanghai 
Economy 1983-1985, pp.26-27.
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their views had been so conditioned and constrained by Shanghai's traditional "role 
model" of the leading municipality in China that they effectively temporized their 
own demands. The situation was similar to one of one party on the negotiating 
table willingly agreeing to all the major arguments of its negotiating counterpart. 
In such case Shanghai’s defeat in the negotiations was, in a sense, self-inflicted.
1987: Saving the "Dragon Head" Position
The limitations of the 1984 attempt were unambiguously reflected in the 
second, and more serious, slide in fiscal revenue which occurred in the years 1986 
and 1987.11 The leading position of Shanghai in the national economy was thus 
under increasing threat. Shanghai's local fiscal revenue in 1987, at 16.5 billion 
yuan, was 7.3% of the national total, a substantial fall from the 16% share in 
1981.12 The average annual economic growth rates had also fallen well behind the 
national average. For instance, the national annual average for national income 
growth from 1981 to 1987 was 9.73%, as compared to 7.85% in Shanghai. The 
national annual average growth rate of total societal production output was 11.44%, 
as compared to Shanghai's 10.16%.13 In sharp contrast to the lacklustre 
performance of Shanghai's economy, that of Guangdong's was booming, with the 
annual average growth rates for the two indices at 11.7% and 15.3%.14 There was 
an increasing sense of crisis amongst Shanghai officials and Shanghai watchers of 
the "Shanghai phenomenon", as there appeared to be imminent danger that 
Shanghai's leading status in China's economy might be taken over by the southern 
provinces.15
The repeated and continuous slides in fiscal revenues soon raised the 
concern of the Centre. In late 1987 central leaders Zhao Ziyang and Yao Yilin went 
to Shanghai to investigate into the difficulties faced by Shanghai. The Shanghai
llrThe average annual rate of decrease was 3.8% for 1981-1983, and 4.2% for 1986-1987,
12Calculated from China Finance Statistics 1950-1991, pp. 59,102; Statistical Yearbook of China 
1993, p.229, Shanghai Statistical Yearbook 1993, p.55.
13Calculated from Statistical Yearbook of China 1993, pp.35, 52; Shanghai Statistical Yearbook 
1993, pp.40,44.
14Calculated from Guangdong National Economic and Social Development Statistics and 
Information 1949-1988. Part on General Statistics, p.69.
15A number of foreign experts from the United States and Europe reportedly made the observation 
when visiting China in 1987 that the economic centre of China was moving southwards to 
Guangzhou, and Shanghai was in the course of becoming the "British Empire" of China, meaning 
that Shanghai, once an omnipotent city, was on the slope of inevitable decline. Such comments 
raised alarm amongst the Shanghai leadership, and reminded them that the threat and danger of 
having moved too slowly in the economic reforms was materializing. See Yu Xiangnian, "The 
Objectives and Strategies of Shanghai's Externally-Oriented Economic Development", Shanghai 
Jihua Jingji Tanshuo, No.2 (1988), p. 10. Yu was the vice-director of the Shanghai Economic 
Research Centre, a high-profile think tank of the Shanghai leadership.
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government took this opportunity to submit a petition report asking for more 
powers and policies favourable to facilitating the revitalization of the economy. 
The report was approved by the State Council in February 1988.16
In this petition the Shanghai government demanded a version of the 
dabaogan responsibility system whereby the level of local fiscal remittance would 
be fixed at 10.5 billion yuan for a period of 5 years. From the fourth year, that is 
1991, onwards, if the total local fiscal revenue exceeded 16.5 billion yuan, half of 
the excess would be forwarded to the central coffers on top of the 10.5 billion 
remittance. In addition, the Shanghai government asked for more autonomy in the 
conduct of export trade, and in the management of prices. It demanded for the 
power to determine independently the level of wages and incomes of the Shanghai 
citizens. Moreover, it requested the acceleration of the development of financial 
institutions, with a view to reestablishing Shanghai's pre-1949 financial centre 
status. In order to enable Shanghai to make up for its relatively slack development 
in the early 1980s, the Shanghai government specifically asked the Centre vo 
increase the central control figures on its total investment scale, thus allowing local 
state enterprises to issue more bonds to raise capital. The Centre was also asked to 
provide more direct support in the form of funds and capital.17
The demands spanned the most important policy areas and, if fully realized, 
signalled the beginning of a substantial change in the macro policy environment. 
The implementation of the report was not smooth, however, and most of the 
powers and additional resources requested by Shanghai, and initially granted, in 
principle, by the Centre, did not materialize in practice. With the onset of 
nationwide retrenchment as from the fourth quarter of 1988, most of the new 
powers were either rapidly recentralized, or simply not implemented. For instance,
The report was serialled Shanghai Government Notice No. 123 (1987), entitled, "A Report on 
Deepening the Reform, Expanding the Opening, and Speeding Up the Development of Externally- 
Oriented Economy in Shanghai". See Shanghai Industry Yearbook 1988, pp.10-11, for an extract 
of the report.
17More details of the 1987 Report may be found in a report reviewing the implementation of the 
Report conducted by Shanghai planning officials one year later. See Cai Laixing et al. "123 Hao 
Wen Guanche Qingkuang Pouxi" (An Anatomy of the Implementation Status of the Report 
No.123), Shanghai Jihua Jingji Tansuo, No.2 (1989), pp.2-63. The Shanghai government requested 
the Centre to enlarge the quotas on total investment scale and total bank finance by 100 million 
yuan annually, and from 1988 to 1990, to provide additional bank finance capital via the People's 
Bank of China with which to finance Shanghai's infrastructural investments and its development of 
food industries. The report also urged the Centre to provide sufficient funds and additional finance 
quotas for centrally planned investment projects in Shanghai, so that Shanghai could use the entirety 
of local bank funds and local quotas in local investment projects. This suggests that central projects 
in Shanghai had previously used up part of the local capital and finance quotas originally meant for 
the exclusive use of local projects, and this had caused some grumbling amongst the Shanghai 
officials.
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the power to manage the prices of 76 more categories of industrial goods was 
undermined by the Centre's determination to stamp out inflationary pressures, and 
the price management authority of eight products was formally recentralized. 
Shanghai's efforts to obtain larger quotas of investment scale and bank finance 
simply failed to bear fruit. The 100 million yuan additional quotas for investment 
and bank finance, and the additional bank capital for infrastructural investments, 
were either cancelled or substantially reduced. 18
The dabaogan system was relatively secure, but the Shanghai government 
was still somewhat dissatisfied. First, the change in economic macro-environment 
caused by the Centre's retrenchment policies resulted in increases in local 
expenditures which had not been taken account at the time when the 10.5 billion 
yuan contract sum was calculated. This meant that the municipal government had 
to shoulder additional burdens, estimated in 1989 at about 1.6 billion yuan, which 
would have been shared with, if not entirely borne by, the Centre under the 
preexisting "sharing the total" fiscal system.
Second, there was the feeling that the Centre had not given Shanghai a fair 
deal. Due to Shanghai's historical legacy of being the base of capitalistic activities 
before 1949, the bulk of Shanghai's fixed assets, formed before 1949, had been 
substantially underestimated at the time when the private enterprises were 
converted into private-public joint enterprises, in order that less interests would be 
paid to the former owners. The implication was that the cost of renovating this part 
of the city's fixed assets could be one to two times that of the official estimates as 
stated in the account books.19 Under the contractual dabaogan system the 
municipal government would be responsible for footing the bill. Since the account 
books had substantially undervalued the costs and thus inflated the profits of many 
old local enterprises inherited from the pre-1949 industrial infrastructure, the 10.5 
billion yuan figure, calculated on the basis of previously existing accounts, was 
similarly inflated. In other words, while the contractual system was intended 
clearly to delineate and assign responsibilities and resources between the Centre 
and the provinces, Shanghai had, within the perspective of municipal officials,
18See Cai Laixing et al., "An Anatomy of the Implementation Status of the Repeat No. 123", p.8.
19The Shanghai government in fact expressed concern over the historical undervaluation of the 
fixed assets in Shanghai in 1984, with the implication that not enough depreciation provision was 
allowed for technical renovation of the state enterprises. See Lin Qiushi, "Dui Guding Zichan 
Buchang Gengxin de Yixie Kanfa" (Some Opinions on the Replacement and Renovation of Fixed 
Asset Investment), Shanghai Caizheng Yanjiu, No.l (1984), pp. 10-12.
289
agreed to a deal which had given it heavy responsibilities but a less than fair share 
of resources.20
Shanghai was not alone in having its reforms cut short. Guangdong's 
attempt to further expand the limits of its autonomy in early 1988 was likewise 
curtailed by the change of the macro economic environment and the onset of more 
control-oriented central policies. The main difference between the two was that 
Guangdong fell back onto a much higher base. The 1987 Report, on the other hand, 
was the first occasion on which the Shanghai government had succeeded in 
obtaining central approval of favourable measures on a more substantial scale. 
With many of the new powers cancelled or severely watered down, and more 
expenditure burdens placed on local fiscal shoulders, it was no surprise that 
Shanghai officials should feel that the 10.5 billion yuan deal and the dabaogan 
system had not in practice been a preferential policy to Shanghai. This was 
apparent in the fact that the macro-environment of Shanghai's economy had not 
seen any significant improvement.21
1990: Favourable Policies on Pudong
In April 1990, Premier Li Peng announced in Shanghai the Centre'*? 
decision to "open" the Pudong area in east Shanghai and its approval of ten 
favourable policies. These would be largely along the lines of those in the existing 
five (including Hainan) special economic zones. The announcement in April 1990 
ended the situation whereby the policy environment and power of the Shanghai 
government was substantially less favourable than that of the southern provinces. 
This had been a change long sought by the Shanghai leadership.22
See Cai Laixing et al., "An Anatomy of the Implementation Status of the Report No. 123", pp.6-7. 
The politics of asset valuation has subsequently entered a new phase with new and shifting issues in 
the 1990s, as the new trend of liquidizadon of state assets in the burgeoning state assets market 
triggered new conflicts of interests between the local and central governments as to how the 
proceeds of sales should be shared. Respondent No. 19, Hong Kong interview, November 1993, 
remarked that as a result of the low depreciation provisions since 1949, the net value of state assets 
in state enterprises in Shanghai as of the 1990s was grossly overvalued. Given that an estimated 
80% of investment in Shanghai state enterprises was formed in and before the 1970s, thus coming 
from the central investment, the "ownership shares" of the Centre in the assets were correspondingly 
inflated. Respondent No.27, Shanghai interview, May 1994, admitted that the question of how the 
Centre and Shanghai government obtained their proper share of state assets sale in Shanghai was a 
complicated one, a contentious issue which was at the present in the court of the Centre.
21That the dabaogan system was not quite a preferential policy from the Centre was the general 
feeling of Shanghai officials. Respondents No.23 and 27 stressed that 10.5 billion yuan was a largi. 
sum, and Shanghai had to give half of the local revenue in excess of 16.5 billion to the Centre since
1991. They agreed that the tax-sharing system should be a fairer system, as the allocation of 
resources between the Centre and provinces would be based on responsibilities and actual needs 
rather than historical precedents which themselves were less than fair. Shanghai Interviews, May 
1994.
22See Shanghai Economy 1990, pp.20-21, for the ten favourable policies announced in April 1990.
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The Shanghai leaders had, in fact, earlier in the year actively lobbied the 
central leaders. When President Yang Shangkun visited Shanghai, Shanghai’s 
leaders complained to him about the plight of their city, asking Yang whether it 
was the Centre’s policy to see the decline of Shanghai. Yang reassured the 
Shanghai leadership that the Centre was determined to assist Shanghai.23 Deng 
Xiaoping, who was also visiting Shanghai at that time, also indicated that the 
Centre would give Shanghai additional support.24 Having sounded out the views 
of the Centre,25 the Shanghai government submitted to the Centre a petition report 
outlining detailed policy proposals for the development of Pudong in February 
1990 for approval.26 The petition included requests for 18 favourable policies. In 
the end eight of these, including more radical proposals such as allowing foreign 
joint ventures in the communications and publication industry, were deleted from 
the approved list.27
Although some specific proposals were not approved, Shanghai 
nevertheless achieved a set of favourable policies comparable to those which had 
been enjoyed by Guangdong for the previous decade. The April 1990 
announcement was, therefore, a major milestone for Shanghai. Shanghai thereby 
acquired a more equal footing in terms of developing its economy, thus ending the 
decade of "policy discrimination" which, in the eyes of Shanghai’s officials, had 
been the major cause of the decline in Shanghai's economic status in the 1980s.28
23Information by Respondent No.23, Shanghai interview, May 1994.
4^ See Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong), April 23,1990. See also Yu Xiguang et al., Dachao Chuqi (The 
Rise of the Big Wave: The Preludes and Aftermaths of the Southern Tour of Deng Xiaoping) 
(Beijing: Zhongguo Guangbo chubanshe, 1992), p.177.
25Another major elderly leader, Chen Yun, did not make his views on Pudong public until May 
1992, when he visited Shanghai on the eve of the May Day and expressed unambiguous support. 
That he had not made clear his views in public is evident from his conversation with Shanghai's 
Mayor Huang Ju. Chen Yun reportedly said to Huang Ju, "Aren't there some journalists asking you 
about my views on the opening of Pudong? Your answer to them is appropriate. I very much 
support the opening and development of Pudong... and you have done a great job here." See 
People's Daily, May 2,1992, also printed in You Lin et. al (eds.), Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 
Guoshi Tongjian, 1976-1992 (A History of the People's Republic of China, 1976-1992) (Beijing: 
Hongqiao chubanshe, 1993), p.1002.
26See "The Two Reports by Wang Ju on the Opening and Development of Pudong", Shanghai 
Economy 1991, p.22. The petition report submitted to the Centre was entitled "A Petition on 
Opening and Developing the Pudong Area".
2 Information from Respondent No.25, Shanghai interview, May 1994. According to the 
respondent, the inclusion of more policy proposals was a conscious bargaining tactic of the 
Shanghai government
280ne of the usual comments of Shanghai's govemment/party officials and enterprise officials after 
"study tours" to Guangdong in the 1980s was: if we were to have been given the same policies (by 
the Centre) as those of Guangdong, we could certainly have done better than they did." Jiang Zemin 
had also made similar comments while he was the party secretary of Shanghai. Respondents No.23 
and 25, Shanghai interviews, May 1994.
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How did this turnaround come about? The Shanghai economy had been 
facing grave difficulties for quite a considerable period, and the Shanghai 
leadership had time and again lobbied for changes throughout the 1980s. Why did 
the Shanghai leadership finally succeed at that particular point in time? It is 
possible that the critical factor at work was one of national political consideration, 
and that the specific circumstances of Shanghai may not have been relevant. In the 
aftermath of June 4, 1989, it was the international environment which was most 
central in the minds of the decision makers at the Centre.
One possible explanation for that particular decision in 1990 sees, therefore, 
the main concern being one of a strategic and political nature, and Shanghai being a 
convenient pawn. Less than a year before, in the aftermath of the June 4th incident, 
many foreign investors had fled the country. China’s international image was 
seriously damaged and some of its major trading partners and exporting countries 
had announced economic sanctions against China. This was an undesirable 
situation both in terms of China's international relations and of its unfinished task 
of modernization. It was necessary to divert the attention of international investors 
and foreign governments from the events of 1989 back to the economic 
development programme of the country. Guangdong and its special economic 
zones had made an impression on the international community, but developments 
there were no longer a "fresh" phenomenon. Shanghai, with its historical fame 
within the international community, its central position in the national economy, 
and its strong association with the planned economy, was the ideal candidate. It 
was envisaged that the opening of Pudong at Shanghai would send a strong and 
clear message to the international community that the Chinese government was, 
despite the "setback" of 1989 and continued economic retrenchment, consistent and 
serious in its economic reform and development.29
This may be one of the main motives behind the Centre's decision to confer 
more favourable policies on Shanghai. Another major reason could be that the 
Centre considered the time to be ripe for a shift in the focus of economic reform 
and development from the border provinces in the south to more centrally situated 
and, traditionally, more important economic centres such as Shanghai.30 In any 
event this extension of the reform based on experience first gained in the south was 
a logical development in the progress of China's reform. As the largest city and
29This was described to the author, by Respondents No. 23 and 25, Shanghai interviews, May 1994.
30This is the reason cited by a number of Shanghai officials on the change of central policy 
regarding Shanghai in the 1990s and the fast economic development in Shanghai since. 
(Respondents Nos 14 and 22, Shanghai interviews, January 1994)
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traditionally the most important economic centre of the country, Shanghai’s 
historical status made it the ideal medium through which to consolidate the reform 
experience of the southern provinces and to extend them inland.
However, the national environment of 1990 lends credibility to the 
suggestion that political motives had played a part in the April 1990 announcement 
It must be remembered that in 1990 China was in the middle of economic 
retrenchment which had begun in late 1988. When the Special Policy for 
Guangdong and the establishment of special economic zones were announced in 
1979 and 1980, the national economic situation was relatively normal. Moreover, 
the decision on Guangdong was, it may be noted, well in advance of the 
announcement for economic adjustment in 1980, In Shanghai's case, retrenchment 
had already been in operation for a year and a half with no sign of ending at the 
time the Pudong policies were announced in April 1990.31 Consequently, economic 
development in Shanghai and Pudong in the immediate aftermath of the 1990 
announcements remained lacklustre. Under severely straitened circumstances it 
was also difficult for the Centre to live up to its promised extra funding support, 
amounting to 1.3 billion yuan per year for a total of five years.32 Foreign 
investments, especially larger projects, were slow to regain their former momentum 
after the impact of the 1989 episode. Whilst investment in the local state sector 
increased by 20% in 1991, on the whole, the performance of the economy was 
constrained by the inertia of Shanghai's established systems. According to one 
report on Shanghai, "the development of Pudong has yet to overcome many hurdles 
to achieve substantive progress".33 There was talk as late as December 1991 that 
the time was not yet ripe for the opening of Pudong 34
31That the decision on Guangdong was made prior to the 1980 adjustment decision was clearly 
demonstrated in Gu Mu's talks with the Guangdong leadership in December 1980. Gu Mu 
reassured Guangdong's leaders in a provincial party committee meeting that the decision on special 
economic zones had been made more than a year before the announcement of the economic 
adjustment measures. Therefore Guangdong could not retreat what had just be started." See 
Centre's Instructions to Guangdong, 1979-1982, p. 125.
32In April 1990 the Centre promised a total of 6.5 billion yuan of additional capital within a period 
of five years in the form of loans and giants. See Shanghai Economy 1991 : 27. For details of the 
breakdown of the 6.5 billion yuan, see a report by the Shenzhen City Study Group, "Pudong de 
Kaifa Jidui Shenzhen de Qishi" (Pudong's Opening and Development and Its Message to Shenzhen), 
Theory and Practice of the Special Economic Zone, No.5 (1990), p.l 1. See also discussion later in 
this chapter.
33See Yan Jialin e t  al, "Tuanzhe Yu Jiyu" (Swings and Opportunities: A Report on the 1991 
Economic Development of Shanghai), Shanghai Jihua Jingji Tansuo, No.7 (December 1991), p.7.
34Some scholars and experts, in a seminar on the Pudong development and investment in the 
Yangzi River Delta, commented that the immediate prospects for Pudong were dim. Major reasons 
included the unfavourable international environment the burden of the Shanghai municipality in the 
traditional planned economy, and the lack of competitiveness of Pudong's favourable policies 
compared to other and earlier established special economic zones. See Ming Pao (Hong Kong), 
December 5,1991. The occurence of such negative comments reflected that the developments in
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The development of Pudong and Shanghai only entered into the "fast lane" 
after Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour in January-February 1992. Deng's talks with 
local officials during his tour of Guangdong, Shanghai, and Wuhan effectively 
announced the end of the 1989-91 economic retrenchment, and called for bolder 
attitudes towards developing the economy. In March 1992 Huang Ju, Shanghai's 
mayor, announced that the Centre had approved additional powers and extra 
capital support for Shanghai. This relaxation of the economic situation nationwide 
allowed the favourable policies announced back in 1990 gradually to have some 
impact. Consequently, in the year 1992 Shanghai's economic environment saw its 
first substantial improvement.35 This indicates that whilst the Centre had 
announced the opening of the Pudong Development Zone in April 1990, the 
priority of the Centre at that time was nonetheless the implementation of economic 
retrenchment. Pudong and Shanghai had thus to wait until the end of the 
retrenchment policy before their development could gather momentum. This fact 
supports the suggestion that the announcement made in April 1990 was more of a 
symbolic than material nature, political considerations having been amongst the 
major motivations behind the decision of the central leaders on Pudong at that 
particular juncture in 1990.36
1993: Protecting the Pudong Policies
The Pudong policies of 1990 and 1992 represented the results of prolonged 
bargaining with the Centre and marked the change in central policy towards 
Shanghai. Subsequent to these announcements, the next important task of the 
Shanghai government was that concerning publicity. It was necessary to eliminate 
the doubts and hesitation abounding in 1990/91 regarding the viability and 
prospects of the Pudong development.37 The collective perception, both within and 
without the nation, of Shanghai as one of the most important bases of central 
planning also needed to change to see Shanghai as a pioneer in economic
Pudong and Shanghai since the April 1990 central government announcement had been less than 
impressive.
35The marked improvement in the macro environment of Shanghai's economy was clearly noted by 
the Shanghai government towards the end of 1992. See Shanghai Caishui, No.l 1 (1992), p.4.
35According to Respondent No.25, the Shanghai government had submitted a development 
proposal, outlining the development plans of Pudong in detail along with some relatively crude 
policy requests, to the Centre in 1987. Zhao Ziyang was in favour of approving. Some other central 
leaders were, however, more critical of local demands for favourable policies and their implications 
as regards the central coffers. As a result the report was not approved. However in 1990 this same 
group of leaders was very enthusiastic as regards the opening of Pudong area. Their political 
motive was self-apparent. (Shanghai interview, May 1994).
37See footnote 34 above.
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development and in market-oriented reforms. The favourable policies enjoyed by 
foreign and domestic investors in special economic zones in the south as compared 
to those in Pudong became hot topics of discussion in official and semi-official 
publications. The most important single message and purpose of these comparisons 
was to convince potential investors that Pudong's policies were the most favourable 
in the country, and that Shanghai, with its new initiatives in Pudong, was about to 
become the most important growth area in China.38
This was, in a sense, the reflex response of a late-comer. It indicates the 
underlying worry amongst Shanghai officials of being left once more in the rear of 
the fast train of economic development. Shanghai's officials were, therefore, 
particularly weary of any hint of erosion of their hard-won favourable policies.
When Zhu Rongji came to Shanghai in October 1993 to solicit Shanghai's 
support for the imminent tax and fiscal reforms on the eve of the Third Plenum of 
the Fourteenth National People's Congress, therefore, the objective of the Shanghai 
leadership was to protect Pudong's favourable policies from any possible threat. 
Shanghai officials were concerned that the central policy to control tax exemption, 
announced in July 1993, as part of the macro economic adjustment measures, and 
likely also to form part of the pending tax and fiscal reforms, would, in effect mean 
the withdrawal of the Pudong policies. The preferential policies were, after all, 
largely built around favourable tax rates and generous tax exemptions. This also 
explains why the Shanghai leadership was so immediately contented and 
expressive of its support to the reforms, upon Zhu Rongji's agreement to Pudong's 
policies remaining unchanged under the 1994 tax and fiscal reforms. As a gesture 
of support, and as "trade-in" for the Centre's pledge, the Shanghai leadership 
therefore agreed to remit an additional sum of 600 million yuan in 1993 over and 
above the originally agreed sum of 11.5 billion yuan.39 In the end Shanghai's
See for instance two articles from the Pudong Administration office, Huang Qifan, "Shanghai 
Pudong Xinqu Touzi Kaifa de Zhengce Tedian" (The Specialities of Pudong's Investment Policies), 
Pudong Development, No.4 (1992), pp.15-17; Gu Xingguan, "Pudong Xinqu Caizheng Zhengce de 
Xinyi Ji Tezheng" (The Characteristics and New Aspects of Pudong's Fiscal and Tax Policies), 
Pudong Development, No.3 (1992), pp.12-13.
39Information from Respondents No. 19,20 and 2 1 , Shanghai interviews, January 1994. Shanghai's 
contracted remittance sum was originally only 10.5 billion, but since 1992 400 million yuan of 
"additional contribution" had been added. 500 million yuan was added in 1993 as Shanghai’s 
additional remittance for local fiscal revenue in excess of 16.5 billion yuan under the contractual 
scheme. This constituted substantially less than the half of the excess as prescribed by the original 
agreement, which would amount to some 3.7 billion yuan given Shanghai's local fiscal revenue of 
1993 reaching 24 billion yuan. This represented the success of bargaining of the Shanghai 
leadership with the Centre. On the other hand, the Shanghai leadership agreed to remit an 
additional 600 million yuan as Shanghai's contribution to the pending tax reforms and in return for 
the Centre's assurance that Shanghai's favourable policies would continue to be implemented.
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support proved critical to Zhu in pushing through the fiscal and taxation reforms at 
the Third Plenum in November 1993.
The priority and emphasis of the Shanghai leadership has, therefore, been 
very different from that of Guangdong. As discussed in Chapter Five, the 
Guangdong leadership's area of concern was more the effect of the tax-sharing 
reform on its retained fiscal revenue. Guangdong consequently focused its lobbying 
on the determination of the base line year during Zhu's visit. Such a difference in 
lobbying emphasis was, however, partly the logical result of the success of 
Guangdong's lobbying on the base line year. Zhu had agreed to postpone the base 
line year to 1993 in Guangdong prior to his visit to Shanghai, and since this policy 
would be universally applied, the Shanghai leadership stood to gain by relying on 
Guangdong's success. Consequendy, Shanghai could seek to expand its benefits by 
focusing its own bargaining on preserving its hard-won favourable policies.
The emphasis of the Shanghai leadership nevertheless revealed some of its 
deep-seated concerns regarding Shanghai's development strategy. It should be 
remembered that from the beginning the contractual fiscal system was regarded as 
neither favourable nor fair to Shanghai. Shanghai's goal, since 1984, had been for 
some kind of tax-sharing system, whereby the revenue sources and expenditure 
responsibilities of the Centre and Shanghai were clearly delineated. Within this 
system the Shanghai government would have ample autonomy to manage local 
affairs, including the legislative power on local taxes.40 Consequently, the 
Shanghai government was not overly concerned about the abolition of the 
dabaogan fiscal system and its replacement by a new tax-sharing system in 1994. It 
was more interested in keeping its centrally approved preferential Pudong policies 
intact. This was particularly the case in view of rumours that the Centre intended to 
withdraw or tighten similar policies originally granted to the south during the 
1980s,
40This is reflected in a report by Shanghai officials during the discussion over Shanghai's 
development strategy in 1984, in which it was written that "the current (1985) changes to Shanghai's 
fiscal system is...largely of a transitional nature, and cannot solve many fundamental problems. To 
improve fundamentally the local fiscal system, the obvious situation has to be a system whereby the 
Centre and the local governments obtain their share of total revenue according to the types of 
taxes... This should be the basic direction of future fiscal system reform." See Xu Riqing et al, "A 
Study on How to Perfect the Local Fiscal System of Shanghai", p.247. For even more specific 
advocation of a tax-sharing system in later years, see for instance, Xu Yunren, "Jiasu Tuixing Yi 
Fenshuizhi Wei Zhongxin de Shenceng Gaige" (Speed up the Implementation of More Fundamental 
Reforms Around the Tax-Sharing System), Shanghai Jinghua Jingji Tansuo, No.3 (1990), pp. 17-20, 
(Xu was then the vice-director of the Institute of Fiscal Science, Shanghai Fiscal and Tax Bureau); 
and Yan Bin, "Zhengque Chuli Zhongyang Yu Difang Caizheng Guanxi de Guanjian: Zhubu 
Shixing Fenshuizhi" (Correctly Handle the Crux of the Fiscal Relationship Between the Centre and 
the Local Governments: Implement the Tax-Sharing System Step-By-Step),Caijing Yanjiu 
(Shanghai), No.4 (1991), pp.3-10.
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In the eyes of Shanghai officials the new tax and fiscal reforms of 1994 
represented, amongst other things, the beginning of a new era of central 
development strategy. Equalization was the key word of this new era. The 
numerous discriminatory practices of the 1980s were either to be cancelled or 
gradually phased out. A major area for such equalization was that of the policy 
environments of different provinces. Faced with such a change in the Centre's 
development strategy the Shanghai government had mixed feelings. On the one 
hand, Shanghai had been the loser in the area-based discriminatory development 
approach of the 1980s and would welcome the shift to more area-neutral policies. 
On the other hand, the Pudong policies were themselves an area-based 
discriminatory policy, and Shanghai was also eager to reap the benefits of such 
policies, as Guangdong had done since the 1980s . Therefore the approach was to 
protect the Pudong policies for as long a period as possible, giving them up only 
after other special economic zones had also done so.41
Although the Shanghai leadership had obtained oral assurances from Zhu 
Rongji about the Pudong policies in October 1993, the special circumstances of 
Pudong (and other special economic zones) were not taken into account when the 
precise measures and policy announcements were subsequently made. There was, 
in other words, a gap between the oral assurances of top leaders and the 
implementation at the working level in central ministries.42 The Shanghai 
government was left to negotiate with the relevant central ministries, notably the 
Ministry of Finance and the State Taxation Bureau, about the status of each of the 
tax reduction policies in Pudong. The uncertainty surrounding the new tax systems 
was of an extent that caused hesitation among foreign investors in early 1994.43
4Respondent No.27 stated that under the existing provisions of the new tax systems, most of the 
existing favourable policies in Pudong and the southern special economic zones would eventually 
disappear. (Shanghai interview, May 1994.) Respondent No.36 confirmed that the power of local 
governments in tax reduction and exemption was placed under control under the new tax and fiscal 
system. As a matter of principle the power to approve new tax reductions and exemptions was 
centralized at the State Council. Pudong and Shenzhen and other special economic zones would 
therefore have to make their cases on an individual basis. In future, under a more rational 
delineation of authority required by the tax-sharing system, the power would be divided between the 
local government and central government Local governments would then have the power to reduce 
and exempt local taxes. But since the Shanghai government under the Pudong policies had 
previously been allowed to exempt and reduce industrial and commerial taxes (which became a 
shared" tax under the new tax system) of foreign enterprises, the new system would still amount 
to a diminuation of the power of the Shanghai government under the favourable policies. (Beijing 
interview, May 1994). For the provision see State Council Notice No.85 (1993), December 15, 
1993, "State Council's Decision on Implementing the Tax-sharing Fiscal Management System", 
printed in Caizheng, No.2 (1994), pp. 18-20, particularly point No.6 in p.20.
42Respondent No.25, Shanghai interview, May 1994.
43The thorny issue involved was whether the Shanghai government could continue to approve new 
tax reduction and exemptions for qualified foreign and domestic investors in accordance with the 
Pudong policies. According to Respondent No.24, the Shanghai government had successfully
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The objective of the Shanghai leadership was to make the central government issue 
a policy document unambiguously confirming the "exceptional" status of Pudong. 
Meanwhile the Shanghai government would continue to implement the Pudong 
policies regardless of the new control provisions.44
Fight for Direct Central Support
Due to the slow pace of change in the macro policy environment, and 
because Shanghai was traditionally a major base of central planning, more central 
support in the form of direct investment projects, capital finance and expansion of 
the total investment control scale represented one important and frequently 
employed means by which the Shanghai government sought to increase investment 
and boost the local economy.
Central Investment Projects
In Chapter Four it was noted that the share of central investment in 
Shanghai's total state sector investment during the 1980s was larger than that of the 
pre-1980 years. From 1950 to 1980, the share was at around 30%, surging to 40% 
during the 1981-92 period. Counting only capital construction projects, central 
investment projects reached their zenith at 6 6% during 1981-85, declining only 
slightly to 59% between 1986-90.45
This high proportion reflects the substantial amount of central investment in 
Shanghai. Amongst the more notable and larger projects was the expansion of sin 
Shanghai Petrochemical Plant, the first phase of which was completed in 1978, the 
construction of Shanghai Baoshan Iron and Steel Corporation, the Hoegtp; > 
Airport, and an electricity power plant in Pudong. Discussion in Chapter Four has 
shown that, despite the proliferation of funding channels in the 1980s, there are 
solid indications of quite a substantial inflow of central fiscal investment funds to 
Shanghai in particular years of the 1980s.46
cleared the case with the Centre regarding the approval of new exemptions and reductions of profit 
taxes. But exemptions of business tax and value-added tax were still unresolved. (Shanghai 
interview, May 1994)
^Respondent No.28, Shanghai interview, May 1994. Shanghai's vice-mayor cum director of the 
Pudong Management Committee, Zhao Qizheng, confirmed publicly in a press briefing on June 9, 
1994 that the Shanghai government would continue to implement all the preferential policies, 
including tax reduction and exemption policies, which had been in force since 1990, quoting recent 
central leadership's assurances that the Centre's policy regarding Pudong remained unchanged. See 
Jiefang Ribao, June 10,1994, p. 1.
45See discussion in Chapter Four Tables 4.5 and 4.6.
46See discussion in Chapter Four Table 4.10.
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Partly as a bargaining tactic and partly as a matter of subjective evaluation, 
there was a marked tendency among Shanghai's officials and commentators to play 
down the contribution of central investment projects to the local economy and to 
the local fiscal coffers.47 There were frequent complaints about the extra burdens 
posed by central enterprises on Shanghai's capital supply, food subsidies, and other 
demands on the city infrastructure and community facilities. The fact that central 
investment could induce a multiplier effect on the local economy and was itself a 
major source of local fiscal revenue via the turnover taxes was ignored. For 
instance, it was commonplace to point out that the profit tax revenue of central 
enterprises entered the central government coffers directly, and that other taxes, 
including the turnover taxes, paid to local coffers were relatively minor and 
insignificant. The fact is, to the contrary, that turnover taxes were the largest 
revenue item in the state budget, and that central enterprises in Shanghai were the 
major source of these taxes. For instance, total local revenue from turnover taxes 
in the first nine months of 1993 was 800 million yuan more than that for the same 
period the previous year, of which 500 million yuan, or 63% of the increase, came 
solely from the Baoshan Iron and Steel Corporation alone.43
Another major area of complaint has been the supply of working capital to 
central enterprises. State enterprises traditionally relied on the state for then- 
working capital supply. Previously working capital was supplied in the form of 
state grants. Since the early 1980s, however, this has been carried out via bank 
loans. Since the supply of total bank finance in any one area was controlled by 
centrally prescribed quotas, the Shanghai government was very wary of central 
enterprises utilizing that part of the quotas which had been alloted to the city, 
especially when central enterprises were normally of very large scale and their 
demand for capital thus very substantial. In one estimate, three central enterprises 
alone could account for 1.05 billion yuan of Shanghai's working capital bank loans 
in 1989, or nearly 2% of the total working capital bank loans for the year. This
Respondent No. 19 admitted that it was a bargaining tactic of Shanghai in its dealing with the 
Centre. By "crying wolf’ and playing down the positive side, Shanghai sought to raise the attention 
of the Centre and succeed in winning more resources. (Shanghai interview, January 1994) The 
December 1987 Report by the Shanghai government also included such a complaint: that centrally 
planned projects had used up a substantial portion of Shanghai's finance capital, and requesting that 
the Centre provide sufficient additional capital to finance its projects in Shanghai. This of course did 
not mean that the complaints were entirely unfounded, but that part of the reality was somehow 
exaggerated and other parts played down, to give the most favourable picture conducive to 
Shanghai’s articulation of interests to the Centre.
^Information from Respondent No.21, Shanghai interviews, January 1994. It should be noted that 
prior to the tax reforms in 1994, all revenue from the turnover taxes went into the local fiscal 
coffers.
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feeling amongst Shanghai officials was amplified by the fact that the Shanghai 
government had originally obtained the consent of central leaders, around 1983/84, 
to guarantee additional capital supply for the central enterprises, but that had not 
been implemented by the relevant central ministries.49 The Shanghai government 
eventually lodged a formal but coded complaint in their December 1987 Report, 
which stated that central projects had used up a substantial portion of Shanghai's 
finance capital and that thereafter the Centre should provide sufficient additional 
capital with which to finance its projects in Shanghai.
Another area of discontent was food subsidies. The Shanghai government 
had to shoulder increasingly large food subsidies in the 1980s as a result of the 
widening gap between the purchase price of agricultural products and the actual 
retail price level. Any rise in retail prices was constrained by the political necessity 
to keep prices at a socially acceptable level.50 Available data shows that subsidies 
of various kinds had eaten increasingly into the total local fiscal expenditure, rising 
from under 700 million yuan in 1985, or 16% of total fiscal expenditure, to 3.8 
billion yuan in 1990, or 53% of the total. Of these, a substantial amount was spent 
on food subsidies.51 From the point of view of the Shanghai government, Shanghai 
was subsidizing portion of the costs of the central enterprises. By paying the cost of 
food subsidies, the local government coffers had been bearing a part of the cost of 
living of their staff, which, in theory, should be covered by the wages earned in 
central enterprises.52
Therefore, although the Shanghai government was eager to obtain more 
direct central support in investment (and statistical information does suggest a
49See Cui Laifu, "Shanghai's Zijin de Xianzhuang, Wenti Yu Duice" (Shanghai’s Capital Supply: 
Present Situation, Issues, and Solutions), Shanghai Economic Review, No.4 (July 1989), p.49.
50Historically Shanghai’s retail price level has been lower and has risen more slowly than the 
national average. From 1951 to 1978, the annual average increase in retail prices in Shanghai was 
0.7%, against the national average of 1.1%. From 1979 to 1984 it was 1,88% against 2.75%, As a 
result the residents in Shanghai were relatively unused to high price rises, and this seriously 
constrained the ability of the Shanghai government to reduce the fiscal subsidies by raising retail 
prices. See Jiang Zemin (ed.), The Ten Years of Economic System Reform in Shanghai. (The Ten 
Years of Economic Reform in Shanghai) (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin chubanshe, 1989), p. 132.
51 Respondents No. 20 and 21, Shanghai interviews, January 1994. Input price subsidies and food 
subsidies are the two major items of expenditure. See also Bao Youde, "Dangqian Caizheng de 
Kunnan Yu Chulu" (The Current Fiscal Situation: Difficulties and the Way Out), Shanghai Jihua 
Jingji Tansuo, No.7 (December 1989), pp,l-2. Pao was the then Director of Shanghai's Finance 
Bureau. The subsidy on state enterprises running in the red was not included in the fiscal subsidy 
expenditures in accordance with China’s accounting method. Until 1993 that sum of subsidy had 
been simply deducted from the incomes of state enterprises, which actually constituted revenue 
from profit taxes and remittance of profits after tax. The poor profit conditions of many state 
enterprises had resulted in negative figures in this revenue item throughout the 1980s. This 
accounting method also made turnover taxes the most important single revenue item in the state 
budget
52This was pointed out by Respondent No. 19, Hong Kong interview, November 1993.
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strong presence of the central government in investment activities during the 
1980s), the general perception amongst Shanghai officials was that Shanghai had 
not benefited much from central investments in Shanghai, and that the amount of 
investment made during the decade had not been that substantial.53 All in all, 
central investment did bring some benefits in terms of increased indirect tax 
revenue and job opportunities for the local population. On balance, however, these 
benefits were regarded as neither substantial nor material in terms of the benefits 
Shanghai should, in theory, have obtained. Part of the benefits were cancelled out 
by the additional financial burdens Shanghai had to bear from accommodating 
these central enterprises. More importantly, Shanghai officials generally expected a 
higher level of central support in return for their historically high contribution to 
the national coffers. The feeling was that: Shanghai deserved more.
In a sense this perception and feeling of discontent amongst Shanghai 
officals regarding central investment was the result of a gap between the changes in 
the macro environment and the rules of the game as regards the attraction of central 
investment on the one hand, and the capability of the Shanghai government to 
adapt to these conditions on the other. As discussed in Chapter Five, the progress 
of economic reforms in the 1980s had significantly altered the rules of the game in 
what had once been largely an administrative exercise in the allocation of 
investment resources. In order successfully to attract investment one would have to 
offer convincing incentives, in the form of good prospects for profit-making. One 
must also, at a time of tight capital supply and keen competition for capital, be 
prepared to contribute part of the investment and to share part of the risk. This 
capability to attract external investment capital by offering has been described by 
Chinese economists as "fishing power". The complaints of Shanghai regarding the 
extra burdens imposed by central projects thus reflected the fact that the Shanghai 
government, and its officials, had yet to adapt to the requirements of the new 
operating environment.
Capital Supply
Another way to increase investment in Shanghai, apart from central direct 
investment projects, was to increase the supply of capital from the Centre, either in
53This view was clearly elaborated by Respondent No.27, Shanghai interview, May 1994. The 
respondent remarked that while central investment projects to inland provinces involved 
'TeaTinjection of capital, central investment projects in Shanghai usually involved substantial 
capital contribution by the local government, whether in form of infrastructure investments such as 
roads and other community facilities or working capital finance. Some existing central enterprises 
were even originally local investment projects and were made central enterprises upon their 
completion.
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the form of grants or bank finance. This was in a sense an even better method than 
that of receiving central direct investments as the municipal government could then 
have more autonomy in the use of capital, and the profits generated from new local 
projects would enter local fiscal coffers instead of central coffers as was the case 
for central direct investments.
There are various types of capital supply. There are, first, grants and loans 
requiring specified investment purposes. For instance, from 1984 to 1991 
Shanghai obtained 2.9 billion yuan of additional capital from the Centre for 
renovating the city’s infrastructure54, and a total of some US$1.3 billion of bank 
loans was also acquired from the Centre to finance the technical renovation of 
Shanghai's aged state enterprises.55 In 1987, the Shanghai government, together 
with Beijing and Tianjin, solicited the support of the State Council in providing 
extra support to the development of export-oriented industries in the three 
municipalities. Additional funds were put aside for the competitive bidding of 
enterprises from the three cities.56 Although such capital usually came with 
specified purposes, it was not difficult for the municipal government to circumvent 
control and divert the funds to other uses. The 2.9 billion yuan targeted for city 
infrastructure renovation was, for instance, appropriated to other uses.57
The largest inflow of extra investment capital came as a corollary of the 
Pudong favourable policies, announced in 1990 and reinforced in 1992. Extra 
capital, to be provided in the five years between 1991-95, totalling 6.5 billion yuan, 
was promised to the Shanghai government at the time the central government 
announced the opening of Pudong in April 1990. The 6.5 billion yuan was in four 
parts: (1) US$ 100 million per annum of foreign capital with favourable interest 
rates equivalent to 2  billion yuan in five years; (2 ) central fiscal grants of 20 0  
million yuan per year, totalling 1 billion yuan in five years; (3 ) additional bank 
loans amounting to 1.5 billion yuan in five years to assist old enterprises in the city 
district to resite in Pudong and upgrade their technology; and (4) loans from the
54See Jin Wen, "Yao Qieshi Jiajiang Shiji Jianshe Zijin de Hongguan Guanli” (To Substantially 
Strengthen the Macro-Management of Shanghai’s Investment Capital”, Shanghai Jihua Jingji 
Tansuo, No. 1 (February 1992), p.6.
55See Guangming Daily, February 24,1993, p.l. The sum was reportedly used as from 1987. See 
also Shanghai Statistics, No,8 (1993), p.3 for a reference of additional loans by the Centre to 
renovate Shanghai’s industrial infrastructure, the quotas of 1992 being 1.3 billion yuan, which had 
however not yet been realized.
56See Lou Rucheng, "Tantan Ruohe Jiakuai Shanghai ’116 Jijian Xiangmu' Jianshe Bufa" (On How 
to Speed Up the Pace of Shanghai’s No. 116 Capital Construction Projects), Shanghai Investment, 
No.5 (May 1987), pp.16-17.
57See Jin Wen, "To Substantially Strengthen the Macro-Mangement of Shanghai’s Investment 
Capital", p.6.
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central Ministry of Finance with negative interest rates of 3% to 4,32% totalling 2 
billion yuan in five years.58
In March 1992, additional capital of up to 4 billion yuan more each year, or 
16 billion yuan in total from 1992 to 1995, was pledged by the Centre. This 
included (1) allowing the Shanghai government to issue 500 million yuan of bonds 
each year to finance specific developments in Pudong; (2) twice as many foreign 
loans as those of 1990 would be arranged with favourable interest rates, making a 
total of USS300 million per annum; (3) an additional 100 million yuan in annual 
quotas of enterprise share issue; (4) the power to issue B shares amounting to 
US$100 million per annum; and (5) an extra 100 million yuan annual central fiscal 
grant.59
From the above data it should be noted that of the total 22.5 billion yuan 
promised by the Centre, only a fraction was central money injected via the 
traditional channels. Money from the central government, namely, outright fiscal 
grants and the negative rate fiscal loans, totalled 2.4 billion yuan. This sort of 
capital incurred the least cost from the viewpoint of the municipal government, and 
was traditionally the most welcome. Next came the 1.5 billion yuan of domestic 
bank loans and the US$1.3 billion foreign loans. The loans would be arranged by 
the central government, and although the municipal government had to pay them 
back in due course, the favourable interest rates amounted to some kind of subsidy. 
Most of the new capital promised in 1992 belonged to the third type, whereby that 
which the Shanghai government obtained from the Centre was not the actual 
supply of capital, whether as grants or loans, but the power to raise capital from the 
market. This included the power to issue 2 billion yuan in bonds, 400 million 
yuan in enterprise shares and US$4 million in B shares. In such cases whether or 
not the capital could be realized would depend on the management ability of the 
Shanghai government, and on the condition and responses of the market.60
Central government fiscal grants for purposes other than investment could 
be a support to local investment, because under the dabaogan system the municipal 
government would be able to deploy more resources to investment if more 
expenditures were borne by the central government. Central fiscal grants in 1992
58See Shenzhen City Study Group, "Pudong's Opening and Development and Its Message to 
Shenzhen", p .ll.
59See People's Daily, March 11,1992, p. 1.
60Respondent No.28 confirmed that the pledges of additional capital were, basically, realized in 
full. The buoyancy in the securities market ensured full utilization of the quotas of share issue 
allowed by the Centre. (Telephone interview, May 1994)
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amounted to about 1.4 billion yuan61, accounting for some 16% of the disposable 
local revenue of Shanghai.62
Another form of central capital supply was through the bank finance 
system. Loans from the central bank at favourable rates amounted to ''cheap” 
money. From 1986 to 1990 the cumulative deposit-loan deficit reached 17.5 
billion yuan63, which was largely covered by loans from the central bank.64 
However information on the transfer of various bank funds to the Centre, at a level 
of 13.4 billion yuan in the case of Guangdong from 1980-88, is not available in the 
case of Shanghai. Nevertheless, information on Guangdong indicates the 
proportion of the net central fund injection into the local bank system.65
The Shanghai government was adamant about its need for more in this 
respect. It was stated that the direct supply of bank funds from the central bank had 
declined substantially, from 4.8 billion yuan in 1986 to 1.6 billion yuan in 1987. 
This was considered totally inadequate for Shanghai's economy, and was not 
commensurate with the contribution and role of Shanghai in the national 
economy.66
Expanding the "Cages”
The central control figures on the scale of total bank finance and total 
investment have been described by Chinese officials as "cages”. This term conveys 
the message that provincial governments are, in theory, to confine their 
discretionary investment decisions and planning within the limits of investment 
total and bank finance as prescribed by the Centre. Although the control figures 
were actually an index of control purpose, itself not denoting any inflow of central 
resources to the provinces, expanding the size of the "cages” has been synonymous 
with attracting more investment capital from the Centre. This was particularly the 
case as regards bank finance quotas. As the Centre expanded the quotas of bank 
finance, Shanghai would be able to obtain more central bank loans to make up for
61See Zhou Youdao, "A Report on the Final Accounts of Shanghai’s 1992 Budget", Shanghai 
Caishui, No.7 (1993), p.4.
62Disposable local fiscal revenue refers to total local fiscal revenue (including the central grants) 
minus the remittance to the Centre. For the figures see Ibid.
63See Almanac of China's Finance and Banking 1992, p.229.
64This was generally the normal way of operation as understood from Respondent No.8, 
Guangzhou interview, December 1993.
65As stated in Chapter Five, net injection of central money into Guangdong's banking system from 
1980-1988 amounted to 13.2 billion yuan, which was about 50% of the value of central bank loans 
to Guangdong in the same period.
66See Cui Laifu,"Shanghai's Capital Supply: Present Situation, Issues and Solutions",p.48.
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its shortfall of deposit. As a result the call for more injection of central bank funds 
in the 1980s, as noted in the section above, was actually a covert call for the 
expansion of the bank finance scale.67
The Shanghai government was most concerned about the constraints 
imposed by the central control figures, as, on the whole, it took the quotas more 
seriously than did Guangdong. This was especially so for the quotas on investment 
scale, which, in Guangdong, were not very seriously observed, as discussed in 
Chapters Three and Five. In Shanghai, data available suggest that the quotas were 
more or less followed, as shown in the table below:
Table 6.1
Shanghai's Total Investment Scale Control and Actual Performance
(Billion Yuan')
Year Seal? Performance4 Excess Investment %
1988 13.01 25.4 95.4
1991 14.22 19.2 35.0
1992 22.03 29.8 44.5
Note: Performance means total local investment made in the year. 
Source: (1) China Capital Construction, No.5 (1989), p.4.
(2) calculated from Shanghai Statistics, No.5 (1992), pp.2-5.
(3) Shanghai Jihua Jingji Tansuo, No.l (1992), p.2.
(4) Shanghai Statistical Yearbooks, 1989,1992,1993.
The extent of excess investment was modest compared to that of 
Guangdong, as shown in Chapter Three. Taking into account that some categories 
of investment were, as a matter of central policy, excluded from the coverage, such 
modest excess investment means, in effect, that the centrally imposed quota was 
largely followed.68
Consequently, very substantial effort was spent every year with a view to 
securing as large a "cage" as possible, and especially at the beginning of a five- 
year-plan cycle. In an account by Shanghai's vice-mayor and head of the Planning 
Commission about the work of the Planning Commission in 1991, the securing of a 
higher investment control scale and the associated supply of investment capital 
from the Centre for the 1991-95 period figured prominently as a major
67This is the interpretation of Respondent No.28. (Telephone interview, May 1994)
68 Some categories of investment were excluded from the coverage of the scale control so as to 
encourage investment in specified sectors. Otherwise they were considered too trivial to merit 
control. For more discussion refer to Chapter Four.
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accomplishment.69 Expanding the quotas was a major objective behind Shanghai's 
bargaining with the Centre for more favourable policies. For instance, in the 
December 1987 petition, the Shanghai government explicitly asked for the 
expansion of the quotas on bank finance and investment scale.
The high degree of concern for the scale quotas was fully revealed with the 
opening of Pudong. When the opening of Pudong became central policy in 1990 
and more investments were destined to be allocated to the area, the Shanghai 
government was keen to have a separate quota of total investment scale for the 
Pudong area. The purpose of this was to prevent the displacement effect of Pudong 
on the old city area, and to increase the total scale of investment in Shanghai as a 
whole.70 This was eventually achieved in 1992 71 In 1993, the quota for total 
investment scale in the old city area was 30 billion yuan, and the quota for Pudong 
10.4 billion. Having a separate quota for Pudong, therefore, amounted to an 
increase of the total investment scale of Shanghai by one-third.72
The meaning of the central control figures to the Shanghai Government was 
considered by some Shanghai officials as analogous to the significance of rice 
coupons to Chinese city residents. To be able to buy rice one must first have rice 
coupons, regardless of whether or not there was, in fact, sufficient rice in supply in 
the government reserves.73 In practice the central quotas had more potential than 
rice coupons for coupon-holders. The supply of rice was ultimately determined by 
the actual quantity of the rice harvest, a factor which was not susceptible to 
manipulation, or certainly not on a substantial scale, at any particular point in t im e . 
On the other hand, the supply of capital in China, at least until the early 1990s, was 
very much a matter of the will of the central government, and developments 
suggested that it was possible to "push" the central government, via the central 
bank, to increase the supply of money by expanding the total scale of investment
69See Xu Hangdi, "To Further Change the Functions of the Planning Commission, to Contribute 
Towards the Opening of Pudong and the Revitalization of Shanghai", Shanghai Jihua Jingji 
Tansuo,NoA (1992), p.l.
70How to formulate and implement the favourable policies in such a way that no extra burdens 
would be imposed on the old city area of Shanghai was a major consideration of the Shanghai 
government in the immediate aftermath of the announcement of Pudong policies. See for instance 
Cai Laixing, "Kaifang Pudong, Kaifa Pudong, Zhenxing Shanghai" (Open Pudong, Develop 
Pudong, Revitalize Pudong), Shanghai Jihua Jingji Tansuo, No.3 (June 1990), pp. 1-6. Cai was then 
the head of Economic Research Institute, Shanghai Planning Commission.
71 The negotiation for a separate investment scale quota for Pudong reached breakthrough in 1991. 
See Jin Wen, "To Substantially Strengthen the Macro-Management of Shanghai's Investment 
Capital", p.4.
72For the figures on the quotas, see Shanghai Audit Bureau," Grasp the Opportunity, and Strengthen 
the Audit Supervision on Capital Construction", Shanghai Audit, No.4 (August 1993), pp. 16-17.
73This is an analogy suggested by Respondent No.28.
306
beyond the existing means. In other words, as far as investment was concerned, the 
primary concern of provincial governments was that of expanding their investment 
scale and bank finance quotas. Having achieved a larger scale, they would then be 
in a position to ask for the "associated" supply of capital with which to finance the 
investment. How the capital was ultimately made available was not their concern.
This illustrates why control figures were deemed necessary as some form of 
control over the investment drives of provincial governments. However in practice 
the central government did not have an effective means through which to prevent 
non-observance of the quotas or to penalize the offenders.74 Some provincial 
governments simply ignored the quotas and implemented their own investment 
plans. In this way their behaviour may be compared to offenders in the case of rice 
control who simply break into the official emergency storage godowns to take the 
rice. Bargaining with the authorities for more rice coupons is no longer their major 
means of access to an increased rice intake. This has been largely the case in 
Guangdong, where there has been substantial excess investment over and above the 
central quotas which have increasingly been ignored. In the case of Shanghai, the 
modest excess" of investment shows that, on the whole, obtaining more rice 
coupons was still considered to be the major and most appropriate route to a full 
stomach.
Implementation Manoeuvres
Having established the fact that the Shanghai government was more rule- 
abiding than was Guangdong, this does not imply that there was no occurrence at 
all of deviant behaviour. A municipal finance official admitted that the Shanghai 
government would adapt the generally-worded central policies and laws in order 
that they were more "tailored" to fit the local circumstances.75 At this point it is 
necessary to differentiate two types of local discretion during implementation. One 
type is that necessitated and allowed by central documents. Provincial 
governments in China are, in fact, generally expected to take the initiative in 
adapting national laws and central government policies to fit the local situation. 
Very often the national documents include general principles and crude provisions 
only, and it is the job of provincial government to formulate provincial regulations 
so as to provide detailed prescriptions. The other type is deviation from the 
originally intended course of action, often motivated by the quest for localised
74This is especially true for the control figure on investment scale. The control on total bank 
finance was strengthened since 1989.
75Respondent No.20, Shanghai interview, January 1994.
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interest. In practice the two types of discretion are not easily distinguishable, 
therefore the legitimacy of the first type to adapt to local conditions provides a 
convenient camouflage for the second, and usually more common, type of local 
deviation.
The common deviations in implementation notwithstanding, the cautious 
mentality of the Shanghai officials has been apparent in its scale and content of the 
deviations, as the following instances show.
Manipulating the Central Quotas on Investment Scale
As discussed in Chapter Three, some categories of investment were 
excluded from the central control figures on total investment scale as part of the 
central policy to encourage socially desirable, non-profit-making, investment 
projects such as the building of schools and staff hostels.76 One way of beating the 
Centre's scale control was, therefore, through manipulating these legitimate 
exemption categories. The Shanghai government was an active exponent of this 
practice.
Data available shows that 36% of Shanghai's local capital const* 
investment in 1987 belonged to these exempted categories. Total local investment 
in 1987 surpassed the original plan by just under 40%. However, if the exempted 
categories are excluded, the total investment is more or less equal to the value 
prescribed by the Centre.77
The exempted categories became, therefore, a convenient vehicle through 
which the Shanghai government might legitimately increase investment beyond the 
control scale. Legitimacy is the key word. The Shanghai government was eager to 
expand investment and to remain righteous. This explains the "coincidence" 
whereby the percentage of excess investment should be nearly the equivalent of the 
percentage of exempted categories within the total investment.78 However there 
was a limit to which one could be both rule-abiding and self-cultivating. The 
concern to appear to be abiding by the rules has imposed a strong self-restraint on
76See Footnote 7 in Chapter Three.
77See Shanghai Economy 1988, pp.558-59.
78Respondent No. 15 admitted that some investments were being placed in the exempted categories 
so that more investments could be made without breaking the Centre's quota control on investment 
scale. But there was a limit as to how much investment one placed beyond the coverage of the 
quotas without inviting queries and disapproval from the Centre. (Shanghai interview, Umsary 
1994)
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the investment behaviour of the Shanghai government, and explains its relative 
modesty in terms of excess investment over the centrally prescribed quotas, as 
shown in Table 6.1 above.
Another method through which to achieve a bigger '’cage" was that of 
excluding projects regarded as important by the Centre from the scale covered by 
the central quota. This tactic was particularly used during periods of retrenchment 
when the Centre was more stringent on the issue of excess investment For instance 
during the retrenchment in 1989 when the investment scale quota of Shanghai was 
cut by 40%, the strategy employed by the Shanghai government was that of 
excluding a number of profitable industrial projects from the plan, and using this 
basis for bargaining when negotiating a larger quota from the Centre. During a 
session of the National People's Congress in Spring 1989 the Director of the 
Shanghai Planning Commission made the following comment on this approach:
"The uniform approach of the current retrenchment drive has brought three 
major difficulties to Shanghai's economic development. First is the cut in 
the investment scale quota, from over 13 billion yuan last year to only 8 
billion yuan this year, a cut of nearly 40%. The US$3.2 billion "9-4" special 
items which were previously allowed outside the coverage of the scale 
quota were included within the coverage of the quota this year. But this left 
the "cage" (i.e., the quota) too small. The only solution was to cut out this 
portion of investment projects. But this also brought about a problem. Of 
the US$3.2 billion, US$1.4 billion was for infrastructural projects such as 
airports, bridges, etc... To repay these loans we had to rely on the more 
profitable projects in which the balance of US$1.8 billion was invested. 
However, now the infrastructural projects were already in progress, we 
could only cut all that the industrial projects. But in this way we would 
also have curtailed the means through which to repay the loans for 
infrastructural projects. ..."79
A difficult situation was thus deliberately created by giving desirable projects a 
low priority within the scale of investment allowed by the Centre. The Centre was 
then confronted with a "problem" which could only be solved by enlarging the 
quota.
79See Chan Xianglin, "Adjustment must be Based on the Actual Circumstances", China Capital 
Construction, No.5 (1989), pp.4-5. The "9-4" special items were a category of projects approved by 
the Centre via a central document issued on September 4, 1986, which allowed the Shanghai 
government additional powers to borrow and use foreign capital of US$3.2 billion to finance badly 
needed infrastructural and industrial renovation projects. In order to ensure Shanghai’s ability to 
repay the foreign loans, and to guarantee the certainty of profits through which to lure potential 
foreign investors, a series of more profitable industrial projects were launched as part of the "9-4" 
projects and the profits from these projects were used to finance the loan-repayment of the 
infrastructural projects. Altogether US$1.3 billion had been used (or assigned to be used) for 
infrastructural projects, including the construction of the Yangpo and Nanpo bridges across the 
Huangpo River, and an amount of US$1.9 billion had been used on industrial projects. Respondent 
No.14, Shanghai interview, January 1994.
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Increasing the Revenue Base of 1993
Another instance of deviation in implementation by the Shanghai 
government is that of the effort to increase the revenue base on the eve of the 
implementation of the tax-sharing system in late 1993, Table 6.2 below shows the 
month-by-month local fiscal revenue in 1993.
Table 6.2
Month
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
Shanghai's Local Fiscal Revenue: 1993 
(100 Million Yuanl
Revenue % Increase Over Same Month 1992
11.8 23.1
10.6 (2.3)
15.9 26.9
24.6 25.0
21.1 36.2
13.7 2.0
19.6 20.4
18.8 32.5
25.2 105.6
31.6 65.1
20.4 32.4
29.0 8.5
Source: Information from the State Planning Commission.
Table 6.2  shows that from September to November, the local fiscal revenue 
of Shanghai increased at a substantially higher rate in comparison with the same 
months of the previous year. This suggests that there was deliberate action to 
collect more revenue before the end of the year.80 The pattern of development 
from September to December was, however, interesting. Contrary to the "upward 
development", with the rate of increase accelerating towards the end of the year as 
was the case of Guangdong, and, as shown in Table 5.2 in Chapter Five, the trend 
in Shanghai was quite the opposite of that in Guangdong. The rate of increase was 
at its highest in September, and it fell substantially each subsequent month.
It should be noted that, as mentioned in Chapter Five, the central 
government, noting the sudden rise in fiscal revenue in September and October, 
had issued a notice in November 1993 warning against the premature and improper 
collection of revenue by provincial governments in an attempt to boost the revenue
80An informed source told the author that the director of Shanghai's Finance Bureau issued in early 
October 1993 an internal directive to finance departments at the district and county levels to order 
them to collect "all revenues which should have been collected." Respondent No.21, Shanghai 
interview, January 1994.
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base line. 81 In a national finance meeting early in December, the Finance Minister 
Liu Zhongli reiterated this warning,82 and this had its desired effect on the 
Shanghai government. Consequently, in early December many enterprises in 
Shanghai received "refunds" of a substantial part of the tax payments they had 
earlier made.83 Many enterprises were reportedly caught off guard when they 
received these tax refunds, no special reason or pretext having been given for them. 
This indicates the abruptness with which the decision on refunding the taxes had 
been made.
The motive behind this swift turnabout concurs with that behind the original 
revenue grasping behaviour, in both cases of which the local coffers benefited. 
Since the central government had made clear its position on the issue, to continue 
such behaviour was likely to invite penalties. More importantly, there was strong 
concern that collecting too much revenue might be detrimental to the city in the 
long run, since it would raise the expectations of the Centre as regards the financial 
strength of Shanghai, and thus invite more "requests" for additonal 
"contributions".84
Reaching out for the New Horizon
Until the late 1980s and even into the early 1990s the attention of the 
Shanghai leadership had been on the heavy burden imposed by the high base of 
fiscal remittances and on the rising prices of raw materials and consumer products. 
The senior leadership spent much time bargaining for a lower fiscal remittance 
level and securing more central support, in the form of fiscal grants, bank finance 
or direct investments. At the level of policy implementation and day-to-day 
practice, various tactics were employed to ensure that more could be achieved 
under a veil of compliance. In these circumstances, manoeuvres were largely built 
around the established area of the central plan system and squarely within the 
bounds of the traditional state sector.
81See Footnote 41 of Chapter Five.
82See a report on the meeting in Shanghai Caishui 1993, No.12, p.5.
83Respondent No.21, Shanghai interview, January 1994.
^Shanghai's local fiscal revenue in 1993 amounted to 24.2 billion yuan, an increase of 30% over
1992. This was a huge jump when compared to the sluggish performance and slides of the 1980s. 
The increase would have been more if not for the substantial refunds in December 1993. As the 
provincial government did not have legislative power over taxes and other fiscal revenue, there was 
concern that, under the tax-sharing system, more of the local fiscal revenue would be transferred to 
the central coffers through the shared taxes. The desire to retain more resources in the locality, by 
collecting less taxes, was therefore still quite urgent as had been the case under the dabaogan 
system. (Respondents No 19 and 21, Shanghai interviews, January 1994)
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This is, however, an oversimplification of the discretionary behaviour of the 
Shanghai government. It is, in fact, incorrect for observers to conclude that the 
Shanghai government did not use, or failed to notice the importance of, tactics 
which developed the room for manoeuvre of the municipal government beyond the 
traditional boundaries of state control. Such tactics had been widely used in other 
provinces, particularly in Guangdong, but in Shanghai the issue was more often a 
matter of capability than of willingness. When the Shanghai government finally 
secured a more relaxed macro environment towards the end of the 1980s, such 
tactics increasingly characterized its discretionary behaviour. By focusing on the 
non-state and extrabudgetary sectors, as opposed to the state and budgetary sectors, 
these recent forms of discretion became the major factors underlining the surge of 
local investment activity since the late 1980s.
For instance there was evidence that, from at least as early as 1984, some 
officials in the Finance Bureau had explicitly advocated the use of tax alleviation 
to promote local economic development.85 It was in fact an established practice. 
From 1980 to 1983, whilst Shanghai was still operating the "sharing the total" 
fiscal system of 1976 and remitting roughly 80% of its local fiscal revenue to the 
Centre, the total value of tax revenue foregone as a result of exemption and 
reduction amounted to nearly 600 million yuan. This was about 1% of the tots- 
local fiscal revenue of the period.86 An article by a finance official aptly describes 
the early thinking of some Shanghai officials on this issue:
"(The finance work), in Shanghai's case, is to expedite the purpose of our 
economic development strategy (approved by the Centre in early 1985). We 
have to drop the old way. That is, we have to change the attitude from one 
of being satisfied simply with increasing the amount of revenue collected, 
containing expenditure, and with balancing revenue and expenditure bills. 
The emphasis of our work should instead be placed on the promotion of 
production... We have to learn a new approach in the management of our 
finance. In order to take more, we have first to give; to give a small piece in 
return for a larger piece,"87
It cannot, of course, be denied that as of the mid-1980s, many officials in 
Shanghai were not too receptive to the idea of tax alleviation being incorporated as
85See Tao Changyuan and Lin Weiting, "Cong Jianmian Shui Kan Shuishou de Jingji Ganggan 
Zuoyong” (Tax Alleviation: the Leverage Function of Taxes in the Economy), Shanghai Caishui 
Yanjiu, No.5 (May 1984), pp.28-30.
86Ibid. Of the total 600 million yuan, about 58% was directed to support production of state 
enterprises which were operating either in the red or on the verge of losses; 12% to support export- 
oriented production; 25% to collective enterprises and 4.5% to support the production of new 
products.
7See Xiong Ruixiang, "Wanshan Caishui Gaige, Wei Shixian Shanghai Jingji Fazhan Zhanlue 
Fuwu" (To Further Improve the Fiscal Reform in the Service of Shanghai's Economic Develops 
Strategy", Shanghai Caishui Yanjiu, No.8 (August 1985), p.4.
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a major part of Shanghai's economic development strategy. In fact the above quote 
points out precisely the dominant approach towards finance work amongst 
Shanghai officials in the mid-1980s. It was obviously still very much focused on 
the due collection of revenue. Nonetheless, if it had not been for the stringent 
fiscal state of local coffers during the 1980s, i.e., the existence of formidable 
objective obstacles, such subjective obstacles might have been overcome in a much 
shorter period of time.
A report completed in 1991 by the Shanghai Commission for System 
Reform on the development strategies of Shanghai's reform in the 1990s includes a 
critical and frank reference to the implications of the objective circumstances 
regarding the municipal government's room for manoeuvre:
The contradiction arising from the excessively heavy fiscal remittance, 
itself a left-over from the old centralized system, has yet to be solved. This 
has posed a limit on the capacity of the local finance (bureau) to adjust and 
regulate the economy. Some fiscal measures which would have made a 
substantial impact on the development of economy could not, as a result, be 
implemented. For instance the municipal government has been unable, 
whether in terms of its authorised powers or in terms of the limits posed by 
the actual circumstances, to implement measures on depreciation, which 
would have a major directing effect on our industrial and investment 
structure, or to devise favourable policies on profit taxes..."88
The background to this report was the two slides of local fiscal revenue of 
1981-83, and 1986-88, as described in Chapter Four. At this time the size of 
Shanghai's local fiscal revenue fell to less than that of the previous decade.89 The 
pressure constituted by the high base of fiscal remittance meant there was little 
room for the government to manoeuvre in order to relieve itself of the burden of 
state enterprises, the tax on which Shanghai paid at a rate generally higher than that 
of the national average.90 The weight of such pressure may have been reflected in 
the fact that, even at the point when the macro environment finally improved in
88See Shanghai Institute for Economic System Reform, Jiushi Niandai Shanghai Gaige de Zhanlue 
Gouxiang (Thoughts on the Strategies of Shanghai’s Reforms in the 1990s) (Shanghai: not openly 
published), p.238.
9Shanghai s local fiscal revenue for 1988 was 15.75 billion yuan, which was 94.4% of the revenue 
level of 1978, at current prices. See Shanghai Statistical Yearbook 1993, p.55. Please note that 
fiscal revenue here refers to budgetary revenue of the local government The total figures according 
to the statistical table of the yearbook include both the budgetary and extrabudgetary t evenness of 
the local finance bureau.
^The practical tax burden of Shanghai's state enterprises was about 40.8%, which was substantially 
higher than the national average. See Lou Jiwei, "Shanghai Jingji Fazhan Zhanlui Xuanze he Gaige 
Celui" (Reform Strategies and Choices Available for Shanghai's Economic Development Strategy), 
Comparative Ecommic and Social Systems, No.l (1992), p .ll, Lou was then a senior official of 
Shanghai's Commission for Structural System Reform.
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Shanghai's favour, the reaction and responses of the Shanghai government were 
stubbornly anachronistic.
The initial response of the Shanghai government to the announcement of 
the Pudong policies illustrates the prolonged effect of the austerity during the 
1980s upon the behaviour of the Shanghai leadership into the early 1990s. In the 
aftermath of the excitment after the 1990 announcement, there was a widespread 
and strongly felt anxiety within the Shanghai government that the Centre's high- 
profile plan for Pudong would have a negative impact on the development of the 
old Shanghai city area. It has been noted earlier in this chapter that the Shanghai 
government bargained for a separate investment scale quota for Pudong. The 
following quote from the 1991 report of the Shanghai Commission for System 
Reform shows clearly that the worry over displacement was the major concern 
behind the fight for a separate quota.
"To build a modernized new area in Pudong, it is necessary to inject a huge 
amount of capital... Under the existing investment administration system, 
the central government has a tight scale control on investment activities. 
This would engender competition between Pudong and Puxi (the old 
Shanghai city) for the supply of capital and the planned scale quota. The 
consequences thereof could be of three types of situation: (a) investments 
flow to Pudong on a substantial scale, and Puxi as a result declines rapidly; 
(b) investments flow to Puxi instead; Puxi is revitalized but the 
development of Pudong is delayed and slowed down as a result; (c) 
investments flow to both Pudong and Puxi without any emphasis; but since 
the supply of capital is limited, investments in both areas are insufficient to 
achieve breakthrough in either area. Based on the present situation, the 
third situation is the most probable"91
Anxiety about the negative effect of the development of Pudong on the old 
Shanghai area was diffused into all the major areas of the favourable policies on 
Pudong. Instead of considering how to make use of the new policies so as to 
benefit Shanghai as a whole, the Shanghai government was preoccupied with the 
restrictions and limitations of the preexisting system. It was concerned that the 
effect of giving preferential treatment to Pudong would make the fulfilment of such 
preexisting duties and tasks more difficult still. For instance, in the 1991 report by 
the Shanghai Institute of Economic System Reform on the reform strategies of 
Shanghai, nearly one-third of the chapter on Pudong development was devoted to a 
section captioned "the system frictions between Pudong and Puxi".92 The 
subsequent long list of "system frictions" spanned the enterprise, investment,
91 See Shanghai Institute for Economic System Reform (ed.), Thoughts on the Strategies of 
Shanghai's Reforms in the 1990s, p.283.
92Ibid. The chapter on Pudong spans 22 pages (pp.276-98), of which seven pages was on the system 
frictions between Pudong and Puxi.
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material supply, finance and banking, fiscal, foreign trade, price, employment, 
social security, and management systems. The following quote from the discussion 
of fiscal system frictions best illustrates the burden of the preexisting system:
"... the 10.5 billion yuan remittance task has (since 1988) become an 
increasingly heavy burden... This fixed remittance target will inevitably 
come into sharp conflict with the tax alleviation policies in Pudong. The 
conflict could be in the form of three types of situation. (1) Existing 
enterprises in Pudong currently have a fiscal contracted remittance task of 2 
billion yuan. If we allow these enterprises to enjoy the policies similarly 
favourable to those existing in the special economic zones, fiscal revenues 
from these enterprises will see a significant shortfall from the original 
contracted sum. (2) If we allow those Puxi enterprises resiting to Pudong to 
enjoy the same favourable policies, there will be another shortfall. (3) 
Enterprises in Puxi will not obtain additional resources but have to bear an 
increasing (fiscal) burden (in face of the shortfall in Pudong, which Puxi 
enterprises will have to make up for if the fixed remittance total to the 
Centre is to be met). Another effect could be that of the remittance sum to 
the Centre not being achieved at all. Either one of the three types of 
situations will directly cause a decrease in local fiscal revenue. The effect is 
that in a relatively long period of time, there would be a dilemma between 
the needs of the Pudong area and the (requirements o f the) local fiscal 
finance (to increase local fiscal revenue and to fulfill central remittance 
targetsj."93
The stringent fiscal and other operating conditions of the 1980s had a 
decisive effect on the behaviour of the Shanghai government. Not only did 
manoeuvres of a more substantive scale outside the traditional state and planning 
sector come much later, the configuration of the manoeuvres bore witness to a 
preoccupation with the old concerns, as the following discussion reveals.
Cutting Back the Budgetary Sector
As noted above, the positive role of tax alleviation for economic 
development and promotion of production was recognized by at least one group of 
Shanghai finance officials in the early 1980s. The haemorrhage of tax revenue, as a 
result of the failure to collect tax or of deliberate evasion by unscrupulous tax 
payers, was a common phenomenon in any tax-paying community. However, due 
to the constraints of the tight fiscal situation throughout the 1980s, the conscious 
use of tax alleviation and the deliberate slackening of tax collection, on the part of 
the tax collecting authority itself as a means to promote economic growth, was 
limited until the early 1990s.
93Ibid., pp. 285-86. The 10.5 billion target of contracted remittance negotiated in 1988 was later 
felt amongst Shanghai officials to be too heavy a burden and an unfair deal for Shanghai generally. 
See discussion earlier this chapter, Footnotes 19 and 20.
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Tax Alleviation
Tax alleviation in Shanghai, according to an official acccout, has undergone 
three major developments since the 1980s.94 The first, in 1985, was the alleviation 
of the profit adjustment tax of state enterprises, first imposed in 1984. This incurred 
reductions in local fiscal revenue of several thousand million yuan. The second 
was in 1988, when the Shanghai government basically transferred the additional 
resources retained from the new fiscal dabaogan system to the state enterprises. A 
total of 1.2 billion yuan of taxes was exempted or reduced at this time.95 The third 
major tax alleviation occurred in 1991, when the central government announced a 
series of measures to alleviate the burden of the medium-large sized state 
enterprises which had accumulated amid the recession of the 1989-91 retrenchment. 
Tax alleviation in Shanghai resulting from the measures was estimated to reach 1.3 
billion yuan.
It should be noted that apart from these three major instances of tax 
alleviation, there was also the "regular" tax alleviation granted to enterprises either 
upon application, or as a result of, a case-by-case bargaining between the 
enterprises through their departments-in-charge. The objective of such tax 
alleviation was generally to help with the development of the enterprises. The 
growth of this category of tax alleviation was restrained by the tight financial 
situation of the 1980s, but towards the late 1980s, its scale had grown to a 
substantial level.96
No comprehensive statistics are available for the total volume of fiscal 
revenue foregone as a result of the tax alleviatons. Earlier in this section it was 
noted that the total value of tax alleviation between 1980 to 1983 amounted to 
about 1% of the total local fiscal revenue for the four-year-period. In the inspection 
of 1989, a total 153 million yuan of improper tax reductions/exemptions was 
detected in Shanghai, which was also just under 1% of the total local fiscal revenue
94See Zhou Youdao,"’92 Caishui Gongzuo Tansuo" (Probing the Way of the Fiscal Work of 1992), 
Shanghai Caishui, No.l (1992), p.7. Zhou was the director of Shanghai Finance Bureau.
95The Shanghai government retained an additional 1.4 billion of local fiscal revenue in 1988 
relative to the 1987 level as a result of the dabaogan system. See Chapter Four for more discussion.
96The director of the Shanghai Finance Bureau, Zhou Youdao, stated in a speech during a tax and 
fiscal reform seminar in November 1992 that regular tax reductions and exemptions during the past 
several years accounted for a substantial portion of Shanghai's local fiscal revenue. See Zhou 
Youdao, "Shanghai Jiang Shixing 'Yiti Liangyi' Caizheng Xintizhi" (Shanghai Will Implement the 
’One-System: Two Wings’ New Fiscal System", Shanghai Caizhui, N o .ll (November 1992), p.4.
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for the year.97 The amount detected from inspections is inevitably a small part of 
the whole picture, which therefore suggests that the value of tax alleviations has 
grown substantially from its level in the early 1980s.
The changes in the macro-environment after 1988 served to activate 
Shanghai's long-suppressed urge to relieve itself of the burden of enterprises. In 
1991, there were proposals to relax the requirements for regular tax alleviation from 
the existing ceiling of 250 yuan profit per worker to a higher level, although they 
have not apparently been adopted.98 In 1992, the generous use of tax alleviation 
was finally adopted as a major tactic, if not the official "policy", of the Shanghai 
government to promote the development of the local economy,99 after lagging 
behind Guangdong's example for almost a decade.
The effect of the stringent financial situation of the 1980s continued, 
however, to linger. The cautious attitude towards fiscal revenue, inevitable after 
decades of tight central control and the pressure to fulfill a high remittance task, 
could not be done away with in a couple of years. An illustrative example is the 
implementation of the Centre's measures to revitalize state enterprises announced in 
1991, The Shanghai government was well aware of the difficulties of its state 
enterprises, and it had increasingly recognized and adopted tax alleviation as an 
approach to develop the economy. However, there was evidence to suggest that 
some measures approved by the Centre had not been adopted, at least not as swiftly 
as would have been expected, by Shanghai's local-level authorities. 100 An 
investigation report by Shanghai Audit Bureau discovered that local authorities 
were slow and unenthusiastic in the promotion and implementation of the centrally 
approved policies. A major and identifiable factor was the concern over the 
possible loss of local fiscal revenue as a result of the policies. Locally devised
See Wu Jinglian (od.)Zhongguo Jingji de Dongtai Fenxi he Duice Yanjiu (An Analysis of the 
Dynamics of the Chinese Economy and Some Solutions) (Beijing: People's University of China 
Press), p. 53.
98A major type of regular tax alleviation was granted to state enterprises operating at, or on the 
verge of, losses, in the hopes that the enterprises could thereby improve their financial position and 
continue production. The proposal was made by the Research Office of the Shanghai Party 
Committee. See "Proposals to end the difficulties faced by Shanghai's industries", Shanghai Reform 
, No.3 (1991), pp.20-22. Respondent No.21, Shanghai interview, May 1994, confirmed that the 
ceiling remained 250 yuan as of 1994.
" S ee  a speech by a Shanghai vice-mayor in the city finance meeting in early 1993, printed in 
Shangha Caishui, No.l (1993), p.6, in which the vice-mayor, Xu Hongdi, stated that the Shanghai 
government in 1992 had focused on "letting in water to feed the fishes", a description long used to 
describe the use of tax alleviation to vitalize the enterprises in Guangdong.
100See Shanghai Caishui, No.l (1992), p.12, and No.4 (1992), p .l, for inferences that the Shanghai 
government should make more effort and create suitable conditions under which to implement 
central government measures. This suggests that such central measures had still not been 
implemented in Shanghai.
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application and detailed implementation rules were bureaucratic and cumbersome, 
it was found, and were often not in line with the actual circumstances. The 
enterprises themselves were also sceptical, suspicious that any benefits gained from 
the new policies might be recollected on an even larger scale in later inspections, as 
had previously occurred.101
On the other hand, there was a very strong motive for making full use of the 
favourable policies, such as tax reduction and exemption, formally authorized by 
the Centre for Pudong. Earlier in this chapter it has been noted that, on the eve of 
the implementation of the new tax and fiscal system in 1994, the Shanghai 
leadership was adamant in seekng to retain Pudong's favourable policies. At the 
implementation level, there was a "last-minute rush" of tax alleviation applications 
by Pudong enterprises for the year 1993, when the prospect of the continuation of 
the policies was crowded with uncertainties. 102 The message is clear: while the 
Shanghai government might still be constrained, to an extent, by the hangovers of 
past financial difficulties in carrying through the tax alleviation policies at 
enterprise level, it was unwilling to be stripped of the power to do so as a result of 
changes in the central policies. This was especially so when other provinces, and in 
particular Guangdong, had been able to tap the benefits of the policies a decade 
earlier.
Ineffective Revenue Collection
The Shanghai government was not quite the same "unenthusiastic tax 
collector" in comparison with its counterpart in Guangdong. This difference was 
due to, on the part of Shanghai, pressure to collect enough revenue to cover both 
the central remittance and necessary fiscal expenditures. Revenue manipulation 
was, however, far from nonexistent. The surge and sudden decline in fiscal 
revenue in late 1993, as discussed above, was a typical case of revenue 
manipulation at the collection stage engineered from the municipal level. There is 
evidence that such refunds of tax revenue aiming at lowering the level of local
101 See the Audit Bureau, Shanghai, Changling district, "An Audit Investigation on the 
Implementation of State Enterprise Policies", Shanghai Audit, No.6 (December 1992), pp. 15-18. 
Similar problems existed in collective enterprises. See Zeng Niansi, and Sui Liang, "Guanyu 
Shanghai Shiqu Chengzhen Jiti Jingji Zhuangkuang de Tiaocha" (A Survey of the Economic 
Situation of the Urban Collective Sector in Shanghai), Shanghai Caizhui, No. 12 (December 1992),
p.8.
102Between January-November 1993, more than 800 applications for the alleviation of circulation 
taxes from Pudong enterprises were approved. This rush was in order to take advantage of the 
favourable policy of reducing/exempting circulation taxes during the first year of operation of any 
Pudong enterprise. The tax revenue forgone on this last minute rush amounted to more than 70 
million yuan. (Respondent No. 21, Shanghai interview, January 1994)
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fiscal revenue also occurred in 1992. A tax department at the district level was 
found to have returned, in November-December 1992, without due approval of the 
district government, over 10 million yuan of taxes. It had also contracted profit 
payments to 24 enterprises under the pretext of over-payments.103 From the 
viewpoint of this discussion it is not material whether or not due approval from the 
district government was given for the tax refunds. The 1993 manoeuvres, albeit 
under the instructions of the leadership of the municipal bureau, amounted to local 
deviant behaviour by any standard. In other words, notwithstanding the 
preoccupation of the Shanghai government with revenue collection, it has a 
simultaneous tendency to conceal a part of its revenue and local resources from the 
Centre. This tendency could be materialized as and when circumstances required.
Consequently, Shanghai has also been seen in the upper ranks of the "black 
list" of unenthusiastic revenue collectors. In the early 1990s, Shanghai ranked 
second, after Guangdong, in the list of provincial-levels having the highest number 
of "improper" accounts.104 From 1985 to 1991, about 3.7 billion yuan of lost fiscal 
revenue was discovered during annual inspection exercises.105 Lost revenue in 
1990 and 1991 amounted to 0.6 billion yuan and 0.34 billion yuan respectively.
Moreover, as in Guangdong, new revenue items were often the major 
source of revenue haemorrhage. From data available for 1991, the Energy and 
Transport Strategic Development Fund and the Budget Adjustment Fund accounted 
for a substantial 13.5% share of the rediscovered fiscal revenue for the year. This 
suggests a strangely similar difficulty in collecting new revenue items as was 
experienced in Guangdong. Deliberate account manoeuvres by state enterprises to 
exaggerate expenditures and conceal revenues accounted for 35%, while the rest 
was primarily due to evasion of various industrial and commercial taxes.106
It is difficult to know precisely the background to the statistical data on 
revenue haemorrhage, and to what extent the haemorrhage was the deliberate 
tolerance, even active facilitiation, of the municipal government. Nevertheless the 
data points out the fact that notwithstanding the image of the Shanghai government
103See Zheng Rujuan, "Jianghua Caizheng Shenji de Jidian Tansuo" (Several Suggestions to 
Strengthen Fiscal Audit), Shanghai Audit, No.2 (April 1993), p.17.
104Respondent No.10, Guangzhou interview, December 1993. According to the respondent, the 
"improper" accounts discovered in annual inspection exercises during the recent years in 
Guangdong amounted to over 2 billion yuan. Shanghai was second to Guangdong, though there 
was a considerable gap between the two.
105Calculated from Shanghai Jingji, No.5 (1989), p.23; Shanghai Caishui, No.2 (1991), p.14; 
Shanghai Caishui, No.3 (1992), p.31.
106See Qin Li, Qian Zhiping, "A Report of the 1991 Fiscal and Tax Inspection Exercise", Shanghai 
Caishui ,No.3 (1992), pp.6-7.
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as a diligent and sometimes over-diligent revenue collector, the city still had the 
second largest sum of "improper" accounts, and also that a substantial amount of 
revenues had simply not been collected.
Diverting Budgetary Revenue to Extrabudgetary Investment
Given the usual image of the Shanghai government, it would be expected 
that the extrabudgetary part of Shanghai's revenue would be relatively small. 
Evidence available suggests the contrary, as shown in Table 6.2 below:
Table 6.3
Budgetary and Extrabudgetary Revenues of Shanghai 
(Yuan Billion)
Year Budaetarv Growth % Extrabudeetarv Growth
1982 16.51 4.10 _
1983 15.37 (6.9) 4.52 10.2
1984 16.11 4.8 5.30 17.3
1985 18.16 12.7 6.75 27.4
1986 17.61 (3.0) 8.43 25.0
1987 16.51 (6.2) 9.68 14.8
1988 14.68 (11.1) 10.94 13.2
1989 15.27 4.0 10.52 (3.8)
1990 15.77 3.3 10.34 (1.7)
Total 145.99 70.58
Average)
Growth) % (0.3) 12.8
Note: The budgetary revenue figures shown for the period 1988 to 1990 were less 
than those in Shanghai Statistical Yearbook 1993, p.55. For consistency purpose 
the figure in the Statistical Book was ignored. The 1986 figure was taken from the 
Statistical Yearbook 1993, p.55.
Source: China Finance Statistics 1950-1991, pp.68,199; 1950-1985, pp.54,144.
Table 6.3 shows that the average growth rate of extrabudgetary revenue was 
conspicuously higher than that of budgetary revenue, which had an average annual 
negative growth rate of -0.3% throughout the 1980s. In fact, the total value of 
extrabudgetary revenue was nearly one-third more than that of Guangdong, as 
shown in Table 5.3 of Chapter Five. It should be noted that although Shanghai’s 
total budgetary revenue, at 128.38 billion yuan (discounting the year 1986 for the 
sake of comparison with Guangdong, for which the 1986 figure was not available), 
was much larger than Guangdong's at 66.53 billion yuan, this was mainly because 
Shanghai had started from a high base in the first place. Moreover, and more 
importantly, a large portion of Shanghai's budgetary revenue, over two-thirds for
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1990, had been remitted to the central coffers, whilst a much smaller proportion of 
Guangdong's revenue was sent to the Centre.107 Therefore although Shanghai had, 
at face value, a higher level of revenue both within and without the budget vis-a-vis 
Guangdong, it was only the latter that could be material in terms of Shanghai 
achieving a higher level of retained revenue for local discretionary use than 
Guangdong.
Since extrabudgetary revenue was completely under local control and 
deployment, this provided a strong motive for provincial governments to increase 
this kind of revenue. On not infrequent occasions, budgetary revenue was diverted 
to the extrabudgetary stream of the local coffers. The heavy remittance task of 
Shanghai, however, limited the extent of such diversionary behaviour. 
Nevertheless, if enough budgetary revenue had been collected and the remittance 
target had been met, it was always in the local interests to expand the 
extrabudgetary part of revenue. In this way more resources could be deployed and 
allocated locally with the minimal oversight from the Centre. More importantly, it 
could preempt possible "requests" from the Centre for additional contributions, and 
sustain Shanghai's image of being in need of the support of the Centre.
The apparently contradictory interest of the Shanghai government in 
collecting a sufficiently high level of fiscal revenue, whilst retaining the surplus in 
the extrabudgetary part so as to forestall central encroachment upon its resources, 
resulted in the composition of Shanghai's extrabudgetary revenue being quite 
different from that of the national average, and, particularly, of Guangdong. Table 
6.4 below shows the difference:
107For the later years from 1988 to 1990, a total of 12.32 billion yuan was remitted to the centre, 
accounting for 32.8% of the total fiscal revenue of the three-year-period. See Table 5.1 of Chapter 
Five.
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Table 6.4
Growth Rates of Shanghai’s Extrabudgetary Revenue: Bv Make-up Portions
National Average and Guangdong 
1990 over 1986 (%)
1990/1986 Increase % National Shan eh ai Guanedone
Local finance bureau (L) 40.3 34.2 26.4
Administrative/Shiye units (A) 96.1 106.4 103.4
State enterprises & 
Departments-in-charge (S) 48.4 10.9 89.1
Total 55.9 23.2 89.2
Source: China Finance Statistics 1950-1991, pp. 189,199,204.
Table 6.4 above shows that the extrabudgetary revenue kept by state 
enterprises and their departments-in-charge, primarily in the form of profit 
retentions and technical renovation funds, had grown at a much lower rate in 
Shanghai. However, on the other hand, revenue kept by the local finance bureau 
grew at a substantially faster rate than it did in Guangdong. The funds kept by 
various administrative and non-profit making institutions (the shiye units) grew at 
the fastest rate, exemplifying the fast growth of various investment funds which 
had been kept in the units since the late 1980s. Table 6.5 below shows the trend of 
the composition percentages over the years, and giving a broader understanding of 
the full picture.
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Table 6.5
Composition of Extrabudgetary Revenues (%)
Shanghai Guangdong National
1986
L 4.4 6.5 2.5
A 11.8 29.1 16.3
S 83.9 64.4 80.6
1987
L 4.6 5.0 2.2
A 13.3 28.4 17.7
S 82.1 66.6 80.1
1988
L 4.4 4.4 2.1
A 13.8 30.2 18.6
S 81.7 65.4 79.3 .
1989
L 4.7 3.5 2.0
A 17.1 28.9 18.8
S 78.3 67.6 79.1
1990
L 4.8 4.3 2.2
A 19.7 31.3 21.3
S 75.5 64.4 76.5
1991
L 5.3 n/a 2.1
A 19.8 n/a 21.5
S 74.9 n/a 76.4
1992
L 9.9 n/a n/a
A 37.2 n/a n/a
S 52.9 n/a n/a
Source: For 1986-1991, China Finance Statistics 1950-1991, pp.191,199, 204. For 
Shanghai data of 1991, 1992, information from the Shanghai Finance Bureau 
(Neibu).
The information in Table 6.5 shows that Shanghai's extrabudgetary revenue 
in state enterprises and their departments-in-charge declined steadily from a very 
high share in 1986. The high share was probably attributable to the large number of 
relatively old state enterprises in Shanghai. Technical renovation funds, the major 
form of investment of these enterprises, were a form of extrabudgetary revenue. 
This part of extrabudgetary funds had been growing very slowly, however, as 
shown in Table 6.4 above. By 1992, it accounted for just over half of total 
extrabudgetary funds in Shanghai.
The main growth points were those handled by the local finance 
departments and by the administrative units, the latter being discussed in more 
detail later in this chapter. As regards the portion held by local finance departments,
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this share increased steadily, becoming towards the end of the 1980 decade higher 
than that of Guangdong. It was also much higher than the national average, despite 
a higher growth in absolute value in the latter as shown in Table 6.4.
The picture emerging from the above case data is one of the Shanghai 
government balancing the need to contain the amount of revenue exposed to 
possible manipulation by the central government, whilst centralizing more of the 
resources under its direct control for its own flexible deployment. The slow growth 
of extrabudgetary funds as handled by enterprises demonstrates the reluctance and 
consequently slow pace of the Shanghai government in dispersing its resources 
amongst enterprises in its society, as discussed in the section on tax alleviation. 
This is particularly clear when contrasted with the rapid and strong surge of 
extrabudgetary funds in state enterprises in Guangdong.
On the other hand, more and more extrabudgetary funds were being held by 
the local finance departments. The proportional share was consistently about 
double that of the national average, and the share in 1991 was more than double the 
share of 1986. Provisional figures for 1993 projected a doubling of this part of 
revenue in terms of absolute value.108 Table 6.4 shows that while extrabudgetary 
funds held by local finance departments generally grew at a slower rate than the 
total sum, both nationally and in Guangdong, the reverse was true in Shanghai. The 
implication is clear. The pressure of a high remittance target, and the heavy 
burden of fiscal subsidies, resulted in a strong inclination within the Shanghai 
government to seek some form of financial security. Funds dispersed amongst 
state enterprises, even though these would be local resources and would 
benefit the development of the enterprises and thus the local economy, would 
still be beyond the direct control of the municipal government and would thus 
not ease the concern over security. Extrabudgetary funds of the local financial 
departments, on the other hand, fulfilled the dual requirements of keeping the 
resources at a distance from the central government, and allowing close and 
direct control by the municipal government.
It is therefore not surprising that instances of "account manoeuvres" by 
Shanghai's finance departments can be detected. Common tactics include keeping
108See "An Analysis of the Local Fiscal Revenue and Expenditure of Shanghai in 1993 and a 
Forecast of 1994", in Shanghai Institute of Economic Development (ed.), Shanghai Jingji Fazhan, 
1993 (Shanghai Economic Development, 1993) (Shanghai: China Business Weekly Press), p.75. 
This article was reportedly written by informed sources in the municipal finance bureau. The value 
of extrabudgetary local fiscal revenue in 1993 was estimated to reach 2 billion yuan, which was 
over 8% of the total fiscal revenue of the year.
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budgetary revenues outside of the budget, exaggerating the value of budgetary 
expenditures, and even keeping "private accounts" beyond both the budgetary and 
properly documented extrabudgetary revenues.109 This rationale is similar to the 
occurrence of tax evasion and haemorrhage phenomenon amongst the enterprises. 
It is not therefore contradictory that the Shanghai tax and fiscal departments are 
strict in the collection of taxes and revenue, and simultaneously evade and hoard 
revenue against possible encroachment by the Centre. Under such strong pressure 
from above, the need to retain some "private" resources as a means to enhance one’s 
independence and room for manoeuvre is natural, whether this be from the point of 
view of state enterprises as tax payers or of local finance departments as remitters 
of fiscal revenue.
Developing the Extrabudgetary and Non-State Sectors
In the late 1980s, the Shanghai government started to reorient emphasis 
from that solely of the traditional state sector and to pay more attention to the 
extrabudgetary and non-state sectors.110 However, as a result of its preoccupation 
with security, the Shanghai government was more interested in developing the 
extrabudgetary part of the state sector than it was the more societal-oriented, 
independence-prone non-state enterprises. Consequently, the development of the 
non-state sector was relatively slow in Shanghai in the 1980s. When more attention 
was finally paid to this sector in the 1990s, the development of the non-budgetary 
state sector grew at a similarly fast, if not faster, pace.
Until 1992 over 60% of industrial output value and over 80% of total 
investment in Shanghai had been accounted for by the state sector.111 The Shanghai 
government had held a traditionally cautious attitude as regards the development of 
the non-state sector. This was despite the fact that most collective enterprises were 
in fact quasi-state enterprises set up by government departments and by state 
enterprises for a wide range of purposes. The general approach of the Shanghai
109See Zheng Rujuan, "Several Suggestions to Strengthen Fiscal Audit", pp. 17-19.
110This is reflected in an article from the Municipal Planning Commission in 1987 calling for a 
broadening of the scope of planning work beyond the budgetary sector and the plans. See Shanghai 
Planning Commission, "Zonghe Yunyong Jingji Gangan de Shijian Yu Tansuo" (The Use of 
Economic Leverage: Probes and Practice), Shanghai Jihua Jingji Tansuo, No.2 (April 1987), p.36.
111 See Shanghai Statistical Yearbook 1993 , pp.99, 244. See also discussion in Chapter Four: 
Table 4.14. The more rapid development of the non-state sector since the late 1980s was partly a 
result of the decentralization of fiscal and investment authority to the subprovincial levels. The 
motivation of district and county level governments to develop the collective sector and to promote 
economic development in general could be traced back to the establishment of the contractual fiscal 
system in 1988. More authority was delegated in 1992. See Zeng Niansi, and Xue Liang, "A 
Survey of the Economic Situation of the Urban Collective Sector in Shanghai", p.7.
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government until the early 1990s was one of control rather than of facilitation and 
support. The emphasis was squarely on "proper management" in accordance with 
the rules of the state, instead of being on creating a favourable environment for the 
proper growth and development of the enterprises.
In this regard the Shanghai government issued a notice in 1985 prohibiting 
the diversion of state revenue by state enterprises to their subordinate collective 
enterprises. In order to qualify for the lower tax rates applicable to collective 
enterprises, it was stipulated that collective enterprises must have accounts 
independent of and separate from their affiliated state enterprises. Any property 
belonging to the latter but previously diverted for use of the enterprise should be 
paid for.112 Given that collective enterprises had traditionally been treated as a 
lesser form of state ownership, and that the establishment of many collective 
enterprises in Shanghai in the early 1980s had been based on administrative and 
political decisions,113 these rules verged on hostility to the collective sector.
Another instance of hostility relates to the provision of bank finance. 
Obtaining capital has been one of the most difficult obstacles for the development 
of the private sector, the existence of which was only legalized in a constitutional 
amendment in 1988.114 The difficulty was, however, more serious in Shanghai than 
elsewhere in China as a result of much stricter observance and more cautious 
implementation of central rules by the Shanghai government.115 For instance, when 
the Shanghai government announced a notice in 1985 regulating the growing 
financing activities of enterprises, it did not take account of the changing economic 
situation since the commencement of economic reform and simply reiterated the 
old rule of a total ban on bank loans to the private sector.116 This effectively
112See Shanghai Government Notice No. 43 (1985), July 15,1985, "The Finance Bureau's Notice 
on the Fiscal and Tax Issues Regarding Collective Enterprises Organized by State Enterprises", 
printed in Shanghai Economic System Reform Leading Group (ed.), A Compendium of Economic 
System Reform Documents of Shanghai. (Shanghai: Qiye Guanli Xuehui, 1986)
113From 1977 to 1982, a total of 365 collective enterprises was set up by municipal bureaux to 
provide jobs for just under 100,000 youths coming back to Shanghai from villages with the end of 
the 10-year Cultural Revolution. See Jiang Zemin (ed.), The Ten Years of Economic System Reform 
in Shanghai, p.77.
114An amendment was made to Article 11 of the State Constitution at the First Session of the 
Seventh National People's Congress on April 12, 1988 to explicitly allow the operation and 
development of private enterprises within the country. See Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian 
Yanjiushi (ed.), Shisanda Yilai Zhongyao Wenxian Xuanbian (Since the Thirteenth Party Congress: 
A Compendium of Important Documents) (Parts 1-3) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe), Part 1, p.216.
115Even though national laws allowed joint ventures between foreigners and private enterprises, 
and nationwide more than 50 private enterprises had formed joint ventures with foreign partners, 
there was reportedly not even a single case in Shanghai as at 1991. See Ming Pao (Hong Kong), 
December 18,1991.
116See Shanghai Government Notice No. 112 (1985), December 13, 1985, "Some regulations of 
The People's Bank of China (Shanghai Branch) on the financing and capital brokerage of
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blocked the route for private enterprises to obtain bank finance. This contrast in 
behaviour with that of Guangdong is spectacular. In order to promote development 
in the local economy, the Guangdong government tolerated, and even facilitated, 
the phenomenon of "pseudo-collectives", whereby private enterprises and 
individuals could obtain the favourable treatment and convenience as that afforded 
to collective enterprises by acquiring a collective enterprise registration. The 
Shanghai government was much more restrictive. In as late as 1989, a campaign 
was launched in Shanghai specifically condemning "pseudo collectives", and many 
had their registration reverted to "private individuals" and were made to pay higher 
taxes.117
In contrast to the lukewarm attitude regarding the non-state sector, there 
was enthusiasm for the extrabudgetary state sector, and particularly for the 
development of fiscal credits, a new form of fiscal management of the budgetary 
fiscal funds. The development of extrabudgetary finance, described as the "second 
finance", was increasingly cherished in the promotion of industrial production.11® 
The quote below shows the high esteem of official authorities for "second finance":
"Strengthening the credit function of the local finance department is 
necessary for the development of the local economy. The support of local 
finance is a vital part of the development of the local economy...It is the 
duty of the local finance department to utilize fully local fiscal funds 
(through fiscal credits) to support the local economy..."119
Fiscal credits refers to the management by the local finance and tax bureaux 
of funds originally derived from budgetary fiscal funds for circulatory use. In a 
sense it is the local finance bureaux acting as banks providing loans to enterprises 
for investment or production,120 or sometimes as ultimate investors via their 
investment companies. This use of fiscal funds was a relatively recent 
phenomenon, although an embryonic form had existed since the 1960s. In 1988, 
the Shanghai government specifically set up an investment company, under the 
auspices of the municipal finance bureau, to engage in lending and investment 
activities, using capital from the municipal budget.121
enterprises", printed in Shanghai Economic System Reform Leading Group, A Compendium of 
Economic System Reform in Shanghai, Part 4, pp.109-13.
117 See Shanghai Economy 1990, p.460.
118See Shanghai Economy 1989, p.482.
119See Yang Sheng,"Caizheng Xinyong Zhineng Burong Xueruo" (The Credits Function of the 
Finance Department Should Not Be Weakened), Shanghai Caishui, No.3 (March 1993), p.29. Yang 
was an official of the Shanghai Finance Bureau.
120One major business of fiscal credit was to serve as the agent of loan finance between two groups 
of enterprises. (Respondent No.27, Shanghai interview, May 1994)
^Shanghai Economy 1989, p.482.
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The funds originally diverted from the municipal budget and subsequently 
placed beyond the budget should, in theory, form part of the total extrabudgetary 
funds, and in particular, part of the extrabudgetary fiscal revenue held by the local 
finance departments. However, as this practice had begun only recently 
nationwide, and as it was in the vested interests of the provincial governments to 
conceal the size of local resources from central scrutiny, this part of funds was not, 
in fact, included in the compilation of the statistics as shown in the tables earlier 
this chapter.122 The value of these funds is estimated to have increased by 1 to 2 
billion yuan per annum in the early 1990s,123 which is nearly a double that of the 
"official" extrabudgetary fiscal revenue of 1992, and up to nearly a quarter of the 
total "official" extrabudgetary funds for 1992. These funds thus constitute a very 
substantial "private account" for the Shanghai government, well beyond the 
coverage of extrabudgetary funds. In other words, whilst the budget is the "first 
finance", and the "official" extrabudgetary funds form the "second finance", this 
new commercialized use of budgetary funds becomes the "third finance" of the 
Shanghai government.
Its large scale, and the likelihood it might shake off central control has 
made the status of this "third finance" controversial. The central bank has always 
had reservations regarding the development of bank-like business by the finance 
department. The Ministry of Finance, on the other hand, seeing its functions under 
the old central planning system on the decline, was happy at the prospect of an 
enlarged scope of activity, and thus influence, in the economy. The provincial 
governments therefore had a powerful ally in this respect.124 Finally a notice was
122Respondents No.22 (Shanghai interview, January 1994), No.27 (Shanghai interview, May 
1994), and No.34 (Beijing interview, March 1994) confirmed that the official statistics on 
extrabudgetary funds nationwide, and in Shanghai in particular, did not encompass the funds 
diverted, generated and kept outside of the budget as a result of the "second finance" activities of the 
local finance departments and their affiliated investment companies. Respondent No.38 (Beijing 
interview, May 1994) remarked that it was very difficult to require the local governments and units 
to provide information at all, the accuracy of the information also being questionable, on those 
locally retained resources beyond the traditional coverage dating back to the pre-reform period. A 
classic and recent example was the data regarding the part of extrabudgetary funds held by state 
enterprises and their departments-in-charge. This entire section of information was simply not 
available when the statistics on extrabudgetary funds were compiled for the year of 1993, since the 
accounting books of state enterprises saw a complete revamp with the implementation of 
international accounting rules with effect from July 1993. According to Respondent No. 38, there 
was a real possibility that data on this part of extrabudgetary funds, notwithstanding the inevitable 
adjustment in the figures with the change in accounting rules, would not be reported in future. It 
simply happened that a convenient pretext was found through which to serve the needs of the local 
interest.
123This was the estimate of Respondent No.34, who had had official access to the records of the 
local fiscal finance in Shanghai. (Beijing interview, March 1994)
124Respondent No.34, Beijing interview, March 1994. According to the respondent, Vice-premier 
Zhu Rongji, concurrently head of the People’s Bank of China since the dismissal of the former head
328
issued by the Ministry of Finance in late 1993 regulating the management of funds 
in the "third finance", implying that the Ministry of Finance, together with the 
provinces, had finally won the battle for the legitimate status of fiscal credits.125
Recentralization of Societal Resources
It should be noted that it was after 1988 that there was first such a major 
source of "extra-extrabudgetary funds" under the auspices of the local finance 
departments. For most of the 1980s decade, and especially during the early 1980s, 
most extrabudgetary resources were in the hands of state enterprises and their 
departments-in-charge. At that time, in order that the available resources could be 
utilized more efficiently and effectively, specialised funds were set up, under the 
auspices of the departments-in-charge, to centralize extrabudgetary funds dispersed 
amongst state enterprises.126
By 1988, it was estimated that not less than 22 specialized funds had been 
set up in Shanghai, of which at least seven were geared towards investment and 
economic development, the focus of the current discussion. The rest were of a more 
"social and welfare" nature.127 As of 1989, investment-oriented funds had 
accumulated a total value of 1 to 2 billion yuan.128 As in the case of fiscal credits,
Li Guixian in July 1993, was inclined to support the position of the banks. That the Ministry of 
Finance supported the development of fiscal credits could also be shown in a study report from the 
ministry, which stated that the development of fiscal credits was "an inevitable requirement of the 
marketization process." See Ministry of Finance, Research Institute for Fiscal Science, "Woguo 
Zhongchangqi Caizheng Zhengce Quxiang de Yanjiu" (A Study of the Policy Orientations of 
Medium-Long Term Fiscal Policy), Caizheng Yanjiu, No.3 (March 1993), p.22. The article by Yang 
Sheng, "The Credits Function of the Finance Department Should not be Weakened", was 
presumably part of the Shanghai government's effort in lobbying for support of the practice of fiscal 
credits. A major argument for fiscal credits put forward in Yang's article, apart from its function in 
supporting the local economy, was that it allowed the finance departments a role in the production 
side of the economy, which was regarded as necessary if the finance department was to continue to 
perform any kind of regulatory role on the economy.
125 See Ministry of Finance Notice No, 189 (1993), November 19,1993, "A Notice c h i  Promulgating 
the Management Rules of Fiscal Credits (Provisional)’", printed in State Audit Commission 
(ed.),Caishui Tizhi Gaige Xueshi Ziliao (Study Materials on Taxation and Fiscal Reforms) (Beijing: 
Neibu, 1994), pp.71-74.
126 See for instance Yu Daxiang, "Pay More Attention to the Efficiency and Effectiveness in the 
Utitlization of Extrabudgetary funds", Shanghai Caizheng Yanjiu, No.5 (1984), pp.5-7. It was 
suggested that funds should be set up to centralize extrabudgetary funds dispersed among individual 
state enterprises to ensure better utilization and minimize wastage.
127 See Bao Youde, "Shenhua Caizheng Gaige, Zhenxing Shanghai Jingji" (Deepen the Fiscal and 
Tax Reform, Vitalize the Economy of Shanghai), Shanghai Caishuiy No.2 (1988), p.7. Bao was the 
then director of Shanghai Finance Bureau. See also Tu Jimo, "Shanghai Difang Touzi Fangshi de 
Bianhua Yu Duice" (Approaches of Shanghai's Local Investment: Changes and Solutions)£ hanghai 
Jihua Jingji Tansuo, No.l (1990), p.27.
128 Ibid., p.28.
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these specialized funds had not been included in the official statistics of 
extrabudgetary funds.129
The sources of capital of these funds were primarily of three types: (1) 
diversion from budgetary revenue; (2) the imposition of various administrative fees 
and the adjustment of prices of products; and (3) capitalization exercises targeted at 
enterprises and private individuals. For instance, more than 1 billion yuan per 
annum of fiscal budgetary funds had reportedly been allocated to the investment 
arm of the municipal government, the Shanghai Jiu Shi Corporation. In another 
case, in 1987 on the establishment of the new electricity development company, 
some 200 million yuan of budgetary funds was granted in order centrally to manage 
the Electricity Fund.130 Part of the capital of the Electricity Fund was derived from 
an increase in the price of electricity, and some administrative fees were even 
collected and imposed directly by the fund managers, instead of by government 
departments.131 Where the purpose of a fund was to solicit capital to finance the 
construction of particular projects, the source of capital could be primarily from 
societal capitalization exercises.132
Specialized funds, therefore, became a major source of investment capital 
in Shanghai towards the late 1980s and especially into the 1990s. The upper 
estimate of their value as of 1989, at 2 billion yuan, is equivalent to 18% of the 
total value of investments in Shanghai's local state sector for the same year, or more 
than 7 times that of local budgetary investment.133 Given the diffused nature of the 
management of the funds, it was difficult for the Centre to control this part of local
129This was confirmed by Respondent No.27, Shanghai interview, May 1994. The respondent 
remarked that since the specialised funds all have their allocation specified and the local finance 
departments could not deploy their resources, there was no need to include the funds in the statistics 
of extrabudgetary funds.
130Respondent No.26, Shanghai interview, May 1994. Shanghai Jiu Shi Corporation was set up in 
1987 initially to manage and coordinate the use of the newly approved US$3.2 billion foreign 
capital. It subsequently developed as a major investment arm of the local government with an 
expanded scope of business spanning real estate development and foreign trade.
131 See Tu Jimo, "Approaches of Shanghai's Local Investment", p.29.
132This was the case of the Fund specifically set up to finance the construction of the television 
tower at Pudong, completed in 1994. Capital came primarily from sponsorships of enterprises and 
"investments" from individuals. (Respondent No.27, Shanghai interview, May 1994) According to 
the respondent, the municipal government would normally pay closer attention to and impose 
stricter rules on, funds soliciting "share capital" from individuals. The main concern was to protect 
individual investors and to contain unscrupulous capitalization practices, since some funds might 
have no prospect of profit return.
133Total investments in Shanghai’s local state sector in 1989 were 11 billion yuan, of which 277 
million yuan was money from the state budget. See Shanghai Statistical Yearbook 1990, p. 240.
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investment capital. The provincial leaderships themselves have even shown signs 
of losing control over the specialized funds supposedly under their management134
A major reason for the loss of central control is that the establishment of 
specialised investment funds was largely a local matter. Although some individual 
funds were established on the basis of centrally approved policies,135 most 
specialized investment funds were primarily the result of local initiatives. There 
were no central regulations or policies requiring the funds to obtain the approval of 
the central government. Consequently, basically all specialized investment funds 
were approved independently by the Shanghai municipal government.136
In facing this new initiative of the provinces, the Centre has yet to give a 
definitive response. No explicit approval and affirmation of authority on these 
funds is conferred on the provincial governments. However, neither is there any 
explicit condemnation of such practice. From the viewpoint of the Centre, the funds 
are one of those "new phenomena" of the reforms, and its attitude has been one of 
"wait and see", and toleration. In fact in 1991 the Centre contemplated either 
centralizing the approval authority to the central Ministry of Finance or explicitly 
delegating the authority to the provincial-level government.137 In the end no 
changes were undertaken and the provincial governments continued their adventure 
in "no man's land" under the passive tolerance and acquiescence of the Centre.138
134It was stated that there had been inadequate oversight and management of the funds at the 
government level, with the management left largely to the fund managers. See Tu Jimo, 
"Approaches of Shanghai's Local Investment", pp.28-29. This is also the view of Respondent 
No.34, Beijing interview, March 1994.
135 An example was the set up of the Shanghai Jiu Shi Corporation in 1987. The background of the 
corporation was the approval of the central government in 1986 allowing Shanghai to borrow 
foreign capital amounting to US$3.2 billion independently to finance necessary infrastructural 
projects. Some of the capital could be used for more profitable industrial products to provide the 
necessary returns to pay back the loans. The Corporation was set up by Shanghai to take charge of 
the raising of foreign capital and management of the investment projects. See Ni Wen, "New 
Attempts in the Changes in the Functions of the Government", Shanghai Jihua Jingji Tansuo, No.2 
(1987), pp.48-51. Stricly speaking the set up of the corporation itself was the discretionary action of 
the Shanghai government in the implementation of the centrally approved policy.
136Respondent No.27, Shanghai interview, May 1994.
137In 1991 there was a big surge in various kinds of specialized funds in many provinces and 
particularly at the subprovincial levels. There was therefore a heightened worry in the Centre that 
the situation might develop further out of control. Several documents had even been drafted to 
tighten control of the funds. If authority should be formally delegated to the provinces, the motive is 
still that of control: with formal power the provincial governments may then be held responsible for 
the better management of the funds.(Respondents Nos.34 and 38, Beijing interviews, May 1994.)
138The Centre's attitude was one of "passive tolerance" because, in accordance with Respondent 
No.38, the reason why the drafted documents were not adopted was the concern that the 
establishment of a formal approval and control system by the Centre would amount to giving a 
legitimate and formal status to the funds, at a time when the Centre had yet to arrive a firm view to 
the future of the funds. This might create difficulties to future plans to replace these funds with 
more proper means to finance local investments. (Beijing interview, May 1994)
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Internationalization
As a major investment strategy in the economic development of Shanghai, 
internationalization is an even more recent development. Notwithstanding the fact 
that Shanghai has a history of being the largest port and hub of foreign economic 
activities in China prior to 1949, internationalization came slowly into the agenda 
of the Shanghai government. This recency of internationalism is more ironic in face 
of the fact that, as noted earlier in this chapter, the Shanghai government has been 
so successful in winning over preferential policies regarding foreign trade and 
foreign investment. Unlike other policy areas, where the Shanghai government can 
attribute their failure in development to a stringent central policy, the "opening up" 
of Shanghai since the early 1980s has been a development encouraged by central 
leaders.
The authority of the Shanghai government regarding foreign investment, for 
instance, was, in the early 1980s, even larger than its Guangdong counterpart. The 
tight financial situation of the Shanghai government would have made turning 
overseas for investment capital a natural recourse. However, having a total 
cumulative value of direct foreign investment contracts of US$3.33 billion, of 
which US$1.5 billion had been realized,139 the foreign investment in Shanghai as of 
1992 was only a tiny fraction of that in Guangdong, where the cumulative realized 
foreign investment from 1979-91 amounted to US$15 billion,140 Comparative 
studies done by researchers in Shanghai also found that, as a result of the much 
smaller size of total foreign investment in Shanghai, the economy of Shanghai was, 
at the end of the 1980s, still largely inward-oriented.141
To account for the relatively slow pace of foreign investment is a 
complicated and difficult task. It is very likely only one facet of the general 
performance of economic development and reform of Shanghai in the 1980s, and a 
product of the interactive effect of central development strategy on reform and the 
Centre's policies on Shanghai. The geographical position of Shanghai, and of 
course the attitude and management style of the Shanghai government are also
139Calculated from Shanghai Statistical Yearbook 1993, p.306.
140See Zhang Hanqing (ed.), Gaige Kaifang Zai Guangdong (Reform and Opening in Guangdong: 
Implementation and Thoughts on the One Step Ahead Policy) (Guangzhou: Guangdong Higher 
Education Press, 1992), p. 125. See also discussion in Chapter Five on "Internationalization'1.
141 See Rui Mingjie and Yu Wenyi, "Wuyue Liangdi Waishang Touzi de Bijiao Fenxi” (A 
Comparative Analysis of Foreign Investments in Shanghai and Guangdong), Shanghai Investment, 
No.7 (July 1992), ppl2-13. It was reported that the share of export value in total GNP in Shanghai 
in 1989 was only 7%, while Guangdong's was 13%—nearly double. Part of the reason was the 
much lower level of foreign investment in Shanghai, since most of the output in foreign enterprises 
was exported.
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likely to have had their bearing on the matter. These issues will be the subject of 
discussion in the following chapter.
Nevertheless the change finally came. The announcement of the opening of 
Pudong in 1990 was a prelude; and this was affirmed and elevated to an ever higher 
profile in 1992. In the Fourteenth Party Congress convened in October 1992, 
Shanghai was hailed as the "dragon head" of the development of the entire Yangzi 
River region. The Centre also unambiguously stated, for the first time, that 
Shanghai should be developed into an international economic, financial and 
commercial centre. Direct foreign investment contracted in 1992 alone, at the value 
US$3.36 billion, was consequently US$ 30 million more than the total cumulative 
value of the previous 12 years.142 In 1993, another peak was reached with the 
contracted value of projects reaching US$7 billion, a more than double of the level 
achieved in 1992. The value of realized foreign investment, at US$2.3 billion, was 
about the equivalent of the total realized between 1980 and 1992.143 Momentum 
had finally been gained.
Internationalization is, however, not simply about foreign investment. 
Attracting more foreign investment is only a necessary component and a means to 
becoming international. The objective is to make Shanghai an international city, an 
international economic, financial and commercial centre, and a modem one. 
Foreign investment is the means by which the Shanghai leadership seeks to 
improve the standards of Shanghai’s economic and management makeup to an 
internationally advanced level. Wu Bangguo, Shanghai's Party Secretary, made 
this point clearly in his report to the Shanghai Sixth Party Congress in December 
1992:
"To open and develop Pudong would inevitably break the ground to the all- 
rounded opening of Shanghai. We have to fully utilize the high degree of 
openness of Pudong,... to push forward the bridging of Shanghai with the 
international economy in the areas of finance, commerce, industry, and 
management. We have to expand the areas in which foreign capital may be 
used... To establish multi-national corporations of our own, so as to enhance 
the capability of Shanghai in international economic participartion."144
As a strategy of development, the very goal of becoming an international 
economic centre is material in enabling the Shanghai government to obtain more 
resources and autonomy. That the goal was endorsed by the Centre itself and
142See Shanghai Statistical Yearbook 1993, p.306.
143Respondent No.24, Shanghai interview, May 1994. See also Shanghai Statistical Yearbook 
1993, p.306.
144See Shanghai Economy 1993, p. 11.
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included in documents of the Fourteenth Party Congress makes this goal still more 
achievable. The Shanghai government might then argue legitimately, in terms of 
the requirements of progressing towards its international position, for more central 
concessions.145
This is, in fact, a logical and forseeable development. The decentralization 
of authority in the 1980s was conceived with the purpose of facilitating a more 
active role by provincial-level governments in the experimentation of reforms and 
the development of the economy. Reform experiments and economic 
developments in the 1980s were, however, necessarily starting from a low base. 
The decentralization of authority to provincial-level governments was 
correspondingly so, and was primarily a series of piece-meal adjustments of the 
preexisting management systems. In other words the reforms in the 1980s were, by 
their nature, largely incremental. The general direction was to improve the 
livelihood and develop the economy. However, in the absence of specific and 
clearly envisaged objectives the formulation of detailed reform measures was 
largely a result of the push effect of the inadequacies of the preexisting system. It 
has, therefore, tended to be piecemeal and relatively limited. With the goal of 
Shanghai specifically that of reaching the advanced international standard, the 
inadequacy of the previous approach became all too obvious.14^  Whether in terms 
of the amount of resources available to attain the goal, or in terms of the power of 
the Shanghai government to gather and manage the resources, either way there was 
a substantial gap between the status quo and the projected requirements for 
building an international economic, commercial and financial centre on a par with 
those of advanced industrialized countries. This gap thereby became the fertile 
ground on which the Shanghai leadership could bargain with the Centre.
145For instance the Shanghai government contemplated asking for more favourable policies for 
Pudong as the original favourable policies, such as the bonded area policy, were subsequently also 
practised in other centrally approved development areas. The new policies included allowing 
foreign-funded trading companies, and enlarging the use of foreign capital in the tertiary sector. See 
Huang Qifan, "Pudong development: the hope of building Shanghai into an international 
metropolis", Economic Forecasting, No.4 (December 1993), p.35. Huang is the vice director of 
Pudong Management Committee.
146 An official of the State Council Development Research Centre admitted that although the central 
government had in the past delegated quite substantial authority to the Shanghai government, the 
Shanghai government would still ask for more in view of the requirements of the objective of 
building an international economic, financial and commercial centre. See Zhu Ronglin, "Shanghai 
Dabu Manxiang Xinshiji" (Shanghai Marching Toward the New Century", Economic Forecasting, 
No.4 (December 1993), p.44.
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Chapter 7
Central-Provincial Relations: Interactive Processes
The discussion of provincial discretionary behaviour in the past two 
chapters shows that the provinces are very proactive in central-provincial 
investment politics. This chapter refines this image of proactive provinces by 
emphasizing the interactive relationship and mutual influence between the Centre 
and the provinces. Proactive as they are, provincial leaders nevertheless work 
under the constraints and influence of the Centre. Mutual influence means that 
central-provincial relations do not constitute a zero-sum game. Instead of arguing 
for the Centre, or the province, being more powerful regarding investment policy, 
this study sees both the Centre and the province as forming institutional constraints 
on each other. Understanding central-provincial relations, therefore, requires an 
examination of this interactive relationship and of the process whereby the central 
and provincial actors seek to outmanoeuvre one another.
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss this interactive relationship. The 
broad institutional context, as set by central policies, regarding provincial 
investment implementation has been outlined in Chapters Three and Four, 
Chapters Five and Six described in detail the methods whereby the Guangdong and 
Shanghai governments manoeuvre within the institutional context in order to attain 
their objective of investment expansion. This chapter focuses on the linkage 
between the institutional context posed by the Centre and the resultant 
discretionary behaviour of the two provincial governments. Specifically, this 
chapter seeks to examine the mediating process whereby central policies influence 
and constrain the choices and behaviour of the two provincial governments, as well 
as the process whereby provincial discretionary behaviour influences central 
policies. As such, this discussion weaves the previous four chapters together.
Guangdong's and Shanghai's Discretionary Behaviour: A Comparison
Before exploring the linkage between central policies and provincial 
behaviour it is pertinent first to compare generally the discretionary behaviour of 
the Guangdong and Shanghai governments. There are obvious differences, as well 
as similarities, in the behaviour as noted in the previous two chapters, and both 
have equal significance. On the one hand, the substantial differences in their 
respective institutional contexts provide grounds whereby differences in the 
discretionary behaviour of the Guangdong and Shanghai leaderships might be
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expected. These differences suggest the impact of differential central policies 
towards the provinces. On the other hand, similarities in discretionary behaviour 
between Guangdong and Shanghai serve to qualify the above impact of central 
policies on provincial behaviour. The similarities suggest that notwithstanding the 
impact of differential central policies, provinces are nonetheless capable of very 
substantive manoeuvres. It would, thus, appear that there is a limit to central power 
over the provinces.
A comparison of Figures 5.2 and 6.1 in Chapters Five and Six respectively 
summarizes the differences and the similarities in a visual manner. On the one 
hand, both the Guangdong and Shanghai governments have engaged in similar 
categories of discretionary behaviour. The discretionary behaviour of the two 
provincial-level governments can be summarized into the same five categories: (1) 
bargaining for more favourable central policies, (2) fighting for more direct central 
support, (3) the flexible implementation of central policies, (4) developing the 
"new horizon" beyond the budget for investment expansion and (5) 
internationalization. These common categories indicate a considerable level of 
similarities between the discretionary behaviour of the two governments. However, 
the two figures, 5.2 and 6.1, also clearly show that the relative extent of the 
different categories of behaviour of the two governments in the 1978-93 period has 
been quite dissimilar. The Shanghai government has been more dependent on the 
Centre as its source of additional resources and as the focus of its discretionary 
behaviour. On the other hand, the Guangdong government has expended relatively 
more effort on "independent" categories of discretionary behaviour, such as 
flexible implementation of policies, developing innovative local policies beyond 
the scope of existing central policies, and internationalization.
It may be helpful to have another look at these two figures, combined into 
Figure 7,1, here again:
336
Figure 7.1
A Comparison of Provincial Discretionary Behaviour: Guangdong and Shanghai
Order of Provincial "Independence", from the highest order to the lowest order:
C, A, D, B
C: High on Provincial Autarchy and High on Local Plans/Market—Developing the 
"New Horizon" beyond the budget and internationalization 
A: High on Provincial Autarchy and High on Central Plans/Policies—Flexible 
Implementation of Central Policies
D: High on Central Dependence and High on Local Plans/Market—Bargaining for 
more direct central support (in the form of extrabudgetary resources)
B: High on Central Dependence and High on Central Plans/Policies—Bargaining 
for more favourable central policies and more direct central support (in the form of 
planned resources)
(a) Trends of Guangdong's Discretionary Behaviour. 1978-93
Occurrence
Lo
Year1978 1985 1993
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Cti) Trends of Shanghai's Discretionary Behaviour. 1978-93
Occurrence
Lo
Year
1978 1985 1993
The above figures give a clear contrast regarding the discretionary 
behaviour of Guangdong and Shanghai. Both Guangdong and Shanghai started off 
in 1978 with a high level of occurrence of discretionary behaviour which was 
highly dependent on the Centre, as reflected by the line (B). However, into the 
1980s, the line (B) declines substantially in the case of Guangdong, while other 
lines which denote a higher order of provincial independence, (C) and (A), 
increased steadily over the decade. On the other hand, the line (B) in Shanghai 
remains at a high level throughout the decade, and lines (C) and (A) continue to lie 
at a relatively low level until the 1990s, when there is a sharp rise in the line (C). In 
other words, until the early 1990s, discretionary behaviour of the Shanghai 
government exhibited a heavy reliance on the Centre, while that of Guangdong has 
seen a steady progression towards a higher level of independence orientation 
during the 1980s.
A revealing example of the differences is seen in the different approaches 
through which the Guangdong and Shanghai leaderships have manoeuvred 
regarding their total investment scale. As discussed in Chapters Three and Five, 
the central control figures in Guangdong prescribing, in theory, the upper-most 
limit of the total local investment scale in the province has not been obeyed. Its 
assigned role in pioneering economic reform provides the Guangdong leadership 
with a strong pretext to "implement flexibly" this central instrument of investment 
control. It has been during times of economic retrenchment only, when central 
leaders have been more concerned about excess investment that the Guangdong 
leaders have paid more attention to the control figures and sought more seriously
338
for a larger quota. On the other hand, the control figures have posed more 
formidable pressure on the Shanghai leadership, who more closely adhered to 
central rules. As a result, instead of simply ignoring the quotas for most of the 
years as has Guangdong, the Shanghai government has generally bargained for a 
larger quota. Consequently, as regards the issue of investment scale control, the 
discretionary behaviour of the Guangdong government is manifest within the 
category of implementation discretions, whilst that of Shanghai falls within that of 
bargaining for direct central support. The heavier reliance on the Centre by 
Shanghai is obvious.
The Guangdong leaders were thus bolder than their Shanghai colleagues in 
the flexible implementation of central policy. Shanghai leaders' concern over 
keeping up the appearance of abiding by rules prompts them to "paper over" the 
discrepancy between central rules and the outcome of their implementation. Thus 
they have simultaneously sought to "bend the rules" by bargaining for a larger 
quota as well as manipulating investment statistics. The result is that, superficially, 
Guangdong's investment behaviour appears unscrupulous, as its substantial excess 
investment over and above the central quotas provides clear testimony to its 
deviant behaviour. Shanghai’s excess investment is, in comparison, modest and 
insignificant, reinforcing the image of the Shanghai government as the loyal 
lieutenant of the Centre.
Important and obvious as these differences may be, their significance 
should not be overstated. Such differences are, after all, relative. Whilst the 
Guangdong leadership has been less preoccupied with bargaining for preferential 
policies than the Shanghai leadership, they have nevertheless been highly vigilant 
in ensuring the continuation of their established preferential policies. This explains 
why the Guangdong leadership was so concerned about the abolition of the 
dabaogan fiscal system in 1993. In order to retain more of its vested interests 
under the new system, the Guangdong leadership took the initiative in bargaining 
for a more favourable base-line, notwithstanding the Centre's promise to respect 
the existing vested interests of provinces in the new fiscal reform.
Moreover, bargaining for more central investment and bank finance has 
also been an important activity of the Guangdong government. As noted 
previously, Guangdong has been quite successful in attracting central investment 
from various central ministries because its vibrant economic growth was able to 
give potential "investors" a better prospect of earning profits. Moreover, crying for 
direct forms of assistance is often a useful tactic for achieving other objectives,
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such as lobbying for more favourable policies.1 In other words, while during the 
1980s the Guangdong government frequently engaged in "independence-oriented" 
discretionary behaviour, the provincial leadership was nevertheless well aware that 
its ability to do so was due to the favourable macro environment deriving from 
preferential central policies. It has therefore taken great care to keep and enhance 
those policies, Guangdong's ability to use the new resources awarded to it 
subsequent to the preferential central polices in order to bargain for better policies 
and cultivate a favourable macro-environment has become well known nationally. 
This has, in fact, been the major characteristic of Guangdong's discretionary 
behaviour.
Similarly, the Shanghai government has not been concerned solely with 
obtaining better policies from the Centre. Officials in its finance bureau recognized 
early on the fact that Shanghai's economy could also benefit from a Guangdong' 
style tax alleviation policy.2 Consequently, towards the end of the 1980s, the 
discretionary behaviour of the Shanghai government became increasingly similar 
to that of Guangdong in being more "independence-oriented", their manoeuvres 
becoming less directed towards the Centre. As noted in Chapter Six, into the 
1990s, the number of local and extrabudgetary specialized funds in the new "third 
finance" multiplied and the value of investment resources managed outside the 
purview of the budget snowballed. Amidst the call to speed up Shanghai's 
development towards making it an international financial centre, the reliance of the 
Shanghai government on the Centre has also conspicuously declined.
To understand the implications of such differences and similarities in the 
behaviour of Guangdong and Shanghai as regards their relationship with the 
Centre, it is necessary to look more closely at the linkage between the institutional 
context posed by the Centre and the behaviour of the provinces. If the differences 
suggest the impact of central constraints on provincial behaviour, how is this 
impact effected? Conversely, if the similarities indicate the activism of the 
provincial leaderships given their constraints as posed by the Centre, what is the 
extent of this activism and its implication for the central-provincial relationship?
Impact of Central Policies: the Mediating Process
The policies of the central government form the most prominent factors in 
the context of the investment discretionary behaviour of the Guangdong and
^ e e  discussion in Chapter Five: Fight for more direct central support.
2See Chapter Six: Develop the new horizon.
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Shanghai governments. As noted in Chapters Five and Six, the central 
government's differential policies for the two areas were originally based on 
national strategic and tactical considerations. As a result, during the 1980s the 
Guangdong leadership found itself operating in a more relaxed policy environment 
with much more room for manoeuvre, much to the envy of most provincial 
leaderships, in particular, Shanghai.
The following table summarizes the relative positions of the two provinces 
in the national economy in 1978, on the eve of the onset of economic reform. It 
explains why the Centre has treated them in such a differential manner.
Table 7.1
Guangdong and Shanghai: 1978
Economic Indicators Guangdong Shanghai
Total %/National Rank1 Total %/N.ational Rank
(bn yuan) (bn yuan)
GNP 18.5 5.1 6 27.3 7.6 1
Societal Output 35.0 5.1 7 59.2 8.7 1
Export^ 1.4 14.2 n/a 2.9 29.7 n/a
Total local fiscal
revenue 3.9 3.5 n/a 16.7 14.9 1
Notes: (1) Rank refers to the ranking position among all provincial-level 
administrations. (2) Export value is in terms of US$ billion.
Sources: Guangdong's Statistics, 1949-1988. (General), pp.74, 162, 175; Shanghai 
Statistical Yearbook 1993, pp.54, 300; Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 1993, 
p.350; Statistical Yearbook of China 1993, pp.215, 633,
Table 7.1 reveals the substantial gap between Guangdong and Shanghai in 
terms of their importance to the national economy. The differential in fiscal 
revenue is particularly significant, as Shanghai's local fiscal revenue accounts for 
15% of the national total in 1978 and Guangdong's for only 3.5%. When using an 
analogy of kinship relations to characterize the situation, the position of Shanghai 
resembles that of the eldest child, and Guangdong of the younger child, of a 
family, with the central government as head of family. As the eldest child, 
Shanghai has had the advantage of advanced developments way in advance ahead 
of its younger brothers. It has correspondingly been required to share the 
responsibility of the Centre earlier than the others in the maintenance of the family 
and the care for the weaker children, namely, the poorer inland regions.
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Meanwhile Guangdong, as the younger child, received attention of the Centre 
much later and did not therefore have any major responsibility placed on its 
shoulders. The Centre therefore found it easier and more feasible to offer 
concessions to the younger child, who, accepting them as its fair share of the 
family resources, did not hesitate to utilize them to the utmost
Consequently, two different sets of policies were conferred on the two. 
Guangdong was awarded the "Special Policy" early in 1979 which enabled the 
province to retain more resources for local economic development, as well as a 
larger scope of authority in the administration of investment policies. Shanghai, on 
the other hand, was expected to provide the resources necessary for the experiment 
As a result, central policies in Shanghai were necessarily cautious and prudent. 
Having a more developed economy, its having been developed at a much earlier 
stage, Shanghai was required to support and assist in the development of other 
provinces. As noted later in this section, this took the form of the direct provision 
of technical and financial assistance to enterprises in other provinces, as well as 
indirect fiscal transfers via the Centre. In 1979, Guangdong was weak and 
relatively unimportant to the Centre. The Centre could, therefore, afford to allow it 
to be "special"—meaning preferentially treated. On the other hand, in 1979 
Shanghai was relatively well-off. It was thus asked to "integrate horizontally" with 
the poorer inland provinces—meaning to play the fraternal role of "elder br< ’ r r " 
and share its wealth with its weaker brothers.
The discretionary behaviour of provincial governments is, by definition, a 
product of the decisions of provincial officials effected under the auspices of the 
existing administrative structure. Given that provincial discretions are constrained 
and influenced by central policies, such influence is effected through the 
intermediary of the attitudes and survival strategies of the provincial officials 
themselves. An explicit discussion of these attitudes and strategies, therefore, may 
illuminate the linkage between static institutional policies and the resultant 
provincial behaviour.
Guangdong
In Guangdong the Special Policy confers on the provincial leadership a 
clear role in achieving the targets of economic development and reform. 
Guangdong is to act as the pioneer of reforms for the rest of country. Such pioneer 
status has allowed the Guangdong government a greater latitude of manoeuvre than 
other provinces, and exceptions were made in its case to central policies and rules
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in order to facilitate its experiments. The entrusted task of the province as the 
pioneer of and experimenter in economic reform in the country required in feet a 
new outlook and attitude amongst provincial officials. Guangdong's leaders were 
therefore encouraged by the Centre to be bolder, less conventional and more 
aggressive.
However, changes in habitual attitudes and working style do not come 
overnight. The emergence of a more progressive attitude towards change and, in 
particular, flexible discretions amongst Guangdong officials occurred through a 
series of developments over a period of time. The early endowment of a favourable 
set of policies in 1979 provided the contextual change necessary for changes in 
attitudes. However, for some time thereafter the conventionally cautious mentality 
was still predominant, even amongst the senior leadership of the Guangdong 
government.3 This is understandable, given that Guangdong, along with Fujian, 
was the first area in the country to undertake reforms, at a time when the inertia of 
the central planning system and the old way of thinking, whereby provincial 
governments were expected to implement central plans and policies only, was still 
very strong nationwide.
The active "coaching" by central leaders during the earlier years had a 
catalytic effect in this respect. In order to alleviate the initial hesitation and feeling 
of insecurity amongst Guangdong's provincial and local officials, central leaders 
had in fact frequently encouraged Guangdong's officials to be bold. The quotes 
below show that sometimes the remarks of central leaders were quite exaggerated 
in this respect:
"Comrade Xi Zhongxun once said, if Guangdong was an independent 
country, its development would certainly be fast. Guangdong has now 
become basically semi-independent"4
3This is reflected in a comment by Gu Mu during a meeting in the Central Party Secretariat in 
September 1980, when Gu Mu was reported to have said that "the major question (regarding the 
implementation of the Special Policy and promoting economic development in Guangdong) is still 
the question of leadership...First, Guangdong's leaders in charge of economic work have still not yet 
been working as a team. Second, there are problems with their style of mentality." At that time Xi 
Zhongxun and Yang Shangkun were respectively the first and second Party Secretaries. See 
Centre's Instructions to Guangdong, 1979-1982, p.97.
4Gu Mu was talking to Guangdong officials, September 1979, in the first meeting with Guangdong's 
leaders after the approval of the Special Policy for Guangdong and Fujian in July, See Centre's 
Instructions to Guangdong, 1979-1982, p.53. Xi Zhongxun was the First Party Secretary of 
Guangdong from November 1978 to November 1980.
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"All central ministries should consider Guangdong's case independently, 
based on Guangdong's Special Policy. ... (Guangdong) should have a larger 
degree of independence."5
"Since (Guangdong) is in fact an 'independent kingdom’, or an 'semi­
independent kingdom', you (Ren Zhongyi) are the King.''6
Anxious as they were to cultivate a bolder-minded force of cadres with 
which to undertake economic reforms and speed up the pace of economic 
development in Guangdong, central leaders reshuffled the provincial leadership in 
late 1980.7 The new first party secretary, Ren Zhongyi, who had been the first, 
party secretary and Governor of Liaoning Province during 1978-1980, 
subsequently became famous for his role in revolutionalizing the dominant norms 
of the local officialdom and creating an environment suitable for the Special Policy 
to be put into practice. Under the guiding hand of the new Party Secretary, the 
provincial leadership in December 1980 interpreted the vague contents o f the  
Special Policy as meaning "Guangdong should open further to the outside world, 
further relax internal policies, and delegate more power to the lower levels".8 The 
change brought about by this new leadership was noted by Gu Mu in his meeting 
with the new Provincial Party Committee in December 1980, when he expressed 
the overall observation that "all cadres, from the leadership to the working level, 
are now fairly confident of their ability to do well in the implementation of the 
Special Policy and in the development of the special economic zones. There is a 
sense of direction."9 In addition to laying down the specific contents of an 
otherwise vague policy, Ren was ready to protect his subordinates from the central 
government, especially when changes in the political wind at the Centre made local 
officials feel vulnerable.10 Clear backing from the central leadership for a bolder 
Guangdong has given the Guangdong leadership greater freedom to flexibly 
implement central policies. They have, in fact, been required to do so.
5 Yao Yilin was speaking in a meeting of the Central Party Committee Secretariat, September 1980, 
refering to the special status of Guangdong under the Centre's austerity program. Ibid., p.101.
6Gu Mu was speaking in a meeting of the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee, December 1980, 
assuring the new First Party Secretary of his autonomy. Ibid., p. 127.
7 Hu Yaobang had became the Secretary General of CCP in February 1980, and Zhao Ziyang had 
became premier in September 1980, both replacing Hua Gufeng. This reshuffle in central leadership 
is likely to be connected to the changes in provincial leadership later in Guangdong.
8See Lu Di et al. "Looking Back the 13 Years of Opening and Reforms in Guangdong", in 
Guangdong Provincial Party Committee (ed.), Guangdong Gaige Kaifang Qishi Lu (A Record of 
Insights of Opening and Reforms in Guangdong) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1993), p.60. The 
authors were officials from the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee Secretariat The three 
dimensions were endorsed by the Centre via Central Document No.27 (1981) as the major contents 
of the special policy, as discussed previously in Chapter Five.
9See Centre's Instructions to Guangdong, 1979-1982, p.121,
10See Lu di et al., "Looking Back the 13 Years of Opening and Reforms in Guangdong", pp.60-61, 
for a brief description of Ren's role in Guangdong in these respects. See also Ezra F. Vogel, One 
Step Ahead of China: Guangdong Under Reform, pp.88, 314-17 for Ren's role and a brief profile.
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The combined effect of favourable central policies* active coaching an d  
encouragement by central leaders, as well as the leadership of a centrally picked 
leader, was the gradual emergence and maturation of a new culture of officialdom 
in Guangdong. This is not to say, however, that there has not been a substantial 
lingering of the old preference for caution and conservatism in some quarters of the 
government ranks. Moreover, discretions and flexible implementation of central 
policies are by no means a phenomenon of the post-Mao reform years only. Nor 
are provincial discretions a feature present only in Guangdong. Notwithstanding 
the possible continuities of the past and similarities with other provinces, there 
were undeniable behavioural and attitudinal changes in Guangdong in the 1980s. 
The normal criterion of performance appraisal has changed from the traditional 
favour for conservatism and caution to one which rewards initiative, and 
experiment. Moreover, this is the first time in China since 1949 that discretions at a 
subnational level have acquired such a high degree of legitimate status for an 
extended period.11
The legitimacy, at least from the perspective of Guangdong officials, of 
engaging in flexible implementation of central policies was reflected in many 
locally written articles. The publication of an article by the provincial propaganda 
chief, entitled "Three 'Sayings’, Three Defences" during the retrenchment period of 
1989 is particularly indicative of the degree of legitimacy and righteousness the 
Guangdong leadership felt towards its flexible implementation.12 After a decade of 
reform, the Guangdong leadership had apparently fully adopted the bold and 
unconventional attitudes which were coached by central leaders earlier in the 
decade. Therefore, when the Centre tightened its economic policies in late 1988, 
the Guangdong leadership felt secure enough to protest against the Centre's 
centralizing measures. The implication of this article for central-provincial 
relationship is discussed in more detail later in this chapter. Here it is noteworthy 
that the sense of pride of the Guangdong officials for their flexibility in policy 
implementation is explicit in the following quote by a group of local scholars:
"The once popular saying of ’going round the red light’ is a typical 
description (of the flexibility of the Guangdong government in fully 
utilizing central policies). For instance, according to the formal procedures,
llrThere are periods in the history of the Republic and pre-1949 China when local governments were 
allowed, or endeavoured to defy the Centre without endorsement Examples of the former type are 
the wide powers and autonomy given to the Regional Governments in the early years of the 
Republic, and the massive decentralization to provincial governments in 1958. These incidences 
were, however, either of a relatively short endurance or blatantly illegitimate.
12This article was published in three parts in Zhongguo Jinbao, January 13,1989, p.2. See Chapter 
Five: Flexible implementation, for more discussion and quotes from the article.
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in order to import production equipment into export production bases, we 
would have to apply for approval from the Ministry of Foreign Economic 
Relations and Trade and other relevant ministries and commissions. T h at 
would take a very long time... A flexible way to achieve the purpose is to 
treat the imports as those of a foreign-funded project. Then it would require 
the approval of the Provincial Commission of Foreign Economic Relations 
and Trade only, as Guangdong has a larger approval jurisdiction regarding 
foreign investment. We are very proud of the pragmatism and flexibility of 
our government, which has won the admiration of other provinces and 
municipalities. "13
As this chapter will later elaborate, the Guangdong government has now come to a 
stage where it competes with the central government in the definition of the  
content of the central policies. However, this process was started by the Centre 
itself. By allowing Guangdong to be exempted from many nationwide central 
policies via the Special Policy, the Centre prepared the ground for the erosion of its 
own authority. Guangdong's leaders were taught to be flexible and imaginative in 
implementing central policies. They were repeatedly told that if they found specific 
central policies and rules which obstructed the course of reform, they could ignore 
them and make their own. They were also assured of the safety of such boldness. 
They would not be blamed for being overzealous in the advancement of their 
autonomy and for inadvertently ignoring central policies. Reform requires learning, 
and mistakes are inevitable, as provincial officials were often told. Such is the role 
of a pioneer, and the economic reform of the nation required a pioneer who 
innovate and try out its options.
Shanghai
In contrast to the clear role of the "pioneer of economic reform" as assigned 
to Guangdong, the role of Shanghai at the start of the reform decade was confused 
and ambivalent. On the one hand, Shanghai was required to perform a "rearguard" 
role in providing the Centre with the resources which were then diverted to the 
experiments in the southern provinces.14 On the other hand, the Shanghai 
leadership expected to perform a role in the process of reform other than that of 
providing the cash for other provinces. Similarly, the central leaders were eager to
13 See Huang Haichao et al (ed.), The Realization of Dreams—Guangdong Advancing to Market 
Economy (Guangzhou: South China University of Technology Press, 1993), p.116.
14Most of such diversion came in an indirect and diffuse way, rather than direct injection of central 
resources through the plans. One way has been through the slack enforcement during the 1980s of 
the bank finance quotas in Guangdong, which effectively enabled Guangdong the resources to 
finance its expanding investment program through bank credits which exceeded the total level of 
bank deposit within the province. The balance of bank finance thus indicated a net inflow of central 
resources which were eitherdiverted from other provinces where bank credits were of a smaller sum 
than the total amount of deposits, or downright "fresh" new money arising from printing of new 
notes. See discussion in Chapter Five.
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tap the other resources of Shanghai, as well as its fiscal remittance, such as its 
higher level of technology and educated workforce. Consequently, the role of 
Shanghai as perceived by the Shanghai leaders, as well as by central leaders, was 
less than clear-cut. The Guangdong leaders, on the other hand, having been 
designated a specific target of achievement, were able to progress through the 
decade deepening their understanding and fulfillment of their defined role within 
the reform. For Shanghai, however, the 1980s was a decade of confusion. From the 
beginning the message from the Centre was that Shanghai could best serve reform 
by sustaining its traditional roles. Disruptions in the macro-operating environment 
caused by the reform, however, placed the Shanghai government, acting in a 
traditional manner, in a difficult position. As noted as Chapters Four and Six, the 
Shanghai leaders gradually discovered that things were not working in the same 
way as before. However, central policies towards them were slow to change, as 
were their own attitudes and accustomed behaviour. Both influenced the reactions 
of the Shanghai leadership to their new-found difficulties during the first decade of 
reform.
The ambivalence of the roles of Shanghai in the process of reform as 
perceived by the Centre and by the Shanghai leadership is embodied in the central 
policy of "horizontal integration". This policy set out the active role which 
Shanghai was expected to play in reform, in addition to its passive role of 
providing funding through fiscal transfers. As an advanced industrial centre with a 
highly educated workforce, the city was to engage in co-operative ventures with 
the less developed provinces and assist their economic development at factory- 
floor level. In other words, Shanghai was not only collectively to share its wealth 
with other provinces in the form of high remittance to the Centre, but the 
individual Shanghai managers, technicans and engineers were also to participate in 
the nation's reform by helping their counterparts in other provinces.
The central government policy of "horizontal integration" refers to 
economic co-operation across administrative boundaries. It was initiated in the 
early 1980s to counter the trend of compartmentalized economic development in 
the provinces. The basic idea was to encourage the better-off coastal areas to help 
the poorer inland regions in their economic development.15 In 1980 the first
15Breaking the compartmentalized structure of the economy was made an explicit aim of the policy 
in the 1980 Temporary Regulation, and repeated in a later 1986 regulation. See Footnote 16 below. 
The aim of encouraging the better-off areas to help the poorer regions was, however, less explicit. 
A municipal government notice on economic co-operation, however, described co-operation with 
the national minority areas and border areas as "assistance", stressing that more benefits should be 
given to the other parties. See Shanghai Municipal Government Document No.85 (1984), 
November 11, 1984, "The Municipal People's Government approving the Regulation on certain
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regulation on the subject was issued by the State Council.16 Shanghai was 
obviously the major candidate targeted to offer help. In December 1982, the 
Shanghai Economic Zone was established to include the regional economy of the 
Shanghai Municipality, Suzhou, Wuxi, Changzhou in Jiangsu, and Hangzhou, 
Jiaqing, Huzhou and Ningbo in Zhejiang.17 The Zone thereby defines the scope of 
Shanghai's provision of assistance, starting from its encircling hinterlands. Since 
then the spatial coverage of the policy has extended and the pace of establishing 
economic linkage increased. As of 1990, a total of 4000 economic organizations 
was set up. And a total of 1.8 billion yuan of capital from units in Shanghai was 
invested in resource exploration projects in the resource-rich inland provinces.18
However, "horizontal integration" was from the beginning plagued by 
immense obstacles.19 Under the existing compartmentalized economic system, 
provincial governments were responsible for the administration and collection of 
taxes/revenues from their subordinate enterprises. Under this system it was difficult 
to reconcile the conflicting economic interests of different areas and to achieve 
inter-provincial economic co-operation. The contractual fiscal system, in place 
since 1980, further reinforced such compartmentalization by raising the rewards to 
provincial governments for making local investment, thus increasing the 
opportunity cost of investing elsewhere. Therefore, by promoting interprovincial 
co-operation through a policy of horizontal integration, the Centre sought to 
ameliorate the negative effects of its fiscal reform policy. In practice this was 
easier said than done.20
issues governing economic and technical co-operation between Shanghai enterprises and enterprises 
in "brother-areas" by the Co-operation Office, and other departments", printed in Shanghaishi Jingji 
Tizhi Gaige Lingdao Xiaozhu (ed,), Shanghai Shi Jingji Tizhi Gaige Wenjian Huibian, (A 
Compendium of Economic System Reform in Shanghai), Part 2, (Shanghai: Qiye Guanli Xuehui, 
1985), pp.12-20, especially p.14.
16"Temporary Regulation of the State Council on Promoting Economic Integration", passed by 
State Council Executive Committee, July 1, 1980, printed in State Planning Commission (ed.), 
Zhongyao Jingji Fagui Zitiu Xuanbian, 1977-1986 (A Selected Collection of the Major Economic 
Regulations) (Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji chubanshe, 1987), p.62.
17State Council Document No. 152 (1982), December 22, 1982, "A Notice of the State Council on 
the Establishment of the Shanghai Economic Zone and Shanxi Energy Base Planning Office", 
printed in State Commission for Economic System Reform (ed.), Jingji Tizhi Gaige Wenjian 
Huibian, 1978-1983 (A Collection of the Documents on Economic System Reform) (Beijing: 
Zhongguo Caizheng Jingji chubanshe, 1983), p.672.
18See The Yearbook of Chinese Horizontal Economy 1991, p.281.
19 A Shanghai scholar remarked in a 1984 article on horizontal integration that sometimes it was 
even more difficult to do business with other units in the country than with foreign bodies. See Wu 
Qi, "Zhinan Ertui, Nuli Kaichuang Jingji Lianhe Xiezuo de Xinjumian" (Marching Against 
Difficulties; Earnestly Working for a New Phase of Economic Integration and Co-Operation), 
Shanghai Jingji Kexue, No.5 (1984), p.8.
20Zhao Ziyang when meeting the provincial leaders of the Shanghai Economic Zone on June 30, 
1983, talked at length about the need to balance the interests of the parties concerned, and the 
principle of mutual benefits in economic co-operation. He said explicitly, for instance, "Economic 
co-operation must be mutually beneficial. Shanghai would not lose, nor would Zhejiang and
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By the end of the 1980s, there was a common consensus among officials in 
Shanghai that horizontal integration had failed to bring the expected benefits to 
Shanghai.21 It was regarded as a failure because assistance had not been reciprocal, 
at least as the Shanghai officials saw it. In return for technical and financial 
assistance, Shanghai had expected to obtain raw materials for production in its 
local enterprises, the previous supply of which since the commencement of reforms 
had become unreliable and had dwindled through the state plan system. These 
expectations had, however, not materialized. As investors in projects located in 
other provinces, the interests of Shanghai's enterprises were often not given proper 
protection and the terms of contracts consequently not honoured. For instance, a 
Shanghai enterprise had, in 1986, invested 6.7 million yuan in an aluminium 
factory in Qinghai. According to the contract, the Shanghai investor would get 
7.8% of the annual production in return for its investment. The actual return in 
1988 was however only 4.8% of the total production, and the Shanghai enterprise 
was forced to pay for the product at a much higher price than the originally agreed 
level.22 Thus while many inventions were transferred to other provinces and cities 
as part of Shanghai's assistance to other areas, Shanghai gained little in return. 
From its own perspective, the policy of "horizontal integration" with other 
provinces had served only to accentuate the outflow of resources and expertise 
from Shanghai.23
This is only half the story. The central policy in the 1980s was to encourage 
coastal regions, including Shanghai and Guangdong, to export more of their 
products in order to earn more foreign exchange with which to finance then- 
increasing import bill. This would also leave more room in the domestic market for 
industries of the less well-off areas. The policy was described as one of "opening
Jiangsu." See "Zhao Ziyang Tongzhi Tan Shanghai Jingjiqu de Renwu ji Gongzuo Fangfa Deng 
Wenti" (Comrade Zhao Ziyang on the Tasks and Working Approach of the Shanghai Economic 
Zone), Shanghai Jingji Kexue, No.l (1984), p.3.
21This is the view of Respondent No.23. Respondent No,28 also admitted the adverse effect of the 
policy on Shanghai. (Shanghai interviews, May 1994)
22See Tu Jimo, "Shanghai Difang Touzi Fangshi de Bianhua Yu Duice" (Approaches of Shanghai’s 
Local Investment; Changes and Solutions), Shanghai Jihua Jingji Tansuo, No.l (1990), p.29.
23 A Shanghai official wrote that although tens of thousands of inventions were made in Shanghai 
every year, in average only several hundred patent applications were submitted and processed every 
year. The ranking of Shanghai in terms of cumulative number of patent applications of the recent 
decade was only the ninth; in 1985 it was the second, falling to the twelfth place in 1993. See 
Shanghai Institute of Economic Development (ed.), Shanghai Jingji Fazhan, 1993 (Shanghai 
Economic Development, 1993) (Shanghai: China Business Weekly Press, 1994), p.44. From 1979 
to 1983, for instance, a total of 3600 technical and technological items were transferred from 
Shanghai’s units to brother areas. See He Gaosheng et al, "Shanghai Jingji Tizhi de Lishi Yange" 
(Shanghai's Economic System Reforms: a Historical Chronlogy), (Parts 1-3), Part 3, Shanghai 
Jingji Kexue, No.7 (1984), p.30.
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up to the world, and co-operating with other regions", and was included in the 
"Shanghai Jingji Fazhan Zhanlue de Huibao Tigong" (Outline of a report of 
Economic Development Strategy of Shanghai). It was approved by the State 
Council in 1985, as a major development strategy.24 The policy looked fairly 
reasonable, prima facie, since the coastal regions were in a better position to 
develop export-oriented industries, with their better access to foreign investment 
and generally higher level of industrial and economic development than that of the 
interior.
In a sense this policy was the Centre's response to two-pronged pressure. 
On the one hand, the inland provinces were eager to develop their own industries 
and narrow down the disparity of wealth between themselves and the coastal 
regions. On the other hand, there was a practical need for more export in order to 
balance the terms of trade. This was why, from the perspective of Shanghai, the 
policy of encouraging exports could in hindsight be alternatively understood as a 
policy of restricting the sale of Shanghai’s industrial products to its traditional 
domestic market.25 The idea was for Shanghai to sell more of its products overseas 
so that the industries of less well-off provinces could have access to more of the 
domestic market. In practice this strategy proved easier said than done. Unlike 
Guangdong, which started from a small base, Shanghai's older, and therefore 
larger, industrial base had heavily depended on the national market since 1949. It 
was thus more difficult for Shanghai rapidly to reorient its products in terms of 
international competition, despite the fact that they were of the best quality in the 
country. Trade statistics confirm that this transition has been difficult. The total 
value of exports by Shanghai's enterprises in 1987, at US$4.16 billion, was even 
2.5% less than the value achieved in 1980 at current prices with an almost 
consecutive decline throughout the 1980-87 period.26 Since this value is in terms of 
the current prices for the year, the decline is, in fact, more serious in real terms. 
Meanwhile, sales to the domestic market faced increasing obstacles with the 
breakdown of the traditional sales system and the rising protectionism of other
24For an extracted version of the Outline, see Shanghai Economy, 1983-1985, pp.25-34. The 
reference to the policy was in p.28.
^This is the opinion of Respondent No.23, Shanghai interview, May 1994.
26See Shanghai Statistical Yearbook 1993, p.300. The exceptions are 1983 and 1986 which saw a 
very slight rise over the previous year. These statistics include all exports made through local 
Shanghai enterprises (foreign trade companies and industrial enterprises with export authority, 
foreign invested companies) central enterprises and foreign trade companies. A portion of the 
exports made through these enterprises were not Shanghai products but brought in from other 
localities. This portion used to be fairly substantial, accounting for up to 40% of the total value 
conducted through the Shanghai enterprises in 1978 and 18% in 1984. Since then the share has 
drastically shrunk to only 6% in the 1990s. See also Shanghai Statistical Yearbook 1993, p.300. 
The coverage of statistics was confirmed with Respondent No.28(a), telephone interview, June 
1994.
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provincial governments against Mnon-indigenousn products.27 Table 7.2 below 
illustrates the slackened "growth" of Shanghai's "exports" to other provinces since 
the 1980s.
Table 7.2
Shanghai's "Export" Trade with other Provinces 
(Billion Yuan and Growth % over Last Calender Year')
Year Total Industrial Products Agricultural I
1952 1.92 1.84 0.08
(n/a) (n/a) (n/a)
1960 6.43 6.33 0.10
(-1-2) (0.3) (-49.0)
1965 5.23 4.73 0.49
(11.0) (9.5) (27.6)
1970 8.08 7.85 0.24
(6.7) (3.6) (11700.0)
1975 8.36 8.09 0.27
(8.8) (8.7) (11.2)
1980 11.23 10.68 0.54
(5.7) (5.8) (3.8)
1985 16.34 15.90 0.44
(18.6) (18.2) (31.8)
1986 15.22 14.78 0.44
(-6.8) (-7.0) (0.9)
1987 15.39 14.73 0.69
(1.1) (-0.4) (48.5)
1988 16.25 15.43 0.83
(5.6) (4.8) (20.6)
1989 16.93 15.90 1.04
(4.2) (3.0) (25.3)
1990 15.25 14.28 0.97
(-10.0) (-9.5) (-6.3)
1991 15.3 15.06 0.24
(0.5) (5.7) (-75.0)
1992 15.09 12.38 2.71
(-1.6) (-18.0) (1053.0)
Notes and Sources: For the purpose of comparison across the years, these figures 
cover trade conducted by the state sector enterprises only, and are at the current 
prices of the year. Total societal figures are available for the years since 1987, but 
do not alter the general trend of the state sector trade. See Shanghai Statistical 
Yearbook 1983,1987,1989, 1990,1991,1992,1993, respectively, p.246; p.274; 
p.324; p.282; p.312; p.334; p.286.
Table 7.2 shows that Shanghai's outgoing trade to the other provinces irx the 
1980s can best be described as stagnating. 1985 was the peak of Shanghai's 
domestic "export". After 1985, and up to 1992, three out of the seven years saw 
negative growth, the most serious year being 1990 when the amount of goods sold
27This was brought to the author's attention by Respondent No.23, Shanghai interview, May 1994.
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to other provinces dived 10% from that of the previous year. When inflation is 
taken into account, the slow growth originating from the percentage points gained 
in the growth years can be written off, and negative growths appeared steeper still. 
In any event the absolute value of goods sold by Shanghai’s state enterprises to 
other provinces in 1992, before discounting inflation, was nearly 8% less than the 
value sold in 1985. This loss of the domestic market at a time when Shanghai's 
products were not yet ready to face the severe competition in the international 
market thus caused the Shanghai economy in the 1980s grave difficulties. This is 
reflected in the two slides in local fiscal revenue during 1981-83 and 1986-88 as 
discussed in Chapter Four.
Towards the late 1980s the central leadership was forced to review its 
policy on Shanghai as its economy continued to ail further, in sharp contrast to the 
robust growth of its previously poor neighbours, and Guangdong in particular. 
Finally, in the spring of 1992, the Centre formally renounced its previous 
"rearguard" policy on Shanghai. The municipality was then asked to play a central 
role in the deepening and broadening of reform in the 1990s.28 The description of 
its new role—the "dragon-head"—, included in a formal resolution in the 
Fourteenth Party Congress of October 1992, reflected the change of Shanghai's 
position from that of back-seat to one of centre stage.
However, it is oversimplistic to assign the difficulties faced by Shanghai 
during the 1980s solely to central policies. They were also a result of both central 
and Shanghai leaders gaining through a process of change regarding the perceived 
role and task of this major city in economic reform. The attitudes and accustomed 
behaviour of the Shanghai officials, though partly a product of the circumscribing 
effect of previous central policies, have themselves constituted a major part of the 
context in which their own discretionary behaviour was constrained.
The Eldest Son
The key element affecting the attitudes of Shanghai officials regarding their 
role in reform and thus their discretionary behaviour was, and still is, their 
perception of being the "eldest son" of the Centre. Originating as it did from
28Deng Xiaoping had expressed regret for not having made Shanghai a special economic zone in 
the 1980s during his visit to Shanghai in January-February 1991, after the opening of Pudong was 
formally announced by the Centre in April 1990. However, it was during his southern tour in 
January-February 1992 that he explicitly regarded this as a major mistake of his in the 1980s. See 
Deng Xiaoping, Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping), Volume 3, (Beijing: 
Renmin chubanshe, 1994), pp.366,376.
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Shanghai's important position in the national economy since the early twentieth 
century, this perceived status as the "eldest son" has had important implications for 
the choices of behaviour by the Shanghai leadership. First, as the "eldest son", the 
Shanghai government has had to be the right-hand man of the "father Centre". This 
has required the Shanghai government to offer its advice and comments on policy 
options, as well as on the implementation of existing policies. Second, the eldest 
son has to share the burden of responsibility of the father for the younger brothers. 
This has required the Shanghai government to follow in the footstep of the Centre 
and become the model for emulation by other provinces. Shangha’s leaders, 
therefore, must act in accordance with the rules, or, at least, appear to have acted 
within the rules. As the "eldest son", Shanghai has occasionally acted as "surrogate 
father", in helping the Centre to rein in other provinces.29
On face value these would appear to be contradictory behavioural patterns. 
The Shanghai government is to take the lead in following strictly the rules and 
polices as prescribed by the Centre, as well as promoting the rationale of policies 
which have not been well received by other provinces. On the other hand, as the 
"right-hand man", the Shanghai government must also act as the critical adviser of 
the Centre, pointing out the inadequacies of existing and fermenting central 
policies, as well as offering constructive suggestions. In reality the contradiction is 
superficial. The Shanghai government has to assist the Centre in maintaining the 
authority of its policies among the provinces, since the central policies are, to an 
extent, a product of its own advice and therefore work towards its own interests. 
Critical advice and interest articulations to the Centre are largely an "internal" 
matter between the Centre and its major assistant, and should be kept as far as 
possible from public sight.30 The remarks of Shanghai's Party Secretary, Wu 
Bangguo, during the Second Session of the Eighth Party Congress in March 1994, 
reflect the relationship between Shanghai and the Centre:
"Regarding the distribution of interests between the Centre and the 
provinces, our position is: once the Centre has made its decision, Shanghai 
unambiguously follows and loyally implements them. Shanghai does not 
seek exceptions as all issues must be uniformly handled."31
29The idea of the role of ''surrogate father", which was often exhibited in the behaviour of the 
Shanghai government, if not required by the Centre, was brought to the author's attention by 
Respondent No.23, (Shanghai interview, May 1994).
30This explains why that which is publicly available in documentary evidence regarding Shanghai's 
articulation of interest and criticisms directed at central policies is generally very mild and lightly 
worded.
3 ^ e e  Jiefang Daily , March 11,1994, p.5.
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The relationship between public statements of support and loyalty, and private 
communications of criticisms and opinions, is interestingly analogous to the 
relationship between senior civil servants and their political masters in Western 
countries within a Weberian-type bureaucracy. The main contrast with Western 
countries is, perhaps, the circumstance under which articulations of interest and 
internal communications are revealed to the public. In the West, such revelation is 
a matter of procedural prescription. In China, it is a measure of the relative strength 
of the different power forces in the system. As and when conflicts of interests 
between the Centre and its main lieutenant become serious and intense, and when 
their differential power narrows to the extent that neither could be coerced into 
silence, differences may then emerge.
Understanding the attitude of Shanghai officials regarding Shanghai's role 
in the nation helps to explain the self-restraint in their discretionary behaviour. 
Despite their discontent with the way economic reforms in the 1980s worked to 
their disadvantage, Shanghai’s officials have nevertheless resigned themselves to 
the inevitability of their misfortune. Moreover, the turnaround of central policies in 
the 1990s has vindicated the importance of Shanghai to the progress of the reform 
process. The coded self-criticism of Deng Xiaoping during his 1992 "southern 
tour" regarding the neglect of Shanghai has been of some consolation to Shanghai 
officials. Nevertheless, the general feeling amongst Shanghai officials was that 
what had occurred had been, by and large, inevitable. Shanghai's importance to the 
national economy meant that the Centre had no alternative but to be prudent with 
changes there at the early stage of reform. In the words of a municipal planning 
official, "it would have been too risky for the Centre to "open" Shanghai and try 
out experiments in the early 1980s."32 Shanghai was not comparable to the remote 
village of Shenzhen and the humble towns of Zhuhai and Shantou, whose different 
treatment and roles at the early stage of reform had been its opposite. The pride of 
Shanghai officials with Shanghai's "eldest son" status and national role had, 
therefore, resulted in a strangely mixed feeling of righteous deprivation and stoic 
acceptance.
Similarly, the central policy of "horizontal integration" had the enthusiastic 
support of the Shanghai government when it was first announced. However, the 
policy was subsequently blamed by the Shanghai leadership for Shanghai's 
lacklustre economic performance in the 1980s. The municipal government was 
said to have been led to focus on setting up factories in the inland provinces at a
32Respondent No. 27, Shanghai interview, May 1994. Similar comments were made by respondent 
No.23, Shanghai interview, May 1994.
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time when they should have paid more attention to the attraction of foreign capital 
and technology.33 Nevertheless, this policy was not simply imposed by the Centre 
on Shanghai. A policy asking for mutual help and co-operation is unable to take off 
unless the dominant donor is willing. The fact is that this policy suited perfectly the 
"big brotherly" orientation of Shanghai officials. Seeing themselves as the stronger 
partner in interprovincial co-operation, the Shanghai government was explicit in 
encouraging its enterprises to care less about their own interests and give more 
benefits to their partners.34 It was only later, when the adverse effect of the policy 
became obvious that Shanghai officials started complaining. To a large extent, 
therefore, it was their own self-image that was at the root of their difficulties in the 
1980s.
Rule-Abiding Bureaucrats
Shanghai's officials have often been described as the best modem 
technocracts in China because of their respect for rules and regulations.35 Some 
Shanghai officials regard the attention they give to rules as the best observance of 
the rule of law in the country, and they are inclined to attribute this characteristic to 
the relatively higher level of education of Shanghai's workforce.36 This 
characteristic of the Shanghai administration has also been regarded as the 
important edge which enabled Shanghai to develop its commodity and futures 
markets much faster in the early 1990s than other cities.37
This tendency to observe rules, as noted in Chapter Six, permeates 
Shanghai's discretionary behaviour regarding its attempts to expand investment and
33 Shanghai has since 1949 been an inward-oriented economy, despite the fact that it was China's 
number one exporter until 1986. In one account it was stated that exports of Shanghai in 1989 
accounted for only 7% of total GNP, whilst the share in Guangdong was 13%. See Rui Mingjie and 
Yu Wenyi, "A Comparative Anlaysis of Foreign Investments in Shanghai and Guangdong", 
Shanghai Investment, No.7 (1992), p.13.
34This was reflected in the Muncipal Government Document No.85 (1984) on economic and 
technological co-operation with other localities. See Footnote 14 above. It should be noted that 
giving more benefit to others was not explicitly stated in the Centre's 1980 and 1986 documents on 
horizontal integration.
35Respondent No. 39, Beijing interview, May 1994.
36Respondent No. 14, Shanghai interview, January 1994. Respondent No.39, Beijing interview, 
May 1994, described the officials in Shanghai as the best bureaucrats in China with the most loyal 
adherence to rules in policy implementation in the sense of a legal-rational western-styled 
bureaucracy.
37Ibid. Also Respondent No. 15, Shanghai interview, January 1994. The rapid development of the 
commodity and futures market, as well as the stock exchange, in Shanghai in the 1990s was also 
largely due to the change of central policy towards Shanghai. But the technocratic expertise of 
Shanghai administrators as well as a more educated workforce and a historical tighter observance of 
rules and regulations in Shanghai were, according to the respondents, important factors in allowing 
the markets to run relatively smoothly within a short period and time. The rules of the game were 
also more transparent and evenly levied—the key to the successful development of markets.
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develop its economy. Where observance of rules to the letter is not possible, due to 
the rules being either obsolete, inapplicable or impractical, the tendency is to 
appear to be abiding by the rules. Feigned compliance has therefore been a major 
characteristic of Shanghai's discretionary behaviour. Shanghai officials, as 
compared to their counterparts in Guangdong, have been more concerned with 
their investment statistics for fear that the statistics might reveal their deviation 
from the centrally prescribed quotas of investment. This concern with rules is 
partly a product of the constraints posed by a tight economic environment, given its 
heavy fiscal burden and the difficulties experienced by Shanghai in the 1980s. It is 
also partly a result of the perceived role of Shanghai by the Shanghai leadership as 
the "eldest son" of the Centre. However, in either case, concern over rules forms a 
part of the strategy employed by Shanghai leaders to improve Shanghai's lot. It is 
the choice of the provincial actor in the context of its institutional constraints.
Regarding the constraints of the preexisting economic management rules 
and policies in Shanghai, it has been argued that rule-observance could be 
considered as the accustomed response of municipal officials as a means to 
surviving under existing circumstances.38 The strong element of central planning in 
the Shanghai economy since 1956 has resulted in a macro environment where 
room for local manoeuvre has been small.39 The heavy burden of fiscal remittance 
and inability freely to adjust prices to compensate for the rising costs of production 
left little leeway for local policies with which to encourage investment in the 
economy.40 The municipal government was conditioned to being meticulous in 
revenue collection as this was the means by which it could meet the fiscal 
remittance targets. The cumulative effect of years of fiscal strain resulted in 
government departments, especially the finance and audit departments, being 
accustomed to focusing their work on the due collection of revenue and prevention 
of haemorrhage 41 Flexibly implementing the rules so as to collect less in order to 
encourage production was alien to this culture. Where discretions and flexibilities 
occurred, they were invariably marginal and of peripheral effect.
However, it is important to emphasize that such rigour is not entirely due to 
surveillance by the Centre. The central policies and centrally prescribed systems
38Respondent No. 15, Shanghai interview, January 1994.
39See discussion in Chapter Six, footnotes 88-90. See also Tu Jimo, "Shanghai Caizheng "Huabo" 
Pouxi" (An Analysis of the Fiscal 'Slides' in Shanghai) Shanghai Jihua Jingji Tansuo, No.l (1988), 
p.53.
40For descriptions on the effect of the tight fiscal jacket on the behaviour of Shanghai's officials 
regarding investment, see the discussion in Chapters Four and Six.
41For some documentary evidence of the meticulous attention to the due collection of revenue, see 
for instance Shanghai Audit, No.5 (October 1992), pp.5-6; No.6 (December 1992), pp.15-18.
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would never be able to eliminate local discretions. Rather, the Shanghai 
government has itself, over time, developed its own system, and culture, of 
internal control in the process of enhancing its ability to fulfill its assigned tasks 
under the system.42 This kind of culture, once established, has taken some time to 
change despite the removal of objective constraints. Although the Centre finally 
abandoned its "rear guard" policy towards Shanghai in 1990, this was a full twelve 
years after the adoption of the Open Door Policy and eleven years after the 
approval of the Special Policy for Guangdong and Fujian. Accustomed strategies 
of survival established during this time could not, therefore, be changed overnight. 
This was the basis on which in 1991, Wu Bangguo, Shanghai's Party Secretary, felt 
compelled to warn municipal finance officials against too pedantic and narrow an 
orientation as regards revenue collection. Instead, he called for a new and more 
progressive attitude towards economic development. The Party Secretary said 
during a visit to the municipal finance bureau:
"(We) have to handle correctly the relations between finance and tax work 
in our work on the economy. At present, many departments have not yet 
fully regarded the promotion of production and economic development as 
the core of their work. In other words, serving the economy is not yet 
considered as the job of many departments. What is the primary 
preoccupation of these departments...? Many are working for the 
functionary needs of the departments, working to their administrative 
superiors, and to the rules of the departments....We should not simply apply 
our minds to a particular rule or document, but also set our eyes on 
economic development as a whole..."43 (emphasis added)
It has previously been noted that provincial leaders are quick to adjust their 
survival strategies in accordance with changing situations.44 However, before 
strategies can be adjusted, the new situation must first be defined. Where radical 
changes in the environment demand basic attitudinal changes, rather than mere 
tactical shifts, adjustments come more slowly. To an extent this is also the case in 
Guangdong. In the previous section it has been noted that attitudinal changes there,
42The banks and audit departments were two typical examples of the culture of strict internal 
control in the Shanghai administration. According to Respondent No. 15, the banks in Shanghai 
would normally stick to the rule book and require the inclusion of a project in both plans, namely 
the credit finance plan, and the investment plan, before approving loans to a particular investment 
project. The breaking of central rules by the municipal government, a frequent phenomenon 
elsewhere, was relatively infrequent in Shanghai. The strictness of the local audit bureau could not 
be compared to the relaxed attitude and flexible implementation of accounting rules as occurred in 
Guangdong. (Shanghai interview, January 1994) Respondent No.23 agreed that much of the control 
that existed in the Shanghai administration was self-imposed local control. This informal culture 
was such that the behaviour of each official was under the surveillance of their surrounding 
colleagues, and this formed a mutually reinforcing environment in which changes happened slowly 
and where they did occur needed to be pushed forcefully from outside and above. (Shanghai 
interview, May 1994)
43See Shanghai Caishui , No.6 (1991), pp.6-7.
^ See discussion of the literature on China's central-provincial relations in Chapter one.
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too, were not achieved overnight. However, the Guangdong leadership has an 
advantage over its Shanghai counterpart in having been assigned a clear and 
focused role early on in reform—a development which has worked successfully, by 
and large, in terms of both national and provincial interests. On the other hand, the 
Shanghai leadership has been struggling for a redefinition of its role at a time of 
deepening economic reform and at the outset of the break-down of the central 
planning system. As a result, the process of strategy adjustment has seen more 
twists and turns in Shanghai than in Guangdong.
The above discussion on the mediating process between differential central 
policies and the discretionary behaviour of the Guangdong and Shanghai 
governments gives rise to two observations. First, the process whereby central 
policies have had an impact on provincial behaviour has not been straight-forward. 
Provincial leaders are not merely responding and reacting to the policies of the 
Centre. Rather, central policies define the limits within which provincial 
governments may then design their strategies in a manner best to enhance their 
own interests. In other words, the Centre prescribes the context and parameters 
within which provincial actors exercise their choice. Provinces are constrained, but 
they also have substantial room for manoeuvre.
Second, the key mediating factors underlining the choices of provincial 
leaders within central constraints are the strategies and attitudes of the provincial 
leaders. These may include their accustomed behaviour and conscious "interest- 
advancement" strategies arisen as a result of the macro-environment in which 
provincial leaders operate, as well as their ideas regarding their role in the nation. 
At times of radical change, there is often a time lag between contextual changes 
and changes in strategies and attitudes. As a result, strategies and attitudes are often 
coloured by yesterday's policies or an objective situation which has subsequently 
changed. This characteristic of attitudinal changes complicates the mediating 
process between central policies and provincial behaviour.
This slackness of attitudinal change is found both in the Guangdong and 
Shanghai leaderships, and has important implications as regards their discretionary 
behaviour. For instance, Guangdong's perception of its role in the nation is, in the 
early 1990s, largely unchanged despite its emergence as a major economic power. 
In 1993, Guangdong became the top exporter of the nation for the eighth-
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consecutive year.45 Its gross national product surpassed that of Shanghai in 1981 46 
and has since 1989 topped the national ranking.47 Economically, therefore, the 
province has become a formidable national force. However, the perceived role of 
the province by the Guangdong leadership and by the Centre has apparently 
remained that of the favoured younger child pioneering in reform. As pioneer, the 
Guangdong leadership had, since 1979, been aggressive in asking for central 
concessions for its assigned task. The Centre had, in fact, encouraged such 
"aggressiveness" on the part of the Guangdong leaders. During one decade of 
reform, Guangdong's wealth snowballed. This pioneer is consequently no longer 
the weak and unimportant peripheral province whose possible failure in the reform 
experiment would not cause the nation too dear. Yet more reforms are still on the 
way, and more pioneering work is yet required. As the discussion in Chapter Five 
has shown, since the early 1990s the Guangdong government has displayed little 
hesitation in pushing for concessions from the Centre at times when it felt that its 
interests were under threat. One revealing example is Guangdong's response to the 
Centre's plan to replace the dabaogan fiscal system, in place since 1980, with a 
tax-sharing system as from 1994. Another instance is its bargaining with the Centre 
in 1991 to obtain cheap central bank loans amounting to some 1 billion yuan 
annually, even though local bank deposits at that time exceeded the local demand 
for loans. The aggressiveness and openness of its lobbying for concessions and 
support, and its success in getting them, demonstrate that old attitudes still hold 
amongst both the central and Guangdong leaders regarding the role, and thus 
responsibility, of Guangdong in the nation.
When taking into account the ready response of the Shanghai leadership to 
central instructions on the eve of the implementation of the new fiscal system of 
1994, the constrast in Guangdong's behaviour becomes still clearer. As discussed 
in Chapter Six, the Shanghai government, in a manner similar to other provinces, 
had sought to expand the revenue base of 1993 in order to increase its retained 
local revenue under the new fiscal system. However, after the Centre detected such 
manoeuvring behaviour by the provinces and issued a stem warning against it, the 
Shanghai government immediately obliged. Some collected revenue was even 
refunded to enterprises. As a result, Shanghai's local fiscal revenue increased by
45See Jiefang Daily, February 22,1994, p,9.
46Calculated from Guangdong Social and Economic Statistics, 1949-1988. Part on General 
Statistics, p.69; Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 1993, p.27; Shanghai Statistical Yearbook 1993, 
p.35.
47 See Guangdong Social and Economic Statistics: 1949-1988, Part on General Statistics, p. 176, 
and State Statistical Bureau (ed.), Quanguo Zhuyao Shehui Jingji Zhiliao Paixu Nianjian, 1992 (The 
1992 Yearbook of the Ranking of Provinces in Major Social and Economic Indicators) (Beijing: 
Zhongguo Tongji chubanshe, 1992), p.8.
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only 8.5% in December 1993 over same month in 1992, in contrast to a 150% 
increase in Guangdong.48 The Shanghai leadership may have felt obliged to follow 
the Centre's instructions as a result of its traditional role of "setting a good 
example" to other provinces. They may also have acted out of calculated interest, 
believing that this approach would best serve Shanghai's interest in the long run 49 
In any event, the Shanghai leadership may have considered such a temporary 
retreat as a necessary means of maintaining its status in the country,50 thus 
enabling it to sustain its influence on the Centre and obtain more favourable 
policies over the long run.51 Thus, while Guangdong has become economically 
strong, it still clings to the role of a younger child. Shanghai has also chosen to 
continue to perform its "eldest son" role. The Shanghai leadership has apparently 
come to the conclusion that its interests may be better served through strengthening 
its position as "right-hand man" of the Centre, and that added responsibility is the 
inevitable price to be paid. This is notwithstanding the fact that, as previously 
noted, Shanghai has already been surpassed by Guangdong and other provinces in 
terms of important economic indicators since the late 1980s. In fact, the more 
vulnerable the Shanghai leadership has felt in the face of the threat to its 
traditionally dominant position, the more anxious it has been to maintain its status 
by acting even more like a "good son" than it would otherwise.
Figure 7.2 below visualizes the mediating process between the imposition 
of central policies as the institutional context and the discretionary behaviour of 
provincial leaderships:
48See discussion in Chapters Five and Six.
49According to Respondent No.21, (Shanghai interview, January 1994), underlying the refunds of 
taxes in December 1993, in the aftermath of warnings from the Centre against base-line scrambling 
behaviour, was the worry that the rapid surge of fiscal revenue in Shanghai might raise the future 
expectations of the Centre regarding the financial strength of Shanghai, and therefore invite further 
extraction from the Centre.
50Respondent No.23 (Shanghai interview, May 1994) remarked that given the difference in 
historical and strategical roles of Guangdong and Shanghai, the Centre was generally more tolerant 
of deviations in Guangdong, than was of those in Shanghai. While the Centre generally required an 
expression of loyalty from all provincial leaderships, localist tendencies in some provinces were 
more tolerable, if not acceptable, than in others. According to the respondent, the expectation of 
the Centre for Shanghai was especially high, and it was "totally unacceptable for the senior leaders 
of Shanghai not to see things from the national viewpoint."
51That Shanghai's Party Secretary, Wu Bangguo, was promoted to the Party Central Committee 
Secretariat, and mayor, Wang Ju, concurrently to the Politburo in the Fourth Plenum of Fourteenth 
Party Congress in September 1994 may indicate that this strategy of Shanghai paid off in enhancing 
its influence on the Centre. See Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong), October 1,1994.
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Figure 7.2
Linkage of Institutional Context and Actors' Choice
Institutional Context Mediating Factor Actors' Choice
-Central Policies ----- > -Strategies/Attitudes -----> -Provincial
of Provincial Leaders Discretionary
Behaviour
What needs re-emphasis in the above figure is that the strategies and 
attitudes of provincial leaders are often slower to change than is the institutional 
context itself. This is especially the case when changes in the context are radical, as 
in the case of economic reform. Consequently, central policies, as well as other 
objective conditions of an earlier period, may still be part of the scene in the form 
of attitudes of the actors involved.
The Power of the Province
The foregoing section elaborates the complexities involved when 
considering the extent in which the Centre influences and constrains the provinces. 
It seeks to demonstrate that the impact of the Centre on provinces is not as simple 
and straight-forward as it may seem. It concludes by pointing out that provinces 
themselves influence the way in which the Centre exercises power over them. 
Central policies work through the attitudes of provincial leaders, who choose their 
specific actions from within the parameters prescribed by central policies. The 
considerable scope to choose within central constraints, which provincial leaders 
have, constitutes their power. The overall operating context is, however, still 
prescribed by the Centre, and the attitudes and survival strategies of provincial 
leaders are also, to a considerable extent, a product of central policies, if only those 
of an earlier period. The overall framework of the above discussion is, therefore, 
still one based on the flow of influence from the Centre to the provinces.
The purpose of this section is to highlight the reverse: the flow of provincial 
power to the Centre. Instead of asking how provincial discretionary behaviour is 
influenced by central policies, therefore, this section asks how the provinces seek 
to influence central policies through their discretionary behaviour.52 What
52A s  noted in Chapter One, the influence of the provinces on central policies has been one major 
theme of Susan Shirk’s works. See Susan Shirk, The Political Logics of Economic Reform
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pressures have the provinces placed on the Centre in order to effect changes? As 
this discussion shows, the role of provinces is not confined to one of responding to 
central policies. It is also one of competing with the Centre in defining the contents 
of the central policies. Provinces thus formulate policies as well as creatively 
implementing them.
Guangdong
When flexibly implementing central policies, the Guangdong government 
has frequently challenged the legitimacy and appropriateness of existing central 
policies and rules. Such competition with the Centre for the right to define the 
contents of central policy becomes a more frequent and manifest phenomenon 
towards the end of the 1980s. As its pioneering skill is increasingly proven through 
the sustained affluence of the province, the Guangdong government has also 
gained confidence as regards its local policies. Meanwhile, as the progress of 
reforms has brought about more difficulties and displacements within the nation, 
conflicts between the Centre and Guangdong have become more intense. A more 
confident Guangdong government has, in these circumstances, felt it necessary to 
"persuade" the Centre to adopt its manner of dealing. The result has been a 
proliferation of local publications since the late 1980s summarizing and publicizing 
the "Guangdong experience".53
The most explicit instance of such competition for orthodoxy is the "Three 
'Sayings', Three Defences" article published by the Guangdong leadership in 
January 1989. As discussed in Chapter Five and earlier in this chapter, these 
articles amount to an open protest by the Guangdong government against the effect 
of the centrally imposed austerity programme, started in late 1988, upon its reform 
efforts. Discouraged by the twists and turns of central policies and the withdrawal 
of many of its special powers since late 1988, the Guangdong government 
launched the most explicit and outright attack ever made by a provincial 
government on a central directive. The thrust of this articulation, through a series
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), especially Chapter Nine; "Playing to the 
Provinces: Deng Xiaoping's Political Strategy of Economic Reform", Studies in Comparative 
Communism, Vol.23, No.3 (Autumn/Winter 1990), pp.227-58. The difference of this section with 
Shirk's work is a matter of emphasis and perspective. Shirk's focus of analysis remains, by and 
large, the Centre, and her discussion elaborates how central officials felt being constrained by 
provinces. The activism and influence of the provinces on central policies was thus deduced from 
the articulations by central officials about their difficulties in imposing their will. On the other hand, 
this thesis has taken a more direct approach in this respect The power of provinces is discussed by 
explicit description about the behaviour of provincial leaders and how they sought to influence 
central policies. For more discussion of the provincialist approach of this thesis, see Chapter One. 
53This is a point raised by Respondent No.9, Guangzhou interview, December 1993.
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of three articles by the provincial party propaganda chief on a provincial party 
paper, went far beyond the usual lobbying for exceptional treatment based on local 
conditions. The particularistic arguments rather formed a part of a general and 
fundamental challenge to the orthodoxy of central policies. This challenge is 
directed at that constituting the fundamentals of central policy.
The argument went as follows: the fundamental central policy since the 
1978 Third Plenum had been that of economic reform, "opening up" and 
modernization, or simply, economic development. Thus, productivity was the one 
and only criterion against which the work of the province should be judged. 
Moreover, Guangdong had been assigned the task of going one step ahead of the 
rest of the nation in pioneering the means to such a goal. Consequently, it should 
not be governed by any of the preexisting central rules and regulations formed 
before the new central policy of economic reform and development came into 
being. Nor, it was argued, should the province be bound by national rules 
formulated thereafter for nationwide application. Its role as a pioneer should 
preclude such a "blanket" treatment. Whatever the justification of these national 
regulations for the rest of the nation, they should be subordinated to the 
fundamental policy of economic reform and development as regards Guangdong. 
Constraining the ability of the pioneer of reform, it was further argued, was 
commensurate to sabotaging central policy of the highest order through pedantic 
regulations. Therefore, unless the Centre changed its fundamental policy and 
abandoned reform and modernization, or unless Guangdong's methods of fulfilling 
this goal failed to bear fruit, those national rules and policies which obstructed 
Guangdong's experiments should give way.
It is helpful to repeat here again the remarks of the Guangdong leadership in 
the "Three 'Sayings', Three Defences" articles, previously quoted in Chapter Five:
"The four modernizations are the major tasks of the entire Party, and 
productivity is the criterion by which to judge whether our work is good or 
not..."
"The Party Centre and the State Council instructed Guangdong and Fujian 
to go one step ahead of the rest of the country...and allowed the two 
provinces to act according to the Special Policy, and 'flexible measures'. 
This means that the Centre does not require the two provinces to follow in 
strict accordance the policy documents which are meant for the use of the 
rest of the country, but rather to follow the Special Policy documents 
tailored for these regions."
"Now that the Centre has flashed a special green light to the two provinces, 
and we (in going in the direction of this special green light) are merely 
going around the "ordinary" red lights (meant for the rest of the country),
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what is there to be criticized? On the contrary, if somebody does not 
implement or try to put their own limitations on the Special Policy 
formulated by the Centre, then this should amount to the flouting of (party) 
discipline. ... Isn't this going against economic opening and reform, the 
highest-order policy directive of the Party T’54 (emphasis added)
Chapter Five also describes some other more specific examples of 
Guangdong officials seeking to redefine central policies. For instance, the 
Guangdong officials have called for the abolition of central rules regarding the 
management of bank loans. They argued openly that the rules had become 
outdated, grounded in rationales of an earlier period. Such rules were therefore 
obstructing the needs of economic development and reform. It was pointed out, for 
instance, that the segregation of bank loans into fixed asset investment loans and 
working capital loans arose from a concern to contain the former, which the central 
government had not expected to have them repaid. But as market reforms 
progressed, enterprises were, at least in theory, required to repay both kinds of 
loans. While some enterprises might be unable to repay their loans in practice, it 
was argued, this was not the reason to arbitrarily impose administrative quotas. The 
quotas had had the effect of displacing the independent professional judgement of 
local banks, and thus inhibiting the spirit of the bank reform. By ignoring the 
central rules, the Guangdong officials argued, they were in fact helping to advance 
economic reform, a role they were assigned to perform. After all, the amount of 
loans lent by a local bank should be restricted by the total amount of deposits, and 
banks should not be disallowed to lend out its available resources to viable 
projects.
There are indications that Guangdong's argument has had some impact on 
national policies. A report by the State Planning Commission, published in 1993, 
acknowledged the wisdom of Guangdong's flexible implementation of these bank 
rules as well as its flexible attitude to rules regarding the central quotas of total 
investment scale. The report noted that by "flexibly handling" these rules, 
Guangdong's authorities had successfully developed the infrastructural facilities of 
the province. Since the Centre and other provinces had generally found it difficult 
to divert enough investment to the low-profit infrastructural sectors, Guangdong's 
success by not strictly following central prescriptions could not but give the 
Centre a disturbing and yet illuminating message. The report of the State Planning
~*4See Wang Hao, "Sanshui, Sanbian" (Three 'Sayings', Three Defences), Zhongguo Jinbao, January 
13, 1989, p.2. The author was alerted to the article by Yang Xiaofei, Shengji Zhengfu de Zishu 
Xingwei: Kaifang Gaige Shiqi de Guangdong Zhengfu (Discretionary Behaviour of the Provincial- 
Level Government: The Guangdong Provincial Government in the Reform Period) (M. Phil 
Dissertation, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1990). According to Yang, Wang was the 
propaganda chief of the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee.
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Commission was generally supportive of Guangdong’s argument, noting that 
"taking into account Guangdong's success, the Centre should perhaps change the 
rules to accommodate, rather than merely tolerating such so called "illegal 
manoeuvres" of the existing system."55 The report notes that Guangdong's 
extensive use of extrabudgetary funds in investment had played a material role in 
enabling the province to finance an ambitious infrastructural and energy 
investment plan.56 Revenue was raised directly from the immediate users of the 
facilities as a means to raising capital for the projects, while in other provinces 
investment in infrastructure had always depended heavily on the state budget. 
Their scale of investment had thus been limited, given the declining share of 
budgetary revenue in national income generally and the existence of other spending 
priorities. Guangdong's success in overcoming these difficulties had impact on the 
Centre's considerations as to the most appropriate way of financing investment. It 
paved the way for officially endorsed large scale development of the capital market 
and the issuing of stocks and shares in the 1990s.
Shanghai
If the power of the Guangdong government to influence central policies 
derives in part from its pioneering role and experience in reform, the power of 
Shanghai is rooted in its established status as the "eldest son" of the Centre. As the 
"eldest son", the Shanghai leaderships have historically had a close relationship 
with the Centre. As discussed above, the Shanghai leadership has maintained a veil 
of feigned compliance, even to those central policies with which they do not agree, 
in order that their status as the "right-hand man" of the Centre be maintained. 
Observing central rules is, in this way, seen as the best strategy through which to 
sustain Shanghai’s influence in the making of rules.
One fairly obvious indicator of Shanghai’s influence at the Centre is the 
career mobility of its leaders. Since 1949 a good number of Shanghai leaders have 
led both provincial and central government careers. To name the more recent 
developments, both the current Secretary General of the Party and a prominent 
vice-premier, Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji, had served in Shanghai immediately 
before their promotion to the central leadership. In September 1994, as previously 
noted, the then Shanghai Party boss, Wu Bangguo, after made a Politburo member
55Lou Jinfen and Guo Shuqing (ed.), Jichu Chanye Jianshe Zijiu Chouju (Capital Mobilization for 
Infrastructural Construction) (Beijing: Zhongguo Fazhan chubanshe, 1993), p.239.
56Ibid., p.232-41.
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in 1992, was elevated to an important position at the Central Party Secretariat, 
while its mayor, Huang Ju, was made a Politburo member.
A clear statement of provincial power, nevertheless, requires us to explore 
the processes whereby Shanghai's leaderships have exerted their influence. This 
examination has, however, proved to be plagued by immense difficulties. Not only 
is there the problem of ascertaining articulations of interests from within such a 
closed political system, but this relationship between the Centre and its "lieutenant" 
is also, by its nature, an "intemal" matter. As noted previously in this chapter, 
opinions and advice are, as a rule, deliberated and delivered in private. Wherever 
possible, the Centre and its lieutenant maintain a "united front" in public. As in the 
relationship between the political master and the senior civil servant in the West, 
this veil of homogeneity and harmony is necessary for the public image of 
effective governance. The veil only drops to reveal the underlying dissension on 
rare occasions where fundamental and material disagreements are involved.57
Notwithstanding such difficulty in detection, some fragments of the 
arguments which have been put forward by the Shanghai government to influence 
central policies in the 1980s have come to light. One major case is the fiscal 
system. In Chapter Six it is mentioned that Shanghai's finance officials have, since 
the early 1980s, advocated a tax-sharing fiscal system.58 At a time, during the early 
to mid 1980s, when the recently installed contractual fiscal system had brought in 
sustained benefits to the Centre as its share of national fiscal revenue rose,59 
Shanghai's officials were nevertheless adamant that this was not the proper fiscal 
system. They argued for a system whereby fiscal authority and responsibility 
between the Centre and the provinces should be clearly delineated through separate 
taxes.60 In other words, revenue would no longer be divided according to the
570ne recent case in which dissensions between political masters and civil servants in the West 
were brought into the open was the provision of overseas development aid by the British 
Government in the early 1990s to the Pergau Dam Project of the Malaysian Government The senior 
civil servant involved held opposing views to those of the ministers and provided evidence to 
parliamentary hearings and judical review procedings on the propriety of the aid decision. 
Eventually the court relying heavily on the evidence by the civil servant, ruled that the Government 
had acted illegally. See The Guardian, (London) Novemeber 11, 1994. A similar and more 
dramatic case, again in Britain, occurred over the Falklands War when a senior civil servant was 
sued by the Government as a result of his making his dissensions public, see Clive Ponting, The 
Right to Know: The Inside Story of the Belgrano Affair (London: Sphere Books, 1985).
58See footnote 40 of Chapter Six.
59The share of centrally collected fiscal revenue had been rising since the institution of the 
contractual system in 1980, only beginning to drop in 1987. See Ministry of Finance (ed.), China 
Finance Statistics, 1950-1991, p. 102.
60See Xu Riqing et al, "Wanshan Shanghaishi Difang Caizheng de Yanjiu" (A study on How to 
Perfect the Local Fiscal System of Shanghai), in Chen Menzhi (ed.), Shanghai Jingji Fazhan 
Zhanlue Yanjiu (A Study of Shanghai's Economic Development Strategy) (Shanghai: Renmin 
chubanshe, 1985), pp.243-58; "Wanshan Difangshui Tixi, Shixing Fenji Caizheng Tizhi"
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subordination relations of enterprises as it was under the existing system. Instead, 
some taxes would form the revenue of the Centre, and others that of the province. 
These principles have in fact formed the backbone of the new tax-sharing fiscal 
system of 1994, although many of the more radical changes to the preexisting 
system have been subsequently watered down.
It must be emphasized that in arguing for a fiscal system based on the 
principle of dividing and sharing taxes in the 1980s, Shanghai officials have been 
acting in the municipality's best interests. The interests of the municipal 
government, namely of having a healthy and stable fiscal system, could, in their 
opinion, be best fulfilled by a tax-sharing system. Powers and responsibilities 
between the Centre and Shanghai would then be clearly defined. The contractual 
system was seen as being of transient utility, not merely because Shanghai had not 
obtained much benefit under such a system, but also because provinces generally 
had remained dependent on the Centre for a good contract. Without a clear-cut 
division of taxes between the Centre and the provinces, the provinces would not be 
able to exercise their independent authority.
This is not to say, however, that Shanghai officials have sought deliberately 
to influence adversely the interests of the Centre. There is no simple dichotomy of 
municipal interests versus central government’s interests. As Peter Ferdinand has 
pointed out, it is often immaterial to try to discern motives behind behaviour in 
terms of private or altruistic interests.61 Very often motives have both private and 
altruistic facets. In the search for a central-provincial fiscal system, it is in the 
interests of the Shanghai government to have a system which guarantees a higher 
and more stable fiscal revenue over which the municipal government may exercise 
autonomous control. The national interest lies in having a system which 
proportionately assigns jurisdictional authority and responsibility to each level of 
government, whilst maintaining the national authority of the central government. 
These two motives do not necessarily contradict one another. From the point of 
view of Shanghai officials, tax-sharing is the best design for a central-provincial 
fiscal system because it more specifically delineates the power and responsibilities 
of both the Centre and the provinces. Both the Centre and Shanghai thereby benefit 
from a stable and secure fiscal relationship: the more the Centre benefits, the more
(Perfecting the Local Tax system, Practising a Stratified System of Fiscal Finance), Shanghai 
Caizheng Yanjiu, No.l (1985), pp.2-5.
61Peter Ferdinand, "Interest Groups and Chinese Politics", in David S. G. Goodman (ed.), Groups 
and Politics in the People's Republic of China (Armonk, New York; M. E. Sharpe, 1984), pp.18-19.
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Shanghai also benefits. In the view of Shanghai officials, in the long run a system 
that enables both sides to benefit and feel secure is the only kind likely to survive.
There is a strong affinity between these early opinions in Shanghai and the 
rationale behind the institution of the new tax-sharing system in 1994. This 
similarity indicates the extent of Shanghai's influence on the central decision to 
implement the tax-sharing system in 1994. In fact, there are indications that 
Shanghai officials and scholars have participated extensively with central 
government officials in the search for a long-term fiscal system between the central 
and lower-level governments. One example is the research on fiscal system reform 
during the latter half of the Seventh Five-year Plan (1986-1990) organized and 
coordinated by the Research Institute for Fiscal Science of the Ministry of 
Finance.62 Amongst the participants was a number of scholars from the Shanghai 
Academy of Social Sciences. The major thrust of the findings of the project was a 
critique of the continued operation of the contractual fiscal system of the 1980s. 
This research also suggests that the vehicle for fiscal system reform should be 
along the lines of a tax-sharing system. The continuity with Shanghai’s earlier 
position is thus obvious.
Shanghai's participation in the formulation of the new tax-sharing policy 
continued as the system entered its early phase of implementation in 1994. The 
early months of 1994 saw numerous detailed expositions from Shanghai on how 
the new system should and could operate.63 As new policies in China were often 
only half-implemented initially due partly to a lack of detailed implementation 
rules and partly to the ponderousness of the preexisting system, Shanghai's 
proactive suggestions constituted a de facto drafter of new central regulations.
Therefore, both the Guangdong and Shanghai governments have, in then- 
own characteristic ways, played a considerable role in the formulation of central 
policies. Guangdong's approach, on the one hand, is led by implementation. It was 
only after the successful implementation of its own "native" policies that the 
Guangdong government ever challenged the legitimacy of central policies whilst 
simultaneously pushing for amendments to such policies. In the case of Shanghai,
62See Song Xinzhong (ed.), Zhongguo Caizheng Tizhi Gaige Yanjiu (A Study on the Fiscal System 
Reform in China) ( Zhongguo Caizheng chubanshe, 1992).
63See for instance Ke Tizuo, "Fenshuizhi de Tansuo Yu Xuanze" (Probes and Choices on the Tax- 
Sharing System), Shanghai Caishui, No.2 (1994), pp.8-14; Gu Xingquan, "Qiantan Caishui Tizhi 
Gaige'' (A Preliminary Discussion on the Fiscal and Tax Reforms), Shanghai Caishui, No.3 (1994), 
pp.10-11, 31; and Wu Jianguo, "Dui Shishi Caizheng 'Tuanyi Zhifuzhi' de Xianshi Sikao" 
(Pragmatic Thoughts on Implementing the Fiscal Transfer Payment System), Shanghai Caishui , 
No.3 (1994), pp. 12-14.
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participation in central policy formulation has followed a more conventional 
sequence. First, there would be advocacy of policy options, followed by 
participation with central officials in their deliberations. Upon the Centre adopting 
a new policy, the municipal government would continue its participation through 
recommendations for smooth implementation. Figure 7.3 below summarizes the 
approaches of Guangdong and Shanghai in exercising their influence on central 
policies.
Figure 7.3
Processes of Provincial Participation in the Formulation of Central Policy
Guangdong
Flexible Provincial Implementation of Central Policies -----> De facto
Amendments to Central Policies (at Provincial Level) ---- > Official Amendments
to Central Policies
Shanghai
Advocacy at Municipal Level > Participation in Policy Deliberations with
Central officials > (Central Policy Adopted) > Recommending Details
for Smooth Implementation of the Policy
Conclusion: An Interactive Central-Provincial Relationship
Discussions in this chapter have sought to demonstrate one point: that 
political influence has many manifestations. The Centre obviously has leverage 
over the behaviour of provincial governments. Its policies define the scope of 
provincial manoeuvre. Through their circumscribing effect on the attitudes and role 
perceptions of the provincial leaders, specific central policies often have an impact 
on provincial behaviour outlasting their very existence. However, the existence of 
central influence does not necessarily mean that provincial leaders have been 
merely the agents of the Centre, or that they respond and react to stimuli from the 
Centre in accordance with a preconceived formula determined at the Centre. On the 
contrary, provincial leaders have ample choice within the contextual constraints of 
central policies. Thus the resultant provincial behaviour is the product of both
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central policies and provincial choices. The institutional context posed by central 
policies and the actors' choice of the provincial leaderships interact with each other 
to produce the manifest behaviour and strategies described in detail in Chapters 
Five and Six.
The interactive relationship between central policies and provincial 
discretionary behaviour thus works both ways. The choices of the provinces also 
have their effect on the Centre. For instance, the success of Guangdong's flexible 
implementation of central policies in delivering positive results has enabled the 
Guangdong leadership to vie with the Centre in defining the content of its policies. 
Shanghai's historical importance in the nation has enabled its sustained 
participation in the formulation of central policies from the initial stage. For both 
provincial governments, their leverage on the Centre is dependent on their success 
in achieving their roles: Guangdong as the pioneer of reform and Shanghai as the 
"right-hand man" of the Centre. The concern for maintaining and enhancing this 
leverage has consequently affected the choice of discretionary behaviour by 
provincial officials. On the one hand, the Guangdong leadership has taken care to 
sustain its momentum of economic growth and, therefore, its image as the 
successful pioneer of reforms. On the other, the Shanghai leadership is concerned 
about maintaining its image of trustworthiness in its capacity as "eldest son" whilst 
also sustaining its economic strength in the nation.
Combining Figures 7.2 and 7.3, Figure 7.4 below visualizes the interactive 
relationship between central policies and provincial discretions:
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Figure 7.4
Central-Provincial Relations: An Interactive Process
v
Central Policies
Attitudes and Strategies of 
Provincial Leaders
Provincial Discretionary Behaviour
--------------------- 7--------------------
The concept of central-provincial relations as interactive is significant in 
both theoretical and empirical respects. First, on the theoretical level, an interactive 
relationship rejects the centrist, top-down perspective of political processes. Rather 
it sees both the Centre and the provinces as actors capable of active choices within 
their respective constraints. Central-provincial relations are, therefore, understood 
in the context whereby the actions of the Centre, via central policies, and those of 
the provincial governments, via their discretionary behaviour, inevitably affect 
each other's choices of subsequent actions. Second, in terms of empirical findings, 
the interactive perspective enables analysts to explain the discretionary behaviour 
of provinces during the reform period of the 1980s and early 1990s. The Centre is 
behind the scenes of provincial government discretions, whose actions and 
orientations are partly a product of past and current central policies. In this respect 
the Centre is itself partly to blame for its frustrations when dealing with the 
increasingly assertive provinces. On the other hand, provinces have been 
successful in exerting influence over the Centre. Provinces are not only the flexible 
implementors and half-hearted agents of the Centre, and orthodoxy is not the 
monopoly of the central government. Previously "orthodox" central policies could 
be displaced and amended by flexible implementation from below, as in the case of
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Guangdong. Alternatively, as in the case of Shanghai, central policies could be 
literally written by provincial officials in conjunction with central officials. This 
concurs with the theoretical discussion in Chapter One, wherein it is suggested that 
the provinces, as well as the central government, may be a locus of the "central 
zone" within the political system from which ideas flow and experiences 
disseminated to the "periphery" of the system. This and previous chapters provide 
sound evidence of the possibility of this "central" role of the provinces.
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Chapter Eight
Shifting Central-Provincial Relations: Emerging Trends
The previous chapter has elaborated an interactive central-provincial 
relationship. An interactive relationship emphasizes the interdependence and 
mutual influences between the Centre and the provinces. This concluding chapter 
highlights the dynamic aspects of this interactive relationship. It demonstrates that 
the central and provincial actors, by influencing each other, themselves constitute 
the forces of change to their relationship. This chapter also identifies the emerging 
trends of change in central-provincial relations in the post-Mao reform period. It 
explains their emergence and draws preliminary conclusions as to the significance 
of these trends as regards political processes in the Chinese system generally.
Before proceeding further it may be helpful to go back to a question first 
raised in Chapter One: why did the Centre simply not crush the unwelcome 
discretions of the provinces by utilizing its superior organizational position and 
command of coercive forces? The Centre possesses at least two forms of coercive 
resources which may be used against the provinces. The first is the use of sheer 
physical force through the Centre's superior command of the military. The second 
is the dismissal of provincial leaders through the Centre's nomenklatura control of 
personnel. The answer for the unreliability of these coercive resources is two-fold. 
First, coercive power is a blunt instrument of control and, given its limited supply, 
can only be used intermittently and sparingly. Second, provincial governments are 
an indispensable ally of the Centre in its task of governance. The utility of the 
provinces as an intermediate level of government imposes a structural constraint on 
the extent to which their power can be crushed. Consequently, although the Centre 
has sometimes used its superior power to stamp out excessive provincial 
discretions, such use of coercion has been temporized by the indispensability of 
provincial discretions, at least to some degree, to any kind of effective governance. 
Due to this fundamental mutual interdependence between the Centre and the 
provinces, it has simply not been feasible that the Centre "crush" its provincial 
opponent as a means to resolving central-provincial conflicts. This is, therefore, not 
because that the Centre is loath to do so, as some analysts have argued, but that it is 
patently unable to.1
1 Barry Naughton argues that the Centre is acting with one hand tied behind its back as a result of its 
reform intentions which require decentralization to the provinces and enterprises. As a result the 
Centre has been unwilling to recentralize investment resources and authority. Barry Naughton, 
"Decline of Central Control over Investment in Post-Mao China", in David M. Lampton (ed.),
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The fact of co-existence obliges the Centre and the provinces to find a 
means through which to resolve their conflicts. One important observation that 
arises from this study is that the search for such a means is a dynamic process 
involving interactions and compromises between the central and provincial actors. 
Moreover, as reform policies accentuate old conflicts and create new ones, both the 
Centre and the provinces have been obliged to find a better means through which to 
ameliorate their conflicts and thereby protect and enhance their respective interests. 
New trends of central-provincial relations have emerged from the intense conflicts, 
manoeuvres and countermanoeuvres, which have taken place over the years. Such 
emerging trends embody the attempts by both the Centre and the provinces to 
adjust their relationship to the new circumstances of the reform period so as better 
to advance their respective interests within their respective constraints.
Traditionally, the Centre and provinces have sought to live in harmony, 
whilst advancing their respective interests, through "papering over" any conflicts 
which may have arisen. The context is a political system wherein the low level of 
institutionalization fails to provide a regularized means through which to reconcile 
conflicts of interests and clear division of jurisdictional authority. The rhetoric is 
that both the interests of the Centre as representative of the nation as a whole, and 
the particularistic interests of the provinces are fundamentally reconcilable. 
Consequently, any manifest sign of central-provincial conflict is, therefore, of 
minor significance. In practice, such conflicts have been reconciled through the 
arbitration of the Centre itself. The resultant situation sees a high-ranking central 
unit or central official presiding as the nonpartial judge over the arbitration of 
conflicts between a province and a central government ministry. This tactic allows 
the Centre to contain the conflicts and encourage its assistants both at central level 
and intermediate level to cooperate. This also enables the provinces to benefit, as 
more often than not the Centre makes concessions to the provinces as a result of the 
foregoing bargaining and arbitration process.2
The ability of central leaders to arbitrate and resolve conflicts between 
provincial and central agencies depends on the resources at their command. The 
traditional means by which to resolve conflicts may be described as a "carrot-and 
-stick" approach. Resources were often awarded to the provinces as a means of
Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), p.78. 
See Chapter One for more discussion on the problem of such an interpretation,
2This ability of the lower-levels to extract concessions from superiors has been noted by Lucian Pye 
in his discussion on "the comfort of dependency". See Lucian Pye, The Dynamics of Chinese 
Politics (Cambridge: Massuchusetts, 1981), p.20.
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resolving conflicts. However, at times when provinces were considered to have 
gone too far in their discretions they would be warned and penalized in no 
uncertain terms. There is an interactive relationship between the use of "carrots" 
and "sticks" for control purpose. As noted in Chapter One, although coercion is an 
effective means through which to extract compliance in specific instances, it is so 
blunt an instrument it cannot too frequently be used. Consequently, in order that 
compliance can be exacted from provinces without the use of direct coercive 
power, the Centre needs to possess other resources through which to solve conflicts 
in an equable manner. Conflicts could be more easily "papered over" at the time 
when the political system was more centralized, and the Centre commanded more 
vital resources with which to "buy o ff  provinces and "resolve" conflicts. The 
success of the socialist revolution brought immense political capital to the central 
leadership and this had kept the level of central-provincial conflict at a relatively 
low level. However, as more and more resources were siphoned off to the 
provinces, partly as a result of this "buying o ff  process, the provinces became 
more and more assertive. Since possessing fewer resources since the 1980s, the 
Centre has found it increasingly difficult to arbitrate conflicts amongst its own 
assistants and intermediaries. Coercion has had to be employed more frequently in 
these circumstances in the form of retrenchment campaigns and reshuffles of 
provincial leaderships. Ironically, however, more coercion has had the effect of 
diminishing returns, as provinces have become increasingly adept at dodging the 
consequences of any "crisis", "sitting it out" until the return to "normality". With 
fewer "carrots" to hand out and "sticks" becoming increasingly costly to 
administer, the traditional means of conflict resolution have now become 
ineffective.
Emerging Trends of Central-Provincial Interactions: Institutionalization
The major trend emerging from the intense conflicts and interactions 
between the Centre and the provinces in the reform period is that of a gradual move 
towards institutionalization. This move is characterized by shifts in two aspects. 
First, the Centre and the provinces find that in order to protect their respective 
interests they will need clearer specification and closer observance of rules. Clarity 
must replace ambiguity in the definition of their relationship and in the conduct of 
their interactions. Second, resources are still the ultimate concern in central- 
provincial relations, but a clearer definition of jurisdiction is gradually coming to 
be regarded as the best means through which to obtain more resources, as well as 
retaining those which have already been delegated.
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From Resources to Jurisdiction
One important change regarding China's central-provincial relations after 
one decade of reform is that the scramble between the Centre and the provinces is 
no longer simply a struggle over resources. Conflicts have rather become more 
about well-defined authority and responsibility. The focus of contention has 
shifted from the possession of resources to the question of how and what one may 
do with one's resources. Ironically, this shift in the objectives of central-provincial 
interactions and bargaining, as economic reform enters its second decade, is the end 
result of intense conflicts and manoeuvres over resources during the 1980s. As 
described in Chapters Five and Six, bargaining between the Guangdong and 
Shanghai governments with the Centre in the 1980s frequently revolved around 
securing resources for the provinces. These resources may have been in the form of 
central investments, or in a lower level of local fiscal remittance to the Centre, or of 
central financial subsidies. It may even have been that of the enlargement of 
investment quotas. Although provinces also bargained for better central policies, 
their main concern was for policies which could increase the amount of resources 
under their control. This focus on resources has resulted in provincial governments 
appearing "Machiavellian" and incredibly "flexible" over policy matters. Policies 
and rules per se have not been the question. What has been most at stake as regards 
bargaining and implementation of policies and rules are resources which such 
policies and rules could bring to the province. Should circumstances change, 
hitherto cherished policies and rules would be abandoned immediately. 
Responsibility and authority could work both ways; hence there was little emphasis 
on having a clear definition of one's responsibility and authority. Authority was 
welcome only when it could bring more resources.
Conversely, from the perspective of the Centre, the allocation to the 
provinces of resources and the authority freely to deploy resources was always 
the focus of its adjustment of policies regarding the provinces. Depending on the 
requirements of different circumstances at different periods, resources and 
authority have on previous occasions been decentralized and recentralized from the 
provinces. Policies have always been subject to change, as has the authority of the 
provinces.
Against this background, it is interesting to note that towards the late 1980s 
and into the 1990s, bargaining between the Centre and the provinces became
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increasingly concerned about a better demarcation of jurisdiction on both sides.3 
Not only should the specific assignment of authority and responsibility be fair and 
consistent, but, more importantly, the demarcation of jurisdiction should be laid 
down in law, and even included in the Constitution, to ensure their relative stability 
and security from encroachment on both sides.4 These calls for a clearer 
demarcation of jurisdiction between the central and provincial governments have 
gone beyond mere requests for an adjustment to the existing distribution of power 
and resources. Both the Centre and the provinces have obviously had grievances 
over the status quo and therefore want changes. Nevertheless, these calls are 
unprecedented in calling for the institution of a regularized avenue through which 
to resolve disagreements in the future. There is, in other words, a recognition of the 
need for a higher level of institutionalization within central-provincial relations.
The question is: what is it that has caused the Centre and the provinces to 
abandon their previous focus on resources, requiring instead a clearer 
institutionalization of their respective authority? Does this shift of focus from 
resources to jurisdiction, as the objective of central-provincial interactions and 
bargaining, signify the failure of previous manoeuvres on both sides to deliver on 
their respective interests? What are their grievances as regards the status quo, and 
why do they believe that institutionalization of their relationship will be the 
solution?
Both the Centre and the provinces have their grievances. On the one hand, 
the Centre has wearied increasingly in its sustained failure to contain the "deviant
3This is reflected in the open articulations of central and provincial officials. For articulations by 
central government officials, see for instance Gu Guoxin, "My View on the Demarcation of 
Economic Management Jurisdiction of the Central and Local Governments", China Administration, 
No.8 (1989), pp.4-7. Gu is an official from the State Planning Commission. For articulations by 
officials from the Shanghai government, see for instance Mou Shide and Wu Guoqing, "The 
Demarcation of Government Jurisdiction of the Centre and the Local government: A Perspective 
from Shanghai's Practice",China Administration, No,8 (1989), pp. 11-13; Dong Dingrong and Zhou 
Xiaoyun, "Several thoughts on reforming the tax management jurisdiction of the central and local 
governments", Shanghai Caishui, N o .ll (1992), pp.14-17; on articulations by Guangdong officials, 
see for instance Li Chunhong and Wu Yixin, "Thoughts on Establishing a Multi-Layered Macro- 
Management System", Social Sciences in Guangdong, No.3 (1991), pp.101-7; The Project Group, 
"The Adjustment of Industrial Structure and Deepening Economic System Reforms in Guangdong", 
in Xiao Ruchuan (ed.), A Study of Guangdong's Industrial S/rucwre.(Guangzhou: Guangdong 
Renmin chubanshe, 1991), pp.243-77. For articulations by officials from other provinces, see Xu 
Fengchao and Zhang Tianping (Hebei), "Thoughts on How to Reasonably Demarcate the 
Jurisdiction of the Central and Local Governments", China Administration, No.8 (1989), pp.8-10.
4See for instance Mou Shide and Wu Guoqing, "The Demarcation of Government Jurisdiction of 
the Central and Local Governments", p.13; The Project Group, "The Adjustment of Industrial 
Structure", p.259. Both articles, from Shanghai and Guangdong respectively, stressed the need for 
legal protection on the demarcation of jurisdiction of the central and local governments. In a work 
adopting a centralist theme, there is a similar call that the demarcation arrangements should be 
written into the Constitution. See Wang Xiaoguang and Wu Angang, A Report on the State Capacity 
of China, p. 168.
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behaviour" of provincial governments. Given the inertia of delegated powers, the 
decentralization reforms of the 1980s have further accentuated the dispersion of 
resources and authority from the Centre to the provincial and lower level 
governments since 1958 and especially since the Cultural Revolution. In the 
process, the power of provincial governments has been enhanced, and the power of 
the Centre to control the provinces further strained. The Centre feels itself to be 
losing control in view of the ever more numerous subnational actors and of 
provincial governments failing to fulfill their proper share of national 
responsibilities. This perception has been reinforced by the fact that, despite the 
frequent extra-contractual "borrowing" and other central extractions from the 
provincial coffers, the share of central fiscal revenue in the total national fiscal 
revenue, as opposed to provincial fiscal revenue, has declined conspicuously and 
successively since the commencement of economic reform. The Centre, therefore, 
wants a clearer demarcation of jurisdiction as a means to containing the unwelcome 
discretions of the provinces, as well as to enhance its power.
On the other hand, provinces also have serious complaints. Provincial 
governments have complained about the insecurity of their decentralized powers 
and the arbitrariness of central intervention. They are, for instance, tired of the 
annual central "borrowing" and the pressure of having to provide additional 
"contributions" to the central fiscal revenue. They also resent the arbitrary 
withdrawal of policies by the Centre. The threat of arbitrary encroachment by the 
Centre is a built-in feature of any authoritarian political system. The low level of 
institutionalization in the system gives provincial governments little protection 
once the Centre changes its mind and opts, once more, for recentralization. 
Provinces may abort and water down the impact of the Centre's moves, but they 
cannot stop the Centre from embarking on a clamp-down. Provincial governments, 
once having tasted the benefits of enhanced power, are all the more resentful of 
such threats to their authority, and thus their dissatisfaction with the status quo. 
Consequently, provinces also want more specifically defined jurisdiction through 
which to protect their hard won resources and authority.
A revealing example of this common interest in increased 
institutionalization is that of the process of institution of the tax-sharing system in 
1994, replacing the fiscal contractual system, in place since 1980. The significance 
of the tax-sharing system reform, as opposed to previous reforms to the fiscal 
system, lies in the emphasis given to the uniformity and legality of the distribution 
of fiscal authority between the Centre and the different provinces. The system 
would be uniform and standardized, by and large, for all provinces. Moreover, and
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most importantly, the delineation of authority and responsibility between the 
Centre and the provinces under this system would have to be legally coded, by 
which code both the Centre and the provinces would have to abide. Given the 
magnitude of vested interests involved in the pre-existing fiscal contractual system, 
such a change would have been inconceivable unless both the Centre and the 
provinces did not stand to gain from the move.
From Ambivalence to Clarity
At the same time, there is the move from ambiguity to clarity in central- 
provincial interactions. A major feature of central-provincial relations in China has 
been a high degree of ambiguity and ambivalence regarding the demarcation of 
"proper'' implementation of central policies on the one hand, and provincial 
deviations on the other. It is in fact this very ambivalence that made possible the 
rapid regional growth of the 1980s. The famous "red light theory", based on 
Guangdong's experience, is a summary of the strategies a provincial government 
can deploy to manipulate the ambiguity of central policies and rules. Conversely, 
the lacklustre performance of the Shanghai economy in the 1980s was attributed to 
the "loyal" and excessively rigid implementation by Shanghai's officials of central 
rules and policies.
Under the pre-reform political system when the power of the Centre was 
much stronger, provincial governments had often sought to blur the clarity of 
central policies. Vague policies increased the latitude for provincial discretions 
during implementation. This preference for ambiguity had not changed with the 
commencement of economic reform. At a time when the situation was changing 
rapidly and uncertainties abounded, clarity and precision in policies and rules could 
only restrict provincial discretions when they were most necessary. There has been, 
therefore, a consistent tendency on the part of the provincial leaderships to blur the 
instructions of central documents, no matter how precise they may originally have 
been. The new ambivalence of central policies and the inconsistencies within 
different central policies has allowed provincial governments to play off one 
central prescription against another, as well as to escape responsibilities for their 
discretions. If ambiguity was insufficient, therefore, provincial governments would 
actively create them.
The benefit of this ambiguity cuts both ways, however, extending beyond 
that of the provinces alone. The Centre, also, requires a degree of ambiguity and 
ambivalence in its policies and rules in order to be able to conduct experiments and
379
to minimize the political risk of failures associated with individual initiatives. The 
Centre will tolerate the discretionary behaviour of provincial governments when 
either the overall impact of the behaviour tallies with its objective, or when it has 
yet to decide on an alternative. Normally the ambiguity is ended when the positive 
impact of the move proves undeniable, at which time local experiments become 
national policy. Alternatively, it is ended when the negative impact of ambiguity 
becomes too much to tolerate. Ambiguity and ambivalence have, therefore, been 
engineered and reinforced by both the provinces and the Centre. The provinces 
seek ambivalence because of the latitiude it gives them. By watering down central 
documents and creating a fait accompli, provinces can circumscribe the range of 
actions which the Centre may take in future, and thereby restrict the power of the 
Centre. Meanwhile ambivalence enables the Centre to turn a blind eye to 
supposedly illegal activities without being branded as politically impotent. In the 
event of things going badly, the superior organizational power of the Centre 
enables it to intervene at will, if at a cost.
A typical example of the politics of ambivalence is found in the "automatic" 
enhancement of investment project approval authority by provincial governments 
nationwide subsequent to Deng Xiaoping's southern tour in early 1992, and in the 
subsequent reaction of the Centre regarding this obvious violation of central rules. 
As noted in Chapter Four,5 the call from Deng Xiaoping for faster economic 
development and reforms were interpreted by the provinces as signalling a further 
round of decentralization. As a result, provincial governments coincidentally seized 
the initiative to "simplify approval procedures and speed up economic 
development" by approving, independently, domestic investment projects of under 
200 million yuan. By so doing the provinces were acting against formal central 
rules regarding their approval jurisdiction of investment projects. According to the 
rules, provinces are allowed to approve projects of under 30 million yuan only, and 
in case of "bottleneck" projects, i.e., those infrastructural and energy projects 
specified by the Centre, up to 50 million yuan. Projects above these ceilings up to 
200 million yuan require the approval of the State Planning Commission and 
projects of over 200 million yuan have to go to the State Council. Interestingly, 
even though the provinces, in this instance, clearly acted beyond the prescription of 
central rules, at that time the Centre did not utter a word, thereby tacitly 
acquiescing to this "illegal" behaviour. Even more interestingly, when the Centre 
became concerned about excess investment and the prospect of "overheating" in
5 See Chapter Four: Footnote 42.
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the economy in 1993,6 the Centre's disapproval of provincial deviations was, still, 
starkly ambivalent. A State Council Notice in January 1994 banned further 
subdelegation of project approval authority at subprovincial levels and the 
dispersion of approval authority horizontally amongst government departments. 
The Notice was, however, conspicuously vague and surprisingly silent about the 
open violation of the preexisting jurisdiction by provincial governments since 
1992, and which was ongoing. A central government official's comments on the 
Notice is revealing in this respect:
"We have also been studying the meaning and implications of the Notice on 
provincial governments' investment approval authority...Regarding the 
reference to subdelegation of authority, our judgement is that the Notice 
definitely means that local governments at various levels should not further 
delegate their existing authorities to lower levels, but nothing is said about 
the propriety of the status quo, that is, the discretionary, or deviationary, 
expansion of provincial government authority to under 2 0 0  million yuan, 
and the subsequent subdelegation to city and lower levels. Therefore the 
status quo can probably continue. In other words, provincial level 
governments can probably continue to approve projects under 200  million 
yuan. What as regards the legitimacy of the approval decisions made by the 
local govenments beyond their formal limit of jurisdiction before the 
Notice? This is absolutely not an issue here. They are of course valid.
It has been noted in Chapter Four that the Centre had initially moved in 
1992 to amend the formal rules with a view to recognizing the legality of the 
provincial practice regarding approval authority, but subsequently chose to do 
nothing.8 In 1994 the economic situation changed and the Centre, whilst 
determined to have a fast economic growth rate, was increasingly worried about the 
"overheating" of the economy as a result of the investment drive of provincial and 
lower-level governments. In acting to stamp out the investment drive through 
restricting the excessive delegation of investment authority, the Centre failed, 
however, to specify exactly what kind of behaviour that was really problematic and 
needed correction. The above remarks by a central official illustrate the 
ambivalence even of a sternly worded order. It is thus difficult to distinguish what 
is the righteous and legitimate from the unlawful and illegitimate. The implication 
of this ambivalence for central-provincial power relations is a high degree of
The State Council on January 29, 1994 issued a notice ordering the strengthening of macro­
adjustment of fixed asset investment in the country. The notice denounced the excessive growth of 
investment in 1993, and the poor efficiency and bias within investment allocation, and called for a 
stop to discretionary subdelegation of project approval authority beyond that which had been 
approved by the Centre. See Guangming Daily, January 30,1994, p. 1.
Respondent No.31, Beijing interview, February 1994.
8See Chapter Four: Footnote 42.
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indeterminancy as regards their respective rights and privileges and in their 
responsibilities towards each other.
This explains why a new trend is emerging, that of ambiguity giving way to 
clarity. As long as the objective of central-provincial politics is one focused on 
resources, ambivalence could serve both the provinces and the Centre well. The 
indeterminancy of one's rights and privileges does not matter as long as one gets 
the desired resources. However, when the objective of both the Centre and 
provinces gradually shifts away from resources to the delineation of jurisdiction, 
this change of objective calls for a different tactic in the political game. There will 
still be bargaining, but the context and content of bargaining will change 
substantially. Success and failure in the power game will no longer depend upon 
one's ability to manipulate ambivalence. It will rather depend on one's ability to 
define and clarify the meaning of jurisdiction to one's advantage, and make it 
binding to all relevant parties. The change of objective towards institutionalization 
of the central-provincial relationship leads, therefore, to a corresponding change in 
central-provincial interactions whereby they are to be increasingly characterized by 
clarity rather than ambivalence. Into the 1990s, trends indicate that both the 
provincial governments and the Centre have begun  to demonstrate 
acknowledgement of the rule of law.9 They need the law in order to protect the 
hard-won results of their bargaining efforts from the encroachment of the other 
party.
Toward A Politics of Compromise
The move towards institutionalization in central-provincial relations in the 
1990s is a result of intense conflicts between the Centre and the provinces since the 
1980s. The intense conflicts which occurred as the objective environment 
experienced radical changes left both the Centre and the provinces dissatisfied with 
their respective situations. The Centre sees itself as losing out to the provinces as a 
result of its earlier decentralization program, and is desperate to regain control. The 
provinces regard themselves as having been unfairly treated by the Centre, which
9See for instance Zhu Xiaoming, "Tupo Chuantong Tizhi Moshi, Gaige Zhengfu Guanli Jigou" 
(Breakthrough the Traditional System Model, and Reform the Management Structure of the 
Government; An Appraisal of the Ten Years' Organizational Reform of the Shenzhen Government), 
Theory and Practice of the Special Economic Zone, No.4 (1990), pp.30-33; Zhang Linghan, 
"Chengli Shenzhen Renda Jigou de Zhanwang" (The Prospect of Establishing the People's 
Congress in Shenzhen", Theory and Practice of the Special Economic Zone, No.2 (1989), pp. 16-18; 
Xuan Zhuxi, '"Jianzheng Fangquan1 Wenti Zuotanhui Fayan Zheyao" (Summary of Discussion of 
the 'Streamlining Administration and Delegating Powers' Seminar”, Theory and Practice of the 
Special Economic Zone, No.5 (1992), pp.57-59; Mou Shide and Wu Guoqing, "The Demarcation of 
Government Jurisdiction of the Central and Local Governments”.
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had penalized them for doing that which had previously been encouraged and, 
indeed, assigned. The forces behind the trend towards institutionalization are 
therefore the Centre and the provincial governments themselves. Both being 
dissatisfied with the status quo, they each want a change in order to improve 
their situations.
There has been, therefore, no single loser or winner in the conflicts between 
the Centre and the provinces. It is not a case of the Centre losing out to the 
provinces, or of the provinces losing out to the Centre. On the one hand, there is a 
clear trend of diffusion of resources from the central level to the provincial and 
lower levels of the governments. Attempts by the Centre to rein in excessive 
provincial discretions have brought diminishing returns. In this respect it would 
appear that the Centre has lost and the provinces have gained. However, the 
provinces have been operating under the constant threat of interference by the 
Centre in their delegated jurisdictions. From their perspective, their new tasks 
under the changed environment of reform have not been reciprocated by 
appropriate changes to their authority and resources. Therefore, both the Centre and 
the provinces have seen themselves as "loser" in the relationship. The Centre 
complains of its weakening capacity to preside over the increasingly assertive and, 
from its point of view, irresponsible, provinces. The provinces wonder how they 
are to fulfill this task of economic reform and development with so little authority 
and support from the Centre.
A situation of "negative-sum" game is necessary to produce the impetus for 
change. A zero-sum situation means that one party gains to the extent that the other 
party loses. Insofar as the gaining party is thus satisfied with its situation, it will 
not force change, other than in the direction that its gains may be increased. The 
loser, however, being dissatisfied with its situation, constitutes a potential force of 
change. However as the loser it has had diminishing power within the system, so 
that it is less likely to be able to change the course of events and become an actual 
force of change. Changes in a zero-sum power situation can thus run unilinearly 
only, as cumulative additions to the gains of the winning party. More radical or 
"qualitative" changes rely on ad hoc factors beyond the zero-sum framework, for 
instance, a change of heart by the winner.
Using an implicit zero-sum framework, some analysts have discussed the 
possibility of the trend towards national disintegration in China. 10 While their
10See, for instance, Gerald Segal, China Changes Shape: Regionalism and Foreign Policy. Adelphi 
Paper 287 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994); Maria Hsia Chang, "China’s
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conclusions have varied as regards prospects of disintegration, such differences are 
more a matter of judgement regarding to what extent the forces of fragmentation in 
the provinces have overwhelmed the integrating forces of the Centre. Central- 
provincial relations in China are, therefore, seen as being trapped in a paradox of 
highly centralized control vis-a-vis fragmentation and disintegration. Either the 
system will continue on its path towards increasing fragmentation, to the point of 
dissolving the Chinese nation, or the Centre will choose to use its superior coercive 
power to crush the centrifugal forces once and for all. The system may then relapse 
into some former situation involving a high degree of centralized control. Changes 
beyond these two static poles are inconceivable in a zero-sum framework of 
central-provincial relations.
In reality, the power relationship between the Centre and the provinces is 
not a zero-sum game. It is not zero-sum because, contrary to the assumption of a 
zero-sum framework, power does not flow a single direction. As this study has 
shown, both the Centre and provinces are actors exerting influence over each other, 
and their relationship is interactive rather than simply top-down or bottom-up. This 
mutual influence has provided the necessary context for compromise. Despite the 
concern of the dissatisfied Centre for enhancing its control it must nevertheless use 
its superior organizational power with restraint. It has to be highly selective of the 
situations where it flexes its muscles over the provinces, since excessive use of 
coercion will bring a diminishing return of desirable results. Moreover, it may also 
be counterproductive in terms of its effects on the fulfillment of the task of 
governance. Any such overt show of force may thus adversely affect the political 
legitimacy of the regime in the long run. Similarly, there is a broad gap between 
dissatisfaction amongst the provinces over authority and resources and any move 
towards secessionist disintegration.
What has occurred in China since the early 1990s, therefore, indicates the 
emergence of a politics of compromise between the Centre and the provinces. As a 
result of the intense conflicts they have experienced, which have led some analysts 
to contemplate the possibility of China disintegrating, the Centre and the provinces 
have been forced, albeit gradually, to acknowledge that the best way to advance 
their respective interests is through institutionalization of their new relationship. 
Institutionalization provides a regularized avenue through which to arbitrate 
conflicts, and works in the interests of both parties. Institutionalization requires a
future: regionalism, federation, or disintegration", Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol.25, 
No.3 (September, 1992), pp. 211-27; Ellis Joffe, "Regionalism in China", Pacific Review, No.l, 
1994; and David Goodman, "The PLA and regionalism in Guangdong", Pacific Review, No.l, 1994.
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clearer delineation of jurisdiction and better observance of rules and regulations. 
This rezoning of authority assuages the Centre by preventing unruly provinces 
from chasing resources whilst shirking responsibilities. Specifically, the burden of 
the senior central leadership, which has become overloaded with the necessity of 
presiding over increasingly intense conflicts between provincial and central units, 
may thereby be ameliorated. For the provinces, institutionalization of their 
authority helps to ward off unwelcome, arbitrary, central intervention, as well as 
enabling them to keep safely the resources and authority they have already 
obtained. By reaching a compromise, the Centre and the provinces both stand to 
gain in a "positive-sum" relationship.
Wider Ramifications: Tentative Thoughts
It is likely, therefore, that the central-provincial interface will become the 
breakthrough point for a qualitative change in the political processes within the 
Chinese system. The core characteristic of the Chinese political system is its low 
level of institutionalization of power. The socialist revolution of 1949 substantially 
expanded the scope and the depth of state power, which Tang Tsou describes as 
"totalism",11 but the problem of low institutionalization has remained. To an extent 
this problem has been accentuated by the radicalism of the revolution, which sees 
institutionalization as an enemy to its continuing progress. The expansion of state 
activity has also made the low level of institutionalization more important in terms 
of its repercussions. During imperial times, the negative effects of low level of 
institutionalization within the state was temporized by the ethos of the mandarinate 
for a limited government, which ordained that the monarch should simply reign, 
but not rule, for the best governance of his people. This ethos has been completely 
reversed since 1949, if not before, as the government has had to lead the entire 
nation down to the grassroots level towards a new way of life. The confusion over 
power and responsibilities amongst the constituent parts of the state—a noted 
feature of low level institutionalization—has resulted in numerous conflicts 
between the different state actors upon embarkment of their new duties. Whilst the
11Tang Tsou uses the concept of "totalism" to describe the high degree of state penetration into the 
society in a political system. Unlike the concept of "totalitarianism", which assumes that a 
government which penetrates deeply into society is also "undemocratic", thus the usual term of 
"totalitarian dictatorship", Tsou's concept of "totalism" refers to the state-society relationship only. 
In other words, it is theoretically possible to have a totalist and yet democratic government, as well 
as totalist and dictatorial government Similarly, "liberalism", the opposite end of "totalism" can 
theoretically come with a democratic as well as a dictatorial political institution. For the most recent 
and comprehensive exposition of this concept of totalism and its use in the analysis of political 
systems, see Tang Tsou, Twentieth Century Chinese Politics: From the Perspectives of Macro- 
History and Micro-Mechanism Analysis (in Chinese) (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1994), 
pp.204-49.
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level of conflict was previously low during the imperial period, due to the low level 
of state activity, conflicts subsequently snowballed as the socialist state took over 
all the major activities within the society.
A number of analysts have elaborated the linkage between the low level of 
institutionalization of the political system and the difficulties of governance by the 
socialist government.12 They have rightly pointed out that in order for such 
difficulties in policy implementation and interest reconciliation to be resolved, a 
change towards a higher level of institutionalization is required. To move towards 
institutionalization requires all actors in the political system simultaneously to 
abandon the perception of political conflicts as necessarily constituting a "total 
victory, total failure" situation, and to adopt a new politics of compromise.13 The 
unanswered question is one of how this change, this "historical compromise" 
between the "warring" parties, may be effected.
This study has shown that such a change is likely to occur first of all at the 
central-provincial interface. This is possible because, fundamentally, the Centre 
and the provinces, though engaging in perpetual conflicts, are interdependent. The 
intensity of central-provincial conflicts forces both the central and provincial actors 
to search for new ways to handle their relationship, and thus to enhance further 
their respective interests. Their mutual indispensability and long-term co-existence 
require each to recognize the interests of the other and to seek compromise. 
Changes do not come, therefore, because some central leaders are simply wise 
enough to design a new relationship with the provinces. Rules and regulations, as 
the Centre and the provinces have gradually come to recognize, can protect one 
party whilst constraining the other, as long as both parties observe the rules. One's 
power first is to be delineated, and thus limited, in order that it can be protected 
from encroachment. As bargaining is rife only amongst near equals, 
institutionalization will be adopted only when the actors on both sides are seriously 
constrained by each other and are thus dissatisfied with the existing rules of the 
game. As a result of their experience in the 1980s, both sides see themselves as the
12See Zhao Suisheng, "The Feeble Political Capacity of a Strong One-Party Regime—An 
Institutional Approach Toward the Formulation and Implementation of Economic Policy in Post- 
Mao Mainland China", Issues and Studies, Parts I & H, Vol.26, Nos. 1-2 (1990), pp.47-80, 35-74; 
Michel Oksenberg, "The American Study of Modem China: Toward the Twenty-first Century", in 
David Shambaugh (ed.), American Studies of Contemporary China. (Armonk, New York: M. E, 
Sharpe, 1993), pp. 315-43; Jia Hao and Lin Zhimin (eds.), Changing Central-Local Relations in 
China (Colorado: Westview Press, 1994); Joseph Fewsmith, Dilemmas of Reforms in China 
(Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994).
13Tang Tsou, "The Tiananmen Tragedy: The State-Society Relationship, Choices, and Mechanisms 
in Historical Perspective", in Brantly Womack (ed.), Contemporary Chinese Politics in Political 
Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.319.
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loser and therefore vulnerable to the encroachment of the other. The Centre and the 
provinces are therefore best placed in the political system to see the dialectical 
utility of restricting one's power in order to restrict the power of the other, thus 
enhancing one's power as a result.
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Appendix
List of Interview Respondents
Respondent No. 
Guangdong 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 
9
10
11
12
13
Shanghai
14
15
16
17
18
Institution/Stream
Planning/Information
Academic/Policy Research
ditto
Statistics
Bank
Finance
Finance
Bank
Planning
Audit
Tax
Tax
Land
Planning
Bank
Academic
Statistics
Pudong Management 
Committee
Date and Place
(1) June 1991, Hong Kong
(2) May 1993, Guangzhou
(1) June 1991, Hong Kong
(2) May 1993, Guangzhou
June 1991, Hong Kong
(1) May 1993, Guangzhou
(2) August 1993, telephone
(3) Sep. 1993, Guangzhou
Sep. 1993, Guangzhou
(1) August 1993, telephone
(2) Sep. 1993, Guangzhou
(3) Feb. 1994, telephone
December 1993, Guangzhou 
December 1993, Guangzhou
(1) Sep. 1993, Guangzhou
(2) Sep. 1993, telephone
(3) Nov. 1993, telephone
(4) Dec. 1993, Guangzhou
(5) Feb. 1994, telephone
(6) April 1994, telephone
December 1993, Guangzhou
ditto
ditto
ditto
January 1994, Shanghai
ditto
ditto
ditto
ditto
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19
20 
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28 
28a 
28b
Beiiing ('Centre')
29
30
31
Academic
Finance
Finance
Planning
Planning
Policy Research
Former research official
Bank
Planning
Policy Research
Statistics
ditto
former finance official 
Planning
Planning (Investment)
32 ditto
33 Finance
34 Audit
35 Planning
36 Finance
37 Policy research
38 Planning
39 Academic
40 Research
(1) Nov. 1993, Hong Kong
(2) January 1994, Shanghai
January 1994
(1) January 1994, Shanghai
(2) May 1994, Shanghai
January 1994, Shanghai
May 1994, Shanghai
ditto
ditto
ditto
ditto
ditto
June 1994, telephone 
ditto
April 1994, Beijing
(1) April 1993, Beijing
(2) January 1994, Beijing
(1) November 1993, Beijing
(2) January 1994, Beijing
(3) February 1994, Beijing
February 1994, Beijing 
ditto
(1) March 1994, Beijing
(2) May 1994, Beijing
April 1994, Beijing
(1) April 1994, Beijing
(2) May 1994, Beijing
April 1994, Beijing 
May 1994, Beijing
(1) May 1994, Beijing
(2) June 1994, Beijing
May 1994, Beijing
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41 ditto ditto
42 Ministry of Justice/NPC (1) May 1994, Beijing
(2) August 1994, Beijing
43 Finance August 1994, Beijing
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